Operation Enduring Freedom and Logistics Lessons from Alexander the Great

By Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Harris, U.S. Army; Colonel Brittany Stewart, U.S. Air Force; and Major James S. Johnson, U.S. Army

Editor's Note: This team thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College.  In the interest of space we are publishing without research notes.  To see the full thesis with all research materials, visit www.faoa.org.  The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect our writing team's original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates greeted General Duncan McNabb on his first day as Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 2008 with a quote from Alexander the Great:  “My logisticians are a humorless lot . . . they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.”  Like Alexander, General McNabb was responsible for ensuring logistics support for combat operations in Afghanistan, but unlike the Macedonian king, he did not have a designated role, authorities, or resources to forge the relationships necessary to create or maintain flexible international logistics routes to support operations.  That role falls to geographic Combatant Commanders, whose theater plans historically center on building partnership capacity for interoperability and combat burden sharing and do not necessarily accommodate long-term logistics considerations.  As a result, the United States faced tremendous logistics challenges in Afghanistan.  If modern Combatant Commanders studied lessons from Alexander’s Afghanistan campaign, they might have realized that they must focus on enduring relationships – balancing headline-grabbing combat operations with comparatively banal logistics support – to manage issues that might jeopardize partner support for U.S. operational requirements. 

Building a Bridge to Afghanistan 

“Support for our forces in Afghanistan is the most difficult logistics assignment we have faced since World War II.” 

~ Jack Bell, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness

When the United States retaliated against al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan for the bombing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon, it lacked means to cross over or through cautious-to-hostile states to transport and supply the 38,000 pre-surge troops who engaged al Qaeda and the Taliban in combat.  Shocked by the terror attacks, many key nations quickly offered basing and/or overflight support.  Combatant Commands identified which potential partners lacked necessary precursors for access, then the State Department worked to fill these gaps as U.S. Central and European Commands (USCENTCOM and USEUCOM) cashed in on prior military-to-military contacts to create an air bridge.  On 7 October 2001, Uzbekistan opened Karshi-Khanabad Air Base to combat support operations followed by air refueling operations from Bulgaria and passenger and air refueling from Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.  The speed at which these relationships developed led to initial reliance on airlift and airdrop options from these bases as work continued to establish ground logistics routes and U.S. troops gained a foothold within Afghanistan.

A hostile relationship with Iran and Turkmenistan’s neutrality precluded U.S. transit arrangements through these countries and focused attention on the deep-water port of Karachi, Pakistan, to become the hub for ground sustainment routes for U.S. operations in Afghanistan.  For the first seven years of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces relied on Pakistani contract carriers to transport sustainment cargo and ammunition across one thousand pilferage- and attack-plagued miles to Kandahar and Kabul.  

The high cost of airlift and the risk in relying on a single nation for logistics throughput pushed USTRANSCOM to develop logistics alternatives to supplying a force that had surged to 100,000 by 2010.  For four months in 2008, the command established logistics relationships with 15 nations to design the Northern Distribution Network, a series of multi-modal routes to move non-lethal cargo from the Baltics through Central Asia and finally into Afghanistan.  Pakistan, however, remained the preferred logistics solution.

Just as the U.S. sought revenge against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, Alexander the Great sought vengeance for the loss and destruction of Greek city states during centuries of warfare with the Persian Empire.  He moved swiftly through Persia, integrating operations and logistics planning and using the decimation of Thebes to send a strong message to cities along his path:  avoid destruction by forming an alliance to become a sustainment node for the advancing Macedonian army.  Only Alexander’s most trusted generals were placed in charge of requisitioning supplies from conquered cities, restocking and distributing supplies from food depots, synchronizing movement of the baggage train and supply ships with the main army, and moving spoils used to finance the war.

Alexander did not consider an Afghanistan campaign until Bessus, the Persian governor of Afghanistan, claimed the defeated Persian king’s crown and retreated into modern Central Asia, starting a 1500-mile, 8-month “merry chase” with Alexander and his cavalry.  Along the way, Bessus destroyed local crops to attrite Macedonian forces, a tactically sound move to limit Alexander’s pursuit options. However, this backfired as it severed Bessus’ relationship with local populations.  Alexander on the other hand generally forbade pillaging and capturing local inhabitants for slaves in order to encourage cities to renounce ties to Persia and pledge their allegiance to Alexander and to contribute supplies to sustain Macedonian operations.  Through these practices, he “became famed for his fairness” in partnering with local cities. 

The Vulnerability of Logistics

“This is the logistics challenge of our generation.”  

~ Vice Admiral Mark Harnitchek, Deputy Commander USFTRANSCOM

As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM continued, initial overwhelming political support for the U.S. began to fray, weakening commitments to relationships, including those that provided logistics access to Afghanistan.  According to U.S. academics Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, U.S. global military presence during the operation relied on special relationships, clientism, and patronage-oriented policy to maintain relationships initially created around shared values, security concerns, and agreements.  They concluded that disconnects between U.S. and host nation perception of the bilateral relationship coupled with differences in access agreements increased the risk of alienation over time.  Their prediction played out in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan – key partners for surface supply routes into Afghanistan.

Pakistani political scientist A.Z. Hilali was one of the first to characterize the U.S. – Pakistan bilateral relationship as “opportunistic: a partnership of two unequal powers based on self-interest with no mutual objectives.  He and other similarly-minded Pakistani commentators tied the deteriorating relationship to minimal coordination for the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, lack of U.S. legal action against a CIA contractor, and drone strikes within Pakistan.  Islamabad reached its breaking point in November 2011, when the U.S. ignored requests for an official apology after NATO helicopter raid killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at Salala Border Post.  In response, Islamabad closed its borders to U.S. and coalition cargo.

Source: USTRANSCOM / Credit: Alyson Hurt/NPR

At this point, USTRANSCOM lacked any military-to-military leverage other than to rely on USCENTCOM’s security assistance resources and authorities, which focused on combat capability and interoperability.  USCENTCOM was more interested in subduing elements in Pakistan supporting terrorist safe-havens rather than on Pakistan’s role in the logistics network and agreed to use security assistance to induce Pakistan to reopen its borders.  Pakistan was cut off from over two billion dollars of security assistance  until it reopened routes in July 2012.  Pakistan’s lock-down did not significantly degrade support to combat operations largely due to relationship building done in 2008 – ninety percent of sustainment and construction cargo was rerouted to the Northern Distribution Network. The Northern Distribution Network continued to shoulder a significant amount cargo up to a year after the borders opened as Pakistani domestic politics kept containers in “logistical limbo” and did not allow cargo flow to normalize.

Another logistics partnership casualty was Uzbekistan, whose bilateral relationship began on a foundation of shared concern for terrorism but ended when U.S. political considerations trumped the need for logistics support to combat.  After 9/11, Uzbekistan quickly authorized the United States to use Karshi-Khanabad Air Base for special operations missions, humanitarian relief efforts, combat search and rescue, ground and air refueling, and passenger processing.  In return, Uzbekistan received U.S. pledges for $300 million in security assistance and targeting of the al Qaeda-aligned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan during operations in Afghanistan.  The relationship soured over lack of U.S. follow-through to provide agreed upon assistance, denial of $23 million in U.S. coalition support funds for airfield maintenance and repair, growing Uzbek concern over the perceived U.S. role in popular Eurasian regime changes collectively known as “color revolutions,” presidential focus on “democracy promotion,” and Congressional decertification of Uzbekistan for human rights.  Uzbekistan finally asked U.S. forces to depart in late 2005 after Washington publicly condemned the government’s response to violent unrest after a prison break in Andijan.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers criticized U.S. decisions that drove Uzbekistan from basing and logistics support  as the unclear focus of the bilateral relationship – logistics, human rights, shared terrorism concerns, democracy agenda – cost the United States use of a regional staging base and forced relocation of some missions to Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan. 

The United States was able to overcome the lack of shared security concerns and convince Kyrgyzstan to allow American forces to operate from Manas Air Base through economic incentives and pay-offs to the political elite.  Payment for the first three years to host combat operations, air refueling, aero-medical evacuation, and passenger processing at the base  topped eight million in rent and over $110 million for the ruling family in the form of ad hoc landing and parking fees, access to foreign private goods, and Defense Logistics Agency fuel contracts.  U.S. praise for Kyrgyzstan’s democratic potential after the 2005 “Tulip Revolution” (a “color revolution”) followed by the U.S. military’s eviction from Karshi-Khanabad Air Base opened the way for the new regime to renegotiate the original lease for $770 million dollars over five years in rent and aid.  The new Kyrgyz political elite also took control of the fuel contracts.  Kyrgyzstan suspended combat operations and rebranded the base as the Manas Transit Center for passenger processing and air-refueling.  When this government collapsed in 2010, the interim president honored existing agreements, but her successor did not support the bilateral logistics relationship.  He leveraged Russian resurgence in Kyrgyz politics and economy to raise the rent further and finally terminate the logistics relationship on 11 July 2014.  

Stability and predictability in the logistics support network for combat operations in Afghanistan suffered from mismanagement of relationships as U.S. and partner goals and motivations diverged.  Alexander faced similar challenges in Central Asia when a one-time supporter broke the partnership to start a guerilla-style war of attrition targeting Macedonian logistics nodes and routes.  

Once Alexander was in Uzbekistan, the Afghan noble Spitamenes surrendered Bessus to Macedonian forces, triggering a pause after the eight-month chase through Central Asia.  The Macedonian army returned to a well-provisioned winter camp near Mazar-e-Sharif, “pivotal node of the king’s complex logistics,” and integrated 22,000 Macedonian and allied surge troops.  Meanwhile, Alexander founded additional cities on the route to Herat as forward logistics bases to support his planned march to India.  Frustrated by Alexander’s use of local cities for logistics support, Spitamenes announced his logistics-focused insurgency by attacking the northern logistics hub in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, and subsequently raiding the outskirts of Mazar-e-Sharif to scatter cattle gathered to feed garrisoned troops.  Because of the resulting shortfall in winter provisions, Alexander repositioned the main army in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to pay for quarter in villages and live off the land in mobile groups, also denying local resupply to Afghan insurgents.  

Even though a local noble was trying to turn the populace against Alexander, the Macedonian policy of fostering relations for logistics support continued to pay dividends.  Local inhabitants near modern-day Karshi-Khanabad Air Base resupplied Alexander’s horse companies and turned over guerillas hiding in the city.  Spitamenes’ wife also chose to ally with Alexander:  based on the starvation and devastation from repeatedly burned fields, she beheaded Spitamenes and presented his head to Alexander to end the war of attrition.

Returning Home

“This summer [logistics] finds itself in an unaccustomed spotlight in Afghanistan, as the Americans attempt what they are calling the greatest feat of military transport in modern times. Nearly 12 years after their war began, they are packing up their colossus, checking they have all the bits and bobs, and shipping it home.”  

~ The Economist

President Obama outlined the plan for transitioning security to the Afghan government and reducing U.S. troop presence, and the U.S. scrambled to secure retrograde routes through existing partners already suffering from deep schisms in relations.  The Northern Distribution Network was the centerpiece for overall U.S. relations with Central Asia from 2008 to 2014, but this was not enough to overcome disconnects in U.S. policy and lack of follow-through on diplomatic and military promises since 9/11.  In addition, over-emphasis on the temporary nature and flexibility of basing agreements compounded the problem of convincing the region of U.S. resolve to maintain military relationships after the retrograde. 

When retrograde, reset, redeployment, redistribution, and disposal officially began in 2012, USTRANSCOM could not overcome regional politics to guarantee access to surface routes out of Afghanistan.  Pakistan was the preferred route of choice due to cost and relaxed regulatory requirements, but its borders were intermittently closed to U.S. and NATO cargo.  When open, cargo movement was unpredictable and dangerous due to worker strikes, insurgent attacks, and threats to local drivers.  The Northern Distribution Network also proved not to be an immediately viable retrograde option.  U.S. diplomatic and military-to-military efforts did not fully understand the bureaucratic hurdles involved in reversing cargo flow through Central Asia and proved to be too little, too late.  This, combined with the inability of USCENTCOM and U.S. Embassy Kabul to agree on funding for the logistics infrastructure required by “reverse transit” agreements inked in 2011.  As a result, the route was not fully operational until late 2013, limiting its utility for retrograde.  Meanwhile in Kyrgyzstan, rent negotiations for Manas Transit Center failed, forcing troop processing functions to transfer to Romania.  

Because of continued missteps in managing logistics-focused relationships with Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, USTRANSCOM had to rely on both military and commercial airlift for the vast majority of retrograde operations.  For the 795 U.S. bases in Afghanistan, 44,000 vehicles and 107,000 containers had to be disposed of or moved out of country while10,000 tons of equipment and 8,500 passengers departed Kandahar Air Base each month at the peak of the retrograde.  The final cost for U.S. forces and equipment to return home was approximately $5.7 billion.  So in the end, retrograde, reset, redeployment, redistribution, and disposal proved successful, even if ugly and inefficient.

Despite the inability of established surface routes to reverse flow and absorb retrograde operations, U.S. logistics relationships had not disintegrated completely.  In summer 2012 after reopening the borders to U.S. cargo, the U.S. and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Agreement authorizing U.S. and coalition movement through Pakistan until January 2016, securing freedom of movement for one year beyond the end of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.  The Northern Distribution Network also remained a success, providing reliable, stable sustainment routes into Afghanistan .  Previous contentiousness over basing did not degrade Uzbek and Kyrgyz support for the southbound routes.  After Russia annexed Crimea, military logistics planners feared losing the geographic center of the network, but Russia allowed cargo to move unhindered toward Afghanistan.

Alexander, too, suffered relationship setbacks in Central Asia.  Unlike the U.S. in the run-up to retrograde, however, he was able to recover fully from the loss of the main supply depot at Mazar-e-Sharif and ensure continued ample support from his logistics network.  While preparing logistics for the march out of Afghanistan, Alexander and his army were caught in a mountain ice storm which devastated supplies and provisions.  The local governor quickly replenished the army’s losses and provided enough additional rations to sustain six days on the march.  The detour led Alexander through the lands of a formerly hostile governor.  Alexander accepted the governor’s surrender without a fight, leading to a feast to celebrate the new alliance.  During the festivities, Alexander fell in love with the governor’s daughter Roxane and took her as his wife.

During the winter pause, Alexander’s forces amassed supplies, built boats, and created fortified cities, garrisons, and outposts to support the march into India.  Alexander’s envoys preceded the army to negotiate with rulers around Kabul for local resupply of horses and elephants.  Alexander synchronized the first leg of the march to India with the harvest and ordered the burning of superfluous gear, including his, to ease the spring crossing of the Hindu Kush as the army followed to Kabul.  This time, he used the Salang Pass, modern site of a decrepit Soviet-built tunnel that is the only ground link between northern Afghanistan and the south.  It is also a vital transit point for the onward distribution of goods brought into country via the Northern Distribution Network.  

Alexander triumphantly departed Afghanistan in 326 BC for his India campaign with a total force of approximately 100,000, including 75,000 soldiers plus service suppliers and camp followers.  An additional 23,000 Macedonians remained in Central Asia to maintain the empire and provide resupply based on Alexander’s enduring logistics-based relationships.   

Learning from Alexander 

“…never slay the logisticians – they are too hard to replace.” 

~ Joe Lynch, Veteran Logistics Professional

Ancient and contemporary historians praise Alexander the Great for applying the noblest aspects of Greek philosophy and higher learning in amassing one of the largest empires in known history without suffering a defeat.  However, they rarely delve beyond his kingly and martial achievements and thus miss the key to his success:  he “better understood the logistics capabilities and limitations of his logistics system than perhaps any other commander, before or since.”  Alexander achieved unity of effort between his combat and logistics operations throughout the Afghanistan campaign and overcame stresses on his logistics network so that he was able to depart victoriously with full logistics support.  He integrated logistics considerations into strategic calculations and delegated implementation to his most trusted generals, similar to USTRANSCOM’s modern role.  As the equivalent to a geographic Combatant Commander, Alexander built and maintained focused, equitable relationships to support his logistics train, a level of advance preparation that afforded great flexibility in meeting military objectives.

General Gregory Martin, Commander, United States Air Forces Europe and Allied Air Forces Northern Europe on 9/11, hailed the air bridge to Afghanistan, the modern equivalent of Alexander’s ground logistics routes, as a “feat of diplomacy and coalition building.”  He understood Alexander’s lessons and urged the use of international relationships to meet logistics requirements and counter politically-motivated loss of access.  However, five months after the transition from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to NATO’s Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT, senior Pentagon logistics officers lament the military’s habitual failure to “set the theater” and maintain access after the end of contingencies.  

It is a reality that USTRANSCOM, the lead logistics advocate for the U.S. military, remains reliant on “geographic combatant commanders, the Department of State and others to ensure the United States establishes the appropriate relationships to ensure access.”  Alexander would applaud that for a brief time from 2010 to 2014, both State and Defense Congressional testimony highlighted Central Asia for its key role as a sustainment node for operations in Afghanistan.  Likely he would bemoan the return to status quo ante bellum in 2015 as focus transitioned back to only the region’s warfighting relationship. 

Sadly, we have yet to institutionalize the 2,300 year-old lesson that commanders must build and preserve relationships of all types, including enduring logistics partnerships to ensure U.S. freedom of access for future operations.  On 15 May 2015 Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev officially severed the U.S.’ hard-fought victory to create the Northern Distribution Network.  His one-page decree marked the “end of an era in Russia’s relations with NATO and United States” by revoking authorization for “rail, automobile, and air transport of military equipment and hardware to Afghanistan and reserve transit through the territory of the Russian Federation.”  

About the Authors

Major James S. Johnson is currently a student at Joint Forces Staff College.  He earned a BA in Business Administration from Campbell University in 2000 and an MS in Logistics Management from the Florida Tech Melbourne Campus School in 2005. Prior to his current assignment, Major Johnson served as the Executive Officer for the 53rd Transportation Battalion (Movement Control). 

Colonel Brittany Stewart is a Eurasia RAS currently serving as Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Budapest, Hungary. Previously she served as the Military Assistant to the Principal Deputy Inspector General for the Department of Defense, and as Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. She earned a BS in History with a Russian language minor and a MS in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College.  

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Harris is an Operations Action Officer for the Joint Staff J3 (J33), Deputy Directorate for Nuclear, National and Homeland Defense and Current Operations.  He holds a BS in IT: Electronics, and a MA in Information Technology Management.  Prior to his current assignment, he served as a Field Artillery Battery Commander in the 82d Airborne Division and various staff positions at  the platoon, battery, battalion and brigade levels.  Joe also served as an ITA division chief on the Army Staff, HQ DA the Pentagon.