From May 2019 through May 2020, I had the opportunity to serve on the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff (S/P) with responsibilities for Latin America and the Caribbean (WHA) and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). My time there coincided with a change in Directors at S/P and the reorganization of the Office. During my year there, I had the opportunity to work on range of major policy issues impacting the Western Hemisphere, including the Department’s response to the People’s Republic of China’s engagement with the region; major trade and migration-related interactions with Mexico and Central America; mass protests in Ecuador, Colombia and Chile; the deepening crisis in Venezuela; the ouster of Evo Morales in Bolivia; new opportunities in the relationship with Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro; the political-electoral crisis in Guyana; the return of the left in Argentina; and on top of everything else, the Covid-19 pandemic.
When the Army agreed to lend me to the State Department to work Latin America issues at the request of then-Director of Policy Planning Dr. Kiron Skinner, I accepted the honor with the promise to return at the end of the one-year detail and to share and apply the knowledge gained in my academic work for the Army. This article is part of my commitment to do so.
Policy Planning Office
During my time at the State Department, I was a member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Office (S/P). The role of the organization has evolved since its establishment in 1947, but in general terms it is the Secretary of State’s “think tank.” Its first director, George Kennan, forged the U.S. doctrine of Containment that shaped the post-World-War-II world. It is a relatively small organization, with approximately 15 members at any time, plus supporting staff. The tradition of S/P as the place in State Department (":the Building") where “big ideas” are thought up makes it a very attractive assignment for both FSOs and Civil Servants. The walls of S/P are adorned by photos of every person who has occupied the post, reminding those who work there of the legacy of “big ideas” that characterizes the organization.
including some of our county’s most famous foreign policy figures. This serves as a constant reminder to those who work there of the legacy of “big ideas” that characterizes the organization.
The Policy Planning Office has several ways of shaping U.S. foreign policy. These include writing notes to the Secretary of State, the review and clearance of papers, direct involvement in State Department projects by S/P members, leveraging personal relationships with senior State Department leaders, the placement of the speechwriting function within S/P, and responsibility for the “dissent channel.”
S/P is the only organization in the State Department that can send a note directly from its members, through the Director, to the Secretary without review by other stakeholders. The intent is to protect its role of providing perspective to the Secretary, without other organizations being able to alter the substance. In my own experience, however, I found it beneficial to coordinate with my counterparts in WHA, INL and other Bureaus affected by my notes before sending them through our Director to the Secretary. First, however well one researches a note, it is difficult to have the same level of detailed information and currency of knowledge as the FSOs at post or the Desk Officer covering the country. Thus soliciting their inputs through WHA and INL leadership was important in getting the facts right. This approach also aided in accurately representing the work and positions of the bureaus to the Secretary. Reciprocally, once the Secretary has received a note, his staff then channels it to the organizations to which it is relevant. Because being effective as a member of the Policy Planning Staff is greatly helped by fluid interchange and a relation of trust with the Bureaus for which he or she is responsible, it is better for their senior leaders to be aware of and have the opportunity to provide feedback on S/P notes involving their equities before they go to the Secretary, rather than after he has seen them and responded with his comments.
Reviewing and clearing documents is the second vehicle through which S/P impacts the policymaking process and day-to-day affairs at State. In addition to conversations and relationships between senior officials, the preparation, review, editing and clearing of “paper” is the primary vehicle for managing the activities and relationships for which the Department is responsible. It is important to note that S/P is one of a small number of “7th Floor Clearers” whose approval is required on virtually all documents, especially those involving high-level interactions with foreign government officials, Congress, and the public. This review extends to press statements, memos advocating policy action by senior leaders, information memos, talking points for meetings between senior leaders and foreign officials and business leaders, hearings and Congressional testimony, reports to Congress, policy and strategy documents, changes to budgets, and even statements to partner nations in celebrating their national holidays. In reality, there is not time to thoroughly read and edit every page of every document that comes to an S/P member.
I was brought into S/P in May 2019 under Dr. Kiron Skinner, although in August she was replaced by Dr. Peter Berkowitz. For me the choice of Berkowitz, previously a respected member of the Policy Planning Staff, was a defining positive moment for the organization. Dr. Berkowitz set a tone of intellectual openness and exchange among members, as well as promoting the freedom to engage and coordinate with the other regional and functional bureaus. These actions dramatically changed the tone and raised morale of the organization. They also helped to restore the healthy relationship that S/P traditionally had with the rest of the Building. With the change in leadership, S/P was also modestly reorganized, establishing a Sub-director for Operations, and a Sub-director for Personnel, facilitating greater attention to formal processes involving its work product and attention to the personnel needs of its staff.
I found that learning how to prioritize and interact with the deluge of documents is an important part of being effective in shaping policy. My choices evolved during my time at S/P. During my first months, I probably drove press and desk officers crazy with my extensive edits of items that had been accepted material for some time. Over time, I came to concentrate on areas where an action or statement seemed to contradict the Administration’s approach to the topic or region or might otherwise create problems. In some cases where I had particular knowledge I intervened more extensively. In others, I tried to use my edits and comments to call the attention of senior decision-makers to an important issue or point.
While an S/P “clearance” is technically always required, there are myriad ways to circumvent members who are overtly obstructionist. These included sending items to a different member of the S/P staff where there is ambiguity regarding who has overlapping responsibilities for the topic, or sending a document only minutes before the deadline, thus making an extensive review of the document almost impossible.
I learned that there is also a social art to intervention. Because one works regularly with the same people on multiple documents, I learned quickly that maintaining a relationship is as important as forcing one’s position on a particular clearance. Often times, that meant picking up the phone to discuss an issue, rather than blasting out a critically worded email for all copied stakeholders to see. I also learned the value of coordination among the “7th Floor Clearers.” In my case, this included interactions with my counterparts covering WHA and INL on the staffs of the Deputy Secretary of State (D) and the Undersecretary for Political Affairs (P). While we did not always agree, there were numerous occasions when two or three of us agreed on the importance of an issue, and backed up each other in calling for change where an issue was particularly important and holding out together to force a change.
When stakeholders cannot agree on the substance of a document through editing it, they can formalize their disagreement for a decision by the Secretary through a “split memo.” Each side specifies its position and supporting arguments, and the Secretary makes the final decision. I had a role in a number of split memos during my time at S/P on Venezuela, immigration, and a handful of other issues. The process highlighted to me a reality that often goes overlooked by media accounts of US foreign policy: that critical decisions are often difficult because the "right decision" may not be clear or simple -- even to well-intentioned and well-informed people. Yet these decisions are indeed thoroughly debated.
The third mechanism by which S/P members may influence policy is through involvement in projects ongoing in the building. In my case, this involved inclusion, on various occasions, in the drafting and editing of policy and strategy documents typically led by the policy planning arm of WHA (PPC). While not receiving much attention from scholars, I often felt that such involvement in drafting documents and defining initiatives from the beginning is one of the most significant ways in which S/P shapes the direction of policy.
A fourth, often overlooked mechanism of influence for S/P, is through the Secretary’s Speechwriters. In recent years, the Speechwriter function was incorporated into S/P. I came to have great admiration for our speechwriters, including the Secretary’s lead speechwriter David Wielezol, who could write eloquently for the Secretary, on a broad range of topics on short notice, and who I observed to be consistently in the office (when not on a plane with the Secretary) long after everyone else had gone home. While David and the other Speechwriters actively reached out across the entire State Department organization to get the material they needed, their physical co-location with the rest of S/P created important opportunities for them to turn to the S/P member with relevant expertise when seeking some particular understanding or example.
Finally S/P management of the “dissent channel” allows it to facilitate the “reconsideration” of important issues by senior leadership, and to shape the definition for posterity of those decisions which are not reversed. As a longstanding part of the State Department tradition, when the Secretary or other senior leaders make a decision, those who see the issue as vital and have a principled disagreement with the decision have the opportunity to write a formal document called a “Dissent Memo.” Responsibility for handling the memo and making a recommendation to, and a written response on behalf of the Secretary, typically goes to the S/P member assigned that regional or functional portfolio. In my time at S/P, I handled dissent memos on issues in which I personally agreed with the position, but understood that the decisions taken were a fundamental part of the direction of the Administration.
State Department Personnel and Culture
I was genuinely impressed by the abilities, professionalism, and intellectual culture of the persons with whom I worked with at the State Department. The organization is an intermingling of three “tribes”: Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), Civil Servants, and “Politicals.” For FSOs, not unlike DoD FAOs, the career path involves an alternation between assignments of increasing seniority in country teams "at post” then “in the building” (at State Department headquarters). While FSOs form the core of State Department culture of diplomacy, Civil Servants, with a different personnel system, play a particularly important role, particularly in Bureaus requiring technical expertise, from science and technology to economic, environmental and legal matters.
“Politicals” is the informal term for those brought into the organization at a senior level through their combination of expertise and connection with the Administration. They are often from a distinguished academic, think-tank, or business background. In theory, these members, assigned or allocated through senior levels of the State Department, help to ensure that the work in the building is aligned with the goals of the Administration. In my experience, however, FSOs, civil servants and politicals all provided their informed inputs with regard to day-to-day policy decisions, but were clear on executing the will of the Administration once a senior-level decision was made. In the gray area of minor day-to-day decisions, however, I did look to those of my colleagues who were closely connected with the Administration for insights with respect to the preferences of the White House before a difference in perspectives forced a formal senior-level decision.
During my time at State, I was positively influenced by the “culture of ideas” that exists within the institution. Among most of my colleagues, there is a deeply rooted interest in knowledge about the countries and cultures in one’s area of responsibility and beyond; this was complemented by enthusiasm for sharing that knowledge and gaining the perspectives of others. I benefited enormously from my colleagues who showed sincere enthusiasm for sharing their subject matter knowledge and the functioning of the State Department system with me. Just as military officers take professional pride in their development of skills as soldiers, FSOs take pride in their knowledge of the countries, cultures, and issues for which they are responsible.
A Glimpse at the Organization
The work of the State Department, within the broader interagency and the dynamic of the careers of its officials, is defined by the symbiotic relationship between the U.S. diplomatic missions abroad (“Post”) and headquarters functions (“the Building”).
In each embassy, the Ambassador manages the relationship with the host nation with the help of resources from the Interagency. While he or she receives guidance from The Building, it is the Ambassador, as the President’s representative to the country, who has the final authority and responsibility over all U.S. government actors and entities operating in the country, from FSOs interfacing with the host government on political, economic and other issues, to representatives of other organizations, who may be executing aid, governance-strengthening or other programs with the host nation.
Within “the Building,” the U.S. government interfaces with partner nations, activities and conditions therein, are dealt with through a series of organizations with often cross-cutting responsibilities. Perhaps best known, the “Regional Bureaus” such as Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) under the Undersecretary for Political Affairs (P), are where the relationships with individual nations and the U.S. country teams with responsibility for them are rolled up. By contrast, “Functional Bureaus” are organized by themes which often cross-cut international boundaries. Those grouped under the Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights (J), for example, including International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), tend to focus more on the execution of programs. Under the Undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment (E) are Bureaus which include Economic and Business Affairs (EB), Energy Resources (ENR), and Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). Under the Undersecretary for Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) is Global Public Affairs (GPA) focusing on DoS global messaging. With the overlapping responsibilities of these organizations, the process of reviewing and approving documents involving a specific event or statement may involve dozens of organizations with equities who, in the State Department tradition, have the opportunity for input.
State and the Interagency Process
During my time at S/P, I observed the role of the State Department in the Interagency process in multiple levels, principally through participation in National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee sessions (PCC), other meetings involving multiple US government entities, and the development of documents involving multiple interagency players. This provided me with a rare chance to see and participate in the interagency process at a high level and one where consensus decisions are crafted out of diverse agency views. I particularly noted the important role played by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in policies and activities involving Migration in Mexico and Central America. I also noted the significant role played by Treasury and Justice with regard to the criminal and anti-democratic activities of the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
Based upon observations from my S/P position, coordination between State and DoD is generally good on day-to-day issues, such as visits by U.S. military leaders to partner nations or activities arising out of ongoing security programs in the region. DoD has several military and civilian personnel embedded within various State Department bureaus, including S/P. State also has a Political Military Bureau (PM) dedicated to security issues and associated coordination. Representatives from DoD organizations with equities in the activities of functional bureaus such as INL and regional bureaus such as WHA were regularly present and made valuable contributions in the meetings that I attended.
In my own work, I did not see substantial evidence that the strategy and policy documents of each Interagency organization are actively used as guides for actions by the other agencies, beyond superficial references to fundamental documents such as the National Security Strategy. I also witnessed and participated in the drafting of some interagency documents but, beyond the somewhat useful exercise of meeting and coordinating their wording, I did not perceive that the result meaningfully influenced the direction of either State or the other US government entities involved.
One of my most insightful interagency experiences was participation in PCCs as part of the State Department team. These meetings provided useful coordination, with each organization reporting what it was doing that could affect the other agencies, and all receiving instruction from the White House through the NSC Director for the Western Hemisphere. In those meetings, however, I did not often see any open exchange among those present to pool their knowledge and agency perspectives so as to generate new ideas about how to coordinate and employ the capabilities of their organizations to more effectively advance US policy goals.
Reflections on the Role of State in Advancing US Foreign Policy Goals
Throughout my time at S/P, I reflected on the contradiction between the competency, professionalism, and dedication of those with whom I worked, our successful execution of countless activities, and the uncomfortable sense that despite everything, we were not achieving significant advances in important US policy goals.
Part of the contradiction, I believe, is simply due to the limits of U.S. power. Based on our historically rooted national self-concept of exceptionalism and faith in science, we have an inherent faith that that with sufficient resources, the right plan, and good intentions, we can change the world around us in a positive direction. In Latin America, this contradiction is also a function of the minimal amount of resources and high-level attention that we have dedicated to the region. Yet in areas such as the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we have dedicated enormous resources only to produce problems on a greater magnitude. Moreover, if only at the margins, history shows that policy, strategy and leadership do matter.
Some ascribe part of the problem to inadequate formulation and execution of plans, arguing that the State Department does not have a culture of planning. Having contributed to and edited a number of State Department planning documents during my time at S/P, I believe that this only partially true. In regional bureaus such as WHA, there is planning about how to move toward select policy objectives, budgetary matters, and planning for near-term activities like senior leader visits and votes in multilateral fora. In Functional Bureaus such as INL there also is planning tied to programs. Yet my informal perception is that the belief in the complexity of politics and relationships, inherent in the State Department culture, causes its leaders to rebel against the concept of planning to “systematically move country X from point A to point B.”
I observed the same natural tendency at State that I also saw at DoD for my very competent and dedicated colleagues (under time pressure in a complex environment) to concentrate attention on the successful execution of the task at hand, leaving planning until later. These pressures also put off to others the questions of whether we were making a difference, and if not, what needed to be changed.
The dynamics and bureaucratic incentives of reporting on the execution of activities and programs further suppressed the identification and posing of such hard questions. In my year at S/P, I read thousands of cables from our country teams and was lulled by the predictability of their declarations that the activity with our partner had gone well, or that our partner really appreciated us, and didn’t really want the alternative that competitors were offering. Such “everything is under control, nothing to look at here” messages arguably reinforced senior leadership disposition to believe that our policies and activities were indeed making a difference, even while numerous media accounts and my ongoing conversations with friends and colleges from the country involved, indicated exactly the opposite.
The problem is also compounded by the fundamental orientation of the State Department to tell our partners what we think and want rather than listening to what they think and want. While seasoned diplomats know better in their personal interactions, I observed the balance of the work that came across my desk to be about transmitting rather than receiving. Every high-level meeting involves the preparation of talking points seeking to advance an agenda. Too seldom did they include questions about what our partners thought or needed.
I left my year at S/P with a deepened respect for the capabilities and professionalism of my State Department colleagues, the dynamics and culture of the organization, and the complexity of the challenges with which they wrestle. I will always be grateful to those who took the time to help me understand the institution and to do my job there more effectively. Now back at the U.S. Army War College, I am confident that my ongoing analytic contributions for the Army and the country are much strengthened for the experience.
About the Author
Dr. Evan Ellis is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. His focus looks at the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region. Dr. Ellis has served on the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff (S/P) with responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean (WHA), as well as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) issues. Dr. Ellis has published over 250 works, including four books, and has presented his work in a broad range of business and government forums in 27 countries four continents. He has given testimony on Latin America security issues to the US Congress, has discussed his work regarding China and other external actors in Latin America on a broad range of radio and television programs, and is cited regularly in the print media in both the US and Latin America for his work in this area.