The ‘Secure U.S. Bases Act’ and the Decline of U.S. International Military Education and Training
By Major Sebastian Engels, U.S. Army
Editor's Note: Major Engels submitted this article as an "opinion piece." The FAO Association encourages submissions from the field, and reminds all authors to obtain clearances, as appropriate. The Journal assumes that all material submitted for publication consideration has been cleared.
The recently enacted “Secure U.S. Bases Act” directly and negatively impacts the United States’ competitiveness regarding increasing access and influence as part of the competition phase of military activities. International military student (IMS) participation in U.S. professional military education remains a cornerstone of U.S. security assistance and foreign policy. On December 6, 2019 a Saudi Arabian military officer undergoing flight training at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida killed three U.S. service members. In response, on 01 January 2021, Congress included the “Secure U.S. Bases Act” in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The FY 21 NDAA requires the DoD to increase vetting of IMS and their family members. These increases include disclosing “personal information including a physical address, fingerprints… an in-person interview, and an extensive background check that will include a review of social media activity.” Students must also receive endorsements from their respective countries’ intelligence chiefs. Responsibility for ensuring these requirements are satisfied falls upon the often undermanned Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC), a section of the military team assigned to American embassies abroad. Each IMS candidate’s biographic request can be tens of pages. The ODCs may send hundreds of IMS to U.S. schools each year. The result of the new requirements could mean canceling courses or a general reduction in IMS attendance.
Many American allies and partners find the new vetting requirements overly onerous, unlawful, or insulting. Individual privacy concerns may preclude IMET participation in other cases. Nations may create quid pro quo measures, restricting U.S. access to their schools or bases. These measures would likely curtail U.S. involvement in foreign military schools, due to DoD protected personal information (PPI) standards. Countries may forgo training altogether or look for alternatives elsewhere. In the best cases, nations will turn to U.S. allies and partners for training. Non-westerly-aligned peripheral nations may pursue training and schools offered by Russia or China.
The new vetting requirements could also affect U.S. foreign military sales, another pillar of security assistance and foreign policy. Advanced equipment sales, such as aircraft, require IMS to train in the U.S. for multiple years. Nations considering new U.S. purchases, weighing costs and equipment capabilities, must now also consider the new vetting requirements for trainees. Equipment offered by competitors, devoid of burdensome, legally questionable vetting requirements, may be more appealing to potential buyers.
International military education and training enables foreign policy objectives. The training improves interoperability, increases professionalism, and offers IMS exposure to democratic institutions. Beyond English comprehension, IMS learn US tactics, techniques, and procedures. They build lifetime relationships with U.S. military personnel. They offer a deep bench of leaders, including many defense ministers and chiefs of defense, throughout militaries. Exposure to IMET is cited as a key proponent to defense transformation and security relationships. Reductions to the candidate pool brought on by new vetting requirements may prevent nations’ most talented and influential personnel from attending DoD courses.
The attack in Pensacola demanded thoughtful consideration of foreign student participation in DoD education and training. The FY21 NDAA requirements will overly burden security cooperation practitioners. Countries will recoil at the new procedures, reducing their militaries’ access to DoD courses. The U.S. may suffer from quid pro quo measures enacted by foreign allies and partners. Security cooperation and foreign military sales may decline as a result of these restrictions, as will U.S. ability to compete for access and influence. Mitigation through careful messaging will offset some of the costs. DoD components must articulate to Congress the likely effects of the Secure U.S. Bases Act and urge revision.
About the Author
Major Sebastian Engels is a U.S. Army Europe and Eurasia Foreign Area Officer. He currently serves at U.S. Army Europe and Africa as a political-military planner. Previously he was the Deputy Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Tbilisi, Georgia. Prior to becoming a FAO, Major Engels served in a variety of positions as an Armor Officer. His operational deployments include Operation Enduring Freedom (2011) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2008-2009).
Thanks for a great review! Sorry to see IMET getting more strenuous in rules! As if working IMET whether the Defense Attache Office or Defense Cooperation wasn't time consuming enough! I never had a Defense Cooperation Office but did have three ODCs set up directly behind my tours. During three of four DAO tours, I was either the Defense Attache or Air Attache and the only Officer in my office with an extra duty of Security Assistance duties and it was really tough having other responsibilities and reports to the Defense Intelligence Agency who cut Attaches no slack and constantly reminded us, our job was not Security Assistance!
As a former Special Agent, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, with Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence/Force Protection tours and concerns, I understand the concerns about Terrorism, but it might be helpful if we quit giving special treatment to certain countries who have shown they are willing to kill our personnel in the US or while doing service in their countries. That said, I will not name them because many of you already know which ones they are. I don't believe it would be too difficult to review terrorism attack histories and select out those countries and make it more stringent for those countries to attend IMET certainly with all the requirements now being used. More time and thought should have gone into a solution for this dilemma.
As someone who specialized in Post Conflict Countries, IMET was and remains absolutely critical to countries being exposed to institutions, values, principles as they come out of war trying to rebuild; as well as, strengthening US capabilities to work with others whether war or a humanitarian disaster. It sounds like an over-reaction and as if we've shot ourselves in the foot making IMET more difficult to attain for those who need it most! Again, I won't mention countries but some of the poorest greatly benefit from IMET opportunities and some like Nicaragua after the 30-year US funded Sandinista/Contra War were the first to volunteer for Peacekeeping in Afghanistan when we asked for allies! Making IMET requirements more tedious is not the answer to potential terrorism!
Greetings to all.
Many thanks for posting this insightful and relevant (understatement) article by Major Engels!
Agree with, and reinforce, his good points, especially the implicit background fall-out of those new measures.
** One can spot and appreciate the (ahem) "default opportunities" and attitudinal influences those provisions of that Act impose on foreign ministerial and military officials when they are considering, comparing, weighing, and selecting among foreign IMET programs for PME available at US military schools and those offered/dangled/promoted (and very subtly) by major competitors such as Russia and China.
** FWIW, one astonishing recent discovery was the FMS sale and delivery by Russia -- including concomitant specific training of operators and maintainers -- by various Russian modern small arms and infantry weapons systems, including ammunition and concurrent spare parts, to the schools and units of the Paratroopers and Special Forces Command of the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
** A possibly parallel development has been the wind-down of the US Army's Office of the Program Manager - Saudi Arabian National Guard (aka "OPM-SANG"), accompanied by readiness of the already-resident British Military Mission (BMM) and opportunistic French elements to replace the SANG's family of US-built and -maintained LAV series of tactical vehicles.
** End of comments... DISCLAIMER: Here speaking privately as a now-retired US Army Middle East FAO (FA 48G - long-time "Gulfie") with many tours or projects supporting USDOD DAOs, SCOs and ODCs in, variously, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Turkey.
Regards to all.
"FAOs Forward!"