Russia After Ukraine: Is the Past Prologue?
by Colonel Justin Hufnagel, German Army
Colonel Hufnagel's article won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Army War College in 2023. Colonel Hufnagel’s work reflects conditions as of mid 2023 and the Journal acknowledges that important events have since transpired. This is a truncated version of the original; if you wish to see the original, please request one by writing to editor@faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
For nearly thirty years, post-Soviet Russia has pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign policy aimed at preserving security within its near abroad and reasserting its great power status. Historically reliant on its military to project power and extend influence, Russia has initiated conflicts among nations formerly within its near abroad that have concluded in either a military loss or with some uncertainty. These conflicts reveal pervasive military deficiencies as well as continuity and patterns of thought, actions, and responses in their policy aftermath. Russia has proven consistently unable to scale its operations to the size or complexity it seeks due to an underinvestment in people and command and control systems. Sustaining a loss or ambiguous outcome in conflict prompts reform efforts that produce inconsistent or incomplete results due to budget pressures, low prioritization, and lack of consensus among leaders. Finally, loss in conflict reinforces Russia’s foreign policy aggressiveness, as it attempts to avoid the appearance of fragility and retain international influence. Motivated by a profound sense of vulnerability as well as a historical sense of greatness, Russia demonstrates a consistent willingness to absorb extensive material and reputational costs to preserve its position.
One year into Russia’s war with Ukraine, the conflict’s outcome remains uncertain. While the war has imposed extraordinary costs on the Ukrainian people and the forces of both sides, it has been characterized primarily by unpredictability. Forecasts in February 2022 incorrectly predicted a swift Russian victory based on an apparent overmatch in size and technological capabilities. Similarly, few predicted the resilience and resourcefulness of the Ukrainians who not only halted the initial Russian offensive but later launched highly effective counterattacks. Security assistance provided by the United States and its NATO allies has proven critical to enhancing the capacity and lethality of the Ukrainians.
Supporting Ukraine remains a strategic priority for the United States. Throughout 2022, the United States invested forty billion dollars in security assistance for Ukraine and it has already requested another thirty-eight billion dollars more for 2023. However, it must balance continued and expanded support for Ukraine against preventing escalation with Russia and attending to other national security priorities. The unpredictable character of the conflict has challenged the United States in realizing this balance. As the war continues, predictions about its next phase or eventual outcome abound. Critically important, however, is preparing for the conflict’s conclusion now. Understanding Russia’s likely post-conflict behaviors will assist the United States and its allies to prepare now for the next phase in a difficult, but pivotal, relationship with Moscow.
In 2023, Vladimir Putin appears to loom large over the course and consequences of Russian foreign policy. However, post-Soviet Russia has demonstrated consistency in patterns of thought, actions, and responses that transcend Putin’s twenty-four years of leadership. Focused on preserving security within its near abroad and reasserting its great power status, Russia has pursued a progressively more aggressive foreign policy characterized by an increased appetite for conflict. These conflicts have revealed pervasive military deficiencies, highlighted by under-investments in people and command and control systems, that strongly contributed to Russian losses and ambiguous outcomes. These losses prompt cycles of reform that produce inconsistent or incomplete results due to budget pressures, low prioritization, and a lack of consensus among leaders. More important, losses prompt increased foreign policy aggressiveness, as Russia attempts to avoid the appearance of fragility while retaining international influence. Motivated by a profound sense of vulnerability as well as a historical sense of greatness, Russia demonstrates a consistent willingness to absorb extensive material and reputational costs to preserve its position.
This paper focuses on post-Soviet Russia’s decision to use force in nations formerly within its so-called near abroad concluding with either a military loss or some uncertainty. Between 1994 and 1996, Russia sustained a profound military loss in Chechnya highlighting its military weakness. Nearly twelve years later, Russia launched a short, intense offensive against the Republic of Georgia that achieved most of the Kremlin’s policy objectives but was judged an uneven win due to Russia’s evident military weakness and its diplomatic costs. Although recent, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and incursion into Syria in 2015 are not considered, primarily because both cases resulted in Moscow achieving clear military success. In 2014, with almost no cost in casualties, Russia simultaneously seized Crimea and locked Ukraine in a frozen conflict on its eastern border, effectively halting its deepening integration with the West. In Syria, Russia successfully provided a regime ally with military and political support, while minimizing its exposure to risk by relying primarily on aerial and standoff weapons systems. Russia’s responses to its poor performance in Chechnya and Georgia illustrate a consistent pattern of actions and behavior that follow a loss or ambiguous outcome in conflict. Recognizing that Russia will likely continue to pursue an aggressive course, the United States and its allies can use this evidence to prepare for Russia’s most likely next steps, focusing on the alignment of priorities and resources.
Case Studies
Despite considerable political, economic, and national-security volatility over the last thirty years, Moscow has retained remarkably consistent foreign policy goals. Between the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, it has steadily pursued three primary objectives: first, securing and maintaining an uncontested sphere of influence throughout its near abroad, and second, preserving its status as a global power. Together, these seek to preserve the nation’s political, economic, and military security while ensuring Moscow’s influence on international issues. Achieving the first two objectives has, from Moscow’s perspective, required deliberate effort to limit the influence and actions of the United States and the West. Although seemingly contradictory, Russian foreign policy has been powerfully driven by both a historical belief in its great power status along with a strong sense of vulnerability
Among its many available foreign policy tools, Russia has consistently relied upon its military. Beyond obvious roles in providing security and offensive capability, Russia’s military has served as an important symbol of power both to its near abroad as well as to other great power nations. Less obviously, the military has provided Moscow with a means of engagement and cooperation with other nations through multilateral efforts. Participation in the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans during the 1990s, for example, is one such case. Of course, Russia’s security and intelligence services have provided important means of projecting influence, particularly through covert and clandestine means. However, both as a symbol and through engagement, Russia’s military features prominently in foreign policy execution.
Moscow’s employment of the military over the past thirty years has been consistent with its foreign policy objectives. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the military was deployed throughout the 1990s to stop internal violence, maintain a presence in strategic regions, and retain political influence. The Kremlin also deployed its military cooperatively in multilateral efforts with the West to help bolster its great power status. In the later 1990s, Moscow assumed a more aggressive posture, believing that its influence as a global power had weakened. Russia’s inability to influence events in Kosovo in 1999 and NATO’s expansion aggravated this sentiment.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has engaged in twenty-five military interventions. Of these, twenty-one occurred throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, coinciding with the instability of this period. Geographically, twenty of these occurred in post-Soviet Eurasia, including seven former Soviet Republics. These military actions were oriented primarily toward stabilization, security, or deterrence with very few involving direct combat operations. The Chechen and Georgian cases stand apart for being among the very few combat operations conducted by Russia, as well as having occurred in the immediate near abroad.
Each case study will begin with a summary describing the conflict’s causes and an overview of its course. The following sections will outline key Russian deficiencies, focusing on planning and preparation, command and control, training, and equipment. Many of these deficiencies simultaneously span the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and defy neat categorization. Each case closes with an overview of the military reforms prompted by the conflict as well as relevant foreign policy responses.
Chechnya, 1994-1996
Russia’s costly war in Chechnya began in 1994 and concluded two years later with a tenuous negotiated settlement and a failure to obtain Moscow’s desired strategic objectives. Beyond its immediate costs, the conflict revealed the degradation of Russia’s military and decline as a world power. What emerges most clearly from Russia’s involvement in Chechnya is its failure to fully assess the strategic problem, formulate an appropriate tactical and operational solution, and then mobilize the appropriate resources to achieve success.
As Russia managed the challenges that followed the fall of the Soviet Union, Dzhokhar Dudayev seized the opportunity to consolidate power within the semi- autonomous Republic of Chechnya and declared independence in November of 1991. Over the next three years, Chechnya’s internal political stability and security eroded, fostering the growth of numerous opposition groups and extensive organized crime. Boris Yeltsin’s decision to intervene in Chechnya reflected Russia’s desire to maintain the integrity of its near abroad while directly confronting a growing internal threat.
Russia waded into conflict tentatively, initially opting to take an indirect approach by supporting two Chechen opposition attempts to topple Dudayev’s government: both failed. After these failures, the Kremlin decided to intervene directly. From this decision to act, the political and military leadership hastily planned an operation intended only to last two weeks. The plan estimated eight days to establish air superiority and bases for operation, three days to cordon Grozny, and an additional four days to complete an assault on the capitol. To accomplish these tasks, Moscow planned to use a joint force that initially totaled over 20,000 personnel including the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Interior Ministry (MVD), Federal Security Bureau (FSB), and a variety of other troops. As conceived, the Russians planned to use multiple columns of armored vehicles to seize key objectives throughout the city, achieving success with speed and shock while anticipating minimal resistance.
An assault launched on New Year’s Eve, over a week behind schedule, quickly collapsed in failure within one day. Following this disappointment, Russian forces pursued subsequent assaults throughout January until finally seizing the Presidential Palace on 19 January, aided primarily by the Chechen decision to abandon it the day prior. From late January through the remainder of 1995 and into 1996, the conflict shifted into the suburbs and surrounding countryside. The Chechens fought an organized, disciplined, and unexpectedly vicious defense that capitalized on Russian weaknesses and the advantages offered by the terrain. Fighting continued until the fall of 1996 with a tenuous agreement signed in November.
Two years of conflict in Chechnya unequivocally exposed the Russian military’s weakness. As Yeltsin assumed power, he largely ignored the needs of the military, focusing instead on the nation’s immediate political and economic challenges. He also deliberately strengthened other security services at the expense of the military, ensuring no single organization gained sufficient strength to pose a coup threat. Finally, economic decline prompted substantial cuts to Russia’s defense spending, from $344 billion to $58 billion between 1988 and 1992. By 1998, it had dropped again to $19 billion. Together, these contributed to a significant erosion in capability and readiness in terms of training, maintenance, and equipment.
Inadequate intelligence and meager planning produced a failure to understand the threat and environment within Chechnya. Earlier efforts to topple Dudayev’s regime proved the Chechens to be an effective, disciplined foe – not, as many assessments claimed, a pushover. Regardless, the Kremlin moved forward hastily planning for a mere two weeks based upon assumptions concerning both their capabilities as well as the Chechens’. Most units did not receive written orders or objectives. Intelligence failures only worsened the Russian’s neglect in planning, as deliberate reconnaissance began only after the operation had commenced.
Russian forces at all echelons suffered from poor command and control. This effectively slowed operational tempo, minimized opportunities for mutual support, obstructed the application of joint fires, and increased confusion. Fundamentally, the Russian leadership was unable to manage the scale, in terms of size and scope, of the envisioned operation. An unnecessarily complicated command and control structure initially split command between contributing organizations. Worse, most of the deployed services had not worked together previously and did not use compatible communications systems or share battlefield intelligence. As a result, Russian forces never effectively cordoned off Grozny, permitting Chechen forces
the freedom to maneuver and resupply through the fight. Poor coordination resulted in countless instances of fratricide, possibly accounting for up to sixty percent of Russian casualties.
Yeltsin’s policy severely degraded the Russian military’s training and readiness level before its deployment to Chechnya. This deliberate underinvestment in people rendered Moscow’s forces particularly vulnerable to well-prepared Chechen fighters fighting in urban terrain they knew well. Corporately, the military retained a legacy mindset from its Soviet predecessors. Although the Soviets had learned extensive lessons about urban combat during WWII, later Soviet military leadership decided that avoiding urban combat made more strategic sense. To save costs, Russian leadership slashed training budgets, minimizing opportunities for commanders and junior leaders to develop. Russian forces also contended with severe shortages in manning and experience. Many soldiers arrived in Chechnya not knowing how to operate their weapons and equipment, much of which had sat, un-maintained, in storage for years. The Kremlin had discharged nearly 600,000 trained soldiers and another 79,000 officers before the conflict, forcing it to rely heavily upon inexperienced and untrained conscripts in under-manned units with poor leadership. This appeared most obviously in the inept employment of armor and infantry in urban terrain, which was extraordinarily vulnerable to Chechen teams armed with anti-armor and sniper systems. Inexperienced crews maneuvered their vehicles into positions that negated the utility of their weapon systems and, once engaged, were difficult to escape. Collectively, these illustrated a force fundamentally unable to clear, seize and hold terrain.
Russia’s Response to Failure in Chechnya
Russia’s military failures in Chechnya prompted some immediate changes during the conflict and larger reform efforts following its conclusion. Changes made during the conflict achieved little, as leaders contended with limited resources and competing priorities. The Kremlin replaced the senior leaders of Chechnyan operations and implemented a simplified command and control structure, aiming to improve coordination and mobility. They adopted a new operational approach, which drew from the lessons of WWII urban combat, and relied heavily on the use of artillery with a more systematic maneuver of infantry. Russian forces began to field improved weapons and equipment focusing on secure communications, snipers, and anti-tank guided munitions. Finally, Russia boosted overall troop strength and quality by deploying some of its most elite formations: naval infantry, airborne, and Spetznaz. While these adjustments marginally improved tactical performance, they were simply not enough to prevent Russia from losing the conflict and signing a negotiated settlement with Chechnya.
As Russia disengaged from Chechnya, its leadership considered larger structural reforms. Recognizing failures in command and control, the military restarted exercises intended to help develop leaders while enhancing cooperation among the joint services. Yet, Russia did little to invest in improved training for individuals and units, especially in urban warfare. Based on its enormous cost, Moscow planned to avoid urban combat in the future.
Foreshadowing later changes, the Kremlin also explored creating smaller, more professional forces manned at eighty percent strength during peacetime. These forces would remain capable of responding throughout Russia’s near abroad in crisis or emergent need. Many also wanted to retain a large conventional capability, having recently witnessed the US and its allies’ dominant performance against Iraq in 1991. Without consensus, reforms were undercut by a continually declining budget and the overall state of the Russian forces’ readiness remained in decline.
Russian foreign policy through the early post-Soviet period prioritized internal security and protection of its strategic positioning and resources in the near abroad. Recognizing its military and economic weakness, Moscow pursued diplomacy, partnership, and cooperation with the US and the West to preserve its status and position. Militarily, Russia remained engaged throughout its near abroad while it conducted combat operations in Chechnya. These remained confined primarily to peacekeeping efforts and contributions to multilateral operations in the Balkans.
Diplomatically, Russia entered multiple bilateral agreements with the US, joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and sought help from the West with economic reforms. Notably, Russia did not oppose NATO’s expansion through this period and even signed additional agreements with NATO. Many point to NATO’s 1999 intervention against Serbia, over Russia’s objections, as a moment when Russian foreign policy pivoted to become less cooperative with the West. This shift began shortly after its painful failure in Chechnya. Published in 1997, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept explicitly identified NATO expansion as a national security threat and warned about external efforts to weaken the nation. Yevgeny Primakov, serving as Foreign Minister, forcefully advocated that Russia stop serving as a junior partner to the United States and moved to expand its influence, particularly into Asia.
Russia’s most glaring response to its inferior performance was its return to Chechnya a little over two years later in 1999. Applying many of the lessons learned from its first incursion, Russian performance nevertheless improved only marginally. Planning and coordination between the joint forces, aided by improved communications, were noticeably better. Preferring to avoid the intense urban combat of its previous experience, Russia opted instead to rely heavily on artillery and air strikes followed by a careful and systematic clearing of terrain. These improvements helped limit Russian casualties, but their avoidance of urban combat continued to limit their overall effectiveness.
Russia’s incursion into Chechnya in 1994 further eroded the poor state of civil-military relations. Yeltsin’s policies ensured Russia’s forces were not a priority, and therefore not maintained at a sufficient state of readiness. Nearly two weeks before commencing operations, Russia’s defense minister signed a report describing the poor condition of the force; Yeltsin’s administration sent them anyway. Over 500 officers, including four deputy defense ministers, openly opposed involvement in Chechnya. Similarly, a senior general refused command of the operation based on his concerns about the inadequate preparations and condition of the force. Yeltsin delayed the official announcement of Russia’s incursion for two weeks and did not visit troops in Chechnya for eighteen months, eroding morale and trust. Russian forces sustained more casualties in the first six months of the conflict than the Soviet Army accrued through ten years of war in Afghanistan.
The aftermath of Russia’s two-year commitment to Chechnya was arguably one of the lowest points in post-Soviet history. The war exacted a substantial toll on a military already considerably weakened by neglect, obsolete equipment, and little training. Russia’s engagement illustrates its resolve to maintain control and influence within the near abroad. Although its deficiencies were clear enough, low prioritization and budget shortfalls obstructed meaningful improvements. Importantly, the minimal trust that existed between civilian and military leadership before the war eroded further. Nevertheless, Russia demonstrated a willingness to absorb extensive material and reputational costs to preserve its position. Moreover, it pressed an increasingly aggressive foreign policy course as it transitioned into the 1990s and 2000s.
Georgia, 2008
Russia’s war with the Republic of Georgia in 2008 lasted only five days. While this conflict appeared to be a success for Moscow, closer examination revealed lingering challenges that persisted from the 1990s. Russia’s decision to intervene illustrates a continued effort to avoid perceptions of decline within its near abroad and among global actors. Its performance illustrated recognition of its past failings, but unaddressed structural and systematic problems prevented substantial gains.