Security Assistance in Fiscal Drawdowns: A EUCOM Case Study

By Major Joel Nelson, U.S. Air Force; Major Garrett Trott, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Commander Ryan Stickel, U.S. Navy; and Lieutenant Colonel Rachel Freestrom, U.S. Air Force

Editor's Note:  This thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College.  The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer:   The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Introduction

“NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known and is the hub of an expanding global security network. Our Article 5 commitment to the collective defense of all NATO Members is ironclad, as is our commitment to ensuring the Alliance remains ready and capable for crisis response and cooperative security. We will continue to deepen our relationship with the European Union (EU), which has helped to promote peace and prosperity across the region, and deepen NATO-EU ties to enhance transatlantic Security.”   - National Security Strategy, February 2015

The U.S. has a strong strategic interest in maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of European states.  This helps uphold the existing international order and maintain a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.  However, Russian aggression undermines this vision by attempting to counter key alliances such as NATO and the European Union, and attempting to establish dominance over what it believes to be its traditional “sphere of influence.”  This is particularly evident in Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent conflict over eastern Ukraine.  The U.S. has not been idle in attempting to counter Russian aggression and maintain the existing order.  U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) top theater priority is to deter Russian aggression, and as a result the U.S. has deployed additional forces to Europe as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve to bolster NATO’s eastern flank, while funding for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) increased dramatically since 2015 for those strategically vulnerable countries that happen to fall outside of NATO protection.   

However, under the White House’s current FY 2018 budget proposal, funding for the State Department’s (DoS) foreign assistance programs will be dramatically reduced, threatening to undercut critical FMF resources in EUCOM’s area of responsibility.  While the Department of Defense (DoD) is set to receive increased funding for deterrence activities in Europe that would ostensibly offset the reductions in foreign aid, inherent limitations in DoD’s authorities still leave critical gaps in EUCOM’s ability to build partner capacity and deter Russia in the region.  Therefore, EUCOM should work closely with DoS to ensure that what limited FMF resources still exist are prioritized and meted out with care.  Key criteria that can help determine how to distribute remaining FMF in the EUCOM area of responsibility should include the country’s strategic importance to the United States, the nature of a country’s relationship to Russia, the country’s membership status in key international organizations, and the availability of applicable Title 10 authorities that can potentially offset the effects of reduced FMF.  Since EUCOM already ranks countries by strategic importance, and since this ranking is classified, this paper will focus on the last three criteria.

Overview of FMF in EUCOM

The Foreign Military Financing Program is an appropriated program that consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training.  While FMF is a Title 22 resource under authority of the Department of State, it is administered by DoD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  FMF is a flexible and effective security assistance resource for building partner capacity since the money is appropriated directly to the recipient country, is multi-year, and can be used to train, equip, and advise foreign militaries and defense establishments for a wide range of possible missions.  Limitations to FMF include the fact that it should be used to purchase U.S.-origin equipment only, and appropriations vary by year, making long term security assistance planning difficult.  In addition, while DoD administers FMF through DSCA, Combatant Commands (CCMDs) have much less control over FMF than traditional Title 10 security cooperation resources.  For example, while a CCMD helps prioritize and submit annual FMF budget requests, Congress ultimately determines FMF appropriations by country, and the CCMD is not free to reallocate FMF resources within the AOR.  Regardless of the limitations, FMF remains more flexible than DoD Title 10 security cooperation authorities and CCMDs have come to rely on FMF as one of their most valued resources for conducting Theater Security Cooperation activities.

The current White House Budget proposal calls for a reduction in foreign assistance that will have profound effects on the FMF program.  According to the State Department’s FY18 Congressional Budget Justification, the FMF budget will be reduced by approximately $1 billion in 2018 for a total of $5.1 billion.   While FY 2018 funding for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan will continue, these strategic partners will account for $4.85 billion of the $5.1 billion total.  The remaining $200 million will be available on a grant or loan basis in a global FMF fund which will be allocated during the year of appropriation to provide the State Department with the flexibility necessary to meet pressing security challenges. Therefore, instead of individual countries in EUCOM receiving their own FMF allocation for the year, DoS will maintain ownership of the funds in a global account and use them at its own discretion.  This is a major difference from previous years where countries could expect a certain amount of FMF in their individual accounts, and makes planning for theater security cooperation a bit more problematic for the CCMDs.  

Historically, EUCOM countries received a combined total of between $70 million and $110 million a year in FMF, spread across 20 or so of EUCOM’s 51 countries. While the total FMF amount in EUCOM was on a general decline from 2010 to 2014, FMF allocations increased dramatically in 2015 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  In particular, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia saw their FMF allocations increase between three-fold and ten-fold, while the remaining European countries saw their FMF either stay flat or decline.  This indicates the strategic importance the State Department placed on these three countries in light of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.  While one could argue that Poland and the Baltic countries were strategically more important, those countries enjoyed the protection of Article 5 and therefore were less in need of increased FMF.  Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, on the other hand, do not fall within NATO’s security guarantee and were therefore able to leverage increased FMF to begin building their own self-defense capacity.  However, now that no European country will have a dedicated FMF under the proposed 2018 budget, EUCOM will have to compete for the $200 million remaining in the global FMF fund.  This will require EUCOM to prioritize countries in their AOR by strategic importance while also taking into account such factors as the nature of a country’s relationship with Russia, its membership status in key international organizations such as NATO, and the availability and applicability Title 10 security cooperation resources.  

Criteria 1: Nature of Relationship with Russia

The first criteria we will evaluate is the nature of a country’s relationship with Russia. This relationship is important to consider given that Russia has claimed a privileged sphere of influence in the world since at least 2008.  While this sphere of influence can include any country where Russia claims to have friendly relations, it is most often considered to mean Russia’s “near abroad,” or those countries that formerly comprised part of the Soviet Union or Russian Empire.  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the former Soviet republics broke off as separate states, Russia was suddenly reduced to roughly the size it was in the seventeenth century.  Deprived of the imperial peripheries that were so vital for its security, not to mention prestige, Russia now attempts to reassert its dominance in the region through increasingly aggressive measures.  However, Russia’s main long-term interest is likely not to establish imperial-style control in the traditional sense, but rather to reestablish hegemony in the Near Abroad to keep the West out of its sphere of influence.  Specifically, Russia maintains security concerns over instability on its periphery and NATO expansion toward its borders, economic interests related to energy transit corridors from Eurasia to Europe, and a political interest in preventing former Soviet republics from integrating into Western political institutions.

In this context, several countries within EUCOM can be considered to fall within Russia’s self-declared sphere of influence.  These may include, but not limited to, the entire eastern flank of EUCOM from Finland through the Baltics, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and to the Caucasus.  Factors to consider with this criteria include whether the country was part of either the Russian or Soviet empires, whether they were a member of the Warsaw Pact, and whether there exist significant Russian-speaking populations in the country today.  

Starting from the north, Finland and Norway both share land borders with Russia, though neither is likely to be at significant risk.  Norway shares almost nothing in common with Russia from a historical or culture standpoint, and Russia has no historic claims to anything Norwegian with the possible exception of maritime boundaries in the Arctic Ocean, which were successfully resolved in 2010. Additionally, while Finland once formed part of the old Russian Empire from 1809-1917, it was never integrated into the Soviet Union, fought a war with the Soviet Union from 1939-1940, and has long held a distinctive national identify with little in common with Russia. Neither Norway nor Finland have significant Russian-speaking populations, therefore both should figure low in our standings for this criteria.

The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania present a different story.  These countries formed part of the Russian Empire since the early 18th century, and were later incorporated into the Soviet Union following a brief 20-year period of independent statehood from 1920-1940.  Receiving independence again in 1991, these countries have set out to secure their sovereignty and territorial integrity by integrating into Western institutions like the EU and NATO.  However, each of these countries possess significant populations of Russian minorities, nearing 30% each in Estonia and Latvia.  This makes these countries especially vulnerable to Russian interference, especially since Russia considers protection of Russian-speaking populations abroad to be in its national interest.  Given this position, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can all be considered at significant risk under this criteria.

Poland also once formed a part of the Russian empire, though the Polish-Russian relationship is fraught with animosity throughout history.  Achieving independence from the German, Austrian, and Russian empires following World War I, Poland was absorbed back into the Soviet orbit following World War II, and while it was never incorporated into the Soviet Union, it became a key lynchpin of the Warsaw Pact.  Since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, however, Poland has maintained a solid western trajectory and was among the first former communist states to achieve NATO and EU membership.  Poland is also among the most outspoken in its concerns about malign Russian influence in the region.  Finally, Poland is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in Europe, with 96.7% of the population claiming Polish nationality.  Judging by these factors, Poland is less vulnerable to Russian influence than its neighbors in the Baltic countries, though it is still at moderate risk.  

Ukraine is the country most at risk to Russia from the standpoint of relationships, due to the strong historic, cultural, and ethnic ties.  Ukraine is the homeland of the proto-Russian state of Kievan Rus, and even Vladimir Putin considers Ukrainians and Russians to be one people, with Kiev the mother of all Russian cities. Russian-speakers comprised the majority population in Crimea when Russia annexed it, and Russian-speakers also comprise the majority of the population in eastern Ukraine, especially in the contested Donbas region.  As is evident by Putin’s comments and Russia’s continued aggression since 2014, Ukraine will remain most at risk under this criteria of relationship with Russia.  Moldova, on the western border with Ukraine, is also at risk since it was once part of the Russian and Soviet empires, and retains significant pro-Russian feelings to this day, especially in the breakaway Transnistria region.

Finally in the Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were each part of the Russian and Soviet empires, though each have distinct non-Slavic national identities. However, Russia maintains a strong strategic interest in the South Caucasus and seeks to keep the region out of NATO.  Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 over the issue of Georgia’s treatment of South Ossetian minorities, and in part over Georgia’s pending NATO membership, and has since recognized the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.  Russia maintains military bases in both of these regions today in violation of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.  Russia also maintains a large military base in Armenia, with whom they share a defense agreement.  Finally, the South Caucasus is a major transit corridor for hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian on the way to European markets, bypassing the Russian pipeline system altogether.  For these strategic and historical reasons, the South Caucasus remain at continued risk of Russian aggression and interference, especially since they fall outside of NATO.  Of these countries, Georgia is arguably most at risk since 20% of its territory is already under Russian occupation, and since Georgia is the only South Caucasian country actively seeking membership in NATO and the EU.

To summarize this section, the countries most at risk to Russia from the standpoint of their historic relations are, in order: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, and Norway.  We did not include Belarus in this analysis since Belarus is firmly in the Russian camp and U.S. engagement with Belarus is extremely limited.  We also did not include the other Balkan and East European states for the sake of brevity and since they do not fall within Russia’s direct sphere of influence.  This list will help EUCOM decide where its security cooperation efforts should focus and how to best prioritize limited resources.

Criteria 2: Membership in International Organizations

The second criteria to consider for prioritizing FMF funds is relatively straightforward: Membership status in key international organizations. International Membership (IM) is a broad term which refers to nations that may be members of organizations outside of the DoD and USG, such as NATO, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN).  Taking into account a country’s membership in these organizations will enable USEUCOM to better prioritize capabilities and resources.  

Of these organizations, the most important by far from a security standpoint is the NATO alliance, which enshrines the principle of collective self-defense through Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.  This article states that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that all other members of the alliance should come to its defense.  This security guarantee gives NATO members a greater degree of security than non-members.  In this context, states that would otherwise be vulnerable to Russian aggression such as the Baltic countries, are reasonably well protected since the weight of the NATO alliance is behind them.  Non-members, however, remain on their own in case of aggression and thus vulnerable.  Finland, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan belong in this category.

The next category to consider would be non-NATO, but EU-member states.  While the EU does not offer security guarantees along the same lines as NATO, its prestige and importance as an international organization makes it less likely that Russia would attempt to violate the sovereignty or territorial integrity of an EU member.  Finland and Sweden fall into this category, not members of NATO but respected members of the EU.  Therefore, although not as iron-clad as NATO membership, EU membership confers benefits that can bolster the security of its members.

The third category to consider would be those European states along Russia’s sphere of influence that are members of neither NATO nor the EU, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.  These countries also happen to lie along strategic energy corridors from Eurasia into Europe.  Given the strategic value Russia places in this region and the fact that these countries fall outside of both NATO and the EU, additional focus is required to bolster their organic self-defense capabilities to deter Russian aggression.  It is unlikely that the U.S. or NATO would come to their direct assistance in time of conflict. 

Taking the criteria of International Membership into account, therefore, priority for FMF should be given to non-NATO, non-EU countries that exhibit a genuine desire to integrate into Western institutions.  This comes down to Ukraine and Georgia as the top two priorities, since neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan desire Western integration.  Poland and the Baltic countries are members of NATO and enjoy Article 5 protection, while Finland is a member of the EU and shares relatively weak historical ties with Russia.  

Criteria 3: DoD Title 10 resources available to EUCOM

The final criteria to consider for prioritizing FMF funds is the type of Title 10 security cooperation funding available to a given country.  The past decade and a half has brought an expansion to the DoD’s focus and employment of the Military as an instrument of national power.  The United States fighting force is no longer simply an instrument of blunt force, but instead a more capable, multidisciplinary tool.  Security Assistance and Cooperation are building blocks of a CCMD that have evolved and grown in scope and role through iterative congressional action.  The Congress has increasingly acted to expand the DoD’s authority to conduct a growing array of security cooperation programs under Title 10 and through NDAA expenditures. The initiative to meet demand and to create programs tackling regional security and organizational capacity is consistent with lessons learned from the last 15 years of war and the reconstruction and stability efforts that inevitably followed.  Recent legislative action in 2017 pulled together the previous patchwork of authorities setting up major reforms to security cooperation, including the creation of a new multi-purpose “train and equip” authority that removes several restrictions on security aid and requires human rights and institution building aid.  Prior to this a RAND study on cooperation identified 106 core statues directly authorizing a variety of activities.   

The U.S.’s rivals, including Russia, have moved to expand their security partnerships globally and continue to act in ways that serve to erode U.S. partners and regional security around Eastern Europe.  The 2017 NDAA implements many reforms that will support Combatant Commander efforts to execute expanded roles in supporting regional stability to include providing a single train-and-equip authority and establishing a unified, annual security cooperation budget for DoD.  The changes within the 2017 NDAA have pulled together a patchwork of laws and regulations to establish a framework within the new Chapter 16 in Title 10, U.S.C. called “Security Cooperation.”  This broadens the definition of Security Cooperation Programs as “any program, activity (including exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the Security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A) To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. (C) To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.”  

The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is a Title 10 security cooperation program begun by President Obama as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in 2014 following the Russian annexation of Crimea.  It has significantly enabled EUCOM to reassure NATO allies and deter further Russian aggression.  The combatant command uses EDI to bolster assurance and deterrence in NATO and strategic Balkan states by increasing US footprint, readiness, and host nation capability to support US combat operations.  The FY18 EDI budget request for $4.8B included proposals for increased presence ($1.7B), exercises and training ($218M), enhanced prepositioning ($2.2B), improved infrastructure ($338M), and building partner capacity ($267M).  In addition, with the coordination of the Department of State, $150M was requested for direct Security Assistance to Ukraine.  The FY18 National Defense Authorization Act, still in resolution, currently includes all the FY18 EUCOM budget requests and added a provision similar to Ukraine’s Security Assistance for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania not to exceed $100M.  EDI is an interesting and easily validated criteria for determining best allocation of the remaining $200M FY18 FMF funds.  From Department of State reports it appears they may already have taken it into account as almost all ERI funded countries took an FMF cut following the 2014 instantiation.  Also, given recent congressional willingness to increase EDI authorities with respect to Ukraine and other Balkan states, it is reasonable that other states exhibiting increased strategic linkage to national interests could be upgraded to security assistance status. Given the attention Ukraine and the NATO allies are receiving through EDI, a strong case can be made for prioritizing Georgia for FMF within EUCOM. 

The FY18 NDAA reflects the consolidation of U.S. security assistance between DoS and DoD.   However, the rebalance of security assistance away from DoS, while potentially effective has some key drawbacks.  EDI Security Assistance requires consent of both departments, which while signaling an accord and whole of government approach is also likely to be a source of mutual friction.  Additionally, the NDAA has set the precedent of allowing new Security Assistance authorities by name only.  To date the NDAA authorized only 4 countries EDI Security Assistance of the original 20+ that received support under Title 22 FMF.  Finally, there is the perception and perhaps reality of militarizing U.S. government support to other states.  This is a key fallacy as the bedrock of peaceful international society is built on civilian control of lethal force.  

Conclusion

Given a dramatically reduced foreign assistance budget for FY18, EUCOM can help offset the impact by prioritizing which states within its AOR are most in need of FMF according to the criteria discussed above, and based on this can request from the State Department’s $200 million global FMF fund. Key criteria to consider include the relative strategic importance of the country, the nature of the country’s relationship to Russia, the country’s membership status in international organizations, and the availability of applicable Title 10 security cooperation authorities.  Based on the analysis above, it appears that Georgia and Moldova should top the list of EUCOM countries in need of continued FMF support, since Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltics seem well covered by existing DoD EDI funding.

A key takeaway from the analysis is that the U.S. is focused on deterring Russian aggression in Europe.  There are many pretexts Russia could use to justify aggression when given the right opportunity.  To prevent that from happening the U.S. and the world must stay abreast of activities in the EUCOM theater, and take special note of any Russian military activities like the Zapad exercises in Belarus this past year.  A second strategy for success is the continued nourishment of newly democratic and western-leaning countries.  As countries continue to modernize and transform their governments, economies, and societies, they become more resilient and less vulnerable to Russian malign influence, while providing better partners for the U.S. and NATO. Persistent encouragement and support for international organizations will help bolster the existing world order and secure U.S. interests.  

As a final thought, though Title 22 FMF is becoming more scarce under the new budget proposal, there are ever more Title 10 funding authorities available.  DoD, DoS, and ultimately Congress must weigh the costs and benefits of consolidating all Security Assistance under one department.  Security Assistance is traditionally a State Department responsibility, and although DoD administers FMF, State maintains ultimate authority as the USG’s principal agent for foreign policy.  Consolidating security assistance authority with DoD, as the FY 2018 budget proposal appears to do, may further diminish the perception of State’s role and create a greater imbalance across the elements of national power. FMF has long been a critical tool of U.S. diplomacy that CCMDs can leverage to help shape the operational environment but not at the expense of undermining State Department’s traditional role that would have longer term implications for U.S. diplomacy and security. The U.S. must be good stewards for the taxpayer, they must take care not to send the wrong message to an international community that is keenly aware of the pitfalls associated with the perception of a military driven foreign policy. 

About the Authors

Lt Col Rachel Freestrom is Chief, Plan Application Support Division, in the USSTRATCOM J5. Lt Col Freestrom deployed twice to Qatar, providing project support to the Combined Air Operations Center and as a flight commander in charge of the main communications hub for the CENTCOM theater. 

Major Joel Nelson is assigned to the Joint Staff Support Center in the Pentagon, Arlington VA.  He has had a diverse career in cyberspace from tactical communications to operational planning. He served as a small comm team commander in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE and as J6 for a Joint Special Operations Task Force during Operation NEW DAWN. He provided cyber defensive planning while with the J3at the Africa Command Cyber Center, USAFRICOM.   

Major Garrett Trott is a U.S. Army FAO specializing in Europe and Eurasia.  He most recently served as Deputy Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia.  Prior to that assignment, he served at Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe as Special Assistant to the Commanding General, and as Country Desk Officer for Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus.  Before becoming a Foreign Area Officer, Major Trott served as an infantry company commander and brigade staff officer in the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and as a platoon leader and company executive officer with the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas.  

LCDR Ryan Stickel is a U.S. Navy Supply Corps Officer assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency Headquarters at Fort Belvoir, VA, where he serves as the J341 Logistics Operations Military Deputy for Order Management.  Afloat, LCDR Stickel has served as Supply Officer in USS PROVIDENCE (SSN-719) in Groton, CT. from 2006-2009 and as Wardroom/Hotel Services Officer and Materiel Officer in USS GEORGE H. W. BUSH (CVN-77) from 2011-2013.  Overseas, he served as a Joint Logistics Planner at the European Command Headquarters J4 Logistics Directorate Staff from 2013-2016.