The African Security Paradox: Redefining Security Cooperation in the Strategic Competition Era

By Ms. Shaunta Russell, Defense Intelligence Agency

Editor's Note: Ms. Russell's thesis won the FAO Association Writing Award at the U.S. Joint Warfighting School in 2023, reflecting conditions and policy at that time. Although the current administration has not fully articulated its foreign policy towards the African region, viewing activities and policies through Ms Russel’s convergence and divergence framework is nevertheless helpful.

Because of its length, we removed thesis notes and publish an abbreviated version of the thesis. To see the full thesis and research notes, please visit www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense. This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes (or appropriate statement per the Academic Integrity Policy). This work cannot be used for commercial purposes without the express written consent of the author.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since its inception as a nation, security cooperation (SC) has been an influential United States (U.S.) foreign policy instrument. An integral component of the United States’ national strategy, security cooperation advances global security and pursues shared interests with vital partners. Deliberate and responsibly managed security cooperation provides a foundation for stability and prosperity in developing countries— by promoting strong governance, enabling long-term relationships, and strengthening the professionalism and interoperability of the United States and its partner armed forces. Through SC, the United States confronts today’s unprecedented challenges to its national interests in Africa, including revisionist adversaries’ global ambitions with an extensive network of allies and partners. Africa, a diverse and dynamic continent with an expansive geopolitical landscape of fifty-four countries, has innately unique and complex security challenges in multiple regions that constantly threaten sustainable stability and economic prosperity for its populations.

Africa’s security landscape challenges generalization. It comprises peaceful, vibrant, and democratic countries, coexisting with failing states plagued by transnational threats, massive human displacement, and interethnic violence. The origins of foreign security cooperation on the continent can be traced to the early days of the Cold War when two global powers economically and politically attempted to shape a new

international world order. In the aftermath of the “second scramble for Africa,” several African countries were left debt-ridden, discarded, divided, and unstable when their Cold War allies abandoned them. The fall of the Berlin Wall, a significant and symbolic event for the West, ushered in catastrophic changes for Africa with enduring effects that marginalized its role and rise during post-colonial globalization. Despite crippling progress impediments, Africa’s resiliency, natural resources, and embrace of democracy have positioned it to become the center of the world’s urban future and a significant player in global politics. Demographically, the continent will double in size by 2050. A quarter of the world's population will be African, and every future global problem -- migration, technology, climate change, resource competition, and health security -- will have an African dimension. What happens in Africa will impact the world; global powers are recognizing this and responding according to their interests.

In the past ten years, over one hundred and fifty new foreign embassies have emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa, indicating a dramatic increase in diplomatic engagement by both allies and adversaries. This has led to a striking increase in connectivity, trade, and the establishment of foreign military bases across the continent, particularly along the Indian Ocean, Horn of Africa, and West African littorals. This research paper focuses on the continent, examining the limitations of current U.S. support to partner human security

needs and the misalignment of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) security assistance platforms in Africa with the current presidential administration’s new African policy. To enable U.S. success in the current strategic environment, DoD, through the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), must create new pathways to rebalance its security role and stabilize functional relationships in competitive and destabilized regions. Under the auspices of the new U.S. policy for Africa, USAFRICOM can reframe its strategic competition policies, reassess its security priorities, and integrate stabilization initiatives that reaffirm U.S. commitment to security and stability for the continent.

Chapter 2: A Roadmap to Aligning USAFRICOM Security Cooperation Plan with New U.S. Policy

Historically, the United States has pursued temporal and conditional relationships with Africa, avoiding significant economic investment or genuine partnership. But now, with strategic competition as a driver, there is a decisive pivot to reprioritize those relationships. During his first tour to Africa as the U.S. Secretary of State, Ambassador Anthony Blinken announced, “the world can no longer dictate or tell Africa how it should be or what to do. It should offer choices that support African self-determinism to shape its future.” This shift in tone and approach is resonating in USAFRICOM messaging as well. Within his first thirty days of command, General Michael E. Langley disseminated a staff memo with similar language stressing the necessity of aligning command actions with policy and authoritative guidance. The Commander emphasized the importance of leveraging USAFRICOM’s resources through a whole-of-government approach -- diplomacy, development, and defense to address transnational threats in collaboration with African partners. This newfound assertiveness in U.S. rhetoric fostering democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and prosperity on the continent aspires to reinvigorate the promotion of liberal values while pursuing U.S. national security objectives.

The current administration's U.S. Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa correctly prioritizes U.S. engagement in the economic and diplomacy dimensions, deliberately excluding previous conditions-based language. In an imminent environment of emerging global competition with China and Russia, this strategy acknowledges the criticality of a United States-Africa partnership to U.S. international relations and attempts to present an approach that supports African solutions to African problems. To reframe its relationship with Africa, the U.S. strategy departs from earlier policies, outlining long- term initiatives with specific effects and impacts. Regardless of its intent, the promise of commitment will likely still be viewed by Africans as more episodic American platitudes and rarely fulfilled declarations.

Ambitiously, the new U.S. strategy seeks to expand the scope of American partnerships with African governments, institutions, and citizens through four central tenets: foster openness and open societies; deliver democratic and security dividends; advance pandemic recovery and economic opportunity; support conservation, adaptation, and a just energy transition. USAFRICOM, as a critical enabler, can play a key role in aligning U.S. SC platforms with the new strategy pillars, reinforcing the linkages between democracy and security, and cultivating shared interests and values.

The first step is demonstrating early and often the altruistic nature of the strategy. A history of global health engagement in Africa has proven consequential to past U.S. foreign policy success. In particular, USAFRICOM’s significant role in supporting Africa’s pandemic recovery, a humanitarian health security initiative that evolved from President George W. Bush’s 2004 Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). This initiative sharply contrasts with authoritarian challengers uninterested in global health leadership before and after the pandemic. Touted by Congress as a health crisis response success, USAFRICOM’s use of $26.07 million from the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) provided funds to prepare, prevent, and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic that saved millions of lives and demonstrated how cost-effective programs could deliver outsized results. Continued administration of these type of essential services demonstrates America’s commitment to African human security while advancing its ideological position against external competitors.

A critical component of the new U.S. strategy is its long-term commitment to democratic governance and adherence to the international rules-based order. The strategy outlines fixed priorities that are attentive to diplomacy and development, emphasizing liberal norms. As such, it facilitates a more coherent response to limiting competitor ambitions in Africa, acknowledging the importance of a strategy that rebalances U.S. influence on the continent against the rise of revisionist ideologies. On the other hand, it does not acknowledge the dilemma of advocating liberal norms in a competition environment or the ability of these norms to transform or shape negative behaviors. The democratic ideals of the new U.S. strategy sharply contrast with the governments of many of its current partners, such as Chad, Uganda, Cameroon, Niger, and South Sudan. There is a growing concern at the uptick of African states noticeably backsliding in their commitment to democracy and accountable governments through fair and credible elections. Remaining African partners have a precarious hold, at best, on democracy with concerning human rights track records. Annual findings indicate that Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, are consistently scored low in civil liberties and political rights by Freedom House, a non-profit organization researching political freedom

and human rights. This demonstrates that norm violations occur frequently, even under the influence of a democratic global power such as the United States.

The inconvenient truth is that the United States’ key security partners spanning Sub-Saharan Africa range in scale from fragile democratic governments to authoritarian regimes. Complicating its position promoting liberal norms is the U.S. narrative of Chinese “harmful activities” -- primarily China’s interests in African resources, state- sponsored loans, and a diverse range of investments across multiple sectors, which most Africans consider vital to development.

For over ten years, USAFRICOM security assistance has steadily become reactive, targeting groups seen as direct threats to U.S. interests utilizing a light counterterrorism footprint as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, pervasive instability and corruption continue to plague Africa, fueling a renewed trend of militarization. Throughout the continent, military presence is increasingly dominating African capitols while modern military weapons are flooding rural communities. The juxtaposition of indirect militarization of authoritarian African states with potential linkages to U.S. security partnerships and U.S. pro-democracy-themed messaging significantly impacts the legitimacy of U.S.-African relations. It also increases risk to U.S. interests.

Over time, this incohesive approach has proven ineffectual in some areas, producing uneven results with imperfect partners. As a result, U.S. security cooperation in Africa now requires a concerted alignment to address enduring destabilizing factors and new U.S. political objectives that challenge state actor adversaries, leveraging political and economic warfare and transnational threats. To its credit, the Biden Administration's Sub-Saharan Africa strategy attempts to balance U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development efforts. It outlines a subordinate role for the U.S. military and prioritizes increased diplomatic shaping by the Department of State , the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other supporting government agencies.

Turning a new page, the strategy infers the importance of the DoD’s unity of effort enablement of the U.S. security and institutional building roles in Africa. USAFRICOM, through its military and human security training, offers the most optimal and unique opportunities to shape and influence African security foundations and institutions. Through deliberate security reposturing, the author contends that the command can be positioned to positively influence political and security outcomes and compete across the theater through four pathways: recalibrating security partner choices; supporting African and European-led multilateral security initiatives; establishing regional security frameworks (RSF); and integrating more peace building and law enforcement training in SC engagements.

Chapter 3: Pathways to Rebalancing the U.S. Security Role in Africa

Any national security strategy must account for two immutable realities. First, cooperation from other countries is necessary to achieve its objectives; and second, most partners will simultaneously advance and impede those efforts. This paper presents ideas for optimizing security partnerships that remain critical to many aspects of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The recommended pathways will prove relevant when working with vulnerable or complicated countries to achieve regional objectives through transformative engagement. USAFRICOM faces multiple challenges to its promotion of African partner peace and prosperity to include zero-sum competition from adversaries in the foreign security sphere. Despite this, reactive responses to strategic competition must not frame the driving tasks of U.S. security cooperation platforms in Africa. Offering an affirmative vision is vital to rebuilding relations, validating good governance initiatives, and legitimizing African institutions through sustainable solutions. It should be assumed that some aspects of security cooperation in Africa will invariably remain reactive. Despite attempts to contemplate alternative futures, predicting unknowns in Africa is unattainable. Examples include the conflict in Ethiopia that continues to destabilize the Horn of Africa, escalating indiscriminate violence in the Sahel, the pressing crisis in Libya, and creeping state fragility across the continent. U.S. SC platforms will have to balance these long-standing issues with the narrower challenge of countering Russian and Chinese actions. Through this approach, USAFRICOM simultaneously empowers African military and policing efforts to defeat aggression and facilitate permissible environments that nurture sustainable security and stability. A deliberate U.S. focus on peace building and strengthening the international rule of law will have far more enduring effects than narrowly scoped competition targeting Russian and Chinese military influence.

This observation does not insinuate that the U.S. strategy in Africa will not need to be effective in challenging competitors. It merely cautions against framing it strictly in competition terms that diverts necessary focus from what U.S. priorities should be. To effectively do both, the United States must avoid zero-sum competition and offer an affirmative vision of security utilizing whole-of-society instruments to reset the U.S.- Africa approach. Across the theater, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) remain a serious threat to the United States, traditional partners, and allies. Extremist groups, such as the Islamic State in Libya, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali and Niger, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Sahel, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, prey upon marginalized populations, maintaining a frenetic pace of devastating attacks and cycles of violence to achieve their objectives. These groups cultivate an environment of distrust and despair to undermine and destabilize state and regional governments. International pressure has provided periodic successes, but the Pentagon’s funding priority shift towards strategic competition jeopardizes those gains. Multiple DoD-mandated U.S. Africa Command blank slate reviews, conducted between 2019 and 2022, mandated optimization of counter-violent extremist organization (C-VEO) operations and supporting force reductions by 20 to 30 percent. While many senior leaders familiar with the requirement described this decision as shortsighted, USAFRICOM maintains it will remain committed to continuing its enablement of African partners despite these austere measures. In a renewed era of strategic competition, the lessons of the last two decades have demonstrated that military action alone is insufficient and that U.S. security cooperation in Africa, as we know it is at a crossroads.

Cooperation Pathway: Recalibrating Security Partnerships Through a Convergence-Divergence Framework

Despite invocations of its global ambitions, the United States must accept that some longstanding allies and partners may not agree with its perceptions of threat and policy priorities. Knowing this does not negate the United States’ significant role in shaping the African security environment, especially if it resources a new approach. It merely implies that a new approach must go beyond conditionality and opportunistic bilateral partnerships with African countries demonstrating the potential to become effective security actors.

For over two decades, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Africa has relied on international cooperation and by, with, and through cost-effective measures to achieve enduring effects. Enhancing U.S. influence by strengthening security partnerships with critical states and institutions must remain a core tenet of any U.S. Africa strategy, primarily working by, with, and through those partners. Former USAFRICOM Director of Operations, Major General William Gayler, lamented the most important distinguishing factor in the U.S. partnership approach, “It’s about relationships, it’s not about access to a resource or a mineral, or sales of U.S. equipment. I think the relationships we build will have a far-lasting impact.” But not all partners are equal, and a systematic understanding of a potential partner’s political nature and shared perception of the threat is necessary to avoid conflicting interests within those relationships.

Developing solid relationships with compatible states remains fundamental to successfully fighting terrorism abroad. It is also a complex process. Democratic governments in Africa, especially new ones, tend to be fragile and vulnerable to interference from autocratic influences. The careful alignment of U.S. political objectives with compatible African and international partner interests will be instrumental in resetting U.S. involvement in African counterterrorism operations. Prioritizing U.S. SC support to governments that willingly reject autocratic influences and pandering from authoritarian adversaries promotes liberal normative behaviors and advances U.S. interests.

If the DoD prioritizes interoperable partnerships, optimizing cooperation will require a shift from a threat-centric paradigm to a partner-centric one that incorporates resources and time to assess expectations and develop shared security objectives.

Examining convergence and divergence factors provides a frame of reference for probing an actor’s priorities and informs assessments of what the United States can reasonably expect from that potential partner. More importantly, U.S. partner engagement strategies must implement a more systematic understanding of the political nature of actors that emphasizes interest alignment and practical incentives to counter misaligned interests.

U.S. military partnerships take diverse forms, but the primary purpose is building capacity and promoting transference of liberal norms. That said, the application of this approach can be negatively impacted by the diverging priorities of partner governments. Convergence factors identify opportunities based on mutual factors, while divergent factors highlight limitations of incompatible partnerships that affect the reputation and effectiveness of the U.S. and its actions. Conditionality shapes behavior and combines assistance rewards with the threat to withhold it. As a coercive tactic, conditionality works when threats are credible, and the costs imposed are high enough to yield the desired effect. This type of limited coercion has a shelf life that must be carried out, or it loses its potency. Moreover, any framework must factor in a monitoring process to assess performance measures and milestones that can inform the application of positive or negative conditionality to redress interest alignment when necessary.

Mali provides an example of a convergent CT partner that demonstrated multiple conflicting factors and eventually, over time, became completely divergent. For decades, the northern regions of Mali have been characterized by acute insecurity. To oust Islamic militants, French forces, augmented by various West African troop contributions and USAFRICOM support, began combat operations in the Sahel in 2013. Organized against several armed insurgencies, the French Army utilized tailored light-footprint expeditionary tactics that achieved some initial successes in urban areas. Still, the approach was ultimately ineffective in building partner-force capacity and deterring extremist activity dispersed throughout ungoverned spaces. After action reports from both United States and French observers emphasized the substantial role that local and central political dynamics played in undermining the French Army’s irregular warfare operations. Bringing things to a head, last year, the Malian government responded to France’s decision to scale down its counterterrorism force posture in the Sahel by increasing its partnership with the Wagner Group -- a Russian private military company. This signaled a deliberate choice by the Malian political elite to strengthen its domestic political position rather than a meaningful option to address its security issues. The French campaign, Operation Barkhane, provides a good example of how divergent interests and insufficient political capacity can become the great equalizer to a sophisticated and technologically superior expeditionary force. It also demonstrates the moral hazard of militarizing a repressive government that misuses those resources.

Mali is just one of many examples of U.S. security relationships being implicit in emboldening negative behaviors in Sub-Sahara Africa, particularly in areas where Islamist extremist groups are active. Research conducted by the Modern War Institute concluded that the United States had provided over $4.8 billion in SFA to multiple countries in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2015 and 2020. The largest recipients, Somalia, Kenya, and South Sudan, are considered essential partners to USAFRICOM’s counterterrorism operations in East Africa.

Joint doctrine prescribes SC and force assistance as tools designed to "maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place." With this in mind, cooperation is most effective when parties are compatible with shared security interests and objectives. At a minimum, all stakeholders must collectively align on the value of the threat and be dedicated to eradicating and containing threat actors that undermine institutions and stability. Making the most of these relationships by pre-determining successful performance measures for U.S.-enabled security platforms requires a determinant model that examines convergent and divergent interests between national, regional, and international interests. The framework identifies factors that indicate misaligned interests and provides an approach for identifying potential patterns to assess political and security interest compatibility for partner selection.

Cooperation Pathway: USAFRICOM Involvement in Multilateral Security Initiatives

Past lackluster or failed attempts to mediate or negotiate conflicts and support human rights in Africa has been interpreted by some African watchers as the U.S. openly ceding influence militarily and politically. Emerging global competitors were eagerly willing to fill the void. Learning from Europe and U.S. mistakes, China successfully adopted a narrative of constancy to African audiences. It has adeptly solidified ties through Chinese-led multilateral structures that support Beijing’s broader ambitions on the continent and globally. China’s messaging strategy, explicitly targeting the Global South, promotes solidarity and cooperation, starkly contrasting with U.S. messaging that tends to frame Africa as a theater of conflict and strife. The Biden administration has made substantive efforts to reframe its messaging to counter growing competitor influence. Still, Washington must be mindful that instability drivers in and beyond Africa, not perception, remains the primary concern of its African and European partners. For nearly half a century, the United States has experienced mixed results with building capacity in Africa unilaterally. To achieve better outcomes for the future, enduring security cooperation dictates the adoption of a more sustainable approach leveraging like-minded partners.

In her statement to the 73rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, H.E. Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garces stated that "multilateralism does not represent, in any sense, a threat to the sovereignty of states. On the contrary, multilateralism gives sovereign states the opportunity -- and means -- to solve complex challenges that it could not overcome on its own." The African Union has forged a unique security identity by creating a niche capability in peace operations. Its willingness to deploy troops into an African conflict to stabilize and set conditions for possible follow-on UN peacekeeping operations has become its distinctive role. This type of expert knowledge and understanding of regional dynamics embodies leveraging African solutions to African problems.

Through its organic peace and security architecture, the AU has signaled its desire to play a leading role in security solutions on the continent. This presents an opportunity for USAFRICOM to work closely with the AU’s Peace and Security Council and its eight Regional Economic Communities, important institutional pillars that provide an overarching continental integration framework. Initially established as economic integration drivers, the RECs gradually transitioned into peace and security actors.

As the primary U.S. SC proponent in Africa, USAFRICOM should prioritize opportunities to participate in African-led multilateral initiatives. This not only validates multinational cooperation but sets the U.S. apart from adversary authoritarian models that undercut the liberal norms of democracy, good governance, and human rights. Cost-informed decisions are an important aspect of cooperation in the new competition era. Twenty-first-century competition will require burden-sharing operations in complex environments. Cooperation frameworks provide access and influence, improve capabilities and response, and ensure concerted partnerships are focused on shared security interests. It also plays an essential role in demonstrating mechanisms that reinforce the rule of law and advocates the norms of rules based international systems to receptive nations.

As acknowledged earlier, the reprioritization of U.S. security requirements in Africa is necessary to mitigate the impacts of planned reduction measures to focus on strategic competition priorities in other theaters. Although not considered a leading DoD coordinator of persistent threats, strategic competition is and will remain a USAFRICOM top priority. Additional resources, even if available, will only partially resolve the security problems that plague the continent. A multitude of case studies examining unilateral approaches by foreign partners in Africa has proven that they do not work. Collective security does. Determining which priorities to elevate in multiple complex landscapes is sometimes unclear. USAFRICOM SC planners must be mindful that DoD’s increased focus on China and Russia should not undermine the command’s established relations with critical African counterterrorism partners. Opportunities to engage and cooperate with non-traditional partners must not only be considered but explored.

Bilateral relationships remain the best approach to continued access to highly fragile states like Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Libya. Access continues to be a core tenant of U.S. targeting efforts against dominant, violent extremist groups operating in Africa. Similarly, continued presence in extremely fragile states is vital to U.S. statecraft influence. Striking an appropriate balance between bilateral and multilateral

cooperation will remain a challenge, but harmonizing the two is necessary to maximize collective contributions and capabilities to remain a security partner of choice.

In contrast to the United States, China is a prolific participant in multinational peacekeeping operations and a significant security contributor to anti-piracy operations in Somalia, humanitarian disaster relief in post-conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo, and counterterrorism operations in Mali. For China, peacekeeping has become an effective tool for its international engagements in Africa and advances its foreign policy ambitions. China-Africa scholar David Shinn explains that China’s security interests on the continent are purposefully binary and closely linked to its economic investments. “China’s efforts to protect its interests and nationals in Africa are intricately linked to its long-term security policy. Its military strategy acknowledges that China’s growing international presence makes it more vulnerable and requires more attention to safeguarding the security of its overseas interests.”

Competition Pathway: A Framework for African Regional Security

Threat-centric relationships emphasize tactical cooperation, while multinational operations support full-spectrum partner-centric objectives as needed. Africa’s complex security problems will require coordinated intent to keep the pressure on extremism and guard against the future emergence of other nihilistic groups. Regional Security Frameworks (RSFs) establish a collective body to execute a nested strategy that addresses numerous factors contributing to instability. Approaching security through a regional framework also facilitates collective responsibility for shared challenges. By coalescing

U.S. bilateral relationships into regionally focused security frameworks under the auspice of African and international institutions, DoD can bolster long-term capabilities for its African allies and partners. The success of an RSF is heavily dependent on the application of effective diplomacy instruments to secure cooperation. Public diplomacy will be necessary to reinforce specific messages, while private diplomacy can facilitate discrete arrangements that enable collective security objectives.

Establishing a framework provides a straightforward strategic approach to capacity building and shared security concerns with regional partners. U.S. security cooperation enabled by a regional framework can effectively counter malign influence and aggression by reinforcing the rule of law and enabling host nation law enforcement operations that support peace operations, NGO stabilization efforts, and economic development projects. Within the diplomatic and military domains, RSFs can improve U.S. efforts to combat violent extremism by confronting deteriorating social and security conditions while simultaneously safeguarding U.S. national security interests. The optics of this security framework also reinforce U.S. commitment to defending the international rule of law, especially to its allies and partners. In this construct, the United States purposely defers the “lead nation” role to regional partners, acting as a facilitator between multiple parties who share complex histories and likely face intense pressures from U.S. competitors. In a supporting role, USAFRICOM enables the RSFs with recommendations regarding strategic gaps, seams, and risks for prioritizing efforts and attribution of military power via enhanced common understanding and enabling force allocation through resource balancing. Additionally, embedded USAFRICOM representatives can facilitate routine touch points and engagements with interagency counterparts to enable whole-of-government coordination and alignment.

What is far less clear is how Africans will perceive this concept. U.S. African policy and defense strategists interviewed by the author agree that RSFs could be instrumental in actualizing a regional shared security concept; however, African countries have historically been hesitant to be seen as part of such a design. This indecision does not make the RSF untenable. On the contrary, it can be a forcing function for developing a narrative that heavily emphasizes (1) U.S.-enabled coordination on shared security issues and (2) encourages continued cooperative integration with the U.S., Europe, and other regional actors, including China—to help make the framework more palatable to African governments. The uniqueness of the African RSF is its broader security arrangement that offers relative autonomy to participants supported by intellectual direction and material resources from the U.S.

East Africa, a growing economic and strategically important subregion provides an optimal environment for an RSF, particularly the Horn of Africa. To date, Chinese interests and activities in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait are strictly economically focused but continue to be influenced by development projects. Beijing has taken no actions to assert itself as a regional security provider but uses instability in the Horn to depict U.S. efforts as strategic failures. Despite its supposed neutral posture, China continues to increase its military presence near strategic waterways and sea lines of communication. This competitive environment with inherent socio-political challenges makes a compelling argument that East Africa is ideal for RSF proof of concept. An indirect, integrated deterrence approach built from military and diplomatic foundations would strengthen the U.S. position in the Red Sea while simultaneously investing in regional cooperation for sustainable security.

The proposed East Regional Security Framework (ERSF) could potentially nullify adversary influence that threatens both U.S. and partner interests by imposing consequences on negative behaviors from regional actors. Partners that contribute to a collective security architecture benefit from a security apparatus that is quantitatively and technologically superior to their own. This advantage, coupled with U.S.-led exercises and training focused on capacity, real-world scenarios, and interoperability, could provide a multinational response to illicit predatory activities such as illegal and unregulated fishing, piracy, human smuggling, and weapons trafficking.

Existing USAFRICOM cooperation opportunities that embrace a whole-of- government approach would elevate the RSF’s shared vision of enhanced security in the region. For instance, the Command’s EXPRESS maritime exercise series is an example of tailored regional training for African partners that address multiple transnational security concerns. EXPRESS exercise training objectives focus on combined maritime law enforcement capacity, interdiction tactics, C2, and COMREL between the U.S., African nations, and international partners. Continued deployment of this type of broad- reaching diplomacy and defense cooperation in multiple regions helps negate drivers of conflict and corruption.

Competition Pathway: Integrating Peacebuilding and Stability Initiatives in U.S. Security Training

USAFRICOM leadership must remain firmly committed to systematic, reliable, and strategic peacebuilding partnerships that lay the foundation for sustained development. Peace building is a term for activities improving human rights through education, monitoring, and the rule of law implementation. The peace process is most effective when it accompanies thriving security institutions that provide basic administration of essential services. Even during the initial stages of peace building, USAFRICOM can demonstrate proactive efforts to assist African institutions in developing indigenous conflict resolution methods.

Strong signaling of intentions is an essential first step in shaping behavior. A coordinated communication plan is an effective tool to articulate new U.S. priorities in Africa. An integrated communications strategy to develop constructive regional engagement plans would ideally be led by the State Department and supported by USAFRICOM. Bolstering the perception of U.S. engagement in Africa should include developing a posture and access agenda in critical regions. Proof of concept opportunities exist in multilateral security initiatives; forecasted command-hosted key leader engagements between senior USAFRICOM staff, ambassadors, and influential African leaders that reinforce the commitment to regional security strategies and counter strategic challenger influence; joint communication strategies tailored to regional partner priorities emphasizing the U.S. as a positive alternative to challenger security partnerships; establishment of regional coordination fusion cells to create unity of effort on regional security and counterterrorism operations; and the creation of a robust media strategy that increases the visibility of positive U.S. engagements and cooperation projects in African media.

Chapter 4: Great-Power Security Rivalry in Africa

Understanding the shifting geopolitics, competing aims, and the convergent and divergent dynamics of SC in Africa requires an examination of the primary actors involved. Africa hosts many of the world's fastest-growing economies, fueled by its critical commodities amid a global development resurgence. It is also a continent of persistent challenges—weak governments, systemic corruption, and human rights abuses; increasingly high debt burdens; and lacking infrastructure for economic growth and investment. Prevalent throughout the continent are persistent transnational threats that directly affect Africa’s long-term stability and the United States’ interests.

Economic interdependence, international systems, and dominant nationalism are all critical elements shaping the current competitive era. The U.S. perspective of this rivalry, outlined in the 2022 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance and the Secretary of Defense’s 2021 Message to the Force, characterizes it as strategic competition, a deterrence and defense mechanism against malicious activities eroding the U.S. military advantage and undermining its influence globally. Both strategic documents describe the United States’ explicit intent to compete and win against emerging revisionist powers, Russia and China, in a complex security environment. But once again Africa sees itself caught in the middle. Past great-power belligerents fought over access to the continent to facilitate self-serving national interests; future great-power confrontations will be no different. Since 2013, the United States has found its position in Africa challenged by China’s surging economic interests and Russia’s intensified presence. Both countries seek a competitive advantage through aggressive trade agreements, investments, and military, political, and security partnerships. America’s approach to its principal competitors in Africa would benefit from a proactive and confident posture vice being defensive and reactive.

The United States and DoD, through USAFRICOM, will have to make hard choices to effectively rebalance current CT operations to amplify other soft security cooperation mechanisms. Selective U.S. presence and engagement have emboldened adversaries and hindered U.S.’s influence to shape African security and law enforcement apparatuses necessary to facilitate stability. The current administration recognized this and the need to reverse the U.S. position from its previous African policies. The new strategy prefers dependable partners and allies who champion liberal norms. Unfortunately, governance in Africa will undoubtedly remain complicated for the foreseeable future, exacerbated by urbanization, corruption, and a rising disaffected youth population. This assertion does not intimate that U.S. involvement alone will address Africa's problems.

The significance of America’s impact in Africa solely depends on what the United States dictates as important. The last U.S. president to visit the continent was Barack Obama in 2015. Eschewing recent policy mistakes and lack of attention, the new U.S. Sub-Saharan Africa strategy represents an opportunity to actualize the U.S. ethos of promoting prosperity and success to developing nations. Despite increasing contemporary forms of democratic backsliding, Africans still strongly believe in democracy. Polling conducted last year by Afrobarometer, a non-profit pan-African survey research network, indicates that 68 percent of Africans espouse and support democratic principles. The survey’s conclusive findings state, “despite the global decline of democracy, many African countries are showing hopeful signs of resilience but are still susceptible to armed conflict and instability.”

Despite this, positive change is happening across Africa, and African institutions are essential to that change. While the rest of the world shifted to a more protectionist posture, Africa created an emerging continental trade framework and sought solutions to its transnational threats and security problems. To promote unity and solidarity in African states’ security, the African Union and other African organizations are collectively working to create multinational responses to counter insurgents and transnational threats. Yet, these same challenges require complex solutions, and many African countries continue to signal a preference for the United States as the security partner to counter those threats. The United States must capitalize on these gains by being consistent and playing to its strengths, championing self-determinism and global institutions. Ideally, African security efforts are bolstered by foreign cooperation and peacekeeping operations that promote and affirm a viable security and development nexus. An ideal U.S. security cooperation strategy is inclusive of African institutions, adaptable when necessary to selective cooperation and contestation, and, most importantly, focuses on African success.

A Competitive Coexistence: Defining a U.S.– China Relationship in Africa

In the reemergence of strategic competition, China and the United States have differing engagement approaches in Africa. While an increased Chinese presence threatens U.S. influence, it is indisputable that China is aiding the needs of Africans in some capacity. China has taken a gradualist approach to shed its previous noninterference policy in Africa and deftly uses security in coordination with its diplomatic and economic policies. Since 1990, China has laid the foundations to increase its SC relationships across the continent, resulting in a more robust and visible military posture active in South Sudan, Somalia, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali. China has committed over 3,500 combat troops toward a long-term approach that contrasts with U.S. levels of involvement. China will continue to leverage trade and investment as its primary engagement tools, but its behavior in Africa could also be considered convergent with U.S. national interests. Beijing’s preference for multilateral and multinational military cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and the African Union demonstrates this. China currently has more deployed troops supporting international operations than any other permanent member of the Security Council.

The China-Africa relationship can be examined through three distinctive periods. In 1955 during the Cold War, cooperative relations deepened with China’s involvement in Africa as part of a non-aligned movement that attempted -- with varying degrees of success -- to avoid taking sides in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. This engagement continued under Mao’s philosophy of promoting wars of national liberation around the globe. After Mao died in 1976, China underwent significant policy reforms with new leadership that shifted its focus internally to economic development. China's return to Africa began in the late 1980s during tremendous growth, primarily driven by its need to enhance its commercial competitiveness and expand its influence on the continent. Beijing’s influence in Africa simultaneously serves its national interests and counters U.S. prestige. Tied to that influence is the support China gains from its African allies in international forums and institutions. Beijing’s strategy in Africa is holistic, using all instruments of power in a uniquely Chinese fashion that many African nations aspire to emulate. Author J. Peter Pham expanded on this by stating, “Many Africans sincerely view China as a model for emulation. They draw parallels between China’s humiliation at the hands of Western powers in the 19th and 20th centuries and their own experience of colonialism.” China represents an alternative to Western governance models, and its relationships in Africa are rapidly maturing in breadth and depth. And yet, U.S. and Chinese goals do not necessarily conflict. While competitive in some regards, China’s behavior in Africa today has slowly transitioned from Cold War-era divergence to globalized convergence with liberal international norms. The norms that China advocates for in the international systems tend to revolve around a strict interpretation of sovereignty. This enables China to present itself as a balanced actor willing to engage with all involved parties while largely placating authoritarian and military-controlled nations that ignore democratic governance norms and commit human rights violations . Despite this, engagement by both powers ultimately serves the interests of Africans.

Politically, Africa is critical to Beijing gaining political support in the international system. According to Eric Olander, co-founder and editor-in-chief of the China Global South Project:

More than any other region, Africa votes as a block in international institutions like the UN. African votes supporting China’s human rights policies, the endorsement of Chinese notions of sovereignty, and development embracing Chinese technology are worth far more to Beijing than African raw materials.

Economically, China’s encroachment in Africa has expanded its political leverage and increased its ability to function as a geopolitical competitor. However, that alone will not necessarily supplant the U.S.’s position as a primary security partner. The limitations of its hard and soft power have made Beijing acutely aware that it is far from achieving a status comparable to the U.S. in this domain. However, this has not deterred its efforts to seek ways to protect Chinese citizens and investments and indirectly challenge U.S. presence on the continent. President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively tied SC to its foreign policy intentions. This has enabled the development of China’s first military base abroad in Djibouti and solidified military cooperation agreements with twenty-five other African countries. These agreements, coupled with ongoing negotiations to develop other potential bases and military support facilities, show a commitment to protect its strategic interests and expand security relationships. China has carefully crafted an image as a defender of sovereignty, a champion of development that leverages international institutions to promote multilateral interactions. However, its willful indifference to criminality, corruption, and brutality remains a source of divergence from the United States. The United States, in contrast, focuses on supporting fragile post-conflict transitions and combating sources of instability and conflict. Its promotion of democracy, peace, and prosperity with supporting actions is the key to rebuilding its credibility. Despite the differences in approach and priorities, China, as a balanced actor, can complement the new U.S. initiatives in the Sub-Saharan Africa strategy. Unavoidably, there will be both competitive dynamics and cooperative necessities with China to advance U.S. and African vital interests on an array of transnational issues such as terrorism, climate change, arms control, and health security. Knowing this, U.S. global competition with China should not overshadow its security objectives and engagements with African nations.

Second Time Around: Russia’s Return to Africa

There are very few upsides to Russia’s involvement in Africa. After nearly two decades of limited activity, it is aggressively reinvigorating ties with historical partners and establishing cooperation options with new ones. President Putin has intentionally pursued permissive environments for investment to mitigate imposed global sanctions, and Africa provides an optimal environment. Russia does not have the resources of China or the United States. It purposely maintains a small economic footprint preferring to expand its nuclear energy portfolios and export paramilitary training and expertise to seize political opportunities. Russia, unlike China, is far less concerned with goodwill investments in Africa. It solely views Africa as a lucrative market for arms sales.

Engagements in North Africa expanded reach in the Central African Republic and the Sahel, and closer ties in southern Africa have significantly expanded Russia’s influence. Through this path, it has become the world's largest arms exporter to Africa. Moscow’s focus on enhancing existing partnerships and increasing its strategic engagements in Africa is also paying off politically. Seventeen African countries abstained in the March 2022 vote of the UN General Assembly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s presence on the continent represents Moscow’s desire to reassert its global influence, extend its global market access, and enable its power projection goals. This directly threatens U.S. influence and is becoming a more dire threat to European allies. Russian security forces have supplanted French peacekeeping units in Mali, and Wagner Group mercenaries now operate in Sudan, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Mozambique. Since 2007, Russia has revitalized its military- economic foothold in Africa, quadrupled arms sales within the past decade, and increased its military cooperation with several African countries. Moscow discreetly negotiates extensive foreign military arms deals through state-owned companies selling large quantities of Russian aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery systems, air defense systems, and integrated coastal area monitoring systems to African countries.

Under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia has established nineteen military cooperation agreements in East, West, and Central Africa. Although these agreements vary in scope and scale, their progress in Africa would be far more limited if countered by a committed U.S. presence. Lost opportunities and vacillating policies created power vacuums that afforded Russia the access opportunities it now has.

Opportunism became a pivotal enabler to Russia’s low-cost and low-risk strategies in Africa. Yet, compared to China and the United States, Russia offers little sustainable development that African states need. The Kremlin only sees opportunities for advancing state interests and influence, primarily its energy companies and arms sales. The Wagner Group is often provocateurs of instability, blurring the line between private and state interventions. By exploiting weak governments, typically engaged in intrastate conflicts, Russia can advance its geostrategic interests at very little cost to Russia.

The Russian footprint remains selective and limited, but not for lack of trying. Moscow routinely engages African countries on the Mediterranean and Red Seas to facilitate port and airfield access. Its aggressive interventions in North and West Africa exacerbate fragile and complex regional dynamics. While the United States and allied democracies focus on European and Asian crises, 1.4 billion Africans are constantly deluged by Russian disinformation and anti-West propaganda campaigns that are gaining traction. Moscow’s support of authoritarian governments challenges the United States and European Union liberal order norms, driving a wedge between African states and their traditional western partners. Ignoring Russian influence may be a misstep, but a more significant mistake would be falsely inflating its actions and ambitions. Russia lacks the resources, intent, and ideology of its predecessor, the Soviet Union. The U.S. should frame current military security engagements between Russia and Africa as opportunistic and transactional. Research findings show that for the foreseeable future, Russia will remain a divergent influence on U.S. efforts that demand competition without overestimating its impact in Africa.

Managing growing tensions with China and Russia is essential to the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy. The United States must be prepared to challenge China and Russia’s discrediting campaigns and baited actions and, when necessary, exhibit restraint. Investing in competitive advantages that play to America’s strengths and articulate an inclusive vision for long-term security reinforces its partnership-based approach and reaffirms the intentions of the new U.S.-Africa policy.

Chapter 5: Enhancing Partnership Through Sustainable Development and Soft Security

Proactive actions that counter instability drivers translate into prevention and are ultimately more cost-effective than reactive mitigation. Moreover, developing lines of effort that increase African partners’ ability to face security threats are far more sustainable in the long term than utilizing conventional military forces. So, how can the United States balance its counterterrorism requirements in Africa within the broader context of offering sustainable security solutions while competing with Russia and China?

The new U.S. policy in Africa underscores the inclusion of resiliency programs in cooperation platforms to strengthen fragile states. A litany of social science research studies has concluded that violent extremism spreads through localized conflict by groups manipulating local grievances to gain position and authority. Mitigating and preventing extremism with fewer military resources demands novel approaches emphasizing community empowerment and collective action. First, there is a need to reevaluate and repurpose, where applicable, command counterterrorism resources. The U.S. State Department, with USAID supported by DoD, has taken the lead on implementing new approaches by developing “soft security” programs that focus on educational training for vulnerable populations, normative messaging through local media sources, and creating employment opportunities in rural communities. The long-term nature of CT requires constant strategy adjustment and rebalance, especially as non-state actors become increasingly resilient to conventional CT tactics and methods. Divergent competition actors openly target susceptible states that contribute to or facilitate extremism. The dynamic of destabilizing actions, which include supplying arms, enabling corrupt and authoritarian governments, and exploiting disorder, challenge U.S. efforts in Africa.

Second, U.S. CT preventative measures should generate sustainable strategic effects executed in tandem with other U.S. tools of national power. This means downshifting from a military-centric approach and increasing involvement in necessary stabilization and development efforts. To align with the new U.S. policy reset, USAFRICOM CT cooperation moving forward should always include support and security provisions to civilian-led institutions, joint civil-military operations -- e.g., Women, Peace, and Security initiatives; DoD partnerships with development projects; law enforcement training and exercises; aggressive information operations that disrupt and discredit extremist narratives; information sharing with international peacekeeping partners; and support to the European Union’s comprehensive Africa agenda to develop conflict resolution strategies and alleviate migratory pressure.

Chapter 6: USAFRICOM Women, Peace, and Security Initiatives

In her address, “The Role of Women in Peace and Security,” Monde Muyangwa, Director of the Wilson Center’s Africa Program, stated, "A country can achieve sustainable peace and security only if women are included." Sub-Saharan Africa faces multi-dimensional security risks in the twenty-first century. Therefore, any comprehensive security cooperation approach must account for gender perspectives in soft security sectors such as climate security, human trafficking, gender-based violence, health security, maritime security, and refugee/migration crises.

Counterterrorism as a top U.S. priority was once the sole driver of US-African partnerships, yet the violence committed under the pretext of CT was rarely held to account. Violence still disproportionately affects women and girls in conflict and exacerbates existing gender discrimination. When conflict responses are militarized, conflict resolution and peace building initiatives become less of a priority. The Leahy law requires human rights vetting of provisional DoD assistance to foreign partner security forces; however, this requirement does not apply to counterterrorism operations assisted by U.S. SOF forces. Defining a holistic security approach must include the soft security issues that impact the most vulnerable. Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) is a policy that identifies the need for women to be critical players in providing solutions to sustainable international peace and security. WPS advocates a gendered perspective and meaningful participation of women in peace processes, peace building, and security. The core premise of the U.S. Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 is that men, women, boys, and girls experience conflict, instability, and disaster differently due to society- defined gender roles and cultural norms. Integrating women and gender perspectives enhances operational effectiveness and enables meaningful security and defense participation.

To increase its WPS efforts, the DoD developed the 2020 DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan as a critical step in advancing its approach to gender roles and the promotion of inclusivity across the spectrum of conflict. The DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan outline three DoD WPS objectives, two of which are the primary responsibility of the Combatant Commands: (Objective 2) Women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors; and (Objective 3) Partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are projected, especially during conflict and crisis. The WPS guiding principles are actualized through cross-cutting whole-of-government and whole-of-society capabilities that support USAFRICOM efforts to build partner nations' defense capacities and integrate gender perspectives in key security focus areas. USAFRICOM has deliberately included WPS activities, operations, and investments in command campaign planning and its security cooperation platforms with partner nations to account for this. In addition, over thirty WPS Gender Focal Points have been trained in understanding the complex security needs and cultural nuances of the environment, as well as the potential adverse effects of joint operations on host nation civilians.

Despite this progress, USAFRICOM's WPS efforts pale in comparison to other combatant command programs with similarly sized theaters of operations, such as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). USINDOPACOM's meaningful implementation of gender-focused training, outreach, and media engagement in the region and near completion of a regional gender network fully operationalize the DoD WPS mandate. Comparatively, USAFRICOM has one full-time advisor to USINDOPACOM's full-time command gender advisor, WPS curriculum developer, gender analyst, and WPS planner. Through its senior leader-led WPS conferences, roundtables, and engagements, USINDOPACOM serves as an exemplar to USAFRICOM on the necessary initiatives required for a tailored and innovative WPS approach in Africa. Going forward, USAFRICOM's commitment to its WPS program will need to be prioritized as an essential tool to demonstrate the Command’s commitment to complex human security challenges within the theater. Elevating gender dynamics and human rights violations in DoD African security engagements confirms the U.S.’s resolve to uphold human rights and rule of law as an example to others.

Successful U.S. preventative strategies in Africa require a whole-of-government approach. Past methods of addressing transnational threats were reactive and resource intensive yet failed to yield durable strategic results. The United States must be as committed to its long-term goals as its revisionist competition. Traditional by, with, and through will continue to enable USAFRICOM’s deterrence methods and partner nation resistance capabilities. Now is the time for a more comprehensive application of by, with, and through that incorporates legitimizing institutions, supporting the rule of law, and bolstering justice mechanisms. Understandably, USAFRICOM will never achieve total omniscience of every problem that ails Africa -- recognized capacity gaps remain in almost every region. It can, however, share prevention strategies that empower and promote existing security partnerships to counter instability drivers that increasingly have no borders.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Experience has shown that solutions developed by non-Africans for African issues are not helpful, and dialogue with vested stakeholders for what works best for the continent is necessary. It can be assumed that strategic rivalries in Africa will inevitably be complicated and enduring. More importantly, the United States must acknowledge that the current competitive environment has given African nations a choice. African governments have shown that they are willing to work with U.S.-perceived challengers, extremist organizations, and criminal groups to achieve specific goals.

Although these concessions are pragmatically effective at times, they are often politically unpalatable to Western partners. This actuality makes for an uncertain future when coupled with the United States’ limited ability to compete with China’s multibillion-dollar investments and Russia’s opportunistic diplomacy. With this in mind, the U.S. has signaled it is ready to move beyond ideological rhetoric and provide concrete and tangible deliverables to its African partners. This research paper’s interconnected findings demonstrate that reframing U.S. strategic competition policies, security priorities and integrating stabilization initiatives can lead to a rebalanced U.S. security approach. First, responsible partner choice is a critical factor to rebalancing U.S. partnerships in Africa. Applying weighted methods that identify divergent and convergent indicators when evaluating potential partners and competitor actors can inform long-term partnership viability predictions. Second, traditional alliance dynamics are relevant but limited. Multilateral initiatives, such as a regional security framework with traditional and non-traditional partners, can facilitate increased access, cooperation, and burden sharing. Third, a reset in the U.S.-Africa relationship necessitates a modified security cooperation approach that incorporates human security programs and soft security initiatives leveraging U.S. statecraft.

This paper also identified U.S. cooperation and competition pathways that reinforce effective long-term stabilization. The key to controlling violence through security relationships in the modern era is the restoration of legitimacy, safeguarding liberal norm institutions, and enabling their authority within the existing international rule of law framework. The linkages of effective policing and security relationships remain essential, whether implemented by international forces, national military forces, local law enforcement, or a combination of all three. Creating a secure environment is, in a greater sense, more important than conflict.

Following the recent rollout of the U.S. Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy, the U.S. messaging strategy on priorities and assistance should continue to be framed as a mutually beneficial investment in Africa’s security and development. Otherwise, press conference platitudes on the predatory behaviors of U.S. adversaries will continue to fall on deaf ears. If African prosperity is genuinely the desired end state of U.S. strategy, meaningful engagement and committed support to security and stabilization efforts will attract foreign investment and create market opportunities that better align with the needs of Africa and its people.

About the Author

Ms. Russell assumed the duties of Branch Chief for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J255), U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) J2, J25, in September 2020. She is responsible for all aspects of planning, organizing, developing, and executing intelligence strategies to drive objectives and evaluations of Intelligence Campaign Planning supporting CCMD efforts. Before her duties with USAFRICOM J25, Ms. Russell was the Joint Staff J5, U.S. Special Operations Command (JSOC) lead responsible for providing strategic guidance to command support agencies and military organizations and overseeing JS J25 horizontal integration within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise on National Defense strategic priorities. Ms. Russell also serves as a senior intelligence officer in the United States Army Reserves. She received her BA from Southern Illinois University, an MA and MS from the University of Oklahoma, and an MA from the U.S. Naval War College.