Red Line and Headlines: How the People’s Republic of China Employs the “Three Warfares” for Deterrence
Major Michael W. Kraft, U.S. Air Force
Disclaimer: The author contributed this article in his personal capacity. The views and opinions expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force or the Department of War.
Editor’s Note: Major Kraft’s thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Air Command and Staff College. For space limits you will see a slightly abridged thesis without research notes. To see the full thesis, please contact editor@faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Introduction
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “Three Warfares” strategy combines information and influence operations through public opinion, psychological, and legal means to deter targets from interfering in Chinese interests without escalating to conflict. This strategy is deeply rooted in a broader deterrence framework, one that uses information to prevent adversaries from acting in ways that could undermine China’s national security and political stability. In its simplest terms, deterrence is the practice of “persuading another that they must not act for fear of the consequences if they do.”[i] It requires a threat of punishment or denial, a target of that threat, and an issuer. In the context of the “Three Warfares,” the PRC employs these strategies to safeguard its national interests, positioning itself as the issuer of the deterrent threat. This article seeks to investigate the PRC’s “Three Warfares” approach to information warfare and influence operations, examining how it executes public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare to deter different target audiences. It will also explore the significance of the “Three Warfares” in the PRC’s geopolitical footprint and assess the implications for US policymakers.
While information warfare has recently found its place in the common military vernacular, the PRC’s focus on utilizing information to win is a centuries-old idea rooted in the historical context of notable Chinese military teachings. In Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, he famously wrote, “Warfare is a matter of deception – of constantly creating false appearances, spreading disinformation, and employing trickery and deceit.”[ii] He proposed strategies of providing spies with incorrect information to leak to the enemy to gain advantage over his foes.[iii] Wu-Chi, regarded as China’s first great general, emphasized in Wu-Tzu that deceit was the only way to overcome a superior army.[iv] Military general and strategist T’ai Kung highlighted in his Six Secret Teachings the critical role of information in clear decision making and even advised leaders to execute those who leaked information.[v] These historical references provide an important foundation for the PRC’s paradigm shift to political information warfare in the digital world.
Now under the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) governance, the PRC’s approach to information warfare has evolved meticulously over time but still finds its roots in early military theory. The country’s 2020 Science of Military Strategy highlights The Art of War as one of its foundations and underlines the role of information in “winning war without fighting.”[vi] This phrase has become a tagline of Chinese military strategy over the last decade, and it blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. This ambiguity makes it difficult to draw a distinction between the two and implies the “Three Warfares” will be employed similarly across both operating environments. The aim is to maintain and increase the PRC’s power projection while deterring any threats to its interests in the region. The “Three Warfares” are a coordinated approach to winning politically without having to resort to armed conflict and weave together to tell the CCP’s story to its intended target audiences.
The first warfare, public opinion warfare, aims to strengthen and control public opinion through a comprehensive use of various media means and resources that inspire Chinese spirit and influence the enemy’s judgment.[vii] The second warfare, legal warfare, represents the ability to grasp and apply laws and regulations flexibly.[viii] The third warfare, psychological warfare, is the timely and effective persuasion to embolden the PRC’s forces while deterring the adversary until it loses the will to fight.[ix] The “Three Warfares” are integral to the Chinese view of strategic deterrence. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy orders, “pay attention to the legal struggle and the use of psychological offense and defense and make full use of legal weapons and public opinion tools to serve deterrence.”[x] Much like Sun Tzu and the military theorists of old, the PRC is focused on using information warfare to deter its opponents.
Literature Review
The advent of social media and digital communication has greatly exacerbated the importance of information as an instrument of power in peacetime and in war. Prior research into this evolving concept covers four thematic categories.
The first theme introduces the PRC’s specific strategy for using information as a political weapon. Dean Cheng’s foundational Cyber Dragon offers a comprehensive analysis of the PRC’s strategy for fighting wars under informationized conditions.[xi] He argues the PRC and the US are orthogonal adversaries, each starting from different origins in information warfare.[xii] Further research from the CSIS and Albert et al examine how the PRC’s activities lurk below the threshold of armed conflict and diverge from common views of information as a supporting instrument of power.[xiii]
The second body of literature focuses on the growing importance of information warfare in international relations and the weight of understanding adversaries’ strategic narratives. Research from Ben O’Laughlin, RAND, and the Global Engagement Center highlight that another nation’s media footprint is unlikely to alter public opinion elsewhere but should be used to understand how to manage that nation in global crises.[xiv] Scholars examine the growing efforts of the PRC to interfere in US processes, highlighting the importance of better understanding the PRC’s overall actors, goals, and messages that seek to influence the US.[xv]
A third key area of study focuses on the impact of information in warfare and provides foundations for understanding the “Three Warfares” and the stakes of future conflict. Both Greenhill and CSIS demonstrate states can go public with threats to deter or coerce opponents, and thus, the US must better synchronize its understandings of Chinese information operations.[xvi] Hersman, Singer and Brooking stress that the updated information domains make all citizens part of the battle. Flooding the information zone removes linearity from deterrence and escalation dynamics and can transcend the tactical and strategic levels of war.[xvii]
Researching information warfare in conflict requires an understanding of deterrence theory. Therefore, the final wave of research focuses on crafting clear, credible threats in strategic narratives. Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influenceis a bedrock of deterrence theory resting on the diplomacy of violence, not in the actual use of force but the threat of its use.[xviii] He argues states must engage in brinksmanship by communicating threats in a way that manipulate a shared risk of war.[xix] Jervis, Lebow, and Gross Stein dissect the role of messaging in Psychology & Deterrence concluding deterrence varies from state to state including how they influence and their commitment process.[xx] Finally, Freedman’s Deterrence reminds that the PRC’s “Three Warfares” threats may look different from other nations’ and may impact audiences differently.[xxi]
Much of this research focuses on the theory behind the “Three Warfares” strategy, its role in larger political warfare, or the power of information as an evolving domain and instrument of power. Despite extensive research on the theory behind the “Three Warfares” strategy, little has been done to analyze the specific strategic narratives the PRC is communicating or how these messages aim to deter specific audiences. Many studies call for further research into PRC strategic messaging to help US officials better comprehend their information and influence strategy.
Theory and Preliminary Hypotheses
The central theory of this article is that the PRC strategically leverages deterrent messaging aimed at three distinct target audiences: the US, Taiwan, and US allies and potential partners. First, the PRC seeks to deter US intervention in the Indo-Pacific. Second, the PRC aims to prevent Taiwan from seeking third-party US support by reinforcing the ‘One China’ narrative. Third, the PRC attempts to exploit tensions within US-allied partnerships, offering its own alliances as a more attractive alternative to potential US partners. If this theory holds, two preliminary hypotheses emerge. First, an analysis of Chinese state media will reveal a significant volume of content targeting these audiences. Second, this content will consistently feature explicit or implied threats, in line with deterrence theory.
The PRC operates twelve English-language state-run media outlets, which produce targeted content across a wide range of topics, catering to diverse audiences. Each of these websites provides a Chinese-produced and approved media trove of articles aimed at highlighting the PRC and the CCP in a positive light. While each of these websites hosts its own media content, they are all hosted by the same parent source. This federated site approach to website domains allows searching for all media within any site’s specific domain.[xxii]
The author conducted bi-weekly reviews and searches of PRC state media websites to understand the PRC’s strategic narratives regarding its global projects, geopolitics, and attempts to increase its influence or undermine that of the US. The content analysis examined each piece of media for the following: date, media source, type of media, presence of propaganda content, primary and secondary audiences, repeated phrases or buzzwords, explicit or implied threats, the nature and target of those threats, and any detailed consequences. For any identified threats, the author investigated whether the target defied the threat and, if so, whether the PRC carried out the consequences. Additionally, the author noted if the PRC employed legal institutions or illegal means to carry out the consequences.
Initial Findings, Patterns, and Trends
Throughout the course of this content analysis, the author identified 128 pieces of Chinese state media that fit the deterrent messaging criteria. Additional media, while still significant to the PRC’s strategic narrative, focused more on the PRC’s expansion of power than on deterrence. Some interesting patterns and trends emerged.
Analysis revealed recurring themes that reinforce the PRC’s overarching strategic narrative. While each article contains a byline and originates from a unique media source, the framework, structure, and phrasing of the writing are often repetitive and similar. Of the 128-item data set, the analysis identified the top 10 themes found in this literature ranked by frequency: One-China Policy (38), US Harm to Others’ Interests, (35), China’s Rise to Power (31), International Cooperation (30), Taiwan Independence (27), Taiwan Reunification (24), Multilateralism (23), Safeguarding China’s Interests (21), Tariffs (18) and Economics (16). These themes emphasize reinforcing China’s sovereignty, particularly in relation to Taiwan, countering US influence, and promoting China’s global role.
Target Audiences, Strategic Narratives, and Deterrent Threats
To test the theory that a significant portion of the PRC’s state media content focused on three target audiences, the first step in this research was to define the primary and secondary target audiences for each media. The United States was the most frequently targeted with 78 mentions. Taiwan was targeted 40 times, Western Allies 26 times, the European Union 13 times, and other potential partners combined for 14 mentions. This broad media coverage directed at these audiences supports the first hypothesis.
The United States
The theory that the PRC utilizes the “Three Warfares” to deter US intervention in the Indo-Pacific was largely confirmed in the research, but the theory fell short of capturing the full scope of the “Three Warfares’” reach. The strategic narrative and deterrent messaging aimed at the US were much more complex and interconnected than initially forecasted.
At first glance, many of the PRC’s threats toward the US focus on the Indo-Pacific region, specifically Taiwan. In a January 2025 article, China Daily highlighted China’s four red lines with the US: “the Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right.”[xxiii] The article also noted, “The South China Sea doesn’t need more Western saviors waving phantom legal flags.”[xxiv] In late 2024, most explicit threats toward the US centered on Taiwan’s Independence, and the One-China policy. On December 22, Taiwan.cn published the article “China Strongly Deplores, Firmly Opposes US Military Assistance, Arms Sales to Taiwan.”[xxv] In it, a spokesperson reiterated the Taiwan red line stating, “To aid ‘Taiwan Independence’ by arming Taiwan is just like playing with fire and will get the United States burned, and to use the Taiwan question to contain China is doomed to fail.”[xxvi] The article then threatened all measures to defend the PRC’s “national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity,” a phrase often repeated in Chinese media to convey threats.[xxvii] This Taiwan threat is consistent across Chinese state media, but the follow-through on punishment usually focuses more on Taiwan itself. Therefore, the US hypothesis is supported, but a change in administration and a growing rhetoric surrounding China as a threat shifted US deterrent threats toward a more global scale.
To understand the shift in threats toward the US in 2025, it’s important to consider the change in administration. The PRC has leveraged the shifting dynamics of US power to highlight its rise as a global presence and expand threats beyond the Indo-Pacific. One of the most comprehensive examples of the shift in messaging the PRC’s rise to power is CGTN’s Podcast “Trump 2.0: Retreat, Expansion, and Controversy.”[xxviii] The podcast highlights that, after President Trump’s first week in office, the United States is ready for a multipolar world.[xxix] The episode offers the most concise encapsulation of the strategic narrative the PRC is trying to propagate to the United States and globally. Nathan King states,
“[President Trump] is the first American president in the 21st century to not say it outwardly, but admit it with his policies, that the United States is not the unipolar hegemon that we once saw at the end of the Cold War. And the world has changed. And he is bringing back deep historical feelings of isolationism and nationalism coupled with a new world in which US power has been relatively shrinking for a decade and a half to the North American continent. What he is less sure of and also less willing to deploy is US power everywhere else.”[xxx]
On one hand, the PRC is positioning itself as a reliable partner in the power vacuum it claims the US is leaving behind. In articles targeting the US, Chinese writers emphasized mutual respect and win-win relationships 17 times noting, “China’s rise is not a problem to be solved by legal gimmicks but a reality to be accommodated through mutual respect.”[xxxi] On the other hand, PRC media initiated a campaign to undermine and challenge the US on a more global stage. A week after President Trump’s inauguration, China Daily released the article “On the Front Foot” in which it noted, “China must be more proactive to prevent frictions with the anxiety-riven US inadvertently spiraling into conflict.”[xxxii] This shift in narrative allowed the PRC to adopt a more aggressive stance in response to US actions.
The PRC laid the groundwork to retaliate toward US economic actions in its new presidency. In a January 20th China Daily article, “Navigating Uncertainty,” Erik Solheim wrote, “One thing is certain: the risk of tariffs and trade wars looms large under Trump. If it happens, China and other nations will not sit idle, but retaliate.”[xxxiii] Two days later, Zhou Lanxu and Wang Keju authored “Tariff Hikes May Backfire on US,” in which they reiterated that China was expected to respond to US tariffs.[xxxiv] After the US issued tariffs on February 4, the PRC responded immediately, filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization.[xxxv] Chinese state media quickly released a Xinhua article, framing US tariffs as an “egregious act typical of unilateralism and trade protectionism” and emphasized the PRC’s readiness to work against US unilateralism with other nations.[xxxvi]Furthermore, Xinhua announced the PRC’s new 15 percent reciprocal tariffs on US products, thus validating the economic deterrent threat previously issued.
Beginning in early 2025, the PRC started to shift its strategic narrative and deterrent threats toward the US, highlighting itself as a rising power unable to be contained. This narrative diverged into two paths: one positioning the PRC as a strong potential partner and the other as a fierce competitor. While the theory of deterring US intervention in the Indo-Pacific still holds true, it became too narrow in scope to encompass the full extent of the “Three Warfares” in action toward the US. This does not mean that deterrent messaging toward the US in the Indo-Pacific ceased, but this research now requires a shift in focus toward Taiwan.
Taiwan
Taiwan’s analysis produced the second highest number of articles, which is expected, given the PRC’s view of Taiwan as its sovereign territory. What stands out, however, is the connection between the US and Taiwan in these sources. Nearly half of the articles targeting Taiwan also identify the US as a key audience. The recurring themes focus on the One-China Policy, reunification, and deterring Taiwan’s Independence, reinforcing the PRC’s territorial claims over Taiwan. What makes Taiwan a unique focus in Chinese state-run media is the dedicated web domain, Taiwan.cn, which specifically targets the island while overtly calling out foreign nations as necessary, as the PRC seeks to deter their influence. This site’s narrative also shows some divergence in messaging but remains relatively unambiguous in its objectives.
On one hand, articles on Taiwan.cn highlight partnerships and exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, emphasizing the shared heritage of the island and Mainland citizens. On the other hand, the PRC primarily uses this website to condemn Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the separatist party, and any foreign state meddling in Taiwan’s affairs against the PRC’s wishes. The threats to these groups are much more explicit and aggressive. The phrasing in these articles is repetitive, reinforcing the PRC’s perspective. Articles often echo the same phrases consistently such as, “The Taiwan question is purely China’s internal affair and brooks no external interference.”[xxxvii] Further, the PRC “will never allow Taiwan to be split from China.”[xxxviii] Finally, the “PLA will continue to strengthen combat readiness, resolutely fight against secession and foreign interference, and firmly safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”[xxxix] The threats that accompany these repetitive phrases are also more aggressive and emphasize the PRC’s position.
In response to Taiwan’s Independence rhetoric, the PRC increases its media presence, particularly when it disagrees with separatist comments or foreign intrusion. Journalists flood Taiwan.cn with headlines depicting adversaries as aggressors, followed by threats to counter their actions. While the PRC occasionally includes the US in these deterrent threats, punishment is more often aimed at Taiwan’s separatists. For instance, in March 2025, Taiwan.cn published two articles, one aimed at deterring the US from providing weapons and another targeting the DPP’s divisive rhetoric. Both articles warned separatists, stating, “The more ‘Taiwan Independence’ separatists clamor, the tighter the noose around their necks will become, and the sharper the sword above their heads will be. We sternly warn the DPP authorities: turn back before it’s too late; persisting in your course will lead to a dead end.”[xl] Threats directed at the US were more subdued and framed within the broader context of safeguarding PRC interests.
On two occasions during this research period, the PRC responded militarily to rhetoric linked to Taiwan’s Independence. In October, the Mainland condemned Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s advocacy for the two-state theory, claiming it undermined peace and escalated tensions.[xli] Three days later, the PLA conducted a massive military operation employing 125 aircraft, the Liaoning carrier, and ships, encircling Taiwan and its islands.[xlii] In January, following articles condemning the DPP’s calls for Taiwan Independence, China’s Fujian Province’s Coast Guard conducted patrols around Taiwan’s islands. Xinhua framed this as a responsibility to “maintain the normal order of navigation” in the region, but it was widely interpreted as a show of force as punishment for Taiwan separatist’s actions.[xliii] In March, PLA spokesman Wu Qian stated, “The PLA has consistently been an action oriented force in combatting “Taiwan Independence” separatism and promoting reunification, with regular patrols around the island and military deterrence becoming the norm in recent years.”[xliv]
This acknowledgement by PLA officials underscores the increasing normalization of military deterrence against Taiwan. It highlights the PRC’s willingness to explicitly carry out consequences using its “Three Warfares” strategy. While these media efforts also aim to deter US and foreign intervention, much of the focus is on Taiwan’s DPP and its citizens. The PRC’s view of Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory facilitates the enforcement of consequences if Taiwan defies its deterrent threats. This supports the hypothesis that state media often employs deterrent threats against Taiwan and aims to prevent Taiwan from seeking third-party support, particularly from the US.
US Allies and Potential Partners
The third and final portion of this article’s theory posits that the PRC employs the “Three Warfares” strategy to deter US allies and potential partners from strengthening their relations with the US. The analysis uncovered an interesting pattern with this target group. When Chinese media specifically targeted an ally or potential partner, the threats were implied rather than explicit. The only exception to this pattern was a deterrence by punishment case involving the Philippines. The PRC’s deterrent messaging toward this group mainly relies on economic and diplomatic persuasion, emphasizing the potential consequences of a decline in these instruments of power. The strategic narrative alternates between portraying the US as an unreliable partner and presenting the PRC as a viable alternative. As a result, key themes such as US Harm to Interests, China’s Rise to Power, Multilateralism, and Economics dominate the discourse.
This research suggests that the PRC employs a framework the author terms ‘deterrence by proxy.’ In this framework, the PRC positions itself as an alternative to the risk posed by a third party, creating a scenario where the target can avoid negative consequences by aligning more closely with the PRC rather than the third party. A key element of deterrence by proxy is that the PRC uses the threat of harm to the target, inflicted by the third-party, as a means of offering itself as an off-ramp. In practice, the PRC issues broad threats to a target audience, US allies and potential partners, in preparation for possible actions taken by a third party, the US.
By threatening existential consequences resulting from US policy shifts, the PRC does not need to follow through with punishment, thus avoiding credibility issues in its deterrence by proxy. However, this approach makes it difficult to validate threats, as the PRC has no direct control over the consequences. As a result, the PRC actively propagates narratives when US actions harm other nations. One method is amplifying foreign leaders’ comments that cast the US in a negative light. For instance, in January 2025, Xinhua published, “Europe’s Angst and Awakening,” which recounted NATO and EU leaders calling for a more autonomous Europe. It echoed French President Macron’s remark that “our Europe is mortal. It can die. It all depends on the choices we make, and those choices need to be made now.”[xlv] It also highlighted his meeting with Germany’s Chancellor, emphasizing the need for Europe’s strategic awakening.[xlvi]
Finally, PRC deterrence by proxy only works if it can highlight when the third-party actions align with its threat narrative. In 2025, this alignment was evident in the ongoing US trade war, which the PRC argues has hurt US allies globally. Xinhua’s article, “Who’s Paying for US Tariffs?” detailed the negative economic impacts on US partners, undermining the international order and creating trade instability.[xlvii] The article’s tagline encapsulated this message perfectly: “America First could lead to America Alone.”[xlviii] This comes as a dire warning as well as encouragement to US allies and potential partners to seek partnerships with the PRC instead.
The “Three Warfares” in Strategic Narratives and Deterrent Messaging
An analysis of six months’ worth of PRC state media reveals a range of strategic narratives aimed at different target audiences. As is typical with strategic communication, each narrative forms interconnected relationships with these audiences and has varying impacts. The PRC’s “Three Warfares,” public opinion, legal, and psychological warfare, each play a crucial role in shaping these narratives, a point clearly evident in this qualitative content analysis.
Public opinion warfare seeks to strengthen and control public opinion through the strategic use of various media channels and resources that inspire Chinese spirit and influence the enemy’s judgement.[xlix] At a macro level, PRC state media and information campaigns aim to shape perceptions of deterrent threats and reinforce strategic narratives. The analysis revealed that each website plays a unique role in influencing public opinion. For instance, 90 percent of the media sources identified in this analysis were published by China Daily, Xinhua, and Taiwan.cn. This suggests that these three sources are more likely to target audiences with deterrent threats, while others are either more internally focused on PRC citizens or less prone to threatening rhetoric. Furthermore, the PRC’s federated site approach to search engines enables it to cultivate specific narratives by site, while ensuring these narratives remain searchable across the broader compendium.
The PRC uses its state media to flood the information zone with articles, podcasts, and videos that propagate its intended narrative. In her analysis, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age,” Rebecca Hersman outlines the strategy of flooding the information zone. She writes, “Disinformation could create confusion and delay among decision-makers by flooding the information zone and causing informational paralysis as information management systems, and the policymakers who rely on them, struggle to distinguish fact from fiction within a loud and crowded information environment.”[l] PRC journalists excel at this strategy, and the analysis highlights how they prepare the public for punishment of states that defy deterrent threats.
For example, in the October 2024 deterrence-by-punishment scenario concerning Taiwan, the PRC flooded the Taiwan.cn site for five days, emphasizing the DPP’s actions before conducting its military exercise. Table 1 outlines the language used in the headlines, which laid the groundwork for the PRC’s military show of force. Each of these articles framed Taiwan’s discussion on independence as a threat, ranging from increasing hostilities toward the Mainland to endangering its own citizens.[li] Particularly within the Taiwan data set, the goal was to preemptively shift public opinion against Taiwan and in favor of the PRC prior to carrying out its punishment. PRC state media plays a critical role in the first of the “Three Warfares” for public opinion manipulation, which it uses to justify both legal and illegal measures of punishment in its second warfare.
Legal warfare represents the ability to grasp and apply laws and regulations flexibly.[lii] The PRC employs its media capabilities to emphasize its legal right to punish and undermine others who subvert the rules of international order. Furthermore, the term flexibly in the context of legal warfare suggests that the PRC views laws as malleable, allowing them to be adapted to different circumstances to gain advantage. The Taiwan data set serves as a perfect example, showcasing a dichotomy between tactics in the legal warfare aspects of deterrent threat messaging and execution.
The October 2024 example of the PLA’s show of force surrounding Taiwan demonstrates a tried-and-true method of legal warfare in action. After flooding the zone with threats to counter Lai Ching-te’s rhetoric on Taiwan Independence, the Mainland’s military exercise served as a punishment for this threat-defying rhetoric. The counterpoint, undermining others who break the rules of international order, is also evident in the Taiwan scenario. In February 2025, President Trump and Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru released the “United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement,” opposing any coercive change to the status quo in Taiwan and expressing support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.[liii] Days later, the US transited two Navy ships through the Taiwan Strait, a common show of force and commitment to peace in the region. While this was similar messaging to the PLA’s military exercise, the PRC quickly denounced it as hypocrisy by the US, accusing it of double standards in the international community and threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRC and Taiwan.[liv] These two similar shows of force, framed as legal by the PRC and illegal by the US, represent a perfect example of legal warfare. The alleged retaliation demonstrates how the PRC subverts the rules to deter by punishment.
The final warfare, psychological warfare, requires timely and effective persuasion to embolden the PRC’s forces while deterring the adversary until it loses the will to fight.[lv] Although this definition suggests a wartime context and is difficult to fully assess through open-source reporting, propaganda plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion and influencing legal frameworks across both peace and wartime. One key example is the employment of deterrent threats, which aims to make them more credible and impactful. Xinhua, for instance, hosts a dedicated section for propaganda posters. While some posters promote a positive image of the PRC, many are designed to undermine the US and deter its potential allies and partners. For example, Figure 1., titled “Always Choose the Right Side,” was released in March 2025 and contrasts two different partnerships.[lvi] On the left, a clear “America First” message is depicted, while on the right, an image of a prosperous and thriving partnership with the PRC is presented.[lvii] In addition to posters, Xinhua produces “Parody Shows,” such as The House of Cuts, which follows a fictional President Upperwood through his exploitive relationships with other nations.[lviii] These episodes follow the nation of “Arimeca,” a clever anagram of America.[lix]Figure 2 illustrates the negative language used to undermine the US in the international arena.
Finally, PRC state-media and lawfare are inherently psychological. In an effort to shift the public opinion of multiple foreign audiences, the PRC seeks to employ the psychology of deterrent threats to persuade its adversaries and potential partners to foster more advantageous relationships. This approach requires the PRC to understand its targets and issue threats in a manner it can manage effectively. Examining each target set helps explain why the Taiwan messaging is explicit and aggressive, while deterrent threats aimed at potential partners are more implicit, with the US positioned somewhere in between. Each narrative must be carefully crafted to effectively alter the decision calculus of the target, if the PRC is to succeed. This necessitates the seamless coordination of the “Three Warfares” to push and pull on each other in pursuit of desired outcomes. Continued study of this media will provide further insight into how these effects are achieved.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The PRC’s strategy of winning without fighting is an age-old concept deeply rooted in the power of information and the ability to manipulate the enemy’s decision calculus to gain strategic advantage. The PRC’s “Three Warfares,” public opinion, legal, and psychological, are central to this strategy as they work in tandem to craft strategic narratives targeting various audiences. These narratives are designed to deter adversaries from interfering in the PRC’s interests both regionally and internationally.
Strategic Narratives and Target Audiences
For the US audience, the theory that the PRC aims to deter US intervention in the Indo-Pacific is strong; however, the scope of the messaging extends beyond this region, highlighting areas for refinement. It would be more accurate to say the PRC seeks to deter US intervention in its global interests and rise to power, which includes the Indo-Pacific. In fact, within the Indo-Pacific area of interest, the US is often a secondary audience, with explicit deterrent threats primarily directed toward Taiwan. This was particularly evident in the punishment scenarios, where the PRC focused on deterring Taiwan from seeking US or other third-party support. The threats toward Taiwan were much less ambiguous, revealing consistent patterns of direct threats with subsequent punishment when Taiwan defied them. Finally, the data regarding the PRC’s messaging toward US allies and potential partners revealed mostly implied threats, with no direct threats made against US allies. The consequences for each of these implied threats were outside of the PRC’s control, offering a new framework for deterrence.
Deterrence by Proxy
The PRC’s deterrent messaging toward US allies and potential partners often centers around existential crises that could arise from continued relationships with the US, such as economic collapse, trade disruptions, and global instability. The PRC frequently positions itself as a superior ally and partner in its peaceful rise to power. Chinese state-run media seeks to create and propagate a form of brinksmanship between the target and a third party, offering itself as the off-ramp to avoid the inevitable consequences. In this sense, deterrence by proxy suggests that the PRC aims to deter through threats of consequences it cannot directly control. This explains why many of these threats are implied rather than explicit. During the timeframe of this research, the PRC’s gamble paid off as the US did in fact cause economic consternation among its allies and potential partners. Deterrence by proxy provides a safety net from credibility losses in case this gamble fails. Further research could explore other examples of similar deterrent relationships involving the PRC and other nations.
“Three Warfares” in Deterrent Messaging
This study reinforced that each of the “Three Warfares” plays a unique yet interconnected role in crafting strategic narratives and issuing deterrent threats. Each supports its counterparts to enhance the PRC’s influence and information operations. Together, these elements create a complex network that amplifies the PRC’s interests. Public opinion warfare lays the foundation for shaping perceptions across all forms of media. This analysis uncovered several instances in which the PRC floods the information zone to influence various audiences and issue deterrent threats. These threats may take different forms depending on the context and target but ultimately pave the way for Chinese action. Psychological warfare complements this by attempting to shift public opinion and deploying blatant propaganda through state-run media. From podcasts and videos to posters, these two warfares work in tandem to sway, deter, assure, and manipulate audiences without integrity or accountability. Finally, legal warfare plays a crucial role by leveraging both legal means and exploitable weaknesses in legal systems to secure favorable outcomes for the PRC. Journalists in PRC media outlets use platforms to expose alleged inequalities in international legal systems to further shift the legal landscape. In this way, the “Three Warfares” strategy acts as a self-sustaining engine that continues to drive PRC media operations.
Recommendations and Further Research
At the macro-level, this research – identifying red lines in headlines – helps clarify the message the PRC is attempting to convey, not only to the US, but globally. In an information environment so meticulously controlled, analyzing PRC state media provides valuable insights into the CCP’s communication strategies. This extends beyond just threat messaging. Scholars consistently point out that the US and China lack mutual understanding. In a 2022 speech, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi remarked, “Since day one of their engagement, China and the United States have been aware that each is dealing with a country very different from oneself.”[lx] Tracking messaging and threat narratives through PRC media may assist US policymakers and military teams in gaining a better grasp of both the physical and digital strategic environments.
The analysis also revealed a few unexpected phenomena that could serve as foundations for further research. First, the Taiwan punishment scenarios suggest that it may be possible to better predict Chinese legal warfare using both overt and gray zone tactics. Continued monitoring coupled with further quantitative analysis may confirm statistical trends that highlight how the PRC employs the “Three Warfares” to convey and act upon its deterrent threats. This would enable the US and DoD to better understand and anticipate potential military action, such as exercises surrounding Taiwan, or gray zone tactics, such as cutting undersea cables.
Second, further research should focus on other targets of Chinese coercion and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The only explicit threat identified in the third data set was a deterrence scenario involving the Philippines. While this relationship did not appear frequently in the analysis, it is likely there are more specific instances of deterrence by punishment in this relationship. Further analysis may reveal additional deterrent dynamics in the region.
Finally, future research could look beyond the scope of US interests by considering non-US perspectives. As a capstone assignment, the author had an opportunity to discuss PRC media narratives with US allies. While the theoretical framework was well received, the target audience did not feel that the PRC’s message of deterrence by proxy had successfully infiltrated Western media circles.[lxi] Additionally, since the scope of this research focused on deterrence from a PRC-US perspective, certain articles or media targeting other groups may have been overlooked. Further research may confirm similar narratives but could unveil additional avenues of deterrence in action and provide alternative paradigms of the PRC-US deterrence relationship.
Conclusion
Sun Tzu famously wrote, “Warfare is a matter of deception.”[lxii] In contrast, Ben O’Laughlin argues that understanding another nation’s media footprint is crucial as it helps “determine expectations about how those actors are likely to act and thus how they should be engaged.[lxiii] In studying Chinese strategic deterrence, it is essential to consider both perspectives. To better understand how the PRC may act on the global stage, the US must continue to analyze its media footprint. However, it must do so with caution to avoid falling victim to the deception embedded within. A deeper understanding of this complex environment will better equip US agencies and policymakers to counter the PRC’s influence in the information domain.
About the Author
Major Michael Kraft is an active duty officer in the United States Air Force. A recent graduate of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, he serves as a Nuclear Operations Officer.
[i] Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 26.
[ii] Ralph Sawyer, trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), 155.
[iii] Ibid., 185.
[iv] Ibid., 208.
[v] Ibid., 45 & 67.
[vi] Xiao Tianliang, The Science of Military Strategy: Revised in 2020, trans. CASI translation engine, China Aerospace Studies Institute (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2022), 23.
[vii] Ibid., 310.
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Ibid., 311.
[x] Ibid., 139.
[xi] Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations, ed. James Jay Carafano (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2017), 14.
[xii] Ibid., 207.
[xiii] Seth Jones, Emily Harding, Catrina Doxsee, Jake Harrington, and Riley McCabe, “Competing Without Fighting: China’s Strategy of Political Warfare,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (August 2023). and Craig Albert, Christopher Hennigan, Lance Hunter, Josh Rutland, and Kristen Topping, “Artificial Intelligence and Information Warfare in Major Power States: How the U.S., China, and Russia are Using Artificial Intelligence in the Information Warfare and Influence Operations,” Defense and Security Analysis 40, no. 2 (5 March 2024): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2024.2321736.
[xiv] Ben O’Loughlin, “The Impact of the Information Ecosystem on Public Opinion during Nuclear Crises: Lifting the Lid on the Role of Identity Narratives,” Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem and the Risk of Nuclear Conflict (15 March 2020), 181.
[xv] Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaba, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Michael J. Mazarr, and James Sladden, “Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends,” RAND National Defense Research Institute (4 September 2019): https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. and The State Department, “How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment,” Global Engagement Center, (28 September 2023).
[xvi] Kelly Greenhill, “Of Wars and Rumors of Wars: Extra-factual Information and (In)Advertent Escalation,” Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem and the Risk of Nuclear Conflict (15 March 2020). and Eric Brewer, Rebecca Hersman, Lindsey Sheppart, and Maxwell Simon, “Influence and Escalation: Implications of Russian and Chinese Influence Operations for Crisis Management,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (November 2021): https://www.csis.org/analysis/influence-and-escalation-implications-russian-and-chinese-influence-operations-crisis.
[xvii] Rebecca Hersman, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 3 (Autumn 2020): https://tnsr.org/2020/07/wormhole-escalation-in-the-new-nuclear-age/. and Emerson Brooking and P.W. Singer, Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 2019).
[xviii] Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 3.
[xix] Ibid., 99.
[xx] Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
[xxi] Freedman, Deterrence.
[xxii] The Fediverse, “What are Federated Sites?,” https://switching.software/articles/federated-sites/#:~:text=In%20a%20nutshell%3A%20Federated%20sites,like%20using%20one%20large%20site.
[xxiii] “Jointly Secure a Good Start for China-US Relations at a New Juncture,” China Daily, 26 January 2025.
[xxiv] Ibid.
[xxv] “China Strongly Deplores, Firmly Opposes US Military Assistance, Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Taiwan.CN, 24 December 2024.
[xxvi] Ibid.
[xxvii] Ibid.
[xxviii] Nathan King, “Trump 2.0: Retreat, Expansion, and Controversy,” CGTN, 22 January 2025.
[xxix] Ibid.
[xxx] Ibid.
[xxxi] Ding Duo, “A Flawed Legal Fantasy Rooted in Arrogance,” China Daily, 25 February 2025.
[xxxii] Wang Fan, “On the Front Foot,” China Daily, 27 January 2025.
[xxxiii] Erik Solheim, “Navigating Uncertainty,” China Daily, 20 January 2025.
[xxxiv] Zhou Lanxu and Wang Keju, “Tariff Hikes May Backfire on US,” China Daily, 22 January 2025.
[xxxv] “China Files Complaint with WTO Against US Tariff Hikes,” Xinhua, 4 February 2025.
[xxxvi] Ibid.
[xxxvii] “DPP Separatist Actions Lead to Dead End,” Taiwan.CN, 10 March 2025.
[xxxviii] Zhang Yunbi, “High-Level Sino-US Talks Continue,” China Daily, 27 January 2025.
[xxxix] “China Slams US Military Provocation Concerning Taiwan,” Taiwan.CN, 15 February 2025.
[xl] “DPP Separatist Dead End,” and “Several US Weapons Will Not Alter Inevitable Demise of Taiwan Independence,” Taiwan.CN, 10 March 2025.
[xli] “Lai’s Two State Theory Fanning Tensions, Mainland Warns,” Taiwan.CN, 11 October 2024.
[xlii] Johnson Lai and Huizhong Wu, “China Deploys Record 125 Warplanes in Large-Scale Military Drill in Warning to Taiwan,” Associated Press, 14 October 2024.
[xliii] “Fujian Coast Guard Conducts Routine Patrols in Waters Near Kinmen,” Xinhua, 23 Jan 2025.
[xliv] “DPP Separatist Dead End”
[xlv] Huaxia, “Europe’s Angst and Awakening,” Xinhua, 28 January 2025.
[xlvi] Ibid.
[xlvii] Huaxia, “Who’s Paying for US Tariffs?,” Xinhua, 21 February 2025.
[xlviii] Ibid.
[xlix] Xiao Tianliang, Science of Military Strategy, 302.
[l] Rebecca Hersman, “Wormhole Escalation Nuclear Age,” 97.
[li] “Mainland Condemns Taiwan’s Leader’s Comments on Motherland as Push for Independence,” Taiwan.CN, 9 October 2024. and “Taiwan’s Ma Slams Lai’s Two State Theory,” Taiwan.CN, 10 October 2024.
[lii] Xiao Tianliang, Science of Military Strategy, 310.
[liii] President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, “US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement,” The White House, 7 February 2025.
[liv] “China Slams US Military Provocation Concerning Taiwan,” Taiwan.CN, 15 February 2025.
[lv] Xiao Tianliang, Science of Military Strategy, 311.
[lvi] Huaxia, “Poster: ‘Better Together’ vs ‘Me Forever,’” Xinhua, 6 March 2025.
[lvii] Ibid.
[lviii] Huaxia, Parody Show: House of Cuts: The Tariff Trap, Xinhua, 1 March 2025.
[lix] Huaxia, Parody Show: House of Cuts: Arimecan Presidential Debate, Xinhua, 30 October 2024.
[lx] State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, PRC (address, Asia Society Meeting, New York, NY, 23 September 2022).
[lxi] Interview with Western Ally representatives, but would like to maintain anonymity.
[lxii] Ralph Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics, 155.
[lxiii] Ben O’Loughlin, “Impact of Information Ecosystem,” 182.