The Quad: A Mature Counterbalance in the South China Sea
By Lieutenant Colonel Shane Hughes, U.S. Air Force
Editor's Note: Lieutenant Colonel Hughes' thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Navy College of Naval Warfare. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Introduction
At first glance, a snapshot of the geopolitical situation in the South China Sea (SCS) may indicate the United States is executing a losing strategy. One might conclude that despite the US military conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) via sea and air to contest China's illegal occupation and construction activities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Chinese influence in the region has made significant gains. However, the author argues the opposite case is true. Specifically, recent efforts and initiatives of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as "The Quad," are now maturing into a highly effective counterbalance to Chinese aggression in the SCS. India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, put it best when he recently stated, "Today's summit meeting shows that the Quad has come of age. It will now remain an important pillar of stability in the region."
The origins of the Quad stem from coordinating efforts of the international response to the 2004 tsunami that devastated Indonesia, Thailand, and many other countries in the Indian Ocean. Making the relationship official in 2007, the Quad focused on less controversial topics such as disaster response, counterterrorism, and transnational crime. The strategic dialogue stagnated and fizzled out for about a decade. It existed in name only until being revived in 2017 by the heads of state of all four member countries. Since 2017, the Quad has become more unified and taken a more open approach to contest China's claims in the SCS, promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) region.
The author will lay out the case for the Quad's success in deterring Chinese aggression in the SCS. First, he will analyze the counterargument that China has made significant gains in the region. This view has been captured in multiple media headlines and is the conclusion of many think-tank analyses. Following the counterargument, three main arguments will be presented, explaining why the Quad is producing a winning strategy against China in the SCS. First, the Quad has unity of effort for the first time since its inception and is reaching its full potential to combat China’s aggressiveness in the region. Second, Quad actions in the SCS nullify China’s use of Lawfare, and customary international norms will not gradually change in favor of China. Third, the author demonstrates how China is significantly concerned with the Quad’s gaining influence by analyzing Chinese media and public-official statements. These three arguments explain how the Quad is successfully combating China’s aggressive economic policies worldwide. Their aggressive ‘Lawfare’ approaches are ineffective, and China’s reactive responses to Quad initiatives show genuine concern as regional influence swings back in favor of a FOIP.
Background and a Counter-Argument
A counterargument posits the Quad has failed to slow down Chinese aggression in the SCS. China now occupies 27 outposts in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, has begun a massive dredging operation to build over 3,200 acres of artificial island territory in the past eight years, and has militarized at least three of these islands. Analysts are approaching this problem set from multiple perspectives (Chinese, United States, and other nations worldwide) claim China has the momentum and will eventually achieve its espoused goal to control all territory and seas within the Nine Dashed Line. In contrast, the author rebukes these early territorial gains as merely initial gains resulting from an overly aggressive approach.
Chinese strategists believe the Quad can be stunted by positioning China as an attractive economic and political partner for the Quad states and other ASEAN claimant nations. Other Western analysts agree that international trade between China and Quad members gives too much leverage to China, and Quad members will shy away from focusing on controversial topics like the SCS. While these concerns were valid in the past, Quad members have decreased their weight on a healthy trade relationship with China. They have begun diversifying their supply networks to reduce dependence on Chinese trade.
Analysts and international law experts argue China is deftly using Lawfare to its advantage in the SCS. It is on track to successfully seize the majority of the SCS through brute force and slowly change customary norms. Their use of lawfare tactics is extensive. It spans from initial claims using revisionist historical maps, declaring a sovereign identification zone inside their claimed Nine Dashed Line, building artificial islands, and repeatedly expelling other claimant nations from these contested waters. Additionally, China has blatantly disregarded the 2016 United Nations tribunal court ruling, hoping an eventual tacit acquiescence from the international community will garner the successes that Russia experienced in Crimea and South Ossetia.
Finally, many analysts believe the Quad members will ultimately temper their responses for fear of miscalculation in such a volatile region. This assertion is not valid. Credible deterrence requires a legitimate threat of consequences. The author assesses that all four members of the Quad are poised to enforce a rules-based order and Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), primarily because it aligns with each country's national interests.