Reconciling Defense and State Department Cultures at Embassies: A FAO Survival Guide To Working On a U.S. Country Team
By Colonel Mark Karas, U.S. Army - Retired
Disclaimers:
The author contributed this article in his personal capacity. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies or the United States Government.
This article references the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), however, as of this printing DISCS is now the Defense Security Cooperation University.
For any member of the U.S. military, but particularly the Foreign Area Officer (FAO), an assignment to a U.S. embassy can be a unique, rewarding, and broadening experience. FAOs can usually expect to have at least one, if not several, assignments on a U.S. embassy country team, most commonly as attachés or security cooperation officers (SCOs). In some countries, the Department of Defense (DoD) deploys non-FAO military personnel, such as special operations forces elements, military information support teams (MISTs), or civil affairs teams to embassies for missions that require close coordination with embassy personnel. These are usually six-month rotational deployments with narrower mission sets that can include different aspects of security cooperation. While these rotational elements aren’t under the direct authority of Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), ambassadors and geographic combatant commands expect SDO/DATTs to make effective use of their “coordinating authority” over these elements.
U.S. embassies are the most notable platform from which U.S. military personnel consistently engage with our international allies and partners in security cooperation and represent the DoD to advance U.S. national security objectives. Arguably, embassies are also where the U.S. interagency functions at its best, as representatives from the various U.S. governmental departments work together daily, advancing U.S. interests globally. Assignments to U.S. embassies can also be challenging and, at times, frustrating for U.S. military personnel as they are immersed not just in a foreign culture, but in an unfamiliar organizational culture led by the U.S. Department of State (DoS).
FAOs receive training and education enabling them to work with foreign militaries in and out of a particular host-nation, but can find it challenging to navigate the culture, rhythm, and idiosyncrasies of the State Department Foreign Service. FAOs develop a good sense for the possible challenges from a host-nation military or security force, but they can find “our side” unpredictable while planning and coordinating different security cooperation initiatives. Understanding State Department foreign service embassy culture, its strengths, idiosyncrasies, and how the U.S. military is perceived, understood or misunderstood, can enable DoD security cooperation initiatives and assist FAOs to work more effectively within a “whole of government” approach.
“Well, the Country team says…”
The term “country team” is frequently tossed around at the geographic combatant commands and throughout Washington’s policy-making circles. U.S. country teams are often asked for information, assessments, positions, and inputs for decisions. There is no prescribed formula to the make-up of a country team, but it is usually composed of the heads of each office within an embassy, including State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSO) leading the Political and Economic sections, Public Affairs, Management, Consular, and the Regional Security Office (from the Diplomatic Security Service), as well as representatives of all other agencies present, including DoD. The country team at an embassy represents a miniature of the broader U.S. interagency, consisting of representatives from whatever U.S. government departments require a presence in that particular host-nation. The country team is at the forefront of U.S. “whole of government” approaches with a particular host-nation, and they are as varied as the countries in which they are present. Led by the U.S. ambassador, the members of the country team provide her or him with their department’s perspective on issues in the areas of defense, security, intelligence, economics, law enforcement, development, public diplomacy, or in any other matter the ambassador deems important.
The positions of the country team hold significant credibility. Those advocating for or against a particular policy direction or some new initiative will often invoke the name of the country team to either buttress or counter arguments. Before meeting host-nation officials, visiting senior leaders, military and civilian alike, will typically request a country team meeting to become familiar with the nuances within a host-nation and to ensure their message is consistent with U.S. policy -- and sometimes more importantly, to learn what not to say. Embassy country teams discuss, debate, assess/mitigate risk, and seek to reach consensus on everything from an understanding of the situation within the host-nation, to the suitability of proposed initiatives, to policy recommendations for Washington. Effective country teams can actually “lead-turn” policy issues for their respective departments, as Washington offices are usually more bureaucratic and face a myriad of disparate functional and regional issues that consume finite amounts of time within the Beltway. Country team composition can be as broad or limited as the chief of mission determines appropriate, based on the U.S. priority interests or the issues at hand in a particular host-nation.
The SDO/DATT leads DoD personnel at embassies and provides the ambassador and the country team advice on DoD perspectives, positions, and capabilities as well as their understanding of host-nation defense and security perspectives, positions and capabilities. The SDO/DATT is also responsible for ensuring all DoD activities in a given country support, complement, and reinforce the embassy’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). For the DoD, country team concurrence is a critical requirement for everything from security cooperation initiatives, to operations, to defense-related policy issues addressed to the host-nation. Working constructively and effectively on a country team is a key requirement for FAOs, as well as for any embassy-assigned military personnel.
“The Ambassador is sovereign…”
The country team is led by the U.S. ambassador who is the chief of mission. Either a career FSO or political appointee, the ambassador is the President’s appointed representative to a host-nation, is confirmed by the Senate, and reports to the Secretary of State. Though the ambassador engages throughout the DoS, anyone who suggests the ambassador works for the State Department will be corrected in short order.
The chief of mission’s authority over all embassy personnel is formally established in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38, signed in 1982, which gives the chief of mission control over the “size, composition, and mandate of such staff elements.” A government department wishing to establish a presence or add positions at an embassy is required to undertake a formal process that ultimately ends with the ambassador signing off on a formal “NSDD 38” cable, agreeing to the addition. The chief of mission needs to agree to the mission of a section, the tasks it will be conducting, and the number of personnel for staffing. All those formally assigned to an embassy under NSDD 38 are under chief of mission authority and serve at the pleasure of the ambassador, who has the authority to remove individuals with little formal justification required. Those asked to leave receive little sympathy from their sending department. Even those military members attached to an embassy, but not formally under NSDD 38 chief of mission authority, would be wise to respect an ambassador’s authority or risk having their required country clearance approvals revoked. The DoD shows great deference to ambassadors, equating them to four-star generals in rank and in protocol. Depending on the country, geographic combatant commanders will discuss issues directly with an ambassador and will often defer to him or her on key decisions. With respect to security cooperation, DoD personnel on a country team -- SDO/DATTs, SCOs, or short-term deployers -- will implement no initiative unless it has chief of mission approval, and the ambassador will rarely agree without country team consensus.
The chief of mission sets the tone, priorities, and culture at a particular embassy. There are ambassadors who enthusiastically embrace working directly with other governmental department representatives outside of the DoS, and those who prefer a more DoS-centric style, delegating those relationships to the deputy chief of mission (DCM) or to an FSO managing a particular portfolio. There are ambassadors whose style decentralizes diplomacy implementation in an embassy, and those who trend towards conducting more of the diplomacy personally with embassy sections providing support. FAOs will serve under ambassadors who openly embrace the DoD mission, those who are skeptical and cautious of DoD initiatives, and those who simply have higher priorities than defense and security issues.
A good relationship with the ambassador is absolutely critical for the FAO serving as an SDO/DATT or SCO. As Foreign Service professionals or accomplished political appointees, ambassadors value a mature, competent, deliberative, clear-eyed, and articulate defense professional, and will look for those qualities with the very first meeting. They look for an SDO/DATT or SCO to contribute positively to the country team with a clinical eye on the defense and security issues of a host-nation and who are predisposed to working collegially and constructively with other members of the country team -- even when there are differing views of a particular problem set and approaches to address those issues.
SDO/DATTs and SCOs need to develop trust with the ambassador. Regular attendance at once-a-week, broader country team meetings are typically not sufficient to keep the ambassador informed on defense and security issues. Routine country team meetings tend to be broadly inclusive affairs that usually just allow for an overview of what is going on in an embassy or in the host-nation. Outside the regular rhythm of country team meetings, SDO/DATTs with their SCOs should seek regular, separate meetings with the ambassador on security cooperation, defense, and security issues. This provides the ambassador with a “deep dive” on defense issues and an opportunity to ask questions and address concerns outside of a regular country team meeting. Some ambassadors have worked with the military extensively and may be more familiar with DoD missions, capabilities, commands, and culture. Some may have little or no experience with the military and need a greater level of comfort with security cooperation initiatives and a deeper understanding of DoD processes and capabilities. Though U.S. ambassadors are extremely capable, even they sometimes need assistance in understanding our culture and deciphering DoD’s impenetrable dialect of acronyms and euphemisms.
“If you’ve seen one U.S. embassy…”
When U.S. military personnel step into an embassy environment, they may initially see the similarities of a military headquarters: urgent requests for information, taskings, requirements for coordination, decision memos, talking-point papers, trip books, and many meetings. But any resemblance to a U.S. military headquarters is usually coincidental and disappears from a military service member’s mental screen in relatively short order. As embassies consist of FSOs, representatives from other government departments, and the indispensable corps of Locally Employed Staff (LES), the chief of mission leads an organization that is rather unique in the U.S. government.
As the State Department Foreign Service leads and is responsible for managing state-to-state relationships for the United States, it is natural that State Department policies, processes, and culture would be predominant within the embassy. But each embassy has its own unique rhythm, idiosyncrasies, and culture, and no two embassies are alike -- “if you’ve seen one embassy, you’ve only seen one embassy.” There are those embassies that monitor and maintain state-to-state relations, and there are those that also encourage and advocate for reforms in their host-nations. DoD personnel traveling to several embassies advocating for or coordinating regional or multi-country functional initiatives have at times expressed frustration, complaining that a particular issue or procedure at one embassy wasn’t experienced at the last embassy. But even in the military, which seeks more of a harmonization of processes and culture across similar organizations, different commands have different organizational cultures and do things differently. Military personnel working with embassies should understand they are very different from military headquarters and from one another. When working with and in embassies, mirror-imaging by military members can result in misunderstandings, miscalculations, and ultimately frustrations for the military officer and FSO alike.
The Obligatory “Defense is from Mars, and State is from Venus” Reference…
There has been a good deal written and discussed about the differences in military and State Department Foreign Service cultures. Within DoD, Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus, a 1998 Army War College research project by U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Rickey Rife and FSO Rosemary Hanson still makes its rounds occasionally, and the title has almost become a hackneyed phrase in DoD. Rife and Hanson made their observations as DoD and DoS collaborated during peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many of their observations are defensible today.
The requirements for DoD and DoS collaboration have only grown since peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Since 9/11, the DoD has received a burgeoning set of authorities and appropriations for security cooperation and other missions to work not just with host-nation militaries, but with law enforcement, intelligence, border security, and civil protection agencies. The U.S. military’s growing body of work outside of traditional military missions and into areas traditionally the work of civilian departments has required the military to work even more closely with the State Department. More military personnel have been assigned to more embassies to work some fashion of security cooperation. For military personnel assigned to country teams working security cooperation, understanding and reconciling the different organizational cultures is as important as understanding and reconciling the culture of the host-nation. Especially important is how FSOs transmit and process information, make decisions, and view risk; and what is critically important is how they view the military and their concerns of militarization of foreign policy.
While DoD is typically more hierarchical and does its work in groups, teams, or “teams of teams,” the State Department, while bureaucratic, is typically flatter organizationally than DoD and is far more individualistic. The Foreign Service is small, numbering around 13,000 personnel who serve abroad for much of their careers (DoS also maintains a civil service of approximately 11,000 that serve in the U.S.). But its smaller size can be advantageous. FSOs can usually get the attention of the ambassador or a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (DAS) sitting in Washington DC a lot faster than the average military staff officer can with a general or flag officer. Within an embassy, an ambassador is more inclined to reach down to hear from an issue specialist without going through an intermediate supervisor. General and flag officers tend not to reach down to specific desk officers as readily.
“The pen is mightier…”
State’s core mission has historically been to manage state-to-state relations, report on key issues, and promote U.S. interests abroad. An FSO’s bread-and-butter skill set is engaging with host-nation governmental or key nongovernmental individuals and “understanding and reporting” on an individual portfolio. They study, analyze, and report on a host of specific issues within a particular country: political issues, economic conditions, human and religious rights, press freedoms, political-military matters, or host-nation foreign relations, to name a few. Their reporting is not just a clinical transmission of information, but it includes “in house” analysis and even policy recommendations. While these formal “cables” are coordinated within the embassy, to include with other non-DoS governmental sections if required, they are largely individual efforts. FSOs are judged by the quantity and quality of their reporting.
As cable writing is an FSO’s essential skill, writing is a critical ability for FSO, and they are very good at it. As opposed to the military’s knack for writing short, bulleted papers and PowerPoint slides with an intention to convey just the key bits of information most economically, State places emphasis on good, stylistically appropriate prose that captures more of the nuance of issues (and they have their own standards for brevity and concision). FSOs are also encouraged to write cables that attract the reader’s attention and even develop a “readership” within the department. They have even been encouraged to be pithy in their selection of cable titles and sub-headings to attract the eye.
For FSOs, style and grammar count, as State Department officials can have difficulty looking past stylistic or grammatical errors when reading a product. Too many grammatical errors and clunky stylistic constructions are significant distractions and can obscure the substance of a written product, undermining an FSO’s analysis or recommendation. Imprecise, clunky writing suggests imprecise, clunky thinking. FSOs at an embassy will often receive their products back from their supervisor, or even from the ambassador, with stylistic corrections -- much to their irritation (any FSO reading this article will have already winced at some of the stylistic constructions and struggled not to make corrections -- they have already stopped reading). But supervisors at embassies understand that Main State will not take poorly written cables seriously, let alone act on their contents. More importantly, State cables can have a wide readership, and it is not uncommon for a State cable to land in the read book of a combatant commander or make its way to the National Security Council.
For U.S. military members serving at embassies, it can be frustrating when written products sent out for coordination in an embassy are returned from FSOs with numerous grammar corrections and stylistic suggestions (which are usually correct). Subsequently, U.S. military personnel tend to misperceive FSOs as “style over substance.” For FAOs who study foreign languages, writing well in one’s own language is an important, if not indispensable, skill to establish credibility on a country team that one’s thinking is clear. Well-articulated positions and perspectives suggest well-thought-out positions and perspectives -- important requirement for military staff officers as well.
While an embassy officially documents its exchanges with “Main State” in Washington D.C. through the formal cable, within an embassy information transmittance and decision-making tends to be more fluid, intuitive, and open-ended. State Department personnel prefer to read, write, and speak in prose. While DoD prefers short papers and clipped PowerPoint briefings, FSOs prefer more detailed, prose-heavy papers and open, and at times open-ended, discussion. Unless facing a hard requirement from a Main State inquiry or guidance message, meetings can become lengthy with open discussion that does not necessarily lead to a definitive conclusion. At times, meetings will end satisfactorily with, “well, let’s just continue to monitor the situation and continue the discussion later.” Country-team decision-making is therefore very fluid -- and seeks to reach not agreement as such, but an equilibrium of consensus.
When FSOs hold a meeting, there is very little preparation or product development to support the gathering. An FSO may have a few notes written down but is expected to speak about a particular issue in an extemporaneous, logical, and articulate manner. During open discussions FSOs can often raise and brainstorm many, many dimensions of a particular issue. They dislike DoD’s overly linear and reductive approaches to issues with the attempt to capture everything on a deck of busy PowerPoint slides or bulleted one-page papers.
DoD members on or working with a country team should be prepared to dramatically reduce their reliance on PowerPoint slides, be able to conversationally express their viewpoint or position on any particular issue, and be ready to be interrupted often. Handing out PowerPoint slides is particularly dangerous in a country team setting. FSOs will start flipping through slides and start to question aspects of the briefing before the hapless military briefer has reached that particular portion of his or her meticulously constructed slide deck. I have watched a number of officers begin a briefing only to immediately start taking questions on later slides before they have even finished the introduction. As FSOs prefer open discussion, military personnel are often taken aback by the number and type of questions as State personnel bring up various issues and scenarios that may seem remote or obscure to a military person. FSOs can engage in an asynchronous, stream-of-consciousness manner, which is at times disorienting for military members. Military personnel serving on country teams should be prepared to brief with few, and preferably no slides, be it for the ambassador, or members of the country team. The same holds true when embassy-assigned military personnel participate in a modified country team meeting for a visiting senior official (yes, even a military one) or congressional delegation.
As FSOs prefer open, more informal discussions in meetings and see things in various nuanced shades of gray, they tend to be uncomfortable with the assertiveness and self-assuredness of military personnel. FSOs can see the military as trying to dominate an issue and “take over,” even when that may not be the intention. During a discussion, if a military person is perceived as overly aggressive during a debate on a particular point, a State Department person may go silent. However, their silence should not be confused with concurrence and a military person should not assume they have come to agreement, if that was the goal of the meeting. State Department diplomacy, even with interagency colleagues, seeks to avoid conflict. Usually in an FSO’s mind the issue has just been tabled for a future discussion -- when the military member has cooled down. The FSO may have also just decided to address the issue through a different avenue, perhaps at a State Department-only meeting.
State Department personnel also tend to express disagreement in more indirect ways. They can express disagreement with their own vernacular; there have been many times when a military person leaves a State Department meeting scratching their head, wondering aloud what was agreed. The answer is often -- nothing. On one occasion, I had a military officer move forward with an initiative, only to hear that members of the country team, and subsequently the ambassador, were displeased, insisting there was no agreement to move forward. Having previously instructed the well-meaning officer to make sure there was broad coordination and concurrence prior to moving forward, and receiving the assurance that it was done, I later had him recap his conversation with one embassy section. He stated that the FSO said they were not comfortable with the initiative, but they didn’t explicitly say “no.” I explained to the exasperated officer that when an FSO says they are not comfortable with something, it can be translated into military staff-speak as a “critically non-concur.” For military members, this way of expressing non-concurrence is at times perceived as irritating passive-aggressive behavior, while in the conflict-avoidance culture of the State Department, it is a perfectly acceptable expression of disagreement.
“First, do no harm…”
The intuitive, fluid, and open nature of State Department discussion and decision-making affects country team level approaches and strategy development. As a particular issue of concern develops within a host-nation and open discussion and debate begin, many variations and dimensions surface when defining a problem and developing potential approaches. When trying to define a particular problem they are often resistant to processing and isolating specific variables, feeling that an issue is too complicated or nuanced to be easily reduced. Issues that arise are complex and approaches have multiple potential consequences -- intended or not. As a result, State Department is comfortable with more incremental approaches that are weighted toward limiting down side, with the unspoken mantra of “first, do no harm.” This incrementalism, while providing for a bit of flexibility, can also limit considering questions of what comes next, or what to do if a particular approach doesn’t work as hoped. In a more “wait and see” approach, those discussions can be tabled for later in a fluid situation.
State Department will often highlight the need to “send a message” diplomatically early in discussions of potential responses. When dealing with a government or political individual acting contrary to U.S. interests, State Department can use other diplomatic tools such as limited personal sanctions or visa restrictions. Such measures have to be approved by Main State and then by the interagency; the process is neither easy nor automatic. After these measures are successfully in place, State will welcome the success of having “sent a message,” whether or not these measures have actually affected behavior in offending actors or governments -- a perfectly acceptable short-term outcome for the State Department. As security cooperation is ultimately an element of foreign policy, it is also fair game on an FSO’s menu of messages.
As State Department discusses potential responses to a concerning situation in a bilateral relationship such as a government’s potential violation of human rights, military personnel need to be prepared for State to include restricting or eliminating parts of the defense and security portfolio as a potential response. Regardless of how a particular host-nation political official or government values programs such as military-to-military exchanges or “train and equip” efforts, the option of halting these programs can appear early in the discussion. The defense and security portfolio is often “low hanging fruit” for FSOs seeking to serve notice to the host-nation. Sending a message by restricting these programs, regardless of their significance to the political institutions of the host-nation government or to DoD security cooperation objectives, is an obvious course of action for FSOs .
From DoD’s perspective, restricting or eliminating the defense and security portfolio is often unfortunate as these programs tend to be apolitical, concrete, or aimed at delivering a needed capability. These programs are also good vehicles for exposing host-nation military and security officials to U.S. principles, such as civilian control of the military. Many experienced diplomats recognize the value of these programs as positive departure points in difficult diplomatic discussions. Additionally, from a resources and programmatic perspective, these programs and initiatives tend to be very difficult to restart once stopped. DoD personnel on country teams need to be able to articulate a solid case for maintaining these programs but prepared to implement and manage these restrictions as a part of a unified team implementing a “whole of government" approach. At times these approaches run contrary to DoD security objectives, and it is up to the SDO/DATT to articulate to the country team the implications of restricting these programs. Questions such as how to reconcile a country’s actions challenging democratic institutions and values with the need for coalition support, for example, are difficult and yes, complicated.
“Lead, follow, get the heck out of the way, or none of the above…”
One of the more significant ways in which Defense and State differ is how the two cultures define and address risk. Often when a disagreement between the two is peeled back, one will find this issue at the core. While the military has developed elaborate formal systems to assess risk, at the most basic level a military person mentally views risk as “probability versus consequence.” The military can accept a low probability of a highly negative consequence, or a high probability of a less negative consequence (courses of action with a high probability of highly negative consequences are typically dismissed). Once acceptable risk is identified then appropriate mitigation measures are applied, but risk is rarely eliminated. While DoD can be risk averse at times, FSOs tend to be dramatically more risk resistant and cautious, particularly when faced with some proposed military initiative. For FSOs, risk is calculated differently in the context of fluid, intuitive, and open discussions. In discussions, they will tend to significantly unweight probability and focus more on sets of consequences -- the more potential consequences presented, the greater the overall risk. FSOs’ discussions of risk can be disorienting to a member of the military as all potential consequences appear to have equal weight. FSOs can appear as “worst case scenario” artists, raising so many consequences, they question whether it’s worth doing anything at all. The potential breadth and width of consequences, no matter how remote to a military person, can be such to an FSO as to make discussing mitigation measures irrelevant. To a military person, FSOs often appear as they are talking themselves into inaction. For State Department, not doing anything is a perfectly acceptable course of action. Doing nothing is often cultural anathema to the military, and from an FSO’s perspective, DoD has a bias towards action for action’s sake.
Even though there may be no appreciable tangible negative effects, even the risk of poor optics or perceptions can be an important consideration for the embassy. Often times it is difficult for a military person to understand the significance an embassy can place on optics. Questions such as: How will the ambassador/embassy/United States be perceived? What message does this send? What inquiries might the embassy receive and can they be adequately answered? What potential narratives might be promulgated and then misused in the host-nation politics? If we publicize too many military events, will we be perceived as too militarized? All these questions are potential points of extensive consideration and discussion, with FSOs appearing overly alarmist to their military colleagues.
In this risk resistant climate, DoD personnel should exercise caution when introducing new, never-before-seen security cooperation initiatives to a country team. Invariably the country team will ask, "Has this been done before, and where?” Invariably someone from the embassy, including perhaps the ambassador, will contact a colleague at the embassy in the country where a similar initiative is ongoing to seek their experiences and advice. FSOs will also informally pulse counterparts at Main State very early in the process to get their respective bureau’s view. New security cooperation initiatives can take longer to socialize on a country team, particularly those that are directed outside the host-nation’s military and towards domestic security forces. Military personnel, actively supported by the SDO/DATT, should brief members of the country team early and often, both formally and informally. They should be prepared to be questioned extensively throughout the coordination and decision-making process. Risk concerns should not be dismissed, but acknowledged, addressed, incorporated into the plan, and then the plan should be re-socialized. Good FAOs should be prepared for multiple iterations of “wash, rinse, and repeat” cycles when introducing new and potentially controversial security cooperation initiatives.
“What? Me? Militarizing…?”
Perhaps the most significant debate in foreign policy formulation and implementation is the issue of the DoD’s “outsized role,” DoS’s “diminished role,” and the question of militarization of foreign policy. While not necessarily a new debate, the issue has steadily grown more pronounced with DoD’s accumulating suite of authorities to conduct “train and equip” under its title authority, and the expanded set of military missions around the world in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) during the Bush Administration. These authorities continued to evolve during the Obama Administration. Most recently the current administration’s stated intention to reduce the DoS’s budget has injected even more enthusiasm into discussions on the issue. Others have argued that DoS also has a responsibility to adapt and assert itself in foreign policy development and implementation with organizational and mission changes, learning how to work better with the military. It is not the intent to engage this debate here, let alone resolve these issues, but suggest how this debate may reflect itself during DoD-DoS collaboration on a country team. DoD personnel, especially FAOs, should be cognizant of these debates and how they might impact effective DoD collaboration with the DoS.
Rosa Brooks’ 2016 book, How Everything Became War, and the Military Became Everything captures the issue of DoD’s expanding roles leading to an oversized influence in foreign policy quite well. In her book, Brooks reflects extensively on the nature of war and conflict in this era: the continual nature of conflict, the challenge of separating war and peace as two separate and distinct conditions, and the implications of that blending. While Brooks’ reflections on conflict are important for any member of the military, what is immediately relevant for the FAO on a country team is her take on the outsized role of DoD in foreign policy development and implementation. She notes that the military has taken on an ever-expanding set of missions, along with the accompanying funding reliably appropriated by Congress to the detriment of civilian institutions, such as the State Department and USAID. She provides many anecdotes to illustrate this view, such as well-meaning efforts by the military to do things like train police and judges, build schools and dig wells, and address cyber threats, all conducted with questionable effectiveness. She notes that the military’s involvement in such areas has raised concerns by those civilian agencies that have the expertise to take on such efforts, but face reduced funding to do so. Subsequently, as the military gathers new missions and funding, it becomes the default organization of choice to deliver effects in areas outside its traditional purview. Even if one does not completely agree with her analysis or conclusions, her views are shared by many in the DoS and other civilian institutions (and yes, even in the military). FAOs will most likely hear her arguments, or variations of them, reflected during country team discussions at an embassy.
In the area of DoD efforts in security cooperation with international partner military and security forces, DoD has certainly exploded with authorities and authorizations to conduct training and equipping efforts outside of the traditional security assistance programs enshrined under State Department Title 22 authority. After 9/11 and with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as GWOT efforts around the globe, DoD felt it needed these programs to address emergent requirements in partner capability development. In this environment, DoD deemed traditional programs like Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), State Department security assistance under its Title 22 authority, were no longer sufficient, if not wholly inappropriate. Established with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, these programs reflect the nature of traditional bilateral political relationships as opposed to an emergent security requirement. During the Bush Administration, building up indigenous security forces and coalition partners during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan became important requirements. Under President Obama, coalition development thinking evolved as the administration sought to address security challenges with “other people’s armies.” The Obama Administration sought to be preventative rather than reactive to security challenges, resolving such challenges before there was a need for another extended commitment of U.S. troops.
Civilian institutions of diplomacy and development express skepticism as to whether the U.S. military is suited for these tasks, pointing out that results are at best mixed and these efforts risk militarization of the problem set at the expense of social, economic, civil society, and governmental institutional development -- core issues of most security problems. Others counter that while the criticisms have merit, the U.S. military is the only institution with the personnel, resources, planning, and projection capability to reliably deliver security in relatively short order. As the DoS and some members of Congress have chafed at DoDs conduct of these sorts of activities, authorizations regularly mandate DoS coordination and concurrence on proposals. Many of these proposals, or “Building Partner Capacity” cases, funded with DoD Title 10 funds, require Country Team Assessments (CTA), ultimately expressing embassy agreement for a particular project. Now, the DoS is involved with these cases from the country team, through the geographic combatant command and the Pentagon, to congressional notification.
Writing in Foreign Policy, James Jeffery, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Iraq, and Albania (and as of this writing serving as the U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement), agrees with Brooks’ argument of the outsized role of the DoD, noting that the “military’s effectiveness in such quasi-diplomatic business is limited.” He argues that the authorities and funding appropriations DoD has accumulated since 9/11 in training and equipping security forces should revert to DoS in its traditional role of managing and overseeing security assistance as foreign policy. However, he places a good bit of responsibility for State’s diminution in foreign policy on its own ever-expanding set of priorities at the expense of big-picture “traditional diplomacy.” He is critical of State Department’s direction over the years in emphasizing an unfocused grab bag of “soft power” social agendas in a bid to be a “deep transformer.” He notes that in the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), issues like the South China Sea and Ukraine are dramatically less prominent than the stated priorities that consist of what he characterized as a “hodgepodge of social engineering” and climate change. He notes that now, “operationally, the State Department is seen as an alternative to -- rather than partner or exploiter of military and other hard power.”
FSOs, particularly more junior ones, do tend to view diplomatic and military actions almost as a binary choice. Instinctively, they have difficulty understanding what role the military plays in diplomacy. Accepting perhaps a very narrow role for the U.S. military to assist with host-nation defense reforms, or exercising with a friendly host-nation military, they tend to view the military as an entity to be called on in an emergency--“just break glass.” But in the meantime, it is best for the military to stay in the glass box. From their perspective, if DoS succeeds in its “deep transformation efforts,” there is little need for military involvement and the immense resources the military consumes. Today’s FSO’s view of diplomacy is broader than DoD’s view (which arguably trends more towards Ambassador Jeffrey’s more traditional model) and encompasses promoting American values through a host of agendas. They have seen that the military’s success has been limited and are naturally skeptical when an enthusiastic staff officer from a geographic combatant command pitches them on something he or she thinks is a grand new idea.
As Jeffrey and others have noted, DoS has accumulated a broad set of more narrow activities in what retired Ambassador Larry Butler has called a “proliferation of priorities.” The proliferation of priorities is perfectly understandable considering State’s culture of open discussion, respect for complexity, and resistance to risk. The result is numerous smaller “soft power” efforts of limited funds targeting big scope issues: child and gender issues, civil society development, LGBTQ issues, religious rights, micro-finance, anti-graffiti campaigns, media funding, civil society development, climate change intervention promotion, etc. This strategic diffusion results in many benign smaller programs that have a positive optic and may raise awareness but have questionable transformative effects, particularly at current funding levels. Jeffery argues that since World War II, “nowhere but Japan, Germany, and in Western Europe (via the Marshall Plan) have soft-power tools transformed strategic terrain to our advantage.” In many respects, the issue is not wholly of State Department’s diminution in foreign policy, but that institution’s diffusion of its efforts, which others have argued is the reason why many of State’s foreign policy development functions have migrated to an ever-growing National Security Council.
FAOs assigned to an embassy will often walk into a blizzard of DoS activities, outside of just defense and security. FSOs, in addition to their core task of cable writing, feverishly try to keep track of the myriad of issues, activities, and working groups. The DoS, particularly at the country team level, has difficulty in prioritizing its efforts and asking itself whether a particular initiative is necessary, sufficient, and truly transformational. Of course FSOs at embassies are quick to assess that the many things an embassy is doing at times need to be scaled back. Many well-intentioned country team meetings have sincerely tried to neck down priorities, but the open discussion format of problem sets often triggers the “it’s complicated” default and priority lists have ballooned again. Like any other bureaucracy in the U.S. Government, it’s hard for the DoS to drop product lines, even with its nuanced thinking and flexible approaches. In the end, the only solution agreed upon is the need for more people and more resources.
Much of this development work is done by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an agency that is separate from the DoS but which reports to the Secretary of State (somewhat analogous to the U.S. Marine Corps falling under the Department of the Navy), though the DoS also manages and implements specific programs in many sectors such as law enforcement and the media, and not every country has a USAID presence. USAID prefers to guard its independence from the DoS, and there are usually energetic and complex discussions at a country team between State and USAID on the direction of development as well. However, USAID does have a more deliberate planning and assessment process in the implementation of its programs that DoD is learning from to better enable security cooperation program assessments.
“So what’s a Combatant Command…?”
Given the ambassador’s authority over all U.S government representation at an embassy and State’s responsibility to coordinate “whole of government” approaches at the country team level, including DoD security cooperation, most rank-and-file FSOs typically know little of the U.S. military. It is true, however, that over the last several years a greater percentage of incoming FSO do have prior military experience, and there have been a significant number of FSOs that have served with the military as political advisors or on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Unfortunately, the DoS advancement systems don’t particularly value assignments that have FSOs working with the military. After their initial training at the Foreign Service Institute, FSOs have little professional development outside of on-the-job experience throughout their careers that can expand their aperture of the U.S. government.
Moreover, FSOs receive little development in leadership and management. There are often few opportunities for FSOs in the Political, Economic, and Public Diplomacy “cones” (State Department’s version of career tracks) to lead and manage and programs. There are FSOs that can go there entire careers without managing programs. For the interagency, this is unfortunate as DoS personnel at country teams are expected to coordinate and integrate multi-departmental efforts to support “whole of government” approaches. On a practical level, they chair working groups on such issues as economic development, investing in people, law enforcement, or countering violent extremism, which FSOs sometimes view as a distraction from their core tasks. These working groups tend not to be planning or strategy development affairs but have a more basic “clearing house” function. Interagency participants share activity information and present proposals, but too often the priority purpose of these fora is to ensure a particular department’s initiative first, does no harm.
In contrast to the State Department, the military sends service members to various professional military education (PME) courses throughout their careers. At the more senior courses, military members are at least exposed to the need for “whole of government" approaches and the primacy of the State Department in foreign affairs (though PME could do much better on presenting the functions and organization of State Department itself). Army officers training as FAOs, conducting their one-year in-region training, will intern at one if not several embassies under the direction and mentorship of an attaché or SCO. Even as FAOs prepare for attaché and SCO assignments by attending the Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS) and the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS) (SDO/DATTs attend both), they are exposed to concepts such as the interagency process and U.S. embassy roles and organization. At these courses, military personnel learn about the role of the DoS, the country team, and the authorities of DoS versus DoD in the conduct of security cooperation and security assistance. Military personnel report to a country team understanding that whatever DoD does requires consistency with, and support to, the ambassador’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). SCOs are briefed on their requirement to provide input to the embassy’s Mission Resource Request (MRR) by way of their FMF and IMET projections. As a result of this continuing education coupled with hard experience, military leaders regularly acknowledge the importance of DoS diplomacy, USAID’s important work in development, the insufficiency of a military-only approach, and the need for DoS leadership. Other than hard experience, there is nothing comparable for State Department FSOs to prepare them to work with interagency partners, including the military.
As professional development DoS sends few of its population to U.S. military professional military education institutions, and fails to make use of the experiences of those that do attend. Despite the strong demand signal sent out by senior military leaders, POLAD positions throughout the various U.S. military commands aren’t always filled with the most qualified candidates, and these positions aren’t thought to be particularly career enhancing within the DoS personnel advancement system. The political-military portfolio in a Political Section of an embassy isn’t considered particularly “attractive” and career enhancing, and these officers often feel the need to seek additional portfolios to make themselves more competitive. This is unfortunate as the Pol-Mil officer is an absolutely crucial position to integrate DoD-DoS efforts at the country team level. A good Pol-Mil officer is a “force and resource multiplier,” and are worth their weight in gold to DoD and DoS, and should be recognized and rewarded for their work.
As a result of unfamiliarity with the military and the lack of appeal of political-military issues, an FSO tends to be surprised at the role of the military at the country team and wonders why military officers show up to public affairs planning meetings, law enforcement working groups, and countering violent extremist meetings. Additionally, with the possible exception of FAOs, military personnel are not seen as having the requisite level of understanding of host-nation nuances to speak authoritatively on an issue, let alone suggest a remedy. This is particularly true of military members who come in from a command to propose an initiative or those who deploy to an embassy for temporary duty, often a source of consternation for FSOs. Having limited understanding of how DoD works, its capabilities, authorities, and resources, they can see themselves as holding the line against militarization. They generally do not understand DoD security cooperation programs and authorities. Many are even unaware that traditional security assistance programs such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), are actually DoS Programs under Title 22 authority and only administered by DoD.
Military personnel can report to an embassy enthusiastically looking forward to jumping into “whole of government” efforts with a broad range of colleagues, only to be greeted at times with suspicion, dismissiveness, and curiosity as to the reason for the enthusiasm. The military person walks away disappointed their “whole of government” effort is unrequited, perhaps with the impression of the stereotypical arrogant FSO, an unfortunate take away for a future potential senior military leader. This can be particularly true of military members that deploy on short six-month rotations, who don’t have the time and opportunity to develop situational awareness and relationships of trust with FSOs. FAOs serving as Attaches and SCOs at embassies should work to build relations (face-to-face), trust, and inform foreign service personnel on the U.S. military, its organizational processes, its programs and capabilities, and resources -- and then let them lead. At embassy working groups, military members should work constructively with FSOs, suggesting potential options for organizing work, but make clear they are there to “complement and reinforce” embassy efforts, not to take over. And as hard as it may be for military, sometimes “dialing back” the energy and assertiveness is more appropriate for a country team setting. Attaches and SCOs should mentor short-term military deployers and help them navigate the idiosyncrasies of country teams. In turn, short-term deployers should work closely with DAOs and SCOs and not only coordinate with these offices, but seek out advice on how best to work within the culture of a given country team.
Conclusion
Considering the personnel and resources at the military’s disposal relative to DoS, it is easy to see how quickly a growing DoD presence and “Swiss army knife” of missions and authorities could soon overwhelm a country team. Aside from the traditional Defense Attaché Office and the Security Cooperation Office, civil affairs teams, MISTs, and special operations forces elements can increase the number of military members visible at an embassy. Obviously military individuals wearing civilian attire attract the eye and can stir consternation throughout the embassy sections. In the small bubble of an embassy community, the question, “what are they really doing here?” is asked in hushed whispers, as if witnessing some bad movie or television show. Some FSOs, concerned about the optic of a militarized embassy, would prefer short-term military personnel not come into the embassy at all.
Additionally, geographic combatant commands maintain a host of program administering offices for some non-traditional military efforts such as: counter-narcotics programs, identity programs that provide biometric capabilities to host-nation security forces, cyber security, consequence management, maritime initiatives for civilian organizations, strategic communications initiatives, and border protection initiatives. At times, these offices reach out directly to specific sections within an embassy, bypassing coordination with the DAO. Many of these well-meaning offices travel to embassies to pitch an exhausted country team on their great ideas, initiatives, or exercises. It’s a challenge for the SDO/DATT to keep track of the constellation of DoD possibilities, and country teams can suffer from combatant command fatigue relatively quickly.
After some time however, once FSOs feel comfortable with DoD and see the resources DoD can bring to the table, they become more comfortable working with DoD to address gaps or reinforce embassy efforts. This process tends to happen a good deal faster at smaller embassies with fewer personnel and extremely limited resources. FSOs may even begin to appreciate the “hard power” aspects of the military. One FSO expressed the observation to me that there are more people in Army bands than there are in the Foreign Service (FAOs will hear this refrain regularly from FSOs), and if diplomacy was funded appropriately, I would have less of a job. Later, that same FSO, frustrated and concerned over the actions of a host-nation political figure and the lack of success in moderating this individual, asked (half joking) if there was a way to organize a large military exercise outside the capital. Experienced FSOs see U.S. military exercises and security cooperation efforts as a tangible signs of U.S. commitment and demonstrations of power that can affect the calculus of decision makers and support diplomatic efforts. They see the resources DoD can bring to bear to complement and reinforce embassy efforts, not run contrary to them.
About the Author
Mark M. Karas is an instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Mr. Karas is a retired Army FAO, and his assignments included serving as the SDO/DATT in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Budapest, Hungary. He has also served as the SCO Chief in Baku, Azerbaijan, and as the Russia Political-Military Planner in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), U.S. European Command. Mr. Karas is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and he earned a Masters of Arts degree in Russian, Eastern European, and Eurasian Studies from Georgetown University.