Strategic Competition in Central Asia - Post-Afghanistan

By Major Joel Springstead, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Commander Sander Mathews, U.S. Navy; and Major Nicholas Brougham, U.S. Air Force

Editor's Note:  This team thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint and Combined Warfighting Center, Joint Forces Staff College.  The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer:  The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

The work that cannot be done by one-hundred thousand cavalry, can be done by one correct arrangement. 

—Amir Timur (Tamerlane the Great) The Sport of Goat-pulling

Figures 1,2: Game of Buzkashi: Taken by Author on March 22, 2021, Joel Springstead.

On the grassy slopes of the Chaktal Mountain range not far from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, dozens of men from nearby villages demonstrated the traditional game of Buzkashi, a Central Asian rural pastime in which many tough players, called Chapandaz, vie for control of a headless goat carcass. A cohort of tourists, U.S. diplomats, and U.S. military observed the sport from the bed of a Soviet-era cargo truck. The spectators were excited but confused about what was unfolding before them. Buzkashi, translated as goat-pulling or goat-grabbing, is a zero-sum game of winners and losers with flexible rules. This version spanned across multiple fields without set boundaries, and to the audience, the game appeared chaotic and lacking an overall strategy. However, as the game progressed, it became evident a strategy did exist. Individually, even the strongest of the horsemen had trouble breaking through the opposition’s unrelenting stings of whips. The ones who did succeed were supported by friends or relatives. While the teammates did not share in the victor’s spotlight, it became clear they did share the prize money.

The lessons of Buzkashi can become entangled with thoughts of the geopolitics of U.S. engagement in Central Asia (CA) and, by extension, our strategic competition with China and Russia in this small portion of the global stage. 

CA, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have on more than one occasion been placed at the crossroads of geopolitical and economic competition between powerful nation-states. A new power vacuum exists following the U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. China and Russia have an opportunity to expand their influence in Central and South Asia (CASA) since the U.S. and its allies decided to remove themselves from the 20-year conflict in Afghanistan. The U.S. has sunk over $2.3 trillion into Afghanistan and is now shifting resources and efforts to other areas around the world. Is investment in CA still important to the U.S. without our troops in Afghanistan? The answer is yes, for the sake of strategic competition. 

This article explains why CA is a key geopolitical area for strategic competition with China and Russia and explores the concepts and resources the U.S. can employ to lead efforts in this arena. This is a critical resourcing and policy issue for the U.S. Government because trust cannot be surged, and trust is an essential factor in partnerships with CA states. Our credibility as a reliable partner and balance to Chinese and Russian dominance will be determined over the next decade. To borrow a lesson from Buzkashi, perhaps the best strategy for the U.S. in CA is to be the supporting teammate enabling our partners and allies to score the winning goal. To avoid the historical traps of what Rudyard Kipling coined as the “Great Game” in CA, the U.S. should focus on the long- term goals of building trust with our CA partners by supporting their sovereignty. The U.S. should also work with allies from outside of CA to build a winning team. Our partners in CA win, and we all share in the prize - a stable region integrated into the world economy and international order, rather than giving up the region to China and Russia.

Another Round of the Great Game?

To operate in CA today, it is necessary to understand realpolitik in CA as it was. CA has been the battleground of strategic competition throughout modern history. While primarily ignored during the Cold War, various powers have tried to influence CA in a political and diplomatic confrontation known as the “Great Game.” There are four significant periods of the “Great Game,” starting in 1813 with the advent of the original “Great Game” and continuing into the 21st century with the “American-Taliban Great Game.” The “Classical Great Game,” which spanned most of the 19th century and made inroads into the beginning of the 20th century, was waged between Great Britain and Russia over Afghanistan and CASA. As Russia made encroachments into CA, Britain unsuccessfully invaded Afghanistan attempting to place pro- British regimes in Kabul and protect their imperialistic interests in India. The Great Game ended when Russia and Britain became allies in WWI. However, geopolitical machinations in the region were far from over. Between 1917-1941, the “Anglo-Soviet Great Game” found the British invading Afghanistan again to settle the border between Afghanistan and British India. The leaders in Kabul used the British-Soviet rivalry to their advantage, trying to maintain political and military independence.

Figure 3: Map of Central Asia. Source: Created using MapChart, Accessed on February 26, 2022, https://mapchart.net/.

With the decline of the British Empire came a new rivalry: the “Soviet-American Great Game” of 1979-1989. The Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 to support the pro-Russian regime in Kabul led to wide-reaching consequences. The U.S. and its allies attempted to limit Russian influence in the region by providing military and financial support to the Afghan insurgents. After the Soviets withdrew from the region, the resulting chaos from tribal infighting allowed for the rise of the Taliban. This led to the 21st-century iteration of this conflict, the “American-Taliban Great Game.” The 9/11 terrorist attacks led to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Eventually, the U.S. lessened its military presence in the country, but in 2003 the Taliban and splinter groups reemerged as an insurgency. Pakistan also played its part in the conflict by helping the U.S. and simultaneously harboring Taliban fighters. In February 2020, the U.S. made a treaty with the Taliban, which promised the total removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021. The resulting withdrawal led to the collapse of the Karzai regime and the reinstatement of the Taliban as the sole power in the region.

So, where will the next decade take us? Another iteration of the “Great Game” being played out in CA? While it is tempting to look at the history of strategic competition in CA as a repeat of the “Great Game,” it is essential to consider new factors and new ways of looking at competition in CASA. A significant factor is the formation of independent Central Asian states in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR). These nation states, while young, have added their voice to the world stage, which allows them to interact globally within international organizations and constructs. This contrasts to times when CASA was ruled by tribal chiefs, emirates, and the USSR. While Central Asian states have in certain aspects been ruled by dictatorial-like regimes, democratic progress has been made in some countries thanks to the efforts of international assistance from the U.S. and allies, as well as new leadership in CA. 

A primary driving factor for the ruling party in CA countries is regime survival. However, part of the equation is the ability to successfully navigate the strategic desires of great powers to avoid losing sovereignty while simultaneously playing the field to acquire assistance to support the state's interests. If a CA country fails to skirt this line, they risk becoming controlled by a more powerful state, or in the situation of Ukraine in 2022, risk losing sovereignty to an imposing power.

The strategy of courting many friends in moderation has been carried out in other parts of Eurasia. For example, Mongolia is bordered by China and Russia and has adopted a “third neighbor” policy to preserve its sovereignty. Mongolia has balanced its investments with powers by partnering with multiple non-geographically connected countries such as the U.S., China, and Russia on diplomacy, security, and trade. This enables Mongolia to benefit from assistance without invoking the hand of any great power due to a perception of taking sides. To illustrate this practice, Mongolia focuses its military instrument of national power not to dissuade an invading force but rather to contribute to peace-keeping operations for the United Nations.

Mongolia benefits by earning legitimacy and respect in the international community, which is practical because its only hope of defending its territory relies on the international community's intervention. A similar stratagem can be seen in CA. Uzbekistan’s foreign policy document states that Uzbekistan will not allow foreign bases on its territory, join security blocks, nor deploy their forces abroad. Uzbekistan’s motive is to retain sovereignty by distancing itself from geopolitically sensitive issues by adhering to these principles.

The U.S. can support CA states with this balancing act to strategically compete in CA. Comparatively speaking, a dollar spent in CA goes further in strategic competition than many other parts of the world. Relatively small but consistent investment in CA states provides a balance to relying on U.S. strategic competitors in areas such as economic investment (China) or defense equipment (Russia) without triggering a reprisal from either competitor. Simultaneously, CA states become more resistant to malign influence, making it harder for China and Russia to ensnare them through dependence. The U.S. stands to gain by supporting stable states to pursue mutually beneficial interests in the region. To further examine U.S. interests, we will now explore the nation’s strategic documents.

Why the U.S. Still Cares about Central Asia

The President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), signed in March 2021, outlines several key priorities, such as: “The U.S. will reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world; the U.S. will reaffirm, invest in, and modernize the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and its alliances with Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, along with other global alliances and partnerships; the U.S. will work with allies to share responsibilities equitably, while encouraging them to invest in their own comparative advantages against shared current and future threats.”

The interim guidance also stresses “the U.S. will also double down on building partnerships throughout the world.” Filtering the INSSG down to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater, the April 2021 Posture Statement of General McKenzie, Commander of USCENTCOM, given to the Senate Armed Services Committee, explains that the 2018 NDS directs the Department of Defense to increase lethality, strengthen alliances, and expand the competitive space. In the context of USCENTCOM’s strategic space, this translates into the pursuit of Line of Effort (LoE) 1: Deterring Iran, LoE 2: Countering VEOs, and LoE 3: Long- term Competition with China and Russia. Gen McKenzie said, “in CA, where proximity to China and Russia is great, and U.S. presence is comparatively small, every interaction holds significance. Opportunities to compete with China and Russia in this region manifest themselves through border security, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and defense institution building.” As encapsulated in its overall mission, USCENTCOM will continue to focus on regional partnerships and cooperation.

Forming the Right Team

Which organizations or allies are best to partner with the U.S. in CA? NATO has had direct engagement with CA but may not be the best organization to employ strategically. NATO’s direct partnerships in CA began when all five countries joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The NACC was established to include former Warsaw Pact members and was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. Additionally, all five countries eventually joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace, which was established in 1994 as a way for countries to build individual, tailored relationships with NATO. A key area of cooperation between NATO and each country in CA in the security sector is building capabilities and interoperability. NATO’s Istanbul Summit in 2004 expanded its presence in Afghanistan and pledged to support military training in Iraq. Leaders at the Summit also agreed “to place a special focus on the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.”

Following the summit, a few positions were created to oversee NATO activities and liaise with these two regions. The Special Representative to the NATO Secretary General position was created to oversee a NATO Liaison Officer for each region. However, the liaison position for CA was canceled in 2017, indicating higher priorities. NATO may not be the best face of security engagement in CA due to the implications of invoking a strong reaction from China or Russia. Under these circumstances, it may be better for individual NATO members with interests in CA, such as the United Kingdom (U.K.), to collaborate with the U.S. to meet objectives.

While China, Russia, and the U.S. seem to dominate the headlines in CA, it is essential to note the investments of other U.S. allies, particularly Japan, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), both of which have vested interests in the region. The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs and the Davis Center of Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University held a seminar series titled “Central Asia Plus Japan: The Evolving Role of Tokyo in Central Asia” and “Understanding Korea-Central Asia Connections” in the Spring of 2021. They discussed, “since the emergence of the post-Soviet republics in 1992, both Japan and South Korea have turned to the region to become key partners and sources of infrastructure development”.  Japan and South Korea specifically have invested in four areas comprising: “technology and technical expertise (particularly in terms of political and financial reform); capital (infrastructure, public services, social dimensions such as education, and healthcare); diplomatic support; and cultural influence/diplomacy (manga, K-Pop, etc.).” According to the Davis Center, “these four areas have proven effective, allowing Japan and South Korea to establish themselves as significant players” in CA. Trade and foreign direct investment from Japan and South Korea have enabled Central Asian states to balance geopolitical pressure against China and Russia.

The Davis Center’s findings also state, “Japan and South Korea can aid the US and Europe in their project to promote regional cooperation and connectivity as a means of enhancing its collective bargaining power vis-a-vis neighboring powers.” The U.S. and Europe share common interests with Japan and South Korea in “promoting stability, diversification of energy supplies, and tourism and opportunities for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).” The Davis Center’s report found, “Japanese security activities on the Tajik-Afghan border share a commonality with Western objectives to stabilize the region to limit the activities of organized criminals and Islamist militants.” Also, for Korea, “Central Asia offered a promising new market and significant natural resources. Throughout the 1990s, Korean foreign policy began to emphasize the importance of its Koryo-Saram Korean diaspora, around half a million of whom reside in Russia and Central Asia.”

These seminars also found CA is not the primary focus of Japan and South Korea’s interests. However, both countries are developing a more “subtle, and potentially more effective, long-term strategy in the region.” “In the face of larger and more accessible concessional loans from Beijing, middle powers such as Japan and South Korea have opted to emphasize the quality of their investments, focus on infrastructure and technology, and not make support contingent on political conditions being met.” “Both actors could benefit from greater coordination with one another and with outside actors such as the United States and European Union to more effectively promote peace and prosperity through socio-economic development in the region.” Central Asian leaders have strengthened their diplomatic toolkits, balancing this new cast of regional actors by pursuing foreign policies to support their sovereignty.

Recommendations

The U.S. needs to lead a multinational, multi-vectored approach utilizing the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to promote the sovereignty of Central Asian states to compete efficiently and effectively. The integration of security cooperation will enable the West to challenge China and Russia from a geographically significant location. ^,  With the collapse of the coalition-backed government in Afghanistan, U.S. resources will quickly be diverted to other pressing needs in different theaters. However, CA should not be forgotten. It is challenging to predict CA’s future following the U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, but we must maintain our influence through political, military, and economic ties.

China and Russia have both made public statements offering to protect their interests in CA. ^, Without competition in CA, China can focus on competition in the Pacific and throughout the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Without a challenge in CA, Russia can concentrate its limited competition resources on advancing its interests along the European periphery. It is uncertain how the Taliban-run government will interact with China, Russia, and the Central Asian States. Concerns and threats of the proliferation of radical ideology, weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics remain.

The U.S. can maximize the resources it spends in CA by partnering with our allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the U.K. to reinforce the sovereignty of CA states and make them more resistant to geopolitical and economic pressures from China and Russia. This can be done with relatively modest investment through security cooperation (training, equipment, and advisement), economic development (trade, education, and infrastructure projects), and sharing good governance and democratic practices in a non-threatening way. 

This process will have its roots in the country teams at U.S. Embassies in CA to enable a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approach. Still, leadership and policymakers at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, USCENTCOM, the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, and others need to drive this process to guide efforts and maximize national resources for enduring solutions. 

We can effectively compete by maintaining a modest investment and utilizing our partners and allies to maximize CA sovereignty and independence. Without sustained, moderate investment in Central Asia, these states will be left to “fight for the goat” without the support of the United States. CA states face dim prospects for the future as they seek to navigate a shaky geopolitical situation while attempting to maintain their own sovereignty against our strategic competitors. Our goal is not to compete to win in this contest. Instead, we seek to remain a credible partner, along with our Western and East Asian Allies, to strengthen CA’s institutions from malign external influence while increasing resiliency against global risks.

About the Authors

Major Joel Springstead is currently serving as a policy analyst at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He was commissioned through ROTC at Oregon State University in 2007. He earned a BA in History from Oregon State University in 2007 and an MA in Regional Studies focusing on Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University in 2016. Prior to his current assignment, Major Springstead served as the Chief of Military Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan; as a Country Director for multiple countries in Central and Eastern Europe at U.S. European Command J5; S4 at the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), and Headquarters Detachment Commander for the 84th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion including a combat tour in Iraq.

Lieutenant Commander Sander Mathews is assigned to U.S. Strategic Command as a Branch Chief. He was commissioned through the Seaman-to-Admiral Program in 2009. He earned a BA in International Studies from Old Dominion University in 2009, an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University, and an MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College in 2018. His prior assignments include Deputy Department Head onboard USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER; a Joint Intelligence Planner at Indo-Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center; Deputy J2 at United Nations Security Council Resolution, Enforcement Coordination Center; J2 at Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula; Intelligence Briefer at the Chief of Naval Operations- Intelligence Plot; and various operational intelligence watch positions onboard Eisenhower, USS CARL VINSON, USS WASP, and USS NASSAU.

Major Nicholas Brougham is currently serving as the Air Training and Exercise Coordinator at NATO Special Operations Headquarters. He was commissioned through OTS in 2008. Major Brougham earned a BS in Management Information Systems from Pennsylvania State University in 2006, an MS in Management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 2014, and a Master of Operational Studies from Army Command and General Staff College in 2021.