Trans-Atlantic Security Issue: Russian Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine

By Mr. Rui Duarte

(Image: Department of Defense DVIDS courtesy photo by Michael Peterson)

Editor's Note: Mr. Duarte's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the College of Naval Command and Staff, U.S. Naval War College. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College.

Scenario: The Day After Russia Detonates a Tactical Nuke

Russia has detonated a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Current diplomatic and economic efforts have failed to prevent nuclear use by Vladimir Putin and his government. How does the US military respond and prevent subsequent uses in Ukraine? In such a scenario, the Department of Defense (DoD) must advocate for aggressive actions to counter additional nuclear events in Ukraine. There are several policy choices to consider under this framework. Course of Action (CAO) 1 includes a conventional military response involving kinetic strikes, offensive cyber and space operations, and stationing US troops in Ukraine in a worst-case/second-use situation. COA 2 involves nuclear posturing on one end and employment of a US tactical nuke on the other end of the spectrum. Even in a nuclear scenario, some critics will argue that the US does not need to intervene militarily in Ukraine and the DoD should pursue COA 3: supply more weapons to Ukraine. The challenge for DoD leaders is determining which option will best prevent Putin from employing more tactical nukes.

The Cost/Benefit Analysis for Russia

The appropriate policy choice will make clear that the costs of using nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits of continuing to use such weapons. The US is well aware of the Russian Cold War doctrine of "escalate to de-escalate," whereby Russia will threaten or use a nuclear weapon so they can "de-escalate" the situation on Russian terms.[i] From the US perspective, there is no logical benefit for Russia to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. There is a plethora of issues working against Putin, from the Russian military’s inability to fight on a nuclear battlefield, the lack of suitable military targets, and the questionable effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons.[ii] If a nation crosses the nuclear threshold, US military leaders understand that they are in a difficult environment to account for all the various risks. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis pondered this nuclear scenario during another war gaming exercise during the Trump presidency. General Joseph Dunford, the Joint Chief of Staff Chairman, summarized it best when he stated that it did not matter whether the US thought they could control nuclear war but whether the Russians thought they could.[iii] Therefore, Putin's perspective is vital in viewing the costs of a limited nuclear war.

According to Putin’s worldview, Ukraine is an opportunity to achieve his grandiose vision for Russia. Putin does not hide his goal of re-establishing the Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, similar to that of the Soviet Union era. In a ceremony following the annexation of four Ukrainian provinces, Putin declared that Russia was fighting the West to preserve a tremendous thousand-year-old civilization with a common culture, traditions, and religions. The speech went on to assert that Ukraine as a country is a relatively new concept and does not supersede Russian claims going as far back as the Ancient Rus era.[iv] Putin's Russia is the Soviet Union by another name and Ukraine is its subjugated province. This outlook is unsurprising to Ukrainians and why they fought so hard to secure security agreements from the West after the Cold War when Soviet nuclear weapons were on Ukrainian soil. Despite their efforts, the eventual Budapest Memorandum (1994) failed to secure any lasting guarantees. The first Ukraine president, Leonid Kravchuk, commented on the reality, "If tomorrow Russia goes into Crimea, no one will even raise an eyebrow.”[v] This eerie prediction was close to the reality for Crimea twenty years later.

Putin would view a cautious US response to Russian tactical nukes as a weakness given the lack of geopolitical costs for the Crimean invasion. When Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, the US answered with "mild" economic sanctions.[vi] When Putin funded an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine several months later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seemed uninterested in helping Ukraine with either arms or troops.[vii] To Putin, such a weak international response to Crimea was a rousing success for Russia with few noticeable costs. As a result, Putin expected this non-confrontational stance by the US and Europe would continue. Ukrainian forces proved no match militarily for Russia and the ease of the Crimean operation and the early fighting in the Donbas led Putin to believe that Ukraine was a weak state with an inept military. [viii] Crimea led to assumptions that Ukraine itself could be taken quickly without much cost. Indeed Putin claimed Russia could conquer Kiev through conventional means within a few weeks as far back as 2014.[ix] These assumptions would likely persist in a nuclear scenario in Ukraine. Putin would still believe the US would back down and international support for Ukraine would eventually dissipate. To Putin, Crimea became the rule rather than the exception as far as the West’s response. Therefore, to convince Putin otherwise, the US needs aggressive military options to cause Putin to re-evaluate his assumptions regarding tactical nuclear war. One such option is a conventional military approach.

Course of Action (COA) 1: The Conventional Response

The first option to counter Russia is a conventional attack against military targets. In a simulated war game during President Obama’s presidency, such a nuclear scenario involving Russia was played out with the National Security Counsel. The Deputies Committee recommended a conventional response mixed with diplomatic efforts to isolate and weaken the Putin regime in response to a hypnotical nuclear attack on the Baltic States. The thinking went that if a nation responded to a nuclear strike with its own nuclear attack, all political advantage gained from Russia breaking the nuclear taboo would be lost.[x] Under the proposed conventional approach, US forces could strike Russian military forces directly involved in the tactical nuclear strike or strategic military targets such as the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.[xi] With such a response, there would be clear and immediate action for using nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The military response would also stretch into other military domains to increase the punishments on Russia.

To disrupt Russian communications and supply chains, a conventional military response would stretch across multiple domains, including cyber and space capabilities. Both cyber and space domains have immediate impacts with wide-ranging repercussions, such as degrading key nodes of civilian infrastructure or transportation.[xii] The space domain specifically could impact satellite communications and the sensor-to-shooter kill chain (ie, targeting).[xiii] All these effects could reasonably distress the Russian supply chain to the Ukrainian front lines and reduce Russian military capabilities. In an ideal situation, space and cyber capabilities could delay Russia's ability to employ another tactical nuke and introduce unexpected costs to the Russian military and economy. However, no plan is fool-proof and the US needs to devise a backup plan in case these conventional measures are not enough.

If the initial conventional measures fail and Putin were to violate the nuclear threshold once again, the US should introduce US troops into Ukraine. Experts have surmised that if Putin used a tactical nuclear weapon to freeze the conflict and preserve military gains, it would take several of these tactical weapons to achieve the objective.[xiv] If conventional strikes or cyber/space operations were not enough to dissuade Putin, possible confrontations between Russian and US troops might be necessary to prevent a subsequent tactical nuclear attacks. Though the risks sound unreasonable, if the US were to chance striking Russian military targets, stationing US troops in Ukraine would not be such a leap in escalation. US troops in Ukraine would increase the risk calculus for Putin and visibly reinforce American long-term commitment to the conflict. As the former Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski once said in 2010, “Everyone agrees that countries that have US soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.”[xv] Although the conventional option provides a robust DoD response with several options, it will have its critics.

The primary objection to the conventional plan will be stationing US troops in Ukraine with an unknown timeline. Critics will ask how long US troops will be committed to Ukraine and the exact mission for the DoD? This approach would violate the Weinberger Doctrine, which calls for defined military objectives and an outcome the military can clearly “win.”[xvi] Will this situation be reminiscent of the quagmire in Afghanistan or, worse, Lebanon? Though US public support for Ukraine is currently high, US domestic support cannot be counted on long-term. Opinion polls in late 2022 are beginning to show declining support for the vast financial commitment to the ongoing conflict.[xvii] As a result, DoD leadership needs to contemplate the impacts of such an open-ended commitment to Ukraine under this conventional response.

From the nuclear deterrence perspective, conventional approaches may, in fact, weaken the overall national security picture. During the Obama war game, the Principals committee advocated a nuclear strike against Belarus, a Russian ally, to signal American resolve and commitment to NATO.[xviii] The Baltic states are under an extended nuclear umbrella, whereby the US has the right to respond with nuclear weapons.[xix] Ukraine is not in NATO, and the US does not need to meet Russian attacks with all available means. Nevertheless, such hesitation could signal that the US nuclear deterrence posture depends on American self-interest vice upholding the international order. Likewise, a non-nuclear response could embolden Putin and strengthen his assumptions regarding the West’s resolve. Realistically, a strategic nuclear response against Russia or its allies would be a non-starter for the Biden administration, given that the proponents of the conventional response during the Obama war game are currently serving key roles in Biden administration, including Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence.[xx] So what is a realistic nuclear option?

COA 2: The Nuclear Option

A second option involves US tactical nuclear weapons. On the lower end of the escalation scale, the US could pursue military posturing by forward deploying tactical nukes closer to the Russian border, even stationing them in Ukraine. NATO cannot deploy nuclear weapons to new members after the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997).[xxi] However, Ukraine is not a part of NATO and does not fall under such restrictions, so the US could position its tactical nukes in Ukraine. This action would visibly reinforce American commitment and meet Russian tactical employment with the threat of a similar US response. Unfortunately, this tactic might be of limited utility given that Russia has a ten-to-one advantage in tactical nuclear weapons according to open-source figures (2,000 vs. 200 tactical nukes for US/NATO). [xxii] Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) does not regulate tactical nukes nor any current arms control agreements, which Russia has exploited to its advantage.[xxiii]

On the highest end of the escalation scale, the US could use a tactical nuclear weapon to respond to a second Russian tactical nuke. In early Cold War planning, the US would use tactical nukes to slow down a conventional Russian invasion in Eastern Europe.[xxiv] Today, the roles are reversed, and Russia is looking to use tactical nukes to slow a conventional US/NATO response.[xxv] Despite the role reversal, the US views tactical nukes as an outdated weapons system. According to US Air Force General John Hyten, the former US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commander responsible for the DoD nuclear mission, tactical nuclear weapons is a misnomer, and there is essentially no difference between a tactical nuclear weapon and a strategic one in terms of danger. If an enemy were to employ a nuclear weapon against the US, the US should respond with strategic weapons.[xxvi] Despite Hyten’s perspective, it is unlikely the Biden administration would pursue such a heavy-handed approach. Per the 2022 Nuclear Product Review, the US objective is to "seek the lowest damage possible" for the best outcome for the US and its Allies.[xxvii] A tactical weapon with its lower yield might be a compromise for US military leaders looking to balance an overt response to Russian actions with potential escalatory consequences.

Like COA 1, the tactical nuclear option has several risks. For one, any tactical nuclear strike will have long-lasting radioactivity associated with its employment. Even a nuclear yield equal to one percent of the Hiroshima bomb would create radioactive debris leading to "intense and deadly fallout.[xxviii] Given the impact, how would planners pick a suitable military target? Locations inside Ukraine may be off the table in addition to targets near NATO territories since this fallout could spread through the weather. Targets inside Russia could quickly escalate up the nuclear ladder. In contrast, strikes on Russian allies, such as Belarus, could punish countries not associated with the fighting while doing little to dissuade the Putin regime.

In addition, the US risks dividing NATO allies by employing a tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield. Per NATO's own 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO “does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russian Federation.”[xxix] A tactical nuke would go against this proclamation. Least of all, previous versions of NATO's strategic concept included a vision of a "nuclear weapons-free world," with domestic audiences within Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium having strong anti-nuclear views.[xxx] Consequently, employing tactical nukes may divide NATO members and dampen diplomatic pressure on Russia. Critics of an aggressive approach will focus on these diplomatic avenues and recommend a third option for the DoD: a logistical support role.

COA 3: The Logistical Approach

Some critics will argue against any aggressive military actions by the DoD, advocating instead for a logistical role. In 2022 alone, the US provided over $45 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian support, dwarfing all other foreign aid.[xxxi] The US should continue on this path and increase supplies to Ukraine, including previously denied equipment, such as modern battle tanks and longer-range missile systems.[xxxii] Ukraine has successfully prevented Putin from achieving his objectives so far, and the Ukrainians can continue this fight with the right supplies. Ukrainian President Zelensky echoed this sentiment and Winston Churchill by going before the US Congress and saying, “Give us the tools and we will finish the job.”[xxxiii] Nuclear war will quickly escalate out of control, so the logistical approach may be the pragmatic answer to minimizing nuclear risk. The indirect DoD role allows for greater flexibility in the diplomatic arena, encouraging harsher sanctions and a broader coalition against Russia. China and India have yet to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine despite a recent joint statement from a "majority" of the G-20 to condemn Russian rhetoric related to nuclear warfare in November 2022.[xxxiv] A logistical approach may open diplomatic inroads to these important world players and affect the strength of additional sanctions.

Despite these advantages, the logistical approach is overly cautious and may not prevent Putin from employing more nuclear weapons, leading to a greater humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. Putin has a history of endorsing tactical nuclear weapons as far back as his time in the Kremlin Security Council under President Yeltsin.[xxxv] If Putin were desperate enough to use nuclear weapons once, he would continue to use them to achieve his objectives. Russia, with no restraints, can quickly go from targeting Ukrainian military units to Ukrainian population centers. The US cannot take a hands-off approach in a nuclear scenario since nuclear weapons will eventually pull the US into conflict. As noted in an editorial by former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the lessons of the 20^th century and world wars are clear: if one nation is allowed to violate the international order unchecked, the US own security will be in danger and be forced to respond.[xxxvi] If Putin uses nukes, the US and its allies would need to respond militarily, given the threat to the post-World War II international order and US national security interests. Better to take immediate, aggressive military action to quell this danger vice allowing it to grow to a larger existential threat impacting all of Europe.

Recommendation

Given the three previous COAs, COA 1 provides the best response to meet a Russian tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine. This option visibly costs Putin and his military forces while also signaling long-term American commitment to allies in the region. A nuclear nation cannot simply impose its will on a non-nuclear nation. If such a situation were allowed to stand, nothing would prevent other nations from following suit, such as North Korea. If the DoD were to pursue COA 2, the US would risk normalizing tactical nukes and chipping away at the nuclear deterrence strategy. COA 3 delays the eventual US involvement and allows Russia time to commit untold atrocities before US action. It is worthwhile to remember Senator John McCain's predictions following Russia’s invasion of Crimea. During a 2014 BBC interview, McCain predicted that Russia would invade Eastern Ukraine and attempt to form a land bridge to Crimea because the US and Europe were unwilling to stand up to Putin. Putin viewed caution as weakness.[xxxvii] Given the Crimea experience, the US needs to stand up to Putin's actions since inaction would be far worse for the US and the international order. A world without an aggressive US response would be one where anyone with a nuclear weapon could blackmail the globe.

About the Author

Mr. Duarte got his Bachelor's Degree in History from Rutgers University (NJ) and a Master's Degree in International Relations from Boston University (MA). He was commissioned as an officer through the United States Air Force (USAF) Officer Training School in Montgomery, Alabama in 2009. After seven years of active-duty USAF service, he transitioned to the USAF Reserves in 2017. He is currently serving as an analyst at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and resides in Washington DC.

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[i] Brookes, Peter. “Russia’s Small Nukes Are a Big Problem for European Security | The Heritage Foundation.” (The Heritage Foundation), 47.

[ii] Budjeryn, Mariana. "Distressing a System in Distress: Global Nuclear Order and Russia's War against Ukraine." (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov. 2022), 343.

[iii] Kaplan, Fred. The Bomb. (Simon & Schuster, 2021), 239

[iv] Putin, Valdimir. “Signing of Treaties on Accession of Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson Regions to Russia.” (Kremlin: President of Russia, September 30 2022), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465.

[v] Budjeryn, Mariana. "Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?" (World Affairs, Sept. 2016), 18.

[vi] Kalb, Marvin. Imperial Gamble. (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 162.

[vii] Ibid, 180.

[viii] Kofman, Michael, et al. “Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.” (RAND, 2017), 69-70.

[ix] Traynor, Ian. "Putin Claims Russian Forces 'could Conquer Ukraine Capital in Two Weeks'" (The Guardian, September 2 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/putin-russian-forces-could-conquer-ukraine-capital-kiev-fortnight.

[x] Kaplan, “The Bomb,” 218-219.

[xi] Helmore, Edward. “Petraeus: US Would Destroy Russia’s Troops If Putin Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine.” (The Guardian, 2 Oct. 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/02/us-russia-putin-ukraine-war-david-petraeus.

[xii] Gartzke, Erik, and Jon R. Lindsay. Cross-Domain Deterrence. (Oxford University Press, 2019), 109.

[xiii] Harrison, Todd, et al. “Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space.” (CSIS Aerospace Security Project, Feb. 2021), 22-23.

[xiv] Sanger, David E., and William J. Broad. "Russia's Small Nuclear Arms: A Risky Option for Putin and Ukraine Alike." (New York Times, October 3 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/03/us/politics/russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons.html.

[xv] Horovitz, Liviu. "Why Do They Want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European Positions Regarding US Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.” (European Security, Dec. 2013), 82-83.

[xvi] LaFeber, Walter. "The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine.” (Political Science Quarterly , 2009), 73.

[xvii] Gramer, Robbie. "Congress to Ukraine: We've Got Your Back in War Against Russia.” (Foreign Policy, November 21 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/21/ukraine-congress-war-russia-u-s-committed-republicans-democrats.

[xviii] Kaplan, “The Bomb,” 221.

[xix] Ibid, 195.

[xx] Ibid, 219.

[xxi] Fitzpatrick, Mark. "How Europeans View Tactical Nuclear Weapons on Their Continent." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (Informa UK Limited, Jan. 2011), 61-62.

[xxii] Brookes, Peter. "Russia's Small Nukes Are a Big Problem for European Security." Monitor Strategic (The Heritage Foundation, 2022), 47.

[xxiii] Ibid, 47.

[xxiv] Sanger, "Russia's Small Nuclear Arms", https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/03/us/politics/russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons.html.

[xxv] Miller, Timothy D., and Jeffrey A. Larsen. “Dealing with Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Cash for Kilotons.” (Naval War College Review, 20040, 70-71.

[xxvi] Lamothe, Dan. "Pentagon Chief Says He Was Asked about Reintroducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Korea" (Washington Post, September 18 2017), https://watermark.silverchair.com/psquar_124_1_71.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAtgwggLUBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggLFMIICwQIBADCCAroGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQM2yHExAqW-wh6510nAgEQgIICi-3qNJkmShtfac4ueKPqZpUKgSW7rc7f3lt1Psc

.

[xxvii] “2022 Nuclear Posture Review” (Federation of American Scientists, October 27, 2022), 8.

[xxviii] Sethi, Manpreet. "Nuclear Overtones in the Russia-Ukraine War." (Arms Control Association, 2022), 15.

[xxix] “NATO 2022 - Strategic Concept.” (NATO - Homepage, September 29 2022), 4.

[xxx] Fitzpatrick, Mark. "How Europeans View Tactical Nuclear Weapons.” 58-64.

[xxxi] "How Much Aid Has the US Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts.” (Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed January 14 2023), https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts.

[xxxii] Ibid, 3.

[xxxiii] Rice, Condoleezza, and Robert M. Gates. "Opinion | Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates: It's Time to Repel Russia from Ukraine." (Washington Post, January 7 2023),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-ukraine-repel-russia.

[xxxiv] Klug, Foster. “Have China and India Shifted Stance on Ukraine War?” (Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2022), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-11-17/has-china-india-shifted-stance-russia-ukraine-war.

[xxxv] Taylor, Adam, and William Neff. "Why the World Is Worried about Russia's 'Tactical' Nuclear Weapons." (New York Times, October 7, 2022), 4.

[xxxvi] Rice, "Repel Russia from Ukraine.", https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-ukraine-repel-russia/.

[xxxvii] HARDtalk. Putin Is “rebuilding Russian Empire” Says Senator McCain - BBC HARDtalk. (YouTube, September 10 2014),

.

Selected Bibliography

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Brookes, Peter. "Russia's Small Nukes Are a Big Problem for European Security." (The Heritage Foundation, Accessed January 5 2023), https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-small-nukes-are-big-problem-european-security.

Budjeryn, Mariana. “Distressing a System in Distress: Global Nuclear Order and Russia’s War against Ukraine.” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, no. 6, Informa UK Limited, Nov. 2022), pp. 339–46.

--- “Was Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?” (World Affairs, no. 2, Sept. 2016), pp. 9–20.

Fitzpatrick, Mark. "How Europeans View Tactical Nuclear Weapons on Their Continent." (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, no. 2, Informa UK Limited, Jan. 2011), pp. 57–65.

Gartzke, Erik, and Jon R. Lindsay. Cross-Domain Deterrence. (Oxford University Press, 2019).

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Helmore, Edward. “Petraeus: US Would Destroy Russia’s Troops If Putin Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine.” (The Guardian, 2 Oct. 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/02/us-russia-putin-ukraine-war-david-petraeus.

HARDtalk. Putin Is “rebuilding Russian Empire” Says Senator McCain - BBC HARDtalk. (YouTube, September 10 2014),

Harrison, Todd, et al. “Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space.” (CSIS Aerospace Security Project, Feb. 2021), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG.

Horovitz, Liviu. "Why Do They Want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European Positions Regarding US Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.” (European Security, no. 1, Informa UK Limited, Dec. 2013), pp. 73–89.

"How Much Aid Has the US Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts.” (Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed January 14 2023), https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts.

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Kaplan, Fred. The Bomb. (Simon & Schuster, 2021).

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LaFeber, Walter. "The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine.” (Political Science Quarterly, 2009), https://watermark.silverchair.com/psquar_124_1_71.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAtgwggLUBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggLFMIICwQIBADCCAroGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQM2yHExAqW-wh6510nAgEQgIICi-3qNJkmShtfac4ueKPqZpUKgSW7rc7f3lt1Psc.

Miller, Timothy D., and Jeffrey A. Larsen. “Dealing with Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Cash for Kilotons.” Naval War College Review, 2004.

“NATO 2022 - Strategic Concept.” NATO - Homepage, September 29 2022, http://nato.int/strategic-concept.

Putin, Valdimir. “Signing of Treaties on Accession of Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson Regions to Russia.” (Kremlin: President of Russia, September 30 2022), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465.

Rice, Condoleezza, and Robert M. Gates. "Opinion | Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates: It's Time to Repel Russia from Ukraine." (Washington Post, January 7 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-ukraine-repel-russia/.

Sanger, David E., and William J. Broad. "Russia's Small Nuclear Arms: A Risky Option for Putin and Ukraine Alike." (New York Times, October 3 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/03/us/politics/russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons.html.

Sethi, Manpreet. “Nuclear Overtones in the Russia-Ukraine War.” (Arms Control Association, 2022), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-06/features/nuclear-overtones-russia-ukraine-war.

Taylor, Adam, and William Neff. "Why the World Is Worried about Russia's 'Tactical' Nuclear Weapons." (New York Times, October 7, 2022).

Traynor, Ian. "Putin Claims Russian Forces 'could Conquer Ukraine Capital in Two Weeks'" (The Guardian, September 2 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/putin-russian-forces-could-conquer-ukraine-capital-kiev-fortnight.