Recapturing Taiwan: Planning for the Worst Option in a U.S. Denial Strategy

By Captain Daniel Fillion, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Beck, U.S. Army; and Major Caleb Green, U.S. Air Force

Disclaimer:   The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

In the summer of 1944, the U.S. military was considering how best to approach and destroy the industrial capacity on the Japanese mainland. One option being explored was Operation Causeway which involved the U.S. invasion of Formosa (Taiwan) to secure air bases from which they could attack the Ryukyu Islands and Kyushu. After a thorough analysis, military planners opted instead to proceed with MacArthur’s invasion of Luzon and Operation Iceberg, which was the direct invasion of the Ryukyus and southern Ogasawara Archipelago, believing that Imperial Japanese forces on Formosa could be bypassed and cut off. The grueling battles that ensued on Iwo-Jima and Okinawa in early 1945 suggest that an air battle and amphibious landing at Formosa would have been a major undertaking that would have resulted in severe losses to U.S. forces.

Fast forward 75 years and the military challenge of a Joint Forced Entry Operation (JFEO) in Taiwan is no less intimidating, despite the advances made in range and speeds of today’s military technology. Nevertheless, it remains an option for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tied its ‘China Dream’ and goal of ‘national rejuvenation’ to the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. The CCP’s aggressive behavior toward Taiwan under General Secretary Xi Jinping, beginning with the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in 2013, has caused U.S. leaders to assess that a move on Taiwan could come before the end of this decade. More recently, Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted the PRC’s desire to speed-up the timeline for reunification. In response, the United States has increased security cooperation and security assistance for Taiwan under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, while it maintains ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan’s status. The ‘One China policy’ evinced from the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué during the Nixon administration was reaffirmed as recently as the latest National Security Strategy in September 2022. The CCP is showing clear signs of losing patience with the U.S. attempt to delay resolution of the issue by ‘electing’ a hard-line Standing Committee (Politburo) and emplacing General Secretary Xi for an unprecedented third term at the 20^th Congress of the CCP in October 2022. While the CCP would prefer a peaceful reunification, the probability of an invasion is not zero and may be increasing. For that reason, the full range of contingency planning must be considered now—from flexible deterrent and/or response options, to a full-scale defense campaign, to a recapture operation—as the potential success or failure of each of these efforts are inextricably linked.

Expanding a Denial Strategy

Eldridge Colby’s recent book The Strategy of Denial argues that “[t]he top priority for the US defense establishment should be ensuring that China cannot subordinate a US ally or quasi-ally in Asia, with the first priority being developing and maintaining the ability to conduct a denial defense for Taiwan.” He contends that the success of a denial strategy -- in other words, preventing the CCP from achieving its objectives either through deterrence or compulsion -- will depend on the formation of a coalition centered on the United States with allies and other partners willing to deter the CCP, or defend Taiwan against the PLA’s attempt to take it by force. He acknowledges that a defense of Taiwan might not be successful and discusses the conditions under which recapture, which he calls an ‘expanded denial’ strategy, must be executed. He equates the importance of Taiwan’s liberation to upholding the trust that nations have in the United States to follow through on its alliance agreements. This same sentiment is echoed by Richard Haass who suggests the result of a failure to protect Taiwan would significantly damage U.S. foreign policy: “[E]very American ally and partner would reconsider its security dependence on the United States and opt for either appeasement of China or some form of strategic autonomy, which would likely involve nuclear weapons.” Fortunately, starting with the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. government has had a reputable track record in responding to PLA aggression aimed at Taiwan.

In The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, Ian Easton explains how the CCP planned extensively to take Taiwan in the summer of 1951, but then abandoned its plans when the Korean War broke out in June. The plan involved roughly 500,000 troops and over 2,000 amphibious ships; their main concern at the time was ‘direct intervention’ by the United States to defend Taiwan. In 1954, the PLA successfully seized Taiwan’s Dachen island group after amassing three-quarters of a million troops on the mainland coast. Later that same year, President Eisenhower signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and the U.S. Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, granting special powers to defend Taiwan, which caused the CCP to cease its offensive. Again, in 1958 the PLA amassed troops across the strait and began shelling the smaller island of Kinmen off the mainland coast. During each of these incidents, the United States’ resolve deescalated the situation with presence and with threat of force. Since then, the U.S. has relied on deterrence and assumptions of the PLA calculus about the challenges involved in an amphibious invasion. It is not lost on military scholars that the allied invasion of Sicily during World War II required a numerical advantage of 6:1 over the defenders and it still took over a month to capture the island.

Given the history of resolute U.S. response to crises in the Taiwan Strait, one might surmise that there seem to be little question of U.S. commitment to deter and even to defend Taiwan from the PLA, even given U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. However, U.S. resolve to recapture Taiwan if it were invaded by the PLA has been unclear. This is because publicly committing to liberate a PLA-occupied Taiwan has several risks. First, the United States must balance deterrence with the risk of outright provocation. Although the U.S. government has been confident in its ability to deter CCP aggression over the past 70 years, the assumption that deterrence will continue to work grows increasingly precarious given the PLA’s rapid modernization and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Historically, the PLA’s amphibious capabilities were the weak link in their invasion plan, but with large investments in its Navy, airborne assault capabilities, and Rocket Forces, the PLA is closing gaps in what would be required for a successful invasion. Publicly committing to defend and liberate Taiwan would be seen by the CCP as highly provocative. Second, the most dangerous scenario of a full-scale invasion is not the only possible scenario in the near term. A gradual take-over approach, such as capturing smaller islands like Kinmen and Matsu near the mainland coast or blockading Taiwan, would present a challenge for the U.S. political leadership in determining an appropriate military response. A statement about committing to defend and recapture could draw a red line that the U.S. government might not uphold under conditions of a more limited CCP action. Failure to enforce a perceived redline might be viewed as a tacit authorization for the CCP to proceed with a full-scale invasion. Third, committing to liberate could impact the political commitment of allies like Japan and Australia. Neither country is obligated to intervene, although there is increasing evidence that both nations are preparing for the possibility of a future confrontation. Finally, and perhaps the biggest reason recapture has not been brought up publicly is that the commitment to defend Taiwan in the first has not been an officially, publicly-sanctioned policy of any U.S. administration since Nixon. 

From Integrated Deterrence to Integrated Warfare

Today’s military planners must consider what a recapture scenario would require while setting the conditions for a successful defense campaign, thereby allowing political leadership the option to execute should it become necessary. Brendan Taylor, professor of Strategic Studies at Australian National University, notes that a common heuristic in public circles is that Taiwanese forces would need to hold out for two to four weeks before U.S. forces would be fully ready to intervene against a full-scale PLA invasion. If the PLA were able to breach Taiwan’s coastal fortifications, mined waters and beaches, and hardened military bunkers, which are all elements of its so-called 360-degree ‘porcupine defense’, and then neutralize major centers of gravity on the island before the United States could intervene, recapture would be the only remaining military option. More likely, U.S. and coalition forces already in theater would be thrust into armed conflict to defend Taiwan. During this armed conflict, the impact of friendly casualties sustained during the defense of Taiwan must be factored into planning assumptions about what may remain available to mount a successful JFEO to liberate Taiwan from the PLA. 

Executing a recapture campaign will require a multinational effort. Not only must the United States consider how to solidify the political will of allies and partners in a hypothetical coalition, but it should consider the need for closer peacetime coordination with Taiwan forces. Deeper U.S.-Taiwan coordination is difficult to justify under a policy of strategic ambiguity and would likely be seen as provocative. Nevertheless, the value of this coordination, that would permeate beyond command elements and reach lower unit levels, including civil defense and reserve units, cannot be dismissed out of hand. As mentioned earlier, balancing deterrence and risking outright provocation must be weighed carefully by decision makers; but prior coordination with the Taiwan military should be seen as a crucial element of successfully executing any future, hypothetical combined military operation.

In addition to the complexities of coalition building, coordination within the U.S. government would similarly present numerous policy complexities that would impact military planning. U.S. resolve is not tied to the interagency—it is tied to the President, the Congress, and ultimately the American people. Thus, replacing the current U.S. policy of ambiguity with unambiguous messaging of U.S. intent to defend Taiwan from a PLA invasion could directly and positively impact resolve for military commitment.

Additionally, if the PLA took Taiwan by force, one might assume the U.S. would seek to de-legitimize the CCP’s territorial claims in the same way the U.S. has successfully de-legitimized Russian claims to Ukrainian territory. And yet, the enormous risk of escalation (possibly up to strategic exchange), combined with the current U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, could create a moment of political hesitation in Washington against mounting a recapture campaign. This hesitation would likely be happening in Tokyo and Canberra as well. Given integrated deterrence would have failed at this point, the U.S. government, allies, and partners would need to shift mindset to a whole-of-government, coalition-supported approach to crisis.

Looking across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power, prospects for successful recapture appear daunting. The first hurdle would be on the diplomatic front in trying to hold together and/or grow a coalition willing to stand up to China’s aggression. The next and more herculean effort would be to hold the coalition together when it begins to rack-up significant losses during Taiwan’s defense. These losses could include ballistic missile attacks on forward bases and staging positions in Japan, South Korea or even Australia. Just as the participation and resolve of key regional allies in a coalition would be essential in the defense of Taiwan, so would their continued support be critical to the success of any recapture effort, especially due to the need for continued access and overflight in Japan, the Philippines, and other Indo-Pacific nations. If the PLA were able to successfully defeat the United States in a fight, the CCP might be able to convince other nations to stay out of a recapture campaign by simply pointing to the loss the coalition suffered.

Even before an invasion was complete, the CCP would be competing in the information space with subversive messaging telling the world their actions are justified. Using coordinated lines of efforts among their ‘three warfares’ (psychological, public opinion, and legal), the CCP would actively shape the environment to drum support for their actions while condemning those of the United States, Taiwan, and other coalition nations. The CCP has always maintained that Taiwan is part of China and would likely paint a picture that Taiwan was welcoming reunification. Following a successful invasion, as was seen in done with Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine, the CCP messaging would quickly evolve to say that any attack on Taiwan was an attack on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and that a coalition recapture effort was in fact the invasion. The U.S. government would need to remain consistent in messaging its policy to signal its conviction against PRC’s actions that were contrary to international laws regarding the use of force and preserving human rights.

Not only would the economies of China and the US plummet, but the global economy would suffer significantly if there was conflict between the two nations. U.S. trade sanctions on China and resultant Chinese countersanctions, coupled with the interruption of some of the most trafficked maritime routes in the world, mean that global trade would be experiencing major disruptions in supply chains. Nikkei forecasts $2.6 trillion would “evaporate” from the global economy in the event of a Taiwan contingency. One of the biggest concerns of the Taiwan and Luzon Straits closing would involve the temporary disruption of energy distribution to Japan and South Korea. One could also assume cyber-attacks on economic and other critical infrastructure would have crippling impacts. As seen in the short time Ukraine has been at war, funding a war takes an enormous budget as the United States has committed over $18 billion in security assistance without being directly involved. The United States would also be forced to pay a significant bill for rebuilding the forces and material losses suffered during a failed defense.

Fighting with a Degraded ‘M’

The military instrument of power would be the primary mechanism by which the United States and other coalition members would affect a hypothetical recapture scenario. Because China will not willingly abandon the fruits of its victory, the U.S. military planners will be faced with no easy options in determining the most effective and least costly way to conduct a JFEO. By the point the coalition was transitioning from a defense to a recapture campaign, friendly maritime, air, and ground forces will have already been degraded in all seven joint functional areas—command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment—during combat with the PLA trying to defend Taiwan. Delaying a liberation campaign to reconstitute coalition forces fully, or even partially, would need to be weighed against the risk of allowing the PLA more time to solidify its gains and establish defenses on the main island. Understanding some of the hypothetical ways in which Joint functions would be degraded illustrates the nature of the overwhelming challenge of a recapture campaign.

The coalition defending Taiwan should expect that the PLA will attempt to disrupt both intelligence collection assets, including those in the space domain, and the transmission methods by which intelligence is shared between commands and units. Disruptions in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) would occur early to conceal enemy movement and inhibit friendly communications. Sea cables might also be damaged. During a recapture campaign, although some functionality may be restored, capability will still be degraded, and the chessboard will have changed significantly in the ensuing time, with PLA forces now firmly entrenched. Similarly, the military information element should not be confused with the information instrument of national power, but both will be leveraged by the CCP and PLA during invasion. The CCP is already shaping the cognitive domain by labeling Taiwan a ‘core interest,’ which essentially establishes a red line that the Chinese population can stand behind, and that it dares others to cross. Cyber-attacks, disinformation, and deception will all figure prominently prior to and during invasion. This would only intensify leading up to and during a recapture operation, where the CCP could easily orient the narrative to self-defense of its own territory to attempt to shift international opinion, undermine the coalition, and create chaos for recapture forces.

Command and control of coalition forces would also suffer degradations at the theater level. As mentioned above, disruptions in the EMS, cyber, and space domains would not only hinder communications, but also tactical datalinks and other decision-making support systems. Ground-based command nodes in the theater, like those in Japan, might have also been attacked during the defense, and others including maritime and airborne platforms might be under threat and hindered in their ability to operate in proximity of PLA forces. A decapitation move against the Taiwan government by the PLA should be anticipated, reinforcing the indispensability of having coalition irregular forces on island to connect with fragments of the Taiwan military and partisans. And yet, the amount of effective command and control that would be required during recapture would be exponentially more challenging than mounting a defense, on par with but arguably even more challenging than the Allied invasion of France during World War II.

Perhaps the biggest challenge for U.S forces will be in movement and maneuver when it comes to conducting a long-range airborne and amphibious assault on unforgiving terrain. Taiwan’s remote location in relation to current U.S. basing means that amphibious and airborne assaults from the closest allied territory in the region, the Philippines (assuming access was permitted), would be more than 400 nautical miles across the Luzon Strait (approximately four times the distance across the Taiwan Strait) and subject to fierce resistance enroute and upon arrival at objective locations. Those staging areas in allied nations, even those as far away as Okinawa (345 nautical miles) or Guam (1,500 nautical miles), would be at risk from the PLA’s long-range ballistic missiles. Support for the large amphibious flotilla and air assault force may also need to operate near or within PLA weapon engagement zones. Additionally, there are few landing positions that are suitable for an amphibious landing on Taiwan’s main island, and the weather and tides make landings outside of September/October and March/April almost impossible. This will geographically and temporally narrow options for coalition forces, replicating the same challenge for recapture that the PLA faced during its contested invasion. Losses to coalition forces during this operation would likely on a similar if not more devastating level than the Normandy invasion in World War II.

Joint/combined fires on PLA forces on the ground in Taiwan would also likely be negatively impacted by dwindling munitions stocks. Massive quantities of missiles, bombs, torpedoes, and other ordnance will be used in the defense of Taiwan, and by the time a recapture campaign would need to be executed, regional stocks—and even global stocks—will be running low. Rearming vertical launch systems and torpedo bays in coalition naval ships and submarines will temporarily take them out of the fight. Ground-based missile defense batteries in Japan and Guam may be completely spent, and aviation units will have also expended a substantial number of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. While the PLA is still fighting in its own neighborhood, coalition armories are far from the fight, complicating delivery timelines and supply chain routing. Further complicating the problem, many potential coalition members, like Australia and Japan, depend on U.S. defense industries for a portion of their munitions and manufacturing timelines for modern missiles can take up to months and years, not days and weeks. For example, the maximum production rate of Javelin missiles is 6,480 per year with a delivery time of 32 months after the order is placed. Additionally, China’s non-participation in the now-defunct U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty means that they have had decades to develop ballistic and other long-range systems that currently out-distance most if not all coalition/joint fires. Whether a contest of existing PLA stocks against coalition stocks, or a contest of production rate capacities, the CCP very well may have the advantage as it has been investing in the production facilities for these missiles for years. In the end, there is little chance of avoiding the classic hazard of needing to put coalition weapons platforms within enemy engagement zones to conduct fires during defense as well as during recapture.

Sustainment of forces will similarly be significantly hampered by the long distances between U.S. staging areas and the operating area. In warfare, geography always plays a role; and the fact that Taiwan is an island makes supporting their military or partisans on the island with weapons and munitions a much different problem set than supporting Ukraine over ground lines of communication. Depending on PLA control of airfields and seaports on the islands, easy entry locations will not be available for coalition forces to be used as forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). Securing air and seaports of debarkation would need to be a priority to facilitate entry and sustainment of forces. Resupply efforts to any resistance or irregular forces on the island would have to be via covert methods, or risky airdrop missions that would take place over contested airspace. Additionally, protection of U.S. and allied forces, as well as Taiwanese forces still fighting on the ground on the island would be extremely challenging. The U.S. has grown accustomed to fighting wars with air dominance allowing ground elements to maneuver freely and have close air support on call. In this scenario the air above Taiwan would be at best contested and at worst PLA dominated. There would also be the constant threat of missiles that could be launched from the mainland. Unless they could be stopped from reinforcing their positions on the islands, PLA maneuver forces on the island would continue to mass, constituting a perpetual threat to coalition forces trying to establish a foothold.

The degradations mentioned above suggest that, if a defense of Taiwan was not successful, there are few reasons to believe that a recapture of Taiwan would have a better chance of success. Although the PLA would have also suffered losses to their capabilities, their proximity between their embarkation ports and the area of operations, their missile support from the mainland, and their initiative in being the attacking force, extends their advantage from the initial invasion through to defending against a coalition liberation effort. In this sense, planners should consider that attempting to reserve forces for a recapture from the defense effort is a losing proposition.

Deterrence + Defense > Recapture

The incalculable costs of attempting to liberate Taiwan once it had been seized reinforces the absolute imperative to deter PLA attack and successfully defend Taiwan should deterrence fail.   Although both defense and recapture campaigns are fraught with risks, the analysis above clarifies that recapture is the much riskier of the two options. Given the staggering loss of personnel and equipment that would happen during recapture, preventing a PLA invasion in the first place must be the priority for the United States.

While not all risks can be addressed, the United States can act now to improve its chances during a defense campaign by addressing shortfalls and challenges addressed above to minimize risk to forces. Peacetime collaboration with Taiwan’s military should be considered, as should greater cooperation with U.S. regional allies to build interoperability. The U.S. military must invest in munitions and longer-range fires to out-range the PLA. Coalition capabilities that can disrupt PLA amphibious forces and Taiwan military investments that contribute to an impenetrable 360 degree “porcupine defense” should be prioritized. 

A possible way to facilitate coalition support to this effort would be by creating an organization subordinate to INDOPACOM charged with the sole task of coordinating a smooth and rapid transfer of equipment, training, and services as outlined by the proposed Taiwan Policy Act to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense. The command could be modeled on the International Donor Coordination Center that has been overseeing security assistance flows into Ukraine and is reportedly transitioning to a formal command to be led by a brigadier general.

Taking another possible lesson from Ukraine, the U.S. Department of Defense might be able to expedite Taiwan’s operational readiness and increase Taiwanese interoperability with US and allied forces by establishing a relationship with the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP). The results SPP membership can bring have been exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. California and Ukraine have been paired since 1993, but the relationship became much more active after Russia illegally annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbas in 2014. The fruit of that partnership ripened in February 2022 when the Ukrainian Army proved to be far nimbler and more decentralized than its stove-piped adversary. In short, Ukraine clearly learned the value of non-commissioned officers and de-centralized mission command. Taiwan has expressed its desire to move toward a de-centralized mission command and the SPP could yield similar results. But even more than military capabilities linked to a stronger defense, efforts to deter CCP aggression in the first place must remain at the forefront.

Delay continues to be a valid approach of U.S. and coalition deterrence efforts. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley argue the 2020s present peak danger for a PLA invasion of Taiwan due to economic and demographic factors that do not bode well for the PRC long-term and the projected retirement of several U.S. navy platforms, with mid-decade presenting a particularly dangerous inflection point. By continuing to manage deterrence short of inadvertently provoking the CCP, U.S. policymakers may successfully extend the problem set past the 2020s to a time horizon where the PLA views it will not gain the upper hand. Investing now in the capacity to deter the CCP’s future ambitions is critical. Communicating U.S. intentions is the other element of deterrence, and Haass suggests that a U.S. policy of “strategic clarity” with regards to Taiwan may be warranted. President Biden’s recent comments that the U.S. would defend Taiwan have only reinforced what the CCP has been convinced of for the past several decades.

Preventing Taiwan from being taken by force will be a litmus test of U.S. credibility globally. If the defense were to fail, any liberation effort could be viewed as falling victim to a sunk-cost fallacy or expending excess blood and treasure that would, at best, result in a pyrrhic victory. To ensure defense has the best chance of success, senior decision makers and strategic planners must go ‘all in’ during peacetime. The US military should continue to expand cooperation with Taiwan forces and build trust and interoperability through exercises and training. Time is of the essence and the costs are high to ensure Taiwan is not taken by force. The up-front costs of preparing for crisis during peace far outweigh the alternatives.

About the Authors

Captain Fillion is a Foreign Area Officer in route to an assignment as the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché in Tokyo, Japan. He was an Olmsted Scholar in Japan and attended the senior staff course at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies. Joint assignments include the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Portugal, the Japan Desk Director in the Joint Staff (J5), and he was special assistant in the Chairman’s Action Group. He was also the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi.

Lieutenant Colonel Beck is a Foreign Area Officer for the European region. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 2001 and a Master of Arts degree in European and Mediterranean Studies from New York University in 2015. He has served in a variety of assignments with overseas postings in South Korea, Iraq, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Most recently, he was the desk officer for Pakistan and Turkmenistan at U.S. Army Central. He is now assigned at the Russia Strategic Initiative at U.S. European Command.

Major Green is currently the AC-130 Program Manager and an instructor pilot for the 492nd Special Operations Training Support Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida. He was commissioned through AFROTC at Oklahoma State University in 2008. He has a BA in Mass Media Communications from Oral Roberts University and MA in Government and Public Policy from Regent University. Major Green previously served as the Director of Inspections at the 1^st Special Operations Wing Inspector General, as an executive officer, flight commander, and has flown over 3500 hours in the AC-130U/J and EC-130H for Air Force Special Operations Command and Air Combat Command.