Understanding Influence in Nigeria
By Major John W. Mahaney, U.S. Air Force
Editor's Note: Major Mahaney's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Overview
The U.S.-Nigerian relationship is characterized by cooperation that is possible because of shared economic and regional security goals. Since the transition from military rule to a democratically elected civilian government in 1999, the U.S. has continued to develop its relationship with Nigeria. This relationship has endured across Presidential administrations, and in 2018 President Buhari was the first Sub-Saharan African leader to be received by President Trump at the White House. Because of Nigeria’s economic weight in West Africa, this relationship presents an opportunity for the U.S. to partner with an emerging force for stability in the region. In addition to boasting the largest economy on the continent; Nigeria has the largest population in Africa, is a member of several international organizations, and hosts the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Through activities in the security and non-security sectors, the U.S. is pursuing a relationship with Nigeria as the keystone to a strategy of regional influence in West Africa and the continent.
Although the United States seeks to be Nigeria’s security “partner of choice” America’s security sector influence activities in the country are oriented toward building partnership capacity. This partnership with the Nigerian Armed Forces specifically targets building partnership capacity in the areas of counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to meet Nigeria’s immediate security needs.
Security is a priority for the Nigerian government because of the high threat posed by several regional and domestic militant groups. Regionally, most efforts are focused on countering Boko Haram, although the rise of the Islamic State – West African Province (ISWAP) has increased in recent years. Domestically, the increased intensity of farmer-herder violence in Nigeria’s middle belt, and the resurgence of militant groups in the Niger River delta threaten the country’s stability.
Although U.S. security cooperation has produced some limited success against Boko Haram, the security partnership between the United States and Nigeria is restrained by tensions that stem from allegations of human rights abuses. Allegations against the Nigerian security forces have included illegal detention, torture, sexual exploitation, extrajudicial killings, and a perceived impunity from prosecution. Because these issues are contrary to U.S. values and cooperation is constrained through policies such as “Leahy Law Vetting,” human rights have become one of the most prominent obstacles to closer cooperation with Nigeria.
The U.S. also maintains several aspects of soft power influence with Nigeria, sponsoring several initiatives to promote Nigerian business and education ties through a series of programs and fellowships. Also, U.S. companies are major source of investment and trade for Nigeria, reinforcing diplomatic links between the countries. Additionally, America boasts a large Nigerian diaspora who contribute to the Nigerian economy with remittances. Overall, the U.S. and Nigeria have several shared security objectives and economic and cultural ties which enable a productive relationship between the two countries.
U.S. Security Objectives and Shared Interests
The U.S. is interested countering Nigeria’s VEOs, but also in building the country’s capacity to become a regional provider of security in West Africa and the continent. Nigeria is equally interested in eliminating its domestic VEO threat but has an unclear position regarding aspirations to be a regional power.
This partnership is a crucial element for the U.S. National Security Strategy, which “seeks sovereign African states that are integrated into the world economy, able to provide for their citizens' needs, and capable of managing threats to peace and security.” Primarily, America seeks to form a partnership with Nigeria that can help advance U.S. interests in the region, primarily with U.S. assistance to Nigeria’s CT capacity. America is continuing to prioritize Nigeria as a recipient of security assistance to target threats such as Boko Haram and ISWAP. Additionally, U.S. efforts are part of an effort to become the security partner of choice.
When Ambassador Symington was confirmed in November of 2016, he stated that the U.S. partnership with Nigeria aims to see the country become “an anchor of stability” on the continent and an “outstanding role model for developing countries.” The U.S. Embassy in Abuja’s website echoes this sentiment as it highlights U.S.-Nigerian cooperation in regional peacekeeping as an example of a success in bilateral relations. For example, the U.S. recognizes the violence in the Lake Chad Basin as one of the top security concerns in West Africa, and relies on Nigeria’s leadership of the multi-national task force confronting the VEOs in the area. Through security cooperation and building partner capacity, the U.S. hopes to form a lasting relationship with Nigeria as a premier source of security and stability in Africa.
Nigeria has several domestic violent conflicts but addressing Boko Haram has become the top political priority. Currently, the International Crisis Group recognizes four main internal security threats to the Nigerian state. These threats include Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Northeast, the violent farmer-herder conflict in the Middle Belt, violence in the Niger River delta, and Igbo separatists in the Southeastern region. Among these crises, the combined insurgencies of Boko Haram and ISWAP have reportedly led to the deaths of 16,000 people and an estimated 2 million internally displaced people. Because these conflicts also threaten regional security, USAFRICOM has made “Supporting Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region” one of the six main objectives of the command’s campaign plan. Additionally, this helps meet the U.S. National Defense Strategy goal of confronting VEOs “by, with, and through” partner nations. However, Nigeria faces several internal security challenges that it must overcome before it can fulfill its role as an African leader in security. The U.S. is working to address these concerns by helping to increase the Nigerian Ministry of Defence’s capacity through institutional reform initiatives.
Finally, to address the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) shift to a focus on “inter-state strategic competition., American activities are working to maintain the U.S.’s status as the preferred security cooperation partner of choice with Nigeria. These efforts have led to an increase in investment for security assistance-related programs, such as international military education and training (IMET) programs. Nigeria remains a priority country for Security Assistance and over the past three years, it has been the largest or second largest receiver of IMET funding in Africa, and is projected to receive an additional $16 million in Train-and-Equip support in 2018 and 2019.
Nigeria shares the U.S. goal of countering VEOs within its own country, but the Nigerian Ministry of Defense stance on becoming a regional force for stability is unclear. This issue is so important that defeating Boko Haram was a cornerstone promise of current Nigerian President Muhammadu Bari’s 2019 campaign. The president even claimed that the group has been “defeated” under his watch.
Security Sector Influence Activities
U.S. Security Sector activities in Nigeria are rooted in the goal of defeating VEOs, but this effort is part of a much more diverse portfolio of activities that include programs to encourage regional cooperation, develop institutions, and promote public health initiatives. Since the rise of Boko Haram in 2010, the U.S. military relationship with Nigeria has become a greater priority for America. This transition saw the rise of Nigerian Security Sector Assistance from $5.2M in 2010 to $23.3M in 2012 and an increase in arms sales from $3.3M to $27M in the same period. Although this amount has recently decreased to $1.3M in 2017, Nigeria remains a priority.
The emphasis on America’s commitment to counter Boko Haram and other VEOs is evident in the FY18 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which has a section dedicated to the “STRATEGY TO IMPROVE DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY SECTOR FORCES IN NIGERIA.” This section prioritizes building partner capacity to fight VEOs and to respect human rights. Because of this guidance, U.S. military Security Assistance programs are generally oriented toward counterterrorism and human rights remain one of the biggest obstacles to the U.S.-Nigerian military relationship. However, through this relationship, Nigeria has also committed to helping the U.S. effort to counter narcotics trafficking, and piracy.
This relationship has led to several regional programs such as Nigeria’s role in facilitating the U.S. Navy’s African Partnership Station for Gulf of Guinea operations in 2007. Further, in 2018, the U.S. and Nigeria co-hosted the sixth annual African Land Forces Summit in Abuja, which welcomed forty senior military leaders from across the African continent. Also, Nigeria is a member of the State Department’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and shares a State Partnership Program with the California National Guard. Additionally, Nigeria received about $800K in international military education and training (IMET) in 2018 and 2019, and the U.S. is recognized as the top international provider of professional military education in the country. Finally, the DoD also partners with Nigeria through humanitarian health initiatives, such as the US Military HIV Research Program/ Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Nigeria (MHRP/WRAIR Nigeria). Through this organization, the DoD administers programs such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Presidential Malaria Initiative (PMI), and spearheads counter-Ebola efforts in the country.
As previously discussed, the greatest obstacle to a relationship between the U.S. and Nigerian military is the Nigerian Security Sector’s record of human rights abuses. These concerns have slowed or stopped several acquisition programs and remain a barrier to closer cooperation. Unfortunately, increased U.S. counter-VEO support and Security Assistance have seemed to correspond to an increased number of human rights abuses. In 2015, Amnesty International reported that the Nigerian military is estimated to have been responsible for the extrajudicial killings of more than 1,200 people since 2012 and the deaths of 7,400 people due to starvation and torture in military detainment since 2011. In addition to the alleged offenses, officials had the perception of impunity as the Nigerian government appeared unwilling or unable to prosecute alleged abusers.
The friction this trend created with U.S. policy-makers culminated in 2014 when President Obama cancelled the deal to sell Cobra attack helicopters to the Nigerian Air Force over such concerns. Three years later, a new deal to sell A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and weaponry to Nigeria was cancelled after a Nigerian jet struck an internally displaced person camp in early 2017. The A-29 program has recently been reinstated, but U.S. concerns over human rights abuses have continued. As a remedy, the U.S. has begun a partnership to help Nigeria improve its Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and air-to-ground integration capabilities. Through this effort, the U.S. hopes to “increase their [the Nigerian Air Force’s] effectiveness in line with international standards” and avoid civilian casualties.
The U.S. is investing in Nigeria’s security sector in hopes that a more secure Nigeria can bring about a more secure West Africa. These investments are focused on ways to build the capacity of Nigeria’s security forces and institutions to combat threats to its security from VEOs, trans-national criminal organizations, and pirates. Although neutralizing these threats promises a more stable region and a closer relationship with Africa’s largest economy, the U.S. still finds itself hindered by gaps in the professionalism of the Nigerian military and its consideration of human rights. As American efforts shift away from direct tactical assistance and focus on improving institutional capacity, U.S. policymakers hope they can have a lasting effect on the professionalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces.
Effectiveness and Nigerian Response
Although the U.S. has invested in Nigeria’s security sector primarily as a means of countering VEOs, these efforts have led to limited success in improving the overall condition of regional security. Boko Haram’s territory and manpower has decreased since renewed efforts to defeat the group in 2015, yet ISWAP’s rise continues to threaten regional security around the countries of Lake Chad and within Nigeria. Further, domestic crises such as the farmer-herder conflicts in the middle belt and violent groups in the Niger River delta are diverting Nigerian security resources away from greater regional concerns. In addition to threats from VEOs, the Nigerian Armed Forces are facing internal struggles such as endemic corruption and an unfavorable international reputation for respecting human rights. Despite U.S. Security Sector Assistance, Nigeria’s scant gains against Boko Haram have been overshadowed by an increase in security challenges and internal conflicts.
The International Crisis Group reported a significant degradation of Boko Haram’s presence, beginning with the Nigeria and Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) offensive against the group in 2015. This effort led to Boko Haram’s loss of their self-proclaimed capital of Gwoza and a retreat further northeast to the Lake Chad area and the Sambisa forest. The celebration for this success was short lived with the appearance of ISWAP in 2016. ISWAP initially formed as a splinter group to Boko Haram as part of a disagreement over the original group’s use of civilian targets. Led by Abu Musad al-Barnawi, ISWAP’s movement quickly gained momentum and in December of 2018. The group demonstrated its capability when it overran and seized the Nigerian military base in Baga on the shores of Lake Chad. The group also attacked a Nigerian base in the capital of Borno State on the day of the Nigerian presidential election. ISWAP has been more successful in rallying Nigerians to its cause and garnering civilian support than Boko Haram, the splinter group is estimated to count 3,500 fighters to Boko Haram’s 1,500. One of the theories behind ISWAP’s success has been the group’s ability to provide basic public services such as sanitation, security, and the facilitation of commerce which fill gaps left by the Nigerian government.
Although ISWAP’s success represents both a domestic and international security challenge for Nigeria, strictly domestic security issues such as the farmer-herder conflict in the middle belt and violence in the Niger River delta are also straining the security sector’s capacity. The International Crisis Group estimated that this conflict has cost Nigeria six times the deaths of the Boko Haram insurgency and displaced more than 300,000 people. Much like Nigeria’s problems with ISWAP, the farmer-herder conflict stems from a lack of opportunities and a perceived inability or unwillingness of the government to resolve the situation.
Additionally, Nigeria has seen a reemergence of violence in the Niger River delta, which is home to most of the country’s oil drilling operations and notorious for tense and violent protests. Violent groups were appeased in 2009 with an amnesty and stipend agreement for militant was reached by the federal government. The violence returned in 2015 when the Buhari administration intended to allow the stipends and amnesty to expire in 2015, as originally planned. An attack in 2016 reduced oil production and sent the Nigerian economy into a recession, leading to an extension of the amnesty and stipend deal by Buhari in mid-2017.
Finally, Nigeria’s security sector faces a dilemma of internal struggles as it deals with issues of corruption and a bleak human rights record. The Department of State noted in a 2017 report that factors such as the lack of coordination and cooperation between Nigerian security agencies, limited database use, and dysfunctional judicial system have all weakened an effective response to Boko Haram. This corruption included, especially under President Jonathan, serious allegations of complicity between the armed services and Boko Haram. For example, the infamous 2014 abduction of the schoolgirls in Chibok was preceded by a four-hour warning to the army that was never acted upon.
This corruption and dysfunction are accompanied by international concerns over human rights abuses, which has decreased U.S. security assistance to Nigeria and arguably improved ISWAP’s popular appeal. As previously mentioned, human rights concerned led to the U.S. curtailing major Foreign Military Sales agreements in both 2014 and 2017. Additionally, U.S. Security Sector Assistance decreased from $23.3M in 2012 to $1.3M in 2017, with an increase in assistance to other regional partners such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Unfortunately, these measures were largely regarded as punitive and not corrective by Nigeria, resulting in an increase in business with U.S. competitors (China and Russia) rather than reform. There is evidence that shows that the Nigerian military’s human rights abuses have increased since the beginning of the fight against Boko Haram. In addition to the previously mentioned numbers of alleged tortured detainees and extrajudicial killings, Nigeria has taken action to suppress the work of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For example, the government suspended operations by the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in December of 2018, later reversing this decision a month later due to international pressure. The Nigerian government has also threatened to suspend the work of Amnesty International.
Overall, Nigeria has not been able to effectively address regional security objectives in response to U.S. Security Sector influence. Despite short-term gains against Boko Haram, Nigeria now faces the emergence of ISWAP and increased domestic instability. Further, the Nigerian security sector has taken little action to address concerns of institutional corruption and human rights abuses. The Nigerian government will need to undergo institutional reform in the security sector to meet shared security objectives with the U.S. Also, the government will need to improve non-military efforts to ensure enduring stability in areas of violent conflict.
Influence Outside the Security Sector
The U.S. enjoys several elements of influence outside of Nigeria’s security interests that promote cooperation. Primarily, the two countries are linked by economic exchanges that provide a good source of income for Nigerian companies and access to an emerging market for American commerce. Additionally, Nigerians are attracted to American culture and the U.S. remains a very desirable location to visit for training events and vacations. Also, the Nigerian diaspora has a notable presence in the U.S. and adds to Nigeria’s annual reception of remittances.
One of the anchors of U.S.-Nigeria cooperation is a strong foundation of economic ties. In 2017, U.S. was Nigeria’s largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) at $5.8 Billion, an increase of more than 30% from the previous year. Nigeria is also eligible for preferential trade benefits per the African Growth and Opportunity Fund Act (AGOA), under which Nigeria enjoys tariff-free trade on most goods. Although most of Nigeria’s exports to the U.S. are in the petroleum sector, there were also some agricultural products in 2018 and a growing $2.9 Billion trade-in-services sector. Nigeria is the U.S.’s second largest destination of exports on the continent in 2017 at $2.2 Billion.
As of 2014. Nigeria ranks as the U.S.’s largest source of African immigrants with approximately 376,000 people of Nigerian birth and their children living in America. Further, in a 2014 study of 15 immigrant countries, Nigerians were found to be the most well-educated group, with more than 37% holding a bachelor’s degree (in contrast to only 20% of average Americans). Further, remittances from this diaspora were estimated in 2012 to be $6.1 Billion. This represents an approximate 29.6% of all remittances to Nigeria, which together composed 7.9% of the GDP.
Finally, the U.S. holds a tremendous amount of soft power as a preferred destination for travel and business. Several interviews indicated that U.S. personnel working in Nigeria noticed a desire to travel to America over other countries for training events and vacation. In one interview, the effect was described as Nigerians “falling in love” with America when they attend U.S. training events. The U.S. promotes this aspect of soft power through programs such as the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the Mandela Washington Fellowship, which introduces up and coming young Nigerians with U.S culture and schools.
Additionally, the Department of State has taken measures to recognize emerging business leaders in Nigeria, especially women leaders. In 2017, the State Department and Fortune Magazine honored Amal Hassan from Kano State as one of sixteen leaders worldwide to join the Women’s Mentoring Program. Through economic partnership, ties to the Nigerian diaspora, and the soft power of American culture, the U.S. has several elements of influence outside of the security sector.
Introduction to Domestic Levers of Power
In Nigeria, the nature of domestic power is both personalized and transactional. Domestic levers of power are personalized because the most influential actors are the elected executives; the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the thirty-six state governors. These elites wield the most political will in Nigeria. Additionally, domestic power in Nigeria is transactional, and economic incentives have been proven to inspire political action. Specifically, offers of international aid or increased oil wealth have resulted in policy changes.
The executives are the official source of political capital in the government and dominate influence in Nigeria’s political ecosystem. They are also the chief distributors of public goods, especially oil revenues. Because of this consolidated influence, the legislative and judiciary bodies act mainly as a check against executive power and are usually not the source of new initiatives or policy. The executive and legislative branches are both elected through a system that is becoming freer and fairer in the eyes of the international community. The military, though an important authority when forming security policy, are kept strictly under the authority of the Minister of Defence. In addition to Nigeria’s official government leadership, there is a class of elite who wield unofficial influence on elected politicians through patronage networks. These are the Nigerian “godfathers”, and they are instrumental to the success of individual politicians throughout the country. Ultimately, the success of any politicians or federal agencies is entirely dependent on the political support of the President, the governors, or the godfathers.
International actors have the most success offering foreign aid or threatening to cut off aid. Further, the Nigerian government’s reliance on oil revenues makes this sector a significant lever of power. Although Nigeria’s GDP is more diversified now than it was in the past, petroleum is still the federal government’s primary source of income. Because of this, oil revenues are the main origin of political patronage and fiercely protected by the Nigerian elite. The executives and godfathers distribute national wealth both oil revenue and foreign aid. Because of the importance of this income, foreign agendas can gain traction when they are tied to offers of more wealth. Influence in Nigeria is personalized in elites who control the transactional networks of resource distribution.
Horizontal Levers
a. Chief Executive. The office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria appears to be the most important lever for gaining and maintaining influence in the country. Presidents in Nigeria serve four-year terms and are chosen through popular elections, which are considered mostly free and fair. Unfortunately, irregularities in this system still exist and initial reports from election monitors allege that freedom and fairness in the 2019 Presidential vote took a step backward. Electoral irregularities, however, have not stopped the Nigerian President from maintaining a firm hand on economic, diplomatic, military, and domestic affairs.
The President is the foremost economic lever of power and has relatively unlimited discretion for budgetary decisions. Additionally, his office serves as the Chair of the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority, sometimes called the Excess Crude Account (ECA) or Sovereign Wealth Fund. This fund can be disbursed at the discretion of the chairman (The President) and was used to purchase the A-29 Super Tucano aircraft from the U.S. to bolster the Nigerian Air Force’s counter-VEO capacity. The President has so much discretion over this money that the opposition party (the PDP) is currently calling for more transparency. About half of the $1B from 2018 is unaccounted for, and the PDP is alleging that it was illegally spent on campaign activities. Additionally, the President directs economic policy and gave the final approval for Nigeria’s signature of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Initially, the President deferred signing in 2018 to make further consultation with business, labor, and government leaders. Buhari formally signed the agreement in 2019.
Diplomatically, the President plays a prominent role both in Nigeria’s regional and international relationships. In this capacity, the Nigerian president has chosen to support regional and international organizations, but only if the decision aligns with Nigerian interests. Most notably, President Buhari led ECOWAS mediation efforts in 2017 after President Jammeh of The Gambia refused to leave office after a defeat in the popular election. As “President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Federal Republic of Nigeria,” the President holds the authority to deploy the military. This authority has significance in the region, where personnel for United Nations (U.N.) and African Union (A.U.) peacekeeping missions are in high demand. After an agreement was not reached in the Gambian affair, President Buhari committed Nigerian forces to the ECOWAS initiative to restore democracy. Conversely, the President chose not to deploy peacekeepers in support of the A.U. mission in Somalia in 2011. Additionally, one of President Buhari’s predecessors, Olusegun Obasanjo, was criticized for an overall lack of support for peacekeeping operations by the United Nations.
b. Governors. Because of Nigeria’s federal organization, state governors operate with relative independence and wield a large amount of political influence. The constitutional court has ruled in favor of the states’ rights over federal rights on several occasions in the Fourth Republic, so the governors enjoy a degree of political autonomy. In addition to the independence inherent in Nigeria’s decentralized federal structure, statutory grants tied to oil production increase the wealth of the governors, especially governors of the oil-producing states. Nigerian governors play a significant role in the country’s domestic political calculus, and in 2013, a group of governors left a meeting of the dominant PDP to form the APC – which won the next Presidential election.
Because so much of the wealth and influence of the governors is tied to oil production, the governors will challenge the Federal Government, including the President, in matters concerning the petroleum industry or the Sovereign Wealth Fund. Under President Goodluck Jonathan, the governors of the South Region lobbied for an increase in their statutory grants. Using the argument of environmental degradation and economic underdevelopment, these governors were able to secure this increase as well as concessions for Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) militants.
c. Legislative/ Judicial. The legislative and judiciary branches of the Nigerian government are not known for exerting influence to enact their own initiatives, but function mostly as checks against executive power. Nigeria has a National Assembly organized similar to the United States legislature, with a Senate of 109 members and a House of Representatives of 360 members. The Opposition party maintains a credible presence and controls a respectable 45% of the Senate and 39% of the House of Representatives. Nigeria also has an independent judiciary, who play a prominent role in upholding constitutional integrity but is still accused of corruption and political interference.
One example of the National Assembly’s check against the President occurred when the Assembly blocked President Obasanjo’s 2007 attempt to change the constitution, which would have allowed him to run for a third term. This occurred despite a PDP majority (Obasanjo’s party) in the legislature. However, Obasanjo was still able to hand-pick a successor candidate from within the party, Umarau Yar’Adua. Also, despite a robust opposition presence, the National Assembly is still not completely independent from the President. There are allegations of coercion from the ruling party, such as August 2018, when the State Security Services (SSS) were accused of intimidating National Assembly members who had defected to the PDP. In this case, it is unclear who inspired the SSS to take such measures, because in response to this incident, the Vice President (who belongs to the ruling party) fired the SSS Director General.
Nigeria’s judiciary also represents a significant check against executive authority In early 2019, President Buhari dismissed Chief Justice Walter Onnoghen, just weeks before the scheduled election. Onnoghen was a vocal critic of President Buhari, and many considered this as a move to stifle a possible to challenge to an APC victory in the 2019 Presidential race. Therefore, although the President may wield the most political will, the National Assembly and Judiciary are an essential part of political calculation in Nigeria.
d. The Nigerian Armed Forces. Nigeria has spent more on its military than any other country in West Africa at $1.9B, about 0.41% of the GDP (2019). However, the military has been mostly absent from the main political decision-making process since the transition to civilian rule in 1999. The Nigerian Armed Forces fall under the Federal Ministry of Defence and are overseen by a civilian minister. Although the Minister of Defence is the President’s main advisor on security matters, interviews with U.S. personnel familiar with the Nigerian security sector indicated that high-ranking military officers are still an integral part of forming and implementing security policy. However, high-ranking officers also tend to move positions frequently, and are subject to “coup-proofing”, “power-balancing”, and other tools of the Nigerian political structure.
Regarding international security partnerships, there is a perception that the Nigerian Armed Forces prefer equipment from international partners over training. Additionally, when procuring equipment, the ministry prefers to work directly with manufacturers instead of partnering with other governments. Further, the Nigerian Armed Forces have shown a desire to acquire second-hand military equipment. Despite this institutional preference for equipment over training, it is widely believed within the Nigerian Armed Forces that American training is important for advancement and promotion. The U.S. is Nigeria’s main foreign military training partner.
e. Government Administration. Government agencies can act as domestic levers of power in Nigeria, though they rely almost exclusively on the office of the President for authority and political capital. However, because of the transactional nature of Nigerian power, these agencies can be used as the mechanism for implementing the agendas of international actors in return for foreign aid, financing, investment, etc.
Although organizational influence waxes and wanes with political support, the agencies that the President chooses are often related to improving Nigeria’s international image in exchange for financial incentives. For example, the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking-in-Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration (NAFDAC) received substantial support under the Obasanjo administration. Both agencies were able to make considerable gains in the areas of human traffickers and counterfeit drug producers respectively. These gains served as a part of a greater Presidential effort to woo international donors to Nigeria. Similarly, the Economic and Finance Crimes Committee (EFCC) has had intermittent success in an ongoing struggle to improve Nigeria’s reputation for corruption by prosecuting various government employees and elected officials.
Between 2006 and 2007, NAFDAC transformed from a relatively weak organization to being considered the most effective government agencies in the country. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals had become such a problem that many West African countries had banned any drugs from Nigeria beginning in 2001. After President Obasanjo appointed a new director and charged her with cleaning up this problem, the number of counterfeit medicines in Nigeria decreased from an estimated 41% of all drugs to 16.7%. Additionally, the reinvigorated agency secured 45 convictions with another 60 pending cases. Similarly, NAPTIP received increased support in the form of a renewed mandate in late 2005. This agency went on to rescue more than 3,500 victims and secure 57 convictions between 2006 and 2009. This was more convictions for human trafficking than occurred in all African countries combined from 2003 to 2008 and moved Nigeria up from a “Tier Two” to a “Tier One” country in the Department of State’s “Trafficking in Person’s Report." President Obasanjo’s support for both of these agencies is usually tied to a desire to improve Nigeria’s international reputation, and specifically in 2006 to secure a debt repayment and relief deal from the ‘Paris Club’, which he did. Nigeria’s international image also suffers from allegations of endemic corruption, and has consistently ranked at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
The EFCC is Nigeria’s main agency for combating this corruption, and increased support resulted in increased investigations and convictions from 2010 – 2013. Despite this apparent increase in anti-corruption activity, however, Nigeria’s CPI ranking has not changed significantly and accounts suggest that the agency is unable to pursue certain corrupt officials who are politically connected. Although this period of support is not linked to a particular international financial incentive, it further illustrates that the Nigerian government selectively chooses agencies to be effective.
These are three examples of Nigerian agencies that furthered the agendas of international actors. These agencies were empowered by the President, who was in turn seeking financial concessions. Despite the usual need for Presidential support, other Nigerian government agencies can act as levers of power with relative independence to achieve individual goals. However, this empowerment appears to occur only when these organizations are already bringing in financial incentives from abroad. The Ministry of Petroleum and the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) are two such examples of this phenomenon These organizations steadily wield influence within the government, though still not independent from the President, and will be discussed later in the “Petroleum Sector” section.
Vertical/Diagonal Levers
a. “Godfathers”. The Nigerian political economy is strongly influenced by a class of elites known as “godfathers.” Most godfathers do not run for political office themselves, but elected officials will often seek financial and political sponsorship of the godfathers. These godfathers are the unofficial directors of the country’s patronage networks and are therefore able to wield significant influence. Several elected Nigerians have admitted that godfather sponsorship is essential to a successful campaign. The influence of these individual not only comes in the form of money and the ability to mobilize local populations but is alleged to also stem from the ability to use coercive violence.
Some scholars argue that godfathers, although they direct significant resources, are often unable to hold office because of possible illegal/extralegal activities. Therefore, the nature of the relationship of a godfather and client is less of a mentorship and more of a “rule by proxy.” In this way, Nigerian politicians at all levels are susceptible to godfather influence. Because godfathers exist in the unofficial patronage system of Nigerian politics, it is difficult to attribute specific instances of their intervention. However, Chief Lamidi Adedibu is one such godfather who is accused of mobilizing gang violence in Ibadan state to influence elections. He allegedly used his influence during the 2007 election to suppress opposition and coerce voters in support of Christopher Alao-Akala’s successful gubernatorial campaign. Additionally, there is some speculation that godfathers were involved not only in enabling certain violent groups in the Niger River Delta, but also in negotiating the terms to end the violence. Godfathers exert influence outside the Nigerian legal system and employ methods contrary to international standards of human rights. However, it is important to note that many Nigerian elected officials owe their success to godfather sponsorship and are highly subject to their influence.
b. Elections/ Political Parties. Since the victory of an opposition presidential candidate in 2015, Nigeria’s political parties have gained more influence within the democracy. Political parties choose candidates for national assembly members, state assembly members, governors, and the President. Elections and political parties are administered by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which has been criticized for being too closely influenced by the ruling party. Despite increasing optimism for Nigeria’s democratic processes, violence and accusations of corruption continue to be a problem.
Nigeria is true a multi-party electoral democracy, and as of December 2018, INEC counted sixty-eight registered political parties. Of these sixty-eight parties the ruling APC and opposition PDP are the largest and most influential. National assembly, gubernatorial, state assembly, and presidential elections occur every four years. Both of the main parties operate independently from their candidates, hold primary elections for candidates, and have an independent governing body headed by a chairperson.
Until 2015, Nigerian elections were not widely considered free and fair, and the PDP established a nominal single-party rule. The PDP lost its long-time grip on power with the APC’s victory in 2015, but international observers have still reported irregularities. In addition to voter coercion, enduring and election-related violence has been a consistent concern during elections. It is estimated that 800 deaths could be attributed to the 2011 elections with another 65,000 internally displaced persons. According to Nigerian election rules, voters must register and vote in the state of their residency, which is very difficult to change. Because of this, internally displaced people due to domestic conflicts present a serious logistical challenge for elections. INEC addressed alternative ways for displaced people to vote in 2019, but this challenge remains a concern for international observers. Observed violence in 2015 was lower than 2011, but the concern of internally displaced people remains.
c. The Petroleum Sector. Although Nigeria’s economy has the reputation of being dependent on oil and gas production, a rebasing of its economy in 2013 revealed that this industry actually makes up a smaller part of the country’s GDP than previously thought. Despite this, the Nigerian Federal Government still relies on the oil and gas sector for 57% of its revenue. Oil production is notoriously decentralized, and is comprised of several state-owned, parastatal, private, and international stakeholders. However, the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) is mandated with overseeing this sector. In addition to the MPR, influence in the oil production is also held by both the NNPC, various International Oil Companies (IOCs), and leaders in the oil-producing areas (especially governors and godfathers). The Federal government will react to protect oil extraction because of reliance on petroleum revenues for the national budget and sovereign wealth fund. For example, after renewed attacks on oil pipelines in 2016 sent Nigeria’s economy into recession, President Buhari secured peace by renewing amnesty and annual stipends for Niger Delta militants.
The Minister of Petroleum is appointed by the President and leads the MPR. He is appointed to oversee the whole sector and serves as chairman of the NNPC. Additionally, the MPR includes the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), which was created as a semi-independent agency to enforce regulations on the industry. However, the DPR is under-funded, and the Minister and NNPC maintain the most influence. Further, IOCs are able to influence the oil sector through their relationships with the MPR and local leaders. IOCs, both private and state-owned, mainly use their influence to maximize their profits through adjusting their oil rents, avoiding taxes, and manipulating the wording of the Petroleum Industries Bill.
d. Violent Extremist Groups. VEOs pose the greatest domestic threat to the Nigerian Federal Government and acted as levers of power in two instances. First, the resources and attention of the Nigerian Armed Forces have been almost entirely dominated by Boko Haram and other VEOs in the North for almost a decade. Second, insurgencies in the Niger Delta region have been able to extort financial and political concessions from the government through violence and sabotage on oil infrastructure.
Nigeria’s battle with Boko Haram and the ISWAP have placed heavy demands on the country’s security sector, shaping the focus of Nigeria’s regional policies. Sharia law is constitutionally allowed in Nigeria, so these movements can best be described as separatist. In the case of Boko Haram, the fighting has diverted military resources from regional commitments to confront the fighters. When fighting this group in 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan withdrew Nigerian peacekeepers from the U.N. mission in Mali “because of the domestic situation in Nigeria.” Therefore, the campaign against Boko Haram caused Nigeria to forego U.N. and A.U. commitments to address this internal threat. Later, ISWAP emerged as a credible threat to internal security. In December 2018, ISWAP overran two Multi-National Joint Task Force bases in Baga. Additionally, ISWAP has begun challenging state legitimacy in the Lake Chad region by enabling economic prosperity in the area. The group has been collecting taxes and protecting local fishermen, farmers, and markets. Although neither of these groups have achieved their stated political objectives of establishing a caliphate in the Sahel, they have successfully shaped Nigeria’s regional security policy.
President Buhari’s move to renew stipends and amnesty for militants in the Niger Delta in 2016 was a direct response to threats on the petroleum industry. This militant group, named the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), took roots from the original MEND insurgency who had secured the government concessions. This movement began in 2005 when the Nigerian government relied on oil production for nearly 80% of its revenue. It is estimated that MEND’s sabotage in 2008 lost the federal government $23.7B in revenue. In 2009, MEND was able to secure their stipends under the auspices of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) peace agreement. Similarly, as previously discussed, in 2016 the President renewed these terms with the NDA and increased the payment amounts. Through this violent extortion of oil production, and allegedly with the help of local godfathers, the Niger Delta militant groups have been able to force the federal government into peace stipends.
Policy Recommendations
a. Invest in personal relationships and understand patronage networks. The President is the premier domestic lever of power; therefore it is important to maintain strong diplomatic relationships with him and his top tier ministers. Nigeria’s political landscape is also dominated by complex patronage networks, and it is necessary to understand who controls which territory. The U.S. should work primarily to cultivate relationships with as many governors as possible, prioritizing governors who control territories with U.S. interests, such as the governor of the wealthy Rivers State. Because the godfathers represent a class of elites whose values may not align with America, the U.S. should work to understand as many patron – client relationships as possible but should use caution when developing relationships with the godfathers. Additionally, because the godfathers represent the unofficial patronage networks of Nigeria, perceived ties to godfathers may threaten the legitimacy of the official federal government. For maximum influence, the U.S. must have as strong an understanding as possible of patronage networks and use this knowledge to cultivate and maintain strong, personal diplomatic relationships.
b. Encourage more efficient foreign military sales practices, continue IMET efforts, continue urging human rights reform. Although the U.S. is recognized as a leader in military training and education, the U.S. must improve its ability to deliver military equipment to become Nigeria’s security “partner of choice”. However, the U.S. lags behind other countries in Nigeria’s defense procurement market. According to Janes IHS, the U.S. is tied for third place in “Existing market access rating” with Italy. In this category, the U.S. is ahead of five other defense partners, but behind Russia in the second spot and China ranked first.
Similarly, in the category of “Government-to-Government relations score – military and security,” the U.S. is tied for third place with three other countries, but behind Israel and China in the second spot and the United Kingdom in first. The extended amount of waiting time for U.S. equipment was observed by several American security professionals as the Nigerians’ major complaint with the U.S. Among the services, the Nigerian Army holds the largest part of the security budget, followed by the Air Force, then the Navy. All three of the services had major procurement programs in 2019, and the national defense budget is forecasted to grow to $1.91B by 2023. The U.S. should look to capitalize on some of Nigeria’s future military procurement priorities.
In addition to pursuing a more efficient foreign military sales program, the U.S. should reinforce its soft power influence through training and continue to press for human rights reform. The U.S. is the leader in military training and Nigerian military officers view American training as positive step toward promotion, America should continue to maintain this reputation. Further, the U.S. should continue to work with Nigeria to improve human rights, as this issue will continue to present a barrier in future cooperation efforts.
c. Leverage U.S. business ties to the Nigerian private industry. In addition to big oil companies who operate in Nigeria, such as Exxon Mobil and Chevron, the U.S. should create as many business ties up and down the Nigerian petroleum industry’s value chain as possible. For example, Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dagnote’s latest construction project, a Nigerian oil refinery, presents an opportunity for possible U.S. involvement, such as with construction firms. Because oil revenues fuel the official and unofficial patronage networks, establishing and maintaining influence in this sector will create leverage for the U.S.
In addition to the oil industry, the U.S. should seek to partner with other sectors of Nigeria’s economy that could benefit from American expertise. An example of this is the Nigerian film industry, sometimes known as “Nollywood.” The industry was estimated to gross $7.2B in 2016, boasting over 1 million direct or indirect employees, and produces more movies annually than Hollywood. Nollywood has already entered into deals with American streaming service Netflix and French media company Canal+ for content and is expected to grow in popularity. The U.S. should search for growing, non-oil areas to partner with Nigerian businesses and expand soft power influence.
d. Use economic incentives (aid, financing) to motivate policy decisions. As evidenced by the hasty transformation of the government agencies NAFDAC and NAPTIP from ineffective to successful and efficient organizations, foreign aid can be leveraged for political action in Nigeria. As mentioned, power in Nigeria has a transactional nature that is evident in the significance of the country’s patronage networks. The U.S. might be able to use economic leverage to “buy” political decisions in America’s favor with aid or debt relief. This approach compliments the first recommendation of understanding patronage networks, which can guide U.S. policy makers to understand which kind of incentive to offer and which kinds of actions are possible.