SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CUBA: THE IMPACT OF NORMALIZATION ON THE COAST GUARD’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CUBAN BORDER GUARD

By Commander Derek Cromwell, U.S. Coast Guard

Editor's Note:  Commander Cromwell's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Because of its length, The Journal has shortened its content to fit publication limits. The Editor found this to be one of the best written in contents and quality of writing and recommends readers to view the full thesis at www.faoa.org.  The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite the ups and downs in the political and diplomatic relationship, bilateral cooperation between the United States and Cuba still needs to continue, if only because the  countries are so close geographically and have many security and other interests in common. Enduring relationships, such as those between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard, are a testament to what can be accomplished when common ground is established through areas of mutual security concern. As the only branch of the armed forces with law enforcement statutory authority, the Coast Guard’s unique authorities improve international engagement and security cooperation in complex political environments. This distinctive instrument of U.S. soft power is not widely understood nor  well documented, and the Coast Guard’s longstanding relationship with the Cuban Border     Guard is no exception.

This research examines the Coast Guard’s maritime security relationship with the Cuban Border Guard -- before, during, and after normalization -- through a qualitative case  study comparison of five distinct mission areas: drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and port security. The Coast Guard’s  early, incremental successes with the Cuban Border Guard represent important   foundational building blocks, positioning this well-established security relationship for considerable growth and expanded cooperation during the Obama administration’s thaw in U.S.-Cuba relations. Furthermore, implications of the Coast Guard’s relationship with the   Cuban Border Guard as a model for use with other countries, especially those with political  differences that otherwise limit constructive dialogue and cooperation, is also considered.   Finally, by reviewing the after effects of the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S.-Cuba     policy, specifically the impacts on the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard security relationship, it can be recognized that such a policy reversal does not serve the national security interests of the United States.

The operational focus of the Coast Guard’s maritime security cooperation with the   Cuban Border Guard, combined with measured growth in mission areas of mutual concern,  are key factors in the long-term success of this important relationship. The Coast Guard’s investment in the permanent in-person liaison position at U.S. Embassy Havana is another  key factor that signals commitment to a cooperative relationship built on trust and mutual  respect. Expanded cooperation between Coast Guard and Cuban authorities across multiple   mission areas during normalization is also noteworthy. In fact, the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard relationship served as a catalyst for broader bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The United States and Cuba negotiated and signed multiple security arrangements, developed new frameworks for the exchange of information, and expanded  security dialogues across the law enforcement spectrum.

With no significant concentration of bilateral security exchanges since early 2018,  the United States should take steps to reinvigorate important dialogues on counter- narcotics, illegal migration, counterterrorism, and mass rescue operations, among others. Instead of using the still unexplained health incidents as an excuse to marginalize U.S.- Cuba relations, the United States should collaborate with Cuba’s scientific and medical experts in the continued search for an explanation. The following recommendations  encourage a return to increased law enforcement cooperation with Cuban authorities and best serve the national security interests of the United States:

(1)  Renew counter drug cooperation and information sharing. This renewal would likely lead to increased drug disruptions and interdictions, as well as deter further expansion of drug trafficking networks.

(2)  Restore Embassy Havana diplomatic staffing, reestablish consular services,  and return to commitments outlined in the migration accords. Although illegal migration from Cuba to the United States has continued to trend down substantially since the 2017 repeal of wet foot/dry foot, increased sanctions combined with the challenges of currency  reunification, COVID-19, and the lack of accessible consular services have pressurized the  possibility of another wave of illegal migration.

(3)  Rekindle the periodic reciprocal exchange series between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard. Search and rescue is a mainstay in this longstanding security relationship, but the last semi-annual technical exchange took place in January 2018. The maritime safety and security implications associated with these areas of mutual concern are too significant to ignore.

(4)  Now that the United States and Cuba have established a shared framework  for oil spill response and contingency planning, continued cooperation in this relatively new but critical area of mutual security concern should be encouraged.

(5)  Finally, regardless of whether maritime travel and trade builds back to normalization era levels under President Biden, port security cooperation must continue to play an important role moving forward.

(6)  Despite Trump’s traditional hardline approach regarding Cuba, none of the 22 signed bilateral agreements stemming from normalization were vacated. The Biden administration should take this opportunity to renew bilateral security cooperation in areas  of mutual concern, including the Coast Guard’s longstanding relationship with the Cuban    Border Guard.

INTRODUCTION

The Obama administration’s historic shift in U.S.-Cuba policy led to significant bilateral engagement and remarkable gains across numerous sectors during the first phase of normalization. Removing Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, reestablishing diplomatic relations, and increasing travel, trade, and the exchange of information represented three major steps in the policy shift away from economic sanctions and other efforts to isolate Cuba. Renewed medical and scientific research, the restoration  of commercial air and cruise passenger travel, substantial growth in Cuba’s entrepreneurial small business sector, and the repeal of the 1995 wet-foot/dry-foot illegal migration policy, represent other recent advances.

With so many positive developments during normalization, people would tend to think the bilateral security relationship would remain strong and multi-faceted with  numerous mature relationships involving various U.S. government agencies and their Cuban counterparts. To the contrary, the significant expansion of cooperation across the security sector during normalization cooled dramatically during the Trump administration, which was accelerated primarily by the dramatic reduction in Embassy staff following the  still unexplained health incidents that affected U.S. diplomats serving in Havana. The last significant concentration of bilateral security exchanges took place in the first few months    of 2018 and included dialogues on counter-narcotics, illegal migration, cybersecurity, preventing terrorism, oil spill response, and mass rescue operations. Similarly, consular services all but shuttered as immigrant visa case processing moved to the U.S. Embassy in  Georgetown, Guyana, and the coveted five-year multiple entry tourist visa was reduced to a single entry valid for three months, and only obtainable off-island at other U.S. consulates. 

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite the ups and downs in the political and diplomatic relationship, bilateral cooperation between the United States and Cuba still needs to continue, if only because the  countries are so close geographically and have many security and other interests in common. Although the bilateral security relationship has quieted considerably, all 22 bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding remain in place. Enduring relationships involving aviation security, Transportation Security Administration (TSA),  maritime security (Coast Guard), and monthly military-to-military fence line talks in Guantanamo continue, albeit at a much slower pace.

Perhaps Randy Beardsworth correctly asserts, “the most well-established functional relationship between the two governments exists between the U.S. Coast Guard    and Cuban Border Guard (Tropas Guarda fronteras).” As the only branch of the military with law enforcement statutory authority, the Coast Guard’s unique authorities improve international engagement and security cooperation in complex political    environments, specifically in the maritime domain. Surprisingly, this distinctive instrument of U.S. soft power is not widely understood nor well documented, and the Coast Guard’s longstanding relationship with the Cuban Border Guard is no exception.

DEFINING SECURITY COOPERATION 

Security cooperation includes a broad spectrum of activities with foreign defense and security forces that promote U.S. national security interests and foreign policy objectives, while developing partner nation capabilities and supporting contingency operations for U.S. military forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) is the established lead agency for activities or operations involving foreign military or defense components.  However, complicated or limited security relationships, such as the U.S. military’s interactions with Cuba’s armed forces, are organized by DOS through the interagency developed Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). Although defense cooperation is limited to   monthly fence line talks at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, security cooperation involving other U.S. agencies and organizations occurs regularly in areas of shared security  concern, such as law enforcement, counterterrorism, environmental protection, and SAR. For the purposes of this research, it is important to note the utility of the Coast Guard as a    military branch operating under DHS, which provides DOD and DOS with unique authorities and capabilities to support security cooperation. With eleven statutory missions supporting various aspects of maritime safety, maritime security, and marine environmental protection, the Coast Guard is often times a “door opener” for national security and foreign policy objectives. 

GREATER  REGIONAL COOPERATION

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War, it can be argued that the last remnant faded with the Obama administration’s push for the normalization of relations with Cuba. Obama’s dramatic thaw in U.S.-Cuba policy was certainly about changing the playbook within the limits of the trade embargo, but it was also an effort to improve wider U.S. cooperation with the Caribbean region and Latin America. As Leo Grande explained, “Obama’s opening to Cuba was undertaken in part because of the deterioration in U.S. relations with Latin America caused by the old policy, and his December 17, 2014, announcement received universal and enthusiastic  endorsement throughout the hemisphere.”   Tulchin and Espach made similar assertions 20 years ago when they advocated for the reintegration of Cuba into Caribbean regional affairs.  If the United States continues to soften gradually its approach toward the Castro regime, Cuba’s democratic Caribbean neighbors, its European trade partners, and Canada will expect the Cuban government likewise to loosen its domestic controls and political freedoms. …change in Cuba – whether the economy becomes a thriving economic competitor to the industries of other Caribbean nations, or the country lapses into political chaos – carries potential threats to the security of the region. …In the long term future, a thriving, stable Cuba cooperatively active in regional initiatives and institutions could significantly increase the leverage of the region in its extra-regional affairs. 

Ambassador Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Chargé d’Affaires Embassy Havana, 2014–2017,  and a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s normalization efforts, also emphasized Cuba’s importance in the regional context. During an interview with the author on  December 30, 2020, he described it this way,

There was a consensus within the administration that the policy toward Cuba had failed to achieve its objectives, and Cuba was changing. The policy that needed to be put in place was one that could more effectively impact that change. Added to this was the fact that neighbors in the Western    Hemisphere, even among our closest allies, were telling us that this was a situation that had to be fixed, that it was interfering in our agenda for the region, and it was disrupting the common agenda we were trying to build with other countries in the region.

Finally, as Susan Rice, Obama’s national security advisor, lamented in her recent memoir, the U.S. decades-old Cuba policy had done nothing to change the political or economic equation on the island. Instead, “the U.S. was reviled by much of Latin America   as a Goliath trying in vain to squeeze the life out of a Davidian Cuba. Our dated Cuba policy was a ball and chain dragging down our broader efforts to strengthen U.S. ties to Latin America and the Caribbean and to bolster the wave of democratic progress that had washed over large swaths of the region.”

Conclusion

Two lessons stand out from this broad-brush overview of the changing nature of security in the Caribbean and Latin America, not only from a regional perspective, but more importantly, in terms of how Cuba fits into the puzzle. The significance of the Coast   Guard’s maritime security relationship with the Cuban Border Guard will become clear in    the chapter case studies that follow, but it is important to begin with the understanding that  the secret to the relationship’s longevity lies in the operational focus and measured growth in mission areas of mutual security concern.  Additionally, the increasing awareness can be  seen amongst U.S. policymakers and security professionals of Cuba’s importance to a more  integrated, multilateral regional security framework.

SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH  DRUG  INTERDICTION

Current Perspective

Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, drug trafficking was identified as one of the principal threats to U.S. national security. Although   overshadowed by the war on terror in the last two decades, drug trafficking has continued  to threaten U.S. security, and regained priority focus in the last few years because of the devastating opioid epidemic facing the United States. Of the 750,000 Americans who died from drug overdoses from 1999 to 2018, opioids contributed to an estimated 46,000 drug overdose deaths in 2018 alone. 

Despite the opioid focus, the use of cocaine and amphetamine type stimulants is also causing major problems. Cocaine trafficking from Colombia north to Central America  and the United States continues to present significant challenges to law enforcement and security forces across the region. Of the reported 1,311 metric tons (MT) of cocaine seized    globally in 2018, 85 percent was seized in the Americas (1,114 MT). Although the bulk of    trafficking routes have shifted from the Caribbean to the Eastern Pacific over the last 10 -- 15 years, an estimated 90 percent of Colombian-produced cocaine is destined for the United States. From 2014–2018, cocaine seizures in the North America sub-region tripled from 91 MT to 272 MT. Several contributing factors should be considered when examining   the exponential increase in cocaine seizures from 2008 to 2018 (71 percent increase), including the expansion in manufacturing and trafficking, largely attributed to the suspension of aerial eradication efforts in Colombia. The increased quantity of seizures is  also attributed to greater cooperation with international law enforcement partners. 

With such widespread consequences, it is unusual that Cuba does not contend with  the same significant consumption and transshipment problems associated with the illegal drug trade. Even though Cuba is situated squarely between Colombia (the number one cocaine producing country) and the United States (the number one consumer of cocaine), Cuba does not have a significant drug problem. As indicated in the Department of State’s annual report of global narcotics control, “Cuba is not a major consumer, producer, or transit point of illicit drugs.” 

To put it in perspective, Cuban authorities seize an average of two MT of illegal drugs annually (combined air and maritime), the majority of which is maritime seizures of   marijuana found washed up along Cuba’s southeastern coast (from disrupted marijuana smuggling runs between Jamaica and the Bahamas). Cuban authorities seized 2.72 MT of illegal drugs in the maritime domain (2.5 MT marijuana and 225 kilograms (kg) cocaine) and another 30 kg at international airport checkpoints in 2016 (an average yearly total for illegal drug seizures in Cuba). 2017 saw the highest seizure totals in recent years, with Cuban authorities recovering 244 bales or 4.57 MT of illegal drugs that washed up along their shores (97 percent of which was marijuana) that was jettisoned from an estimated   63 go-fast vessels.

Hold What You’ve Got 

Despite the Trump administration’s efforts to roll back U.S.-Cuba normalization, the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard continued to cooperate operationally in the fight  against drug trafficking. Another first in the bilateral security relationship occurred on July 7, 2018, when Coast Guard officials transferred a representative drug sample and case package to Cuban authorities (the transfer took place in conjunction with an unrelated migrant repatriation). The evidence, collected from 611 pounds of jettisoned marijuana recovered by Coast Guard cutter VIGILANT and Port Security Unit 309 in early June near     the Guantanamo Bay naval station entrance, enabled Cuban authorities to prosecute two Jamaican nationals detained that same afternoon by the Cuban Border Guard. The close coordination between the Coast Guard Seventh District and Cuban Border Guard command centers enabled the near simultaneous interdiction and apprehension of the smugglers and  their go-fast vessel in Cuban waters.   

The well-established success of the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard relationship  helped pave the way for better coordination between the drug enforcement authorities of both countries. In conjunction with the July 2016 signing of the bilateral counter-drug arrangement, the DEA established direct communication channels with Cuba’s DNA. The   exchange of information on numerous drug investigations, coupled with law enforcement   cooperation and the subsequent arrests of U.S. fugitives by Cuban authorities, was certainly    encouraging. The 4th and last counter-narcotics technical exchange was hosted by DEA in Washington, DC on January 19, 2018. A range of topics was discussed, including money  laundering, use of the internet to sell and distribute, and the opioid epidemic in the United  States. Both delegations provided an overview of their drug prevention programs.

Conclusion  

The periodicity of law enforcement cooperation slowed during the second half of Trump’s presidency, but there is renewed optimism as the U.S. transitions to President Biden. Law enforcement and counter-drug cooperation have long been areas of mutual interest for the United States and Cuba, and despite Trump’s traditional hard line approach,   none of the 22 signed bilateral agreements were vacated. Renewed cooperation and information sharing between the United States and Cuba will likely lead to increased drug   disruptions and interdictions, as well as curb further expansion of drug trafficking networks.

SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH     MIGRANT INTERDICTION

Policy Milestones  and Operational Successes

The trust shared today between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard developed incrementally over decades. As Noble describes, the resident Coast Guard liaison position, established in September 2000 to increase counter-drug cooperation and combat illegal migration, was also borne out of necessity for closer coordination following  the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue shoot down.

Despite numerous warnings from the Cuban government through various channels  (formal and informal), the Clinton administration failed to recognize the seriousness of Fidel Castro’s admonitions. On February 24, 1996, Castro had finally had enough of the unauthorized entries into Cuban airspace and ordered Cuban military jets to shoot down the Brothers to the Rescue planes. Two of the three planes did not return to South Florida,   and four Cuban Americans lost their lives that fateful afternoon. Founded in 1991 by Cuban   exile José Basulto, Brothers to the Rescue assisted the Coast Guard in the search for thousands of rafters crossing the Florida Straits. After the 1994 mass migration crisis subsided, Basulto’s humanitarian mission evolved, becoming increasingly provocative as his small planes repeatedly violated Cuban airspace, on occasion even dropping anti-Castro  propaganda over Havana proper. 

The controversial incident fueled at sea protests and memorial services by Cuban Americans. Worried about incursions into Cuban territorial waters and another  international incident, the Coast Guard sent a Seventh District (Miami) staff officer to Havana on periodic “circuit rides” to help foster better communication with the Cuban Border Guard (and to assess the potential for a permanently staffed resident position). 

In the 1994 migration accord, Cuba agreed to prevent unsafe departures while the United States agreed to interdict rafters at sea and transfer them to the temporarily established migrant camps. The 1995 accord established the direct repatriation mechanism still used today for Cuban migrants interdicted at sea. Semi-annual migration talks combined with Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard operational coordination and technical exchanges have deepened the shared understanding of the challenges and complexities inherent to countering illegal migration along the U.S.-Cuba maritime border. A key factor contributing to the Coast Guard’s success intercepting illegal migrants over the last 25 years has been Cuban Border Guard notifications. Despite this positive information sharing aspect, it is sometimes misconstrued that Cuban authorities are not willing to stop illegal departures. As Noble emphasized, “Cuban [officials are] not going to put their people in ‘harm’s way [in order to take the undocumented migrants] off their rafts, or shoot at [smuggling] go-fast boats.” Notifying the Coast Guard and enabling the migrant interdiction five hours to a few days later, when they are tired and less likely to be aggressive, is a preferable alternative to the potential risk associated with forcing them to stop. For every illegal departure reported by the Cuban Border Guard, shore patrols and local citizenry reporting thwart two to three times as many. 

The surge in Cuban migrants arriving along the United States southwest border from 2014 through 2016 is attributed, in part, to the Cuban government changing its “long- standing policy of requiring an exit permit… for Cubans to travel abroad.” Prior to the January 2013 change, it was rare for Cubans to receive permission to travel off the island.   As emphasized in the beginning of this chapter, the Obama administration’s thaw in U.S. relations with Cuba was another contributing factor to the increase in Cuban migration, as  many Cubans believed the CAA would soon go away. In response, Washington was aggressive with strategic messaging in an effort to squelch such rumors, stating repeatedly  the Obama administration had no plans to change U.S. immigration policy with regard to Cubans. Unfortunately, this messaging did little to assuage illegal migration, as Cubans grew increasingly desperate. The  Coast Guard faced a wide range of very difficult maritime  interdiction scenarios (wet foot), including self-inflicted gunshot wounds, as some migrants opted to shoot themselves in the lower left abdomen in extreme hopes of being airlifted by helicopter to medical facilities in South Florida (dry foot). 

Although the Obama administration’s public messaging suggested no changes were  afoot, high-level negotiations were taking place between U.S. and Cuban officials in conjunction with other 2016 bilateral dialogues. For instance, Ambassador Kristie Kenney,   Counselor of the State Department, headed the U.S. delegation during the third Bilateral Commission held in Havana on May 16, 2016. Then Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, who was also part of this U.S. delegation, attended the Bilateral Commission and met separately with his Cuban security counterparts ahead of the second Law Enforcement Dialogue on May 17, 2016. Deputy Secretary Mayorkas’s visit came on the heels of the historic signing of a memorandum of understanding between  the Department of Homeland Security, Cuba’s Ministry of Interior, and Cuba’s Customs Authority, a security cooperation arrangement first discussed during Mayorkas’s October 2015 visit to Havana. On the margins of these May 2016 bilateral exchanges, Ambassador Kenney and  Deputy Secretary Mayorkas quietly engaged in the beginnings of   a series of negotiations that would ultimately repeal wet foot/dry foot. 

On January 12, 2017, President Obama announced the immediate termination of the special status afforded Cubans migrants who stepped foot on U.S. soil. The Joint Statement Communique between the United States and Cuba Concerning Normalizing Migration Procedures:

…[outlined] certain measures which were agreed in order to promote   migration between the two countries that is safe, legal and orderly. Actions    agreed in the Joint Statement [included] the return of Cubans attempting to  migrate illegally to the United States, the end of the wet foot/dry foot policy   and the parole program for Cuban health care professionals, and application to Cuban nationals of the same migration procedures and standards that are  applicable to nationals of other countries.   

In an instant, the pull factor contributing to illegal migration from Cuba evaporated. The Coast Guard went from interdicting more than 5,000 Cuban migrants in fiscal year 2016 to just over 2,000 in fiscal year (FY)17, the majority of which were interdicted between October 1, 2016, and January 11, 2017 (before the policy’s end). FY18 interdictions totaled a mere 200 by August 14. Dramatic declines also occurred at and between ports of entry along the southwest border (58,269 in  FY16; 20,955 in FY17; 6,044   in FY18 (as of August 21)). For the first time in more than 20 years, the maritime flow of migrants (Cuban, Haitian, and Dominican combined) was such that Coast Guard and other U.S. law enforcement resources could be balanced against other security priorities.

Conclusion

In response to the still unresolved health incidents affecting U.S. diplomats serving in Cuba, the Trump Administration all but closed the Embassy Havana in October 2017.   Since then, consular services have been severely limited with immigrant visa processing occurring at the U.S. Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana, while Cubans applying for non- immigrant or tourist visas, or simply in need of a renewal,  must schedule through and travel  to U.S. embassies or consulates in other countries. Consequently, the U.S. agreement under   the 1994 migration accords to issue 20,000 immigrant visas annually was last honored in 2016. Furthermore, the last round of semi-annual migration talks took place in Washington, DC in July 2018. Although illegal migration from Cuba to the United States has continued to trend down substantially, the Biden administration should consider the   restoration of Embassy Havana diplomatic staffing (to September 2017 levels), the re-establishment of consular services, and a return to full participation in the semi-annual U.S.-Cuba migration talks. These measures will go a long way to releasing some of the pressure that has steadily increased within the populace since the downsizing of Embassy  Havana in October 2017.

SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH   SEARCH AND RESCUE

Search and Rescue Builds Trust

SAR is more than just the Coast Guard’s legacy “bread and butter” mission. Areas  of mutual interest, such as SAR, are starting points or bridges to building trust in  challenging or adversarial relationships with foreign countries. In 1978, the Carter administration first encouraged Coast Guard cooperation with the Cuban Border Guard as   part of confidence-building steps aimed at normalizing relations with Cuba. The two sides  met in Havana that January and discussed improving communications and SAR coordination. Although Cuba’s military adventures in Angola and Ethiopia sidelined the Carter administration’s normalization efforts, this early Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard dialogue led to the establishment of a teletype communications channel for SAR coordination and the beginnings of security cooperation. 

Communications via message evolved from teletype to email over the years, but established voice communications protocols remained elusive until the spring of 2015. Spurred by the December 2014 U.S.-Cuba normalization announcements, the Coast Guard and SAR Cuba  (Cuba’s whole-of-government construct for aeronautical and maritime SAR  coordination) finalized bilateral SAR operational procedures with the exchange of diplomatic notes. In addition, vessel-to-vessel and command center-to-command center communications protocols were established that significantly improved Coast Guard-SAR  Cuba response coordination. These newly approved procedures eliminated the legacy requirement to route SAR-related messages through respective foreign ministries for review and approval. In less than six months, Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard command centers progressed from limited direct voice communications to routinely  contacting each other by telephone for SAR coordination.

Clearing the Airspace

It seems simple enough, but something as benign as obtaining aircraft overflight authorization from another country can significantly affect the odds for shipwreck survivors. Years of cooperation between the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities, coupled with the January 2017 U.S.-Cuba SAR agreement, enabled the Seventh Coast Guard District (Miami) to obtain aircraft overflight clearance quickly from  Cuba’s foreign ministry during a September 2018 response. With 28 Jamaican fishermen forced to  abandon their burning 130-foot fishing vessel deep in the Caribbean basin, the Coast Guard   and Colombian Navy were racing against time. As Captain Shawn Koch, chief of incident  management for the Seventh District, explained, “This [overflight authorization] cut off at  least two additional hours of flying [the Clearwater based HC-130 Hercules] around the western tip of Cuba.” Thanks to the prompt cooperation from Cuban authorities, the HC- 130 aircrew was able to locate the fishermen during the initial aircraft sortie, who were clinging to debris and the capsized vessel’s hull. After dropping life rafts from the HC-130,  the Coast Guard coordinated the successful rescue of all 28 survivors with assistance from  nearby motor tanker CHALLENGE POLLUX. The Colombian Navy then transferred the SAR survivors ashore in San Andres, Colombia for medical care.106 The importance of quickly obtaining overflight clearance of Cuba to the success of this rescue effort was not   lost on the HC-130 lead pilot. As Commander Troy Glendye stated, “The fact that we were  able to do that for this case was monumental.” 

The first instance of a Coast Guard overflight of Cuban airspace in support of SAR  occurred September 5, 2014. Larry and Jane Glazer, Rochester real estate developers, passed out at the controls of their TBM-900 aircraft while flying at 25,000 feet on their way to Naples, Florida. With the plane proceeding southeast on autopilot, the Coast Guard   coordinated an HC-130 Hercules overflight of Cuba, arriving in the search area shortly after the plane disappeared from radar (approximately 14 miles north of Jamaica). While no one survived, the Coast Guard’s ability to work directly with Cuban authorities ensured  the HC-130 was on scene shortly after the crash. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) scrambled two F-16 fighter jets to follow the plane as it tracked south   along the Florida Coast; the fighter jets broke off from their escort at the boundary of Cuba’s territorial airspace. Even without established diplomatic ties, the relationship between the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities served as the benchmark for cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Although established protocols existed for coordinating SAR cases with Cuba, this case predated the historic announcements by Presidents Obama and Castro by a few months. The uncertainty of this first ever SAR overflight of Cuba caused some senior Coast Guard officials to question the safety of the HC-130 aircrew. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations and no formal SAR agreement, the Coast Guard HC-130 received timely overflight clearance and transited Cuban airspace without incident.

Increased Search and Rescue Coordination

As normalization initiatives expanded in scope, the Coast Guard and Cuban Border   Guard benefited from consistent semi-annual technical exchanges from January 2015 through January 2018, including fruitful discussions that enhanced SAR collaboration. On  January 18, 2017, the bilateral SAR operational procedures (first agreed upon in 2015) got   an upgrade as representatives from the U.S. and Cuban governments signed the Agreement    on Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue at the Hotel Nacional in Havana. As the  Department of State explained, “The purpose of this Agreement is to strengthen cooperation in the field of maritime and aeronautical search and rescue in order to enhance effectiveness and efficiency in assisting persons in distress and to act in furtherance of obligations under international law.” Although the Trump administration opted not to further normalization efforts, and the various bilateral security dialogues were shelved because of safety concerns over the unexplained health incidents that affected U.S. diplomats, SAR cooperation continued to prosper from this collaborative foundation. 

Conclusion

The Biden administration would do well to reinvigorate the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard semi-annual technical exchange series. As one of only a few Western Hemisphere countries with a truly integrated, whole-of-government approach to SAR, Cuba shares the U.S. goal of reinforcing international SAR standards, both air and   maritime, with regional neighbors. Similarly, renewed attention should be dedicated to the  mass rescue operations dialogue begun in 2017, another shared interest that has significant implications to maritime safety and security.

SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH   MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Preventing Another Deepwater Horizon

An estimated five billion barrels of untapped oil reserve exists under the ocean floor  off Cuba’s northwest coast, and for more than a decade, Cuban authorities have been conducting offshore oil exploration through partnerships with Spain, Russia, Malaysia, and  Venezuela, to name a few. As Booth further explains, Cuba got the attention of U.S. regulatory and environmental response agencies in February 2012, when it began drilling offshore exploratory wells in partnership with Repsol, a Madrid headquartered deep ocean drilling company. With the massive Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico not even two years old, U.S. authorities worried about the environmental and economic consequences should a similar blowout occur in Cuban waters, approximately 60 miles south of the Florida Keys. 

To make matters worse, the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba complicated cooperation, forbidding U.S. oil industry and spill response experts from partnering with Cuba, and limiting direct U.S.-Cuba government cooperation. In fact, only limited environmental cooperation existed between U.S. non-governmental organizations,   academic institutions, and Cuba’s scientific community prior to Deepwater Horizon. The very first dialogue that addressed the environmental concerns associated with Cuba’s expanding oil and gas sector was nurtured by the Environmental  Defense Fund. To avoid   stiff penalties associated with the embargo, Repsol’s sophisticated Scarabeo 9 semi-submersible drilling rig was constructed with less than 10 percent of U.S. manufactured components, including the critically important blowout preventer. In the event of a    blowout, the closest capping stack -- not U.S. manufactured -- was in Scotland, at least one   week from delivery to the offshore site. Moreover, disposal of oil collected from such a spill would also be hampered by the embargo.

Conclusion

The Coast Guard’s early efforts to develop oil spill response coordination protocols   with Cuban authorities through the MTOP multilateral forum are noteworthy and indicative  of the shared concern for environmental protection. As seen with the previous case studies  on other building blocks of U.S.- Cuba security cooperation, the oil spill preparedness and   response relationship needed U.S.- Cuba normalization to truly flourish. The Biden administration should encourage continued cooperation in this relatively new but critical area of  U.S.- Cuba maritime security cooperation, especially now that the oil spill response    implementation CUBUS Plan is complete. As emphasized with the 2016 incident involving motor tanker KRITI AMBER, this bilateral coordinating instrument has wider applicability    to shared environmental threats in the maritime domain.

SECURITY COOPERATION THROUGH   PORT SECURITY

Expanded Opportunities (Secure Trade and Travel)

As part of the expanded dialogue between DHS and Cuba’s MININT and AGR, a comprehensive secure trade and travel working group consisting of various component organizations from both countries was envisioned. This Secure Trade and Travel Flows working group first convened on September 28, 2016 in Washington, DC. The DHS delegation was co-chaired by Alan Bersin, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, and Seth Stodder, Assistant Secretary for Border, Immigration, and Trade Policy. Senior representatives from DHS components included the Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and the TSA. Cuba’s delegation was comprised of senior officials from the Border Guard, Port Authority, Immigration, Customs Authority, Civil Aviation Authority, Cybersecurity, and  MINREX. This expanded security collaboration was a tenet of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between DHS and MININT-AGR in May 2016. As explained by senior DHS border and transportation security officials before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security:

The MOU sets the basis of cooperation in exchanging risk information for travelers, cargo or conveyances in international transit; the continuation of periodic, mutual, and reciprocal assessments regarding air, sea, and port security; and the coordination of transportation security, screening of cargo, travelers baggage, and the design of secure, efficient inspection facilities at ports and airports, among other things. 

Highlights from the Secure Trade and Travel Flows exchange included Cuba’s approval for the Coast Guard’s continued IPS program dialogue and port security visits, the cultivation of a CBP-AGR relationship similar to that of the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard, and the coordination necessary to finalize TSA’s federal air marshal  initiative aboard U.S. commercial flights operating between Cuba and the United States. In addition, the Cuban Border Guard reiterated its concern about the increasing risk associated with growing recreational vessel flows and the importance of continued SAR coordination and improved law enforcement information sharing. AGR proposed a future  reciprocal CBP visit to Havana and expressed appreciation for the canine security exchange   proposed by TSA. As Bersin explained in the interview, “I was pleasantly surprised by the extent to which we were able to have genuine dialogue… I was struck by the    constructive nature of the discussion, and the need to find out through negotiation just how far they were willing to go.”

Conclusion

Although travel precautions stemming from the unexplained health incidents affecting U.S.  diplomats and the Trump administration’s rollback of normalization slowed  security engagements considerably, the Secure Trade and Travel Flows working group met again in 2017. The port security dialogue has continued unabated, with additional technical  exchanges between Coast Guard and Cuban port security experts and visits to the eastern port of Santiago de Cuba and southern port of Cienfuegos. As the Biden administration  reviews U.S.-Cuba policy, expanded law enforcement and security cooperation will undoubtedly be a focus area. Regardless of whether maritime travel and trade builds back   to 2016–2017 levels, port security cooperation will continue to play an important role moving forward.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

As the only branch of the military with law enforcement statutory authority, the Coast Guard’s unique authorities across the maritime security spectrum open doors to international engagement and security cooperation in complex political environments. Surprisingly, the Coast Guard’s longstanding relationship with the Cuban Border Guard serves as an excellent example of this distinctive capability and its importance to U.S. national security. The examination of this positive and productive security relationship -- before, during, and after normalization -- through the lens of five Coast Guard mission- specific case studies, provides a number of important findings and recommendations.

LESSONS LEARNED

The operational focus of the Coast Guard’s maritime security cooperation with the   Cuban Border Guard, combined with measured growth in building block mission areas of  mutual concern, are key factors in the long-term success of this important relationship. The Coast Guard’s investment in the permanent in-person liaison position at U.S. Embassy Havana is another key factor, signaling commitment to a cooperative relationship built on   trust and mutual respect. The decision not to remove the Coast Guard liaison as part of  the 2017 reduction in diplomatic staffing is indicative of the position’s importance to the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard’s expanded cooperation with Cuban authorities across multiple mission areas during normalization is also noteworthy. This well-established relationship served as the catalyst for broader U.S.- Cuba law enforcement cooperation. The United States and Cuba negotiated and signed multiple security arrangements, developed new frameworks for the exchange of information (especially in the areas of SAR and oil spill preparedness and response), and expanded security dialogues across the law enforcement spectrum (port security and secure trade and travel in particular).

Implications of the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard relationship as a model for use with other complicated international relationships are also a key consideration. Regardless of the law enforcement agency involved, the Coast Guard has demonstrated that incremental steps can be taken to build relationships in areas of mutual concern, despite  the ups and downs associated with strained relationships at the political level.

Finally, the broader importance of the Obama administration’s dramatic U.S.- Cuba  policy shift and efforts to normalize relations is emphasized. By considering the geopolitical significance of Cuba, especially in terms of the implications for U.S. foreign policy objectives with the wider Caribbean and Latin America, it is possible to understand  why this new approach was in the U.S. national interest. The United States should take additional steps to encourage Cuba’s integration in the multilateral regional security framework.

RECOMMENDATIONS

By reviewing the after effects of the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S.- Cuba  policy, specifically the impacts on the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard security relationship, it can be determined that such a policy reversal does not serve the national security interests of the United States. With no significant concentration of bilateral security exchanges since early 2018, the United States should take steps to reinvigorate important dialogues on counter-narcotics, illegal migration, counter-terrorism, and mass rescue operations, among others. Instead of using the still unexplained health incidents as an excuse to marginalize U.S.-Cuba relations, the United States should collaborate with Cuba’s scientific and medical experts in the continued search for an explanation.

Law enforcement and counter-drug cooperation have always been areas of mutual interest for the U.S. and Cuba. Despite Trump’s traditional hardline approach, none of the 22 bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding were vacated. Renewed cooperation and information sharing by the Biden administration would likely lead to increased drug disruptions and interdictions, as well as deter further expansion of drug trafficking networks.

Although illegal migration from Cuba to the United States has continued to trend down substantially since the 2017 repeal of wet foot/dry foot, increased sanctions, combined with the challenges of currency reunification, COVID-19, and the lack of accessible consular services, have pressurized the possibility of another wave. The Biden administration should consider the restoration of Embassy Havana diplomatic staffing (to  September 2017 levels), the re-establishment of consular services, and a return to the commitments outlined in the migration accords.

SAR is a mainstay in the Coast Guard-Cuban Border Guard relationship, but the last semi-annual technical exchange between them occurred in January 2018. The Biden administration would do well to reinvigorate this periodic reciprocal exchange series, as well as the mass rescue operations specific dialogue begun in 2017. The maritime safety and security implications associated with these areas of mutual concern are too significant  to ignore.

As seen with the other building blocks of U.S.- Cuba security cooperation, the oil spill preparedness and response relationship benefited from the normalization of relations.  In addition to establishing coordination protocols and oil spill response procedures, the CUBUS Plan encourages the exchange of operational and scientific information and outlines a framework for joint contingency planning and a series of periodic response exercises. The United States should encourage continued cooperation in this relatively new  but critical area of U.S.- Cuba maritime security, especially now that the CUBUS Plan   is complete.

Unlike the other case study mission areas where security cooperation stalled  considerably under Trump, the port security engagements between Coast Guard and Cuban  authorities have continued without interruption. Regardless of whether maritime travel and   trade builds back to normalization era levels under President Biden, port security cooperation will continue to play an important role moving forward.