U.S. Support to French Operations in the Sahel

By Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Schroeder, U.S. Army

Introduction

As the U.S. enters its third year of supporting French operations in Mali, the security situation remains unstable due to delays in the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement by signatory armed groups (SAG). In northern Mali, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb through its affiliate Al-Murabitun continues to carry out attacks against soft targets throughout the Sahel region and collaborates with other terror groups including Ansar al Dine that are intent on spreading Sharia law and avoiding integration with the national government.  Other SAGs such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) are intent on gaining an independent homeland and representation in the government. The Algiers peace accords were designed to bring all stakeholders to the table to form an agreement on how to manage northern Mali, but it is largely stagnant due to differences among the groups.  What’s worse, those signatory armed groups are still cooperating with active terrorist groups to control supply routes in their territories.  

France and Culture

France has a long history in North Africa stemming from colonial and economic ties.  France previously governed Mali as part of its territory known as French Sudan dating back to the late 1800s. It established military outposts in remote parts of northern Mali and a robust cotton industry along the Niger River at Koulikoro.  Today, the French army has established new forward operating bases in the same locations, corresponding to the availability of water and proximity to overland trade routes that date back centuries.  After independence in the 1960s, France continued to shape economic and political policy in its former colonies through nefarious means with an unwritten policy termed “Francafrique.”  This included corrupt relationships with leaders and intervening in elections. This so-called “neocolonialism” continued until the administration of President Nicolas Sarkozy, who said he would put an end to the policy.

Former Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny coined the term “Francafrique” in the 1950’s as a way to characterize the privileged relationship between former French colonies and France. Over the subsequent decades, shadowy advisory units within the French government dedicated to maintaining influence over African dictators wielded power.  Under President Sarkozy, Francafrique remained stagnant or even degraded due to rhetoric in a speech given in Dakar that some found offensive. This period was also marked by a continuance of privileged relationships. President Hollande attempted to change this mindset by seeking African solutions to the security challenges. He noted that France’s intervention in Mali came at the request of the Economic Community of West African States.  The French government has worked to dismantle the secretive structures and insists that its days of covert meddling are over. However, France continues to wield more influence in Africa than anywhere else in the world.  

Mali is a resource-poor nation with an agriculture-based economy that relies on foreign donors to subsidize food imports.  Mali currently imports more than it exports, adding to the public debt and increasing its reliance on donors.  Its GDP of $29 billion is just 1% of France’s $2.9 trillion.  France receives 33% of its uranium for its extensive nuclear energy system from neighboring Niger.  In addition, it is securing the rights for oil exploration in Mali to fend off efforts by China, Russia and Brazil to make inroads in the market.  Finally, over 6,000 French citizens and representatives for many French industry giants like Total and Orange live and conduct business in the country.  

Militarily speaking, France is very much still present in West Africa. It has permanent security commitments in Gabon, Senegal, Djibouti and Ivory Coast as well as deployed troops in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Chad, Niger and the Gulf of Guinea.  Africa accounts for over 70% (or 7,000+ soldiers) of France’s total military deployments, including permanent bases and ongoing operations. Virtually all of France’s former colonies or possessions have some remaining French military presence. The U.S., on the other hand, has only one permanent base:  Headquarters for Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemoinier in Djibouti.  French forces on the continent also engage in security missions along with training and exercises with multiple host nation militaries.         

French military actions in Africa continued in places like Ivory Coast (Licorne) and Central African Republic (Sangaris) under the pretext of protection of French citizens and interests.  In Mali, Operation Serval successfully pushed Tuareg rebels away from Bamako back to their homelands in northern Mali.  Divisions among the Tuareg communities (who make up only 0.9% of the population), related to territorial disputes and representation in the Malian government, are the main causes of today’s problems.  These disputes combined, with an influx of outside Islamic extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb (AQIM), caused the UN Security Council to pass a resolution in 2013 establishing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).  While inter-communal Tuareg problems do not represent a direct threat to the U.S., stopping the spread of Islamic extremists in the Sahel region is one of U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) highest priorities on the continent. 

Lessons learned in Afghanistan point to the need for understanding the local culture, which includes ethnic group dynamics and socio-economic issues. Regarding Mali, there are essentially two categories of armed groups: self-defense and Islamic extremists. The latter are bent on spreading Sharia law and attacking Western interests, while the former push for independent territories or increased representation in the government. Given their colonial economic and military ties, the French are well-suited for operations in Mali.  

French military operations in Africa – speedy and audacious

At the beginning of Operation Serval, France committed to following a tactic mastered by Napoleon:  speedy and audacious movement to seize terrain. France deployed as its basic conventional unit a 200-man combined tactical subgroup (sous-groupement tactique interarmes, SGTIA) augmented with specialty platoons and airmobile assets or upgraded to a combined arms battalion task force (GTIA). These task-organized formations are decentralized, giving commanders more autonomy at the company level. These scalable echelons resulted in junior leaders acquiring combined arms combat leadership experience early in their careers.  Above all, they allow for rapid movement designed to overwhelm and surprise the enemy. 

Serval also represented a return to “deep operations in the air land battle” for France after years of asymmetric, non-linear operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.  Again, the SGTIA was well suited and tailorable to both types of operations. On the U.S. side, the Marine Corps’ Special-Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) under Marine Forces Africa (MARFORAF) has the mission to respond to crises around the continent including non-combatant evacuations (NEO). To shorten response times, the USMC could work with the French and other partners to pre-position assets closer to potential hotspots to prepare for more rapid response to mission requirements.  Also, the large geographic dimensions of North Africa require deliberate planning concerning close air support and resupply. The Marine Corps’ Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) brings more mobile capability to the fight similar to the French doctrine of employing smaller, more mobile forces.  Lastly, helicopter and drone ISR missions are critical in gaining information on trafficking routes and a “see over the next dune” tactical capability.  

Armed group tactics in remote areas and how to counter them

While northern Mali remains a haven for terrorist groups due to the lack of state control and porous borders, it is also an inhospitable desert environment where the search for water is the primary concern among nomadic inhabitants. Terrorist groups recognize this and try to control lifelines with the support of local militias or by commandeering trafficking routes.  AQIM is well resourced partly due to money obtained from ransoms, and can build a support system where supporting elements deliver food, water and weapons by SUVs to bases in northern Mali. French operations are focused on containment by cutting off the supply lines.  Some routes enter the ungoverned spaces of Algeria where the French do not have authority to operate. Pushing an armed terrorist group out of Mali creates a problem for another country and allows the group to gather resources and plan for attacks.  

Outsourcing military support

When Presidents Obama and Hollande wrote a joint article in the Washington Post they stated, “Transnational challenges cannot be met by any one nation alone.” This article and the resulting alliance between France and the U.S. in North Africa paved the way for a new style of cooperation. The U.S. essentially ceded leadership of operations in North Africa to France while making a commitment to provide logistical support. The war-weary U.S. was all too happy to spare boots on the ground in exchange for undertaking airlift missions. France outsourced support from other countries as well such as Spain, Germany, the UK and Canada. 

What sets this mode of operation apart is that the allied partners are essentially hired help with little input into French operations. While there is a coalition coordination center (CCC), the command is not set up as a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The French remain firmly in operational command and, given their historical ties and national interests, this is likely the most effective arrangement. The French have the unique ability to influence the actions of the Malian government either through economic concessions or political leverage. The fledgling Malian government stands to benefit by aligning itself with France through trade development and military support. France can also mobilize neighboring countries such as Niger and Chad – also former colonies – along with pro-government Tuareg groups like the MLNA. This useful multilateral and regional approach to security issues in Africa is where the U.S. faces challenges due to domestic policy restrictions, including the lack of authorities to provide direct assistance to regional organizations.

By outsourcing components of military operation France can cut costs to help mitigate a decade of budget cuts to the French military. From 1991-2001, the French government cut the defense budget by 18% as part of the “peace dividend” following the end of the Cold War. According to the CIA World Factbook, France now spends 1.9% of GDP on defense spending, less than half what the U.S. spends and down from the 3.4% in 1990.  Contributions from the U.S. typically are provided through Presidential Drawdown Authorities, essentially a grant of assistance provided “out of hide” from the U.S. armed forces directed by the U.S. President for a country in need of urgent military assistance. This temporary support not only covers aircraft and fuel but also allows for the support of liaison officers and soldiers. By agreeing to take on the major burden of leading operations in Northern Africa, France can put pressure on NATO donors for logistical contributions

Liaison support

As the first French “liaison officer” to the U.S., General Lafayette cemented U.S./French relations in the 18th century through his service in George Washington’s Continental Army.  Coming from a wealthy landowning family in France, Lafayette set out seeking glory and became enamored with the American cause. Captivated by General Washington, this teenager went on to lobby France for additional military support including ships and guns. Over 235 years later, the U.S. continues the tradition of mutual support with aircraft, fuel and people in support of French operations. This history of allied cooperation highlights the fact that like-minded nations can form effective coalitions in various formats in support of a common cause. At the national military level, the U.S. provides two liaison officers with one focused on bilateral U.S/French cooperation and one solely on Africa. The latter assists in the coordination of U.S. military support flights between Africa and France, as well as information exchanges. Liaisons serve the dual purpose of day-to-day coordination activities and as a symbolic token of support to a partner nation. While the tangible work is critical to the partnership, it is the intangible aspects of a shared history and common enemy that serve as the glue of the relationship.   

Can France maintain its efforts in North Africa?

With the French economy stagnating, youth unemployment on the rise, and a continuing refugee crisis, future French military commitments to Africa may be in doubt. France has commitments all over the African continent and may need to shift and prioritize its efforts.  This prioritization includes drawing down in CAR and focusing on Mali and Libya in the near term.  Long-term commitments to protect French citizens in Ivory Coast will also add to the drain on resources.  The U.S. will continue its supporting role to the French in Mali while most likely taking a leading role in other hotspots such as Somalia, Nigeria and Libya.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder is the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché to Zimbabwe and Malawi.  His previous FAO assignments included In-Country Training in Gaborone, Botswana, 2009-2010.  From 2012-2015, he was the Assistant Army Attaché in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  He then served from 2015-2017 as the South/East Branch Chief in the Security Cooperation Directorate at U.S. Army Africa, Vicenza, Italy.