The Future of Strategic Competition in the Sahel Region: Placing Partnership First
By Major Laura Rajosefa, Armed Forces of France
Editor's Note: Major Rajosefa's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Air Command and Staff College. Because of length, we publish here an abridged version of the thesis. To see the full thesis with all research materials, please visit www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Disclaimer: The present research paper was completed in December 2021. The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the French Government, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, the French Air & Space Force, the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
Introduction
In 2020, Afrobarometer (a Ghana-based polling institute) measured popular opinion of Chinese involvement in eighteen African states. According to researchers Soule and Selormey’s analysis of this study, “perceptions of China have changed for the better in some countries in the Sahel region.” Both China and Russia engaged in deepening defense cooperation with Sahelian states. Russia and Mali, for instance, signed an official defense cooperation agreement in 2019. Malian Armed Forces public statements suggest that China possibly followed in Russia’s footsteps on July 23rd, 2021.
Strategic competition is unfolding in the Sahel region—a vast geographical area comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina-Faso, and Chad. How can the United States incorporate this nascent reality in a security context still characterized by endogenous terrorist threats linked to Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS)? Should counterterrorism operations be halted to pursue strategic competition instead? In order to answer those questions, this research paper will decode the Chinese and Russian approaches and derive hypotheses and scenarios.
As Army Brigadier General Gregory Hadfield hinted, “it is important to remember that outside of selling arms for their own economic benefit, China and Russia are not doing much to help counter extremist groups to rob Africans of their future.” Fighting terrorism and maintaining a check on China and Russia are not mutually exclusive. Because CT remains a critical partner need that neither Russia nor China intend to sincerely address, it remains one of the western comparative advantages in the Sahel, and a foundation upon which building enduring diplomatic, economic and informational strategies.
Decoding the Chinese approach.
China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) regularly makes the headlines as a staple of the country’s growing economic ambitions. Yet, limiting the BRI’s scope to the sole economic field proves a misconception of the extent of this pivotal element of Beijing’s grand strategy—which shifted from a regional to a global focus under Xi Jinping’s guidance.
A tailored variation of the BRI: the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
Launched and funded by Beijing in 2000, the FOCAC initiative is a comprehensive platform structuring the Chinese efforts on the African continent. While FOCAC pre-existed the formal branding of China’s “going-global” strategy under the blanket Belt and Road Initiative unveiled in 2013, Chinese officials indirectly corroborated that FOCAC should serve as a platform to integrate its nexus of BRI bilateral agreements. Since its inception, the forum has met every three years—alternatively taking place in Beijing and African capitals. Its latest edition took place in Dakar (Senegal) from November 29-30, 2021.
Scholar Srikanth Kondapalli underlines that “compared to other such international forums such as Europe-Africa Summit, France-Africa Summit, Tokyo International Conference on African Development, and India-Africa Summit, the FOCAC has steadily expanded in terms of membership and influence.” In 2021, the eighth edition included 53 out of 54 African nations. Incidentally, the FOCAC 2021 also saw the participation of the African Union Committee (AUC), which endorses a leading role in developing pan-African infrastructures.
Mapping BRI efforts in the Sahel thus appears of paramount importance to fully grasp the extent of China’s growing economic and military ambitions in the region.
Hypotheses regarding the Chinese infrastructure maneuver in the Sahel region.
While high visibility infrastructure projects in Eastern Africa have garnered significant attention, expansion of the Chinese presence in the Sahel goes relatively unnoticed. The Sahel, a region comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Tchad, and Burkina-Faso, forms an aggregate of mostly landlocked countries. At first glance, they do not fit the typical profile of coastal African countries targeted by the Maritime Silk Road strategy—which noticeably includes the ports of Mombasa (Kenya), Djibouti, and Port Sudan.
However, their central geographic location and potential in raw mineral resources prove increasingly strategic in China’s African roadmap. Combining open-source documents, this section will map known Chinese initiatives with planned infrastructure projects to derive hypotheses regarding China’s 2030-2035 maneuver— which could connect the Gulf of Aden to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea.
Infrastructure and Energy, “revealed [in an August 2021 interview] that the AU Commission would put forward a proposal to establish a China-Africa infrastructure cooperation plan aligned to the AU’s Program for Infrastructure Development-Priority Action Plan (PIDA-PAP 2) at this year’s FOCAC forum.” PIDA PAP 2 (a 2030 strategic roadmap declined in 69 projects) noticeably promotes the idea of “infrastructure corridors,” a concept compatible with the BRI structure. Moreover, PIDA transport projects partially overlay the 70s’ Trans-African Highway (TAH) network (see figure 4).
As South-African researcher Cobus von Staden details in a 2018 article—Can China Realize Africa’s Dream of an East-West Transport Link?—most of TAH 5 linking Dakar (Senegal) to N’djamena (Chad) already exists—though pavement reveals patchy. Railways could complement unfinished road sections: in 2017, two Chinese companies launched feasibility studies to implement standard gauge tracks linking Port Sudan to N’Djamena—thus potentially superseding the missing TAH 6 section linking the two countries. Similarly, China has invested in trans-Saharan railway projects linking Algeria to Nigeria and recently completed a critical section of the Algerian TAH 2 highway.
To achieve connectivity between relevant maritime facades—Mediterranean coastline, Gulf of Guinea, Atlantic, Gulf of Aden—control of landlines going through the Sahel proves crucial. Consequently, Beijing could shape two multimodal transport corridors by upgrading and complementing pre-existing TAH sections and leveraging PIDA-PAP 2 projects portfolio. While this enterprise remains highly complex and costly, it could prove feasible in the long run—especially considering the unique state-controlled Chinese loan model.
Subsequently, the Sahel region appears located at the crossroads of East-West and North-South corridors connecting strategic maritime facades—the Mediterranean Sea, Gulf of Guinea, Atlantic Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden.
According to journalist Njumbe Smith, Amani Abou-Zeid, the AU Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy, “revealed [in an August 2021 interview] that the AU Commission would put forward a proposal to establish a China-Africa infrastructure cooperation plan aligned to the AU’s Program for Infrastructure Development-Priority Action Plan (PIDA-PAP 2) at this year’s FOCAC forum.” PIDA PAP 2 (a 2030 strategic roadmap declined in 69 projects) noticeably promotes the idea of “infrastructure corridors,” a concept compatible with the BRI structure. Moreover, PIDA transport projects partially overlay the 70s’ Trans-African Highway (TAH) network.
PIDA infrastructure projects (source : AU infrastructure database).
Leveraging the resource potential of the Sahel
In addition to its geographical position, the Sahel homes untapped potential of natural resources—including oil, uranium, natural gas, and lithium. Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) operate several facilities and prospect mining concessions across the region.
Thus, in Niger and Tchad, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) respectively exploit the Agadem and Koudalwa oil fields. Due to various disputes with the Chadian government and spill incidents, operations in Koudalwa have experienced some hiatus over the years. In contrast, Agadem’s production gradually reached full capacity and became “a structural feature of China’s presence in Niger.” However, Chinese attempts at exploiting the northern Nigerian uranium depot of Azelik have been halted due to profitability and security concerns—yet, China retains its concession rights.
Lithium proves even more strategic to China. The country dominates the ore global supply chain and intends on maintaining a quasi-monopolistic position. The rise in lithium prices, supported by increased demand for electric vehicles, will likely spur competition. As British journalist Jeremy Cliffe articulates, “the geopolitical effects of the ‘lithium race’ are already being felt. It is a reason for China’s growing presence in Africa, including its funding for infrastructure projects that support the extraction of mineral resources.” In this particular context, top Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium invested 130 million dollars in the Malian Goulamina project. Geologists believe this site to be one of the largest lithium reserves in the world. If those estimations prove correct, China’s incentives in the Sahel region could drastically increase, steering the need for a more enduring military presence.
Trans African Highway network (source: OECD iLibrary)
Security and Defense implications.
From a Chinese perspective, participating in Sahel peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations serves several purposes: securing Chinese investments and nationals, strengthening its political influence, and contributing to the PLA’s modernization effort by providing much-needed combat experience.
An increased military footprint to secure Chinese assets and citizens.
In the Sahel, China’s infrastructure and resource extraction activities partially overlap Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) areas of operation. Therefore, Chinese nationals are at increased risk of facing hostilities, such as the July 2021 abduction of three construction workers in northern Mali. While the scope of those attacks remains limited in regards to the overall Chinese presence on the continent, analyst Tom Bayes points at their resonance within Chinese domestic audiences. For Beijing, defending expatriates “has become a foreign policy priority, reflected in the FOCAC 2018 Action Plan’s calls for better protection of Chinese nationals in Africa.” Bayes further elaborates that “beyond reassuring Chinese of their protection in Africa, impressing domestic opinion with evidence of China’s rise is an important dimension of Beijing’s push for an African security role.”
Moreover, securing trade passing through Sahelian transport corridors entails protecting Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Gulf of Guinea. In order to do so, the Chinese Navy could replicate a pattern similar to the 2017 opening of its Djibouti base and seek to secure deep-water facilities on the Atlantic facade. US Africa Command’s head, General Stephen Townsend, warned in May 2021 that “China [had] approached countries stretching from Mauritania to south of Namibia, intent on establishing a naval facility.” Assessing interpersonal relationships between Chinese Navy officers and their African counterparts, researcher Marielle Harris noted that Beijing “courts counterparts in coastal countries in the Gulf of Guinea.” Citing intelligence sources, the Wall Street Journal further contended in December 2021 that the port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea could be the latest location targeted by the CCP.
Consequently, as Chinese infrastructure and mining projects expand, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should likely step up its footprint in the region. States wary of jihadism bleeding across their borders may welcome such a move. Opening the 2021 FOCAC edition, Senegal’s Foreign Minister—H.E Aissata Tall Sall—declared she “hoped China would become a ‘strong voice’ in combatting terrorism in the vast Sahel region.” Thus, an increased military presence in the Sahel would contribute to China’s overall political influence. China may indeed reinforce its capacity to garner UN votes among African nations by presenting the image of a reliable ally and responsible Great Power.
Incidentally, researcher Ilaria Carrozza notes that the Sino-African cooperation dialogue increasingly focused on security issues from 2011, in phase “with the start of Xi Jinping’s term and his emphasis on military modernization.” Aside from its soft-power dimension, could an increased involvement in the Sahel serve Beijing’s military modernization agenda?
Sahel peacekeeping operations as a combat experience opportunity for the PLA.
Addressing the CCP leadership in 2017, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of combat in modernizing the PLA :
A military is built to fight. Our military must regard combat capability as the criterion to meet in all its work and focus on how to win when it is called on. We will take solid steps to ensure military preparedness for all strategic directions, and make progress in combat readiness in both traditional and new security fields.
However, training in the Indo-Pacific may pose a dilemma to the CCP. In South-East Asia, scholar Philip C.Saunders points out that “the need to preserve a peaceful regional environment for economic development…is in tension with the desire to use China’s power.” In that regard, West Africa and the Sahel region present the opportunity to develop combat-proven armaments and increase the PLA’s experience without overtly upsetting Beijing’s Asian neighbors—and incidentally hasten a US-coordinated response.
Crucially, many Chinese weapons systems are largely untested in actual combat. With expanding defense budgets and militaries engaged in active combat, West Africa offers promising markets for China’s arms exporters and the chance to hone their products through combat testing—as researcher and former diplomat Wang Hongyi notes, ‘overseas practical combat testing can help Chinese military enterprises to obtain customer feedback, improving the performance and quality of weapons in a targeted manner. Meanwhile, the PLA has not seen major engagement since China’s unsuccessful invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and according to its official newspaper it has been infected by ‘peace disease,’ eroding its war-fighting abilities. Deployment in Africa– including anti-piracy patrols, NEOs, HADR, UNPKOs, and joint exercises – allows the PLA to alleviate this peace disease and hone its capabilities with active experience in hostile environments.
In hindsight, the deployment of Chinese infantry in Mali supports this proposition. While limited in scope (the PLA committed a force protection company of 170 troops), this move presented a rupture in Beijing’s policy. Few economic incentives could have explained China’s rationale—exports consisted mainly of cotton and shea butter. Instead, it matched Xi’s impulse for a more active role on the global stage. Scholar Jean-Pierre Cabestan notes that the Chinese forces leveraged their vicinity with other peacekeepers and French Operation Barkhane’s soldiers to “[learn] to operate in a hostile and terror-ridden environment” and thus “improve their operational capabilities.”
As far as employing modern equipment in real-life combat goes, it is worth noting that “Chinese arms manufacturers have started to sell more advanced technologies, including the CH-3 and CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicles…to support Nigerian operations against Boko Haram.” Likewise, could Mali be at some point offered more advanced equipment? In a July 2021 social media post, the Malian Armed Forces soberly mentioned the signature of a Sino-Malian agreement accompanied by equipment donations. While a parallel with the Nigerian case remains highly speculative, the fact that the Chinese media kept quiet about this exchange should, at the very least, draw closer scrutiny. The meeting happened a few days after the abduction of three Chinese construction workers, whom the Malian military eventually liberated on November 1st. Observer Andrew Lebovich suggests the possibility of a ransom. The July 23rd meeting could also relate to those specific circumstances.
The most threatening hypothesis could allow China to contest US freedom of action in simultaneous chokepoints and maritime facades ( with a Chinese presence in the Pacific, the Gulf of Aden and the Atlantic).In the long run, this could impede US power projection potential, and therefore the ability to intervene globally—a current strength of the US military. Moreover, China will have the ability to shift the deterrence paradigm : with sustained submarine presence in both the Pacific and the Atlantic, Beijing will pose a renewed threat to US vital interests. Moreover, an increased security footprint in the sub region will strengthen Chinese expeditionary capabilities, as analyst Tom Bayes points.
The most likely hypothesis could allow China to redefine the global world order. By securing access to critical mineral resources presently untapped in the Sahel region , Beijing will not only be dominant on the economic field, but also impose its vision and standards trough economic coercion. Democratic backsliding in Africa–home to the fastest demographic growth on the planet—will also empower Beijing’s authoritarian voice within international forums: the continent represents 54 UN votes.
Failure to contest Chinese engagement in Africa, and specifically in the Sahel region, could lead to nefarious consequences in the long-run. In shorter terms however, Russia poses an immediate challenge that is worth analyzing.
Decoding the Russian approach.
In reaction to western sanctions imposed after Crimea’s annexation, Moscow reconsidered its foreign policy and initiated a pivot towards the African continent. Contrasting with Beijing’s economic might, “Russia cannot afford to be a major source of infrastructure projects.” Therefore, the Kremlin preys on frail states afflicted by rebellions and internal conflicts to strike security deals. “Despite providing less than 1% of Africa’s foreign direct investment, ” Moscow succeeded in expanding its outreach to the Sahel region, with Mali as a spearhead. Understanding Putin’s asymmetric strategy proves crucial to contain Russian ambitions in neighboring Burkina-Faso, Niger, and Chad.
Indirect approach and hybrid warfare actors.
The Guardian accessed leaked documents describing M. Prigozhin’s alleged business plans in Africa. According to journalists Harding and Burke, Prigozhin’s Wagner group identified Mali as a prospect as soon as 2018. Jeune Afrique contributor Mathieu Olivier claims that Wagner emissaries were spotted in Mali at the end of 2019. Wagner’s project likely matured: Reuters revealed in September 2021 that the Malian government actively sought to secure a deal with the private military company (PMC). Bamako would grant Wagner mining concessions (possibly complemented by a ten million dollars monthly fee) in exchange for security services. This pattern reveals consistent with Wagner’s modus operandi in the Central African Republic (CAR), a country where Russian mercenaries stand accused of exactions towards the Fulani minority—a brutal behavior that some Malians may, unfortunately, consider favorably. European and American signaling intensified to hamper Moscow’s agenda. Following a row of EU sanctions, the US Department of State declared on December 15th being “alarmed by a potential deployment of Russia-backed Wagner Group forces in Mali.” Concomitantly, in an article dated December 14th, French journalist Elise Vincent reports that a technician and senior executive of M-Invest—one of Wagner’s parent companies—were spotted in Mali. She reveals that prospection efforts target the gold production area of Menankoto, in the southern part of the country. As of December 20th, Maxim Shugaley, an influence specialist linked to the Prigozhin nexus, announced his alleged arrival in Bamako—a signal that Wagner is committed to its Malian endeavor.
In hindsight, information operations may have paved the way for Prigozhin’s mercenaries and miners’ arrival in Mali. Messages supporting an increased Russian implication in Mali’s security emerged in 2017—noticeably through demonstrations organized by the Mali Patriots Group. Leveraging social media platforms, the Kremlin gradually increased the scope and outreach of its disinformation campaigns. Discussing public demonstrations in support of Russia following the August 2020 coup in Mali, Joseph Siegle analyzes that,
While seemingly incongruent, the pro-Russian sentiments were consistent with a line of messaging that began in Bamako a year earlier following the signing of a fuzzy security cooperation agreement between Mali and Russia. Social media sites blamed the former colonial power, France, for Mali’s militant Islamist insurgency in the north and called for France to pull out the 5,000 troops it had deployed to help combat the jihadists. These themes were subsequently picked up in protests organized by opposition groups in the months leading to the coup.
Using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques, researchers Kevin Limonier and Marlene Laruelle mapped the extent of Prigozhin’s operations (see figure 5 below). As the researchers demonstrate, the Centrafrican example proves that “activities in the fields of security and mining are correlated with digital initiatives of unclear origin, as several websites openly supporting Russian presence in the country have been detected for years.” By analogy, social media posts echoing anti-French narratives in Mali —such as the ones depicted by Siegle—may have been part of an integrated campaign designed to lay the ground for the subsequent August 2020 coup, which benefited the Kremlin’s overarching goals in the region.
Chaos as an end goal.
Mali’s political situation appears volatile. In August 2020, a mutiny deposed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK). Following the coup, the junta appointed a civilian-led government (headed by President Bah N’Diaw) in an apparent effort to initiate a transition process. Interestingly, one of the first diplomats received by the coup leaders was the Russian ambassador. As Jeune Afrique notes, junta leaders Malick Diaw, Sadio Camara, and Assimi Goïta partially trained in Russia. This proximity may have put the interim administration under strain. In an interview for Deutsche Welle, Malian analyst Etienne Fakaba Sissoko contends that Camara’s attempts at negotiating conventions with Moscow prompted his demise from Bah N’ Diaw’s transitional government. In return, Camara’s dismissal triggered the overthrowing of President N’Diaw in May 2021, in what was dubbed by several observers “ a coup within a coup.”
As researcher Samuel Ramani phrases it, “although there is insufficient evidence to make a conclusive determination about the Kremlin’s role in the coup, Russia is a potential geopolitical beneficiary from Mali’s political transition.” Observers also believe that the Wagner group leveraged its facilities in Libya to train rebel factions involved in the death of Chad’s President Idriss Deby—who succumbed to battle injuries in April 2021. These actions could reflect an attempt at initiating a regime change more favorable to Russian interests.
Overall, turmoil in the Sahel benefits a cunning Russia. As Scholar Joseph Siegle analyzes, “the primary exports that Russia has to offer Africa—mercenaries, arms, and disinformation—are inherently destabilizing.” Besides this economic incentive, exploiting chaotic situations in the Sahel offers Russia a lever on the southern flank of NATO. Per Siegle, “Russian influence in Libya and the Sahel provides Russia access to key nodes of African migration and human trafficking routes. Russia thus has the ability to provoke humanitarian and political crises for Europe while challenging spheres of historically European (primarily French) influence in Africa.”
Weaponizing illegal immigration in the Sahel appears a possible adversary course of action, consistent with a form of asymmetric warfare author Kelly Greenhill coined as Coercive Engineered Migration. Stressing that authoritarian adversaries tend to “think out of the box” defined by the five traditional military domains (air, land, sea, cyber, and space), Greenhill pleads to consider this form of “societal warfare.” Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov indeed publicly identified the strategic potential of society-centric maneuvers:
Of course, it would be easiest of all to say that the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ are not war, and so there are no lessons for us—military men—to learn. But maybe the opposite is true—that precisely these events are typical of warfare in the twenty-first century. In terms of the scale of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war. The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.
On December 23rd, 2021, fifteen European countries denounced the ongoing deployment of Wagner in Mali in a joint statement. Understanding the mechanisms used in the Malian case, and monitoring its repercussions, should help anticipate the group’s expansion in the Sahel—with Chad, where Russian political advisers’ presence was suspected, being a possible target.
In the Sahel, China expands its global reach and plays the long game, while Russia seizes opportunities to destabilize NATO on its southern flank. Those two actors may have conflicting interests in the region. However, as recent rapprochement efforts have shown, Beijing and Moscow will likely find a temporary modus vivendi. Responding to the challenges posed by strategic competition will thus require relying on the cumulative strength of the United States and its allies, addressing potential weaknesses, analyzing common threats, and exploiting opportunities.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
Strengths
Superior western military capabilities
Tactical victories such as the neutralization of Abu Adnan Al-Sahrawi, the IS in Greater Sahara leader, and senior AQ leaders Abdelmalek Droukdel and Djamel Okacha, represent the epitome of intelligence and dynamic targeting. Those tangible successes are made possible by the combination of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets, combat drones, and special operations—all fields of US and French expertise. Paradoxically, CT feats did not prevent the propagation of militants to central Mali, and face increased criticism. While CT cannot replace peace processes secured by the MINUSMA nor the return of Malian state officials in the North of the country, it offered windows of opportunities to peacemakers and local authorities. To a large extent, solely attributing the degradation of the security situation to shortcomings of CT operations reveals biased : for instance, dereliction of the Malian state in central parts of the country fueled both Dogon self-defense militias and incentivized stigmatized Fulani to join jihadist groups. To a large extent, Chinese and Russian competitors are aware of those intricate ethnic and political issues, and do not intend to constructively intervene. Noticeably, Wagner’s alleged deployment in southern Mali contradicts narratives presenting the PMC’s involvement as a substitute for France’s operation Barkhane.
As Mali-oriented CT operations may be jeopardized by Wagner’s presence, containing the expansion of terrorism in Sahel and west Africa will remain a critical military task. Aside from American and French bases in Niger, western democracies can count on a robust basing network in the sub-region. France is indeed granted the authorization to base forces in Chad, Senegal, and Gabon—within reach of the main CT areas of operations. Moreover, as a recent French paratrooper exercise demonstrated, forces can swiftly be projected in western Africa from Europe. China does not intend to reach this level of projectability in the foreseeable future, and do not appear as a credible CT alternative to West Africans . Per Tom Bayes ,
Chinese leaders and analysts criticise ‘Western interventionism’ in Africa as an attempt to maintain Western hegemony that undermines ‘African solutions to African problems’. West African interviewees not unjustifiably see little prospect of Chinese intervention of the type undertaken by France in Mali in 2012–2013 or the UK in Sierra Leone in 2000 (both with UN endorsement and intended to protect existing governments). For a number of West African interviewees, though extra-regional intervention is not a first preference, this severely limits China’s role as a security actor. As a Nigerian security specialist observed, ‘China is risk averse on security ... its inability to deploy troops [to the region] limits how seriously it can be taken’. The result, as a Malian military officer commented, is that ‘one doesn’t necessarily think of China’ when responding to a security crisis. This is already seen on CT and COIN, the subregion’s principal security concerns. Here, an African diplomat judged, ‘China offers nothing better than France, [or] the US’. While it is true that disillusion with France’s Operation Barkhane is growing, interviewees in Mali and Burkina Faso pointed rather to Russia as an alternative, in light of its adventurism in Syria and the Central African Republic, suggesting the reported concerns of some in the US strategic community that its mooted West Africa troop drawdown will allow China ‘to fill the gap’ on CT are misplaced.
Superior economic frameworks
The US model of development remains the most favorably seen on the African continent. In a critical commentary, Camara and Tugenhadt contend that “arguably, [a] myopic focus on countering China’s economic engagements has blinded the United States to its own unique strengths.” The authors defend the idea that the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)—a trade framework giving vetted countries tariff-free access to U.S. markets—boosted Africa’s industrialization in sectors where exports to China were not possible. Similarly, West African observers’ high expectations regarding the Power Africa initiative prove that the US has a card to play in this field. Finally, initiatives such as the Millennium Corporation Challenge leverage aid to build infrastructure projects—with successful realizations in Niger and Burkina-Faso.
Weaknesses
Sahelian governance challenges may hamper cooperation efforts
Following the coup in Mali, the Biden administration announced the country’s removal from the AGOA framework. While this decision appears consistent with the defense of democratic standards, it highlights the challenges of the sub-region. Without promoting free and transparent trade standards, prosperity will likely be hampered, and corruption will persist. In those environments, unscrupulous actors such as China and Russia thrive. For that very reason, Tugenhadt and Camara stress that the US “punitive approach” based on sanctions present limitations. However difficult, governance-focused approaches can bear fruits in the long run. The recent resignation of Burkina-Faso’s government following the Inata gendarmerie attack shows that political accountability exists in the region. Despite mixed outcomes, in Niger, investigations regarding arms deals malpractices are pursued independently. Retrenching totally from those regions may hinder democratic signs of progress currently underway.
Opportunities
China’s Belt and Road Initiative risks overstretching and faces criticism in Africa.
According to several observers, FOCAC 2021 marks an inflection point for Chinese aid and investment programs. As researcher Paul Nantulya highlights, Beijing’s attempts at restructuring African debt—either via “resource-for-infrastructure financing (RFI) or debt-equity swaps”—may ultimately antagonize public opinions. Therefore, “negotiating increased infrastructure financing will be complicated as China’s infrastructure lending and [Foreign Direct Investment] in Africa may slow over the mid-term due to the growing number of borrowers unable to repay their debts.”
In addition to those financial considerations, Chinese poor environmental standards may alienate local populations, whose livelihood depends on traditional forms of agriculture and living-off the land practices. For instance, Tom Bayes notes that “ in interviews from Nigeria to Mauritania, discussion of a Chinese presence in the Gulf of Guinea most frequently raised the issue of large scale, illegal overfishing by Chinese trawlers, a major source of discontent in the region with a significant impact on local livelihoods and thus security.”
Potential for a more integrated western effort in the region exists.
As Stanford professor Russel Berman notes, “despite the differences between them, which Washington has been unable to leverage, Beijing and Moscow pose a de facto combined challenge to western leadership in Africa”—an emerging theater for strategic competition.
Combined, the European Union (EU) and America’s investment and aid flow far exceed China’s; yet Xi Jinping has imposed his narrative, depicting Beijing as Africa’s first economic partner. While aligning strategies involving pure business interests remains challenging, the EU and the US should coordinate when engaging the African Union on infrastructure, development, and governance matters. To that extent, G7 declarations could be the starting point of a better alignment between the American Build Back Better World initiative and the EU’s Global Gateway framework.
Knowledge sharing with European-focused institutions reveals a path worth exploring in regard to fighting Russian disinformation— which involves the same hybrid actors in Mali and Ukraine. Expanding relationships with the US multidomain task force based in Germany, NATO’s strategic communication’s Center of Excellency, or Finland-based Hybrid Center of Excellency could be interesting.
Threats
Russia will further weaponize Sahelian’s perceptions
From a Russian perspective, Mali represents a critical step in pursuing a greater disinformation effort in the Sahel. Messages falsely accusing France of financing and arming terrorists’ groups originated in Mali and propagated to Burkina-Faso and Niger, culminating in violent protests at a logistic convoy passing through those countries. Analyst Andrew Lebovich points out that the movement that staged the demonstrations in Burkina-Faso, COPA/BF, is close to the Malian pro-Russian movement Yerewolo. In parallel, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, delivers public remarks accusing NATO’s intervention in Libya of having caused the Sahelian situation—selectively ignoring decade-long conflicts between Northern Mali’s Tuareg minorities and the central power in Bamako. Consequently, rejection of western states could spread to countries where the United States and France currently operate military bases.
China may further disseminate its authoritarian norms
In opposition to Russia’s short-term goals, China seeks to remodel the international order. Beijing favors stability—achieved through social control and repression of freedom of speech. In Africa, China has invested in building computer and media networks. As the African continent gets more urbanized, information technology (IT) infrastructure allows social control mechanisms to be implemented on a larger scale. This Chinese authoritarian norm could appeal to African strongmen who fear losing control—either over an election, a coup, or a rebellion. Given Sahel’s political instability, this region could prove favorable for democratic backsliding.
Moreover, as China maintains steady military exchanges with conflict-ridden nations, undemocratic standards could also be disseminated via the military. Researcher Paul Nantulya warns that “as China deepens its ties to African militaries, including through training and education initiatives, Beijing brings its perspective on party-army relations.” In the CCP’s view, a military subordinated to the ruling party strengthens its grip on the society. In the Sahel region, insecurity may serve as a pretense for juntas—noticeably Mali—to keep the military at their sole disposal.
Recommendations: moving past the Counterterrorism vs. Strategic Competition dilemma.
As Dr. Matthew Levitt argues, “global competition with the likes of Russia and China will demand that the United States take into consideration not only its own set of interests but the needs and threat perceptions of its local partners.” In the Sahel region and West Africa, terrorism remains a major security concern. Wary of a possible western disengagement, several Sahelian and West African leaders may seek to secure counterterrorism cooperation deals with either China or Russia.
Consistent with those realities, US AFRICOM is pursuing a strategic campaign to maintain US prime access in the area. Per Levitt,“ U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa… account for about 0.3 percent of Defense Department personnel and budgetary resources.” As General Townsend testified before Congress, “bottom line: [US Africom] relationships and …counter-VEO efforts build US influence over strategic competitors” at a modest cost.
China has likely taken notice of those efforts and propagates narratives accusing the US of manipulating African countries like mere pawns, an attitude flagged as reminiscent of the Cold War era. Consequently, aside from traditional military cooperation, a sustained emphasis should be placed on strategic communication, people-to-people interactions, and counterpropaganda.
Commitment.
Public debates surrounding the US Global Posture Review (GPR) focused on the need to redeploy efforts to the Indo-Pacific, in line with former Obama and Trump administrations’ willingness to operate a “pivot to Asia.” While the GPR maintained the current amount of military assets committed to the African continent, the overall conversation on the Indo-Pacific and the end of the “war on terror” era could spark a “fear of abandonment” among local partners. Additionally, the possible arrival of the Wagner PMC in Mali could trigger the departure of several international partners and impede transnational CT arrangements between Mali, Niger, and Burkina-Faso. In order to provide evidence of the United States’ enduring commitment, communication efforts could focus on tangible DIB initiatives, such as those successfully conducted with Niger ( C-130 donation, IMET program involving a female C-130 pilot). Marielle Harris also notes that local media outreach should be improved. She highlights the example of Exercise Flintlock 2020, where AFRICOM invited Mauritanian journalists“ but apparently did not invite reporters from the 10 other African countries that participated.”
Counterpropaganda.
A significant part of the ongoing strategic competition lies in the information domain. China and Russia are indeed engaged in shaping perceptions to undermine democratic standards and US leadership. As Judd Devermont contends,
“The most effective brakes on violent extremism, democratic backsliding, and negative Chinese and Russian influence are strong local institutions, robust media, and community activism…U.S. financial and technical support—albeit not advertised as countering violent extremism or strategic competition programming—has the potential to bolster these actors, enabling them to shine a light on vulnerabilities and abuses, as well as press their governments to adjust policies.”
Enabling critical thinking in local communities reveals challenging. Unfolding its FOCAC action plan, China trains journalists and builds television and internet infrastructures across the continent, including in French-speaking western Africa. Consequently, counterpropaganda cannot be envisioned solely from a military standpoint: it remains a whole-of-government effort. Aside from re-evaluating the missions of the interagency Global Engagement Center, Joseph Siegle, for instance, pleads for a “stronger outreach to social media firms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to elevate their efforts…in Africa.”
Conclusion
A significant part of the US military literature related to strategic competition focuses either on the Indo-Pacific or emerging warfighting domains (cyberspace, space). In contrast, China’s efforts to expand its Belt and Road Initiative to the Sahel region remain under the academic radar. On the same note, several armed forces’ publications address Russian activities through the paradigm of hybrid warfare applied to the eastern-European context. However, the pivot to Africa operated by the Wagner nexus remains relatively undocumented.
Strategic competition in the Sahel regions takes several forms. China’s long-term goal appears to be the development of economic corridors that will sustain Beijing’s appetite for critical resources—such as lithium, oil, and uranium. To secure its investments and nationals and appear as a responsible international actor, China will increase its military footprint in the region. Alongside, Beijing will actively promote its social control model and authoritarian standards—in an attempt to redefine an international order in line with its interests. In contrast with China, Russia adopts a disruptive stance and focuses on creating rifts among NATO allies. By maintaining instability on NATO’s southern flank, Moscow tries to divert the attention of the Alliance, which has to face several threats and somewhat conflicting priorities—with migration and terrorism being prime concerns in several South European countries.
To counter those actors, a sustained engagement in the region appears necessary. While counterterrorism will stay a primary lever to maintain strong partnerships with Sahelian governments, the United States should rely on its unique economic and diplomatic strengths to complement a well-developed security approach. Failure to do so could leave a booming continent at the mercy of authoritarian powers, thus modifying the global order in the long run.