News from the Field - Wearing Every Hat: Lessons from a Lean U.S. Security Cooperation Post in Southeast Asia
By Major Aaron Harris, U.S. Army
Disclaimer: The author contributed this article in his personal capacity. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Embassy Dili, Indo-Pacific Command, the U.S. Army, or the Department of War. Any opinions expressed in this article are those of the author himself and do not necessarily reflect official policy of the Department of War.
Introduction: A State Rebuilding
On the eastern edge of the Indonesian archipelago—just north of Darwin, Australia—lies Asia’s youngest sovereign state: Timor-Leste. Emerging from centuries of Portuguese colonial rule and a brutal Indonesian occupation from 1975 to 2002, this state has endured profound hardship and loss. Nearly 25 percent of its population perished during the occupation, and Indonesian forces razed much of its infrastructure, especially in the capital city of Dili.[1]
With the support of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, Timor-Leste began the immense task of rebuilding. Now 23 years into independence, it continues to navigate the lingering shadows of conflict while making steady progress in governance, economic development, and security institution building. Timor-Leste crafted its foreign policy carefully tomaintain neutrality, adopting a “friend to all” approach, which has facilitated regional integration efforts. Timor-Leste's anticipated accession to ASEAN in 2025 marks a significant milestone in its evolving role within Southeast Asia.[2]
For Timor-Leste, international partnerships remain indispensable. Australia leads with over $1 billion in support, including more than 30 embedded Australian Defence Force advisors in Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Defense and its military—the Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL).[3] Portugal, Indonesia, the U.S., China, New Zealand, Brazil,and other states contribute either through resident attachés or advisors, and non-resident engagements continue to expandwith other states, including Japan, South Korea, and Canada.
The U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Dili manages the American defense program here, as it has for over two decades. Serving as the ODC Chief and sole foreign area officer (FAO) at the U.S. Embassy, I managed a broad portfolio spanning professional military education, bilateral exercises, humanitarian assistance, noncommissioned officer and officer development, and emerging air and maritime domain awareness initiatives.
Uniquely within U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Timor-Leste lacks a formal U.S. defense attaché, eitherresident or accredited. As the senior Department of Defense (DoD) representative, I effectively wore multiple hats—defense cooperation program manager, advisor to the ambassador, diplomat, and host for visiting delegations. Thismultifaceted role demanded agility, sound judgment, and constant recalibration. On any given day I might be inspecting runway lights with engineers at dawn; and by nightfall, discussing air domain awareness with the president. This billet requires both breadth and depth—often simultaneously.
The Operating Environment: Competing Influences, Limited Capacity
Timor-Leste has encountered many challenges in its journey as a young, resource-dependent post-conflict state. Although the government actively seeks to diversify its economy, Timor-Leste remains heavily reliant on petroleum revenues drawn from its sovereign wealth fund, which experts estimate will deplete around 2035.[4] This looming depletion creates urgency for sustainable development and compels Timor-Leste to lean heavily on international partnerships for security and economic stability.
Against this backdrop of economic uncertainty and reliance on external support, the F-FDTL has its roots in resilience. Tracing its origins to Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor(Portuguese: Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL), the guerrilla resistance movement that fought for independence against Indonesian occupation. Many senior leaders in today’s F-FDTL fought in that struggle. Over time, the force has gradually evolved into a modest but increasingly professional military of approximately 3,400 personnel spanning land, naval, and emerging air components.
Australia leads Timor-Leste’s defense partnerships, maintaining embedded advisors and a robust defense cooperation program that has shaped F-FDTL’s development for decades. Complementing this presence, Portugalprovides enduring training and mentorship rooted in shared history. Other states—including China, Indonesia, New Zealand, Brazil, and Japan—engage through advisors, attachés, and high-level exchanges.
Within this crowded yet mostly cooperative environment, the U.S. defense presence—though modest in personnel—delivers outsized impact. As the lone in-country FAO, I served simultaneously as ODC Chief and de facto Defense Attaché. This flexible structure allowed me to act as the primary military representative, bilaterally coordinating security assistance,engaging senior Timor-Leste leadership and advancing reform priorities.
Our lean footprint sharpened our focus rather than limiting our influence. The trust fostered by continuity andprincipled engagement reinforced U.S. credibility across Timor-Leste institutions. In a regional context where China’s growing influence competes for attention, Timor-Leste consistently recognized the United States as a reliable, values-based partner. This reputation positions the U.S. well to continue deepening defense cooperation and to support Timor-Leste's path toward a more capable and resilient security sector.
The Security Cooperation Mission: Broad, Shallow, and Persistent
Cultivating Capability and Networks
Professional development lies at the heart of Timor-Leste's security cooperation strategy. Each year, approximately 15 to 20 F-FDTL officers participate in professional military education (PME) courses through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, funded under Title 22. ODC Timor-Leste leverages IMET as an essential tool for cultivating a capable, young officercorps poised to lead Timor-Leste’s future military.
Officers who complete PME return with valuable knowledge and experience that elevate their units’ tactical andoperational effectiveness. Many distinguish themselves and subsequently advance to key leadership roles within the F-FDTL. Beyond technical skills, these courses provide crucial opportunities to build professional networks across the region and internationally, integrating Timorese officers into a broader community of security professionals.
However, English language proficiency remains a consistent challenge. While a few officers speak English fluently, many struggle with the language and require substantial preparation. Candidates must pass a minimum standard,assessed through tests administered by the ODC. Regardless of test score, all IMET participants receive English language instruction at the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) at Joint Base San Antonio, Lackland, Texas prior to beginning PME courses.
Balancing the benefits of PME against the operational needs of a small military is delicate. Removing multiple officers simultaneously risks impairing unit effectiveness. This balancing act grows more complex given other international partners also offering military education opportunities, including military academy slots, company- andfield-grade PME, and senior staff courses. Close coordination with the F-FDTL leadership and allied donors is essential toensure opportunities are maximized without overburdening formations.
One telling example came when ODC Timor-Leste secured the first-ever slot for an air component officer to attend the U.S. Air Command and Staff College—a yearlong field-grade PME course that included English language preparation. The officer selected was the air component’s only field-grade officer and served as the second-in-command. His departure created a significant leadership gap, forcing a captain—an aviator by trade—to step into this role. In the commander’s absence, this junior officer was suddenly responsible for coordinating with general officers and managing day-to-day component operations, duties typically reserved for much more senior personnel. These kinds of “growing pains” underscore the importance of deliberate planning and coordination to ensure that investments in training do not come at the expense of operational effectiveness.
In addition to IMET, Title 10 programs hosted by institutions like the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) offer targeted short-term engagements. These specialized forums focus on distinct domains—intelligence,communications, cyber—or specific leadership cohorts such as senior enlisted leaders or component commanders. These programs broaden participation to noncommissioned officers and civilians, enriching institutional development.
However, the challenge of rank or specialization mismatches can arise. For instance, courses designed for O6-level intelligence officers may be attended by junior personnel due to the F- FDTL’s organizational structure, reducing the course’s effectiveness. Likewise, language barriers persist, particularly courses expect attendees to present or lead discussions.
The ODC’s small team of locally employed staff also shoulders a significant administrative burden. Coordinating travel, managing paperwork, and supporting numerous conference attendances can stretch limited resources thin—sometimes at the expense of higher-impact programs like IMET. I learned to politely decline invitations that fall outsidethe ODC's capacity or strategic priorities in order to protect program effectiveness and sustain staff morale.
Section 333 Capacity Building and Foreign Military Financing: Patience and Partnership
While IMET and conferences are foundational—and often more structured and formulaic in their programming—building partner capacity through Section 333 authorities is more of an art, requiring foresight, strategic planning, and patience. Security cooperation activities funded under Title 10 Section 333 (Train-and-Equip authority) are often developed over multi-year timelines and require early coordination and detailed planning. These programs are prioritized based on strategic alignment, feasibility, and DoD component prioritization, and are implemented through a collaborative effort involving geographic combatant commands, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), military services, and other implementing partners.
Security cooperation offices develop and submit proposals for significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCIs), aligning activities with five-year plans and coordinating closely with U.S. embassy country teams, the combatant command security cooperation divisions to which they belong, and the host state's military and defense ministry. Congressional notification and approval remain key gating factors in program execution, and not all initiatives receive authorization to proceed.
Fortunately, I inherited a previously approved SSCI built through close collaboration between former ODC Chiefs, Embassy staff, and Timorese defense leadership. The initiative supported INDOPACOM’s strategic objectives, including the development of Timor-Leste’s nascent air component, and aligned with the F-FDTL’s national priority to counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). IUUF is estimated to costTimor-Leste over $200 million annually.[5] This SSCI included the delivery of Timor-Leste’s first state-owned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)-capable aircraft—a Cessna 206 for maritime patrols—and funding for small-scale infrastructure improvements at Baucau Airfield, located approximately 2.5 hours east of Dili. Once used by Portuguese and Indonesian forces, Baucau Airfield had fallen into disrepair. Its revitalization marked a significant step toward extending state sovereignty and enhancing national disaster response capabilities.
Standing up an air component from scratch presented unique challenges. I did not have Billy Mitchell or HapArnold in town to call on, so I leaned heavily on support from Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), my Bilateral Affairs Officer(BAO) from the Rhode Island National Guard (RING), and regional subject matter experts. At only four years old, officers with ground force backgrounds staffed the air component entirely, making focused mentorship and tailored air domain training essential to fostering an air-minded culture.
To that end, we embraced a whole-of-government approach—ensuring the aircraft was mission- ready, training airmen to a baseline proficiency level, and assisting the Ministry of Defense in crafting foundational policies on air operations, sustainment, and doctrine. As the United States remains the only significant partner supporting the development of Timor-Leste’s air component, this unity of effort simplified coordination but placed a disproportionate burden on the ODC.
Foreign military financing (FMF) offered a complementary path for building partner capacity. As a Title 22 authority, FMF facilitates defense procurement and promotes interoperability with U.S. systems. The partner state initiates requests through formalized Letters of Request (LORs), which the ODC manages and the combatant command reviews before proceeding to the DoD and State Department and, ultimately, to Congress.
In 2023, the installation of a new constitutional government brought changes in Ministry of Defense leadership, naturally affecting ongoing security cooperation efforts. Several officials with deep familiarity in FMF processestransitioned out of their roles, resulting in some gaps in institutional continuity. I stepped into the ODC Chief position during this period of adjustment, learning FMF procedures while simultaneously supporting newly appointed Ministry counterparts through the complex request and approval cycle.
To maintain momentum and engagement, I developed new FMF proposals—including funding for an embedded air operations advisor—and met regularly with senior Ministry leaders to emphasize the strategic value of continued cooperation. At the same time, the Ministry was reassessing its broader approach to security partnerships, a deliberateprocess that introduced some delays. This highlighted a key principle of security cooperation: enduring progress can advance only as quickly as the partner is prepared to move, shaped by its own priorities and institutional rhythm.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Initiatives: Diplomacy in Action
Humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) efforts represent some of the most visible and diplomatically impactful pillars of ODC Dili’s operations. When I arrived in Dili, the U.S. Navy Seabees program already had a deeply rooted presence, with rotating teams deploying twice annually since 2009. Their sustained commitment has earned lasting trust among Timorese leaders—so much so that President Ramos-Horta, speaking at a recent SeabeesChange of Charge ceremony, shared that he had personally requested an expanded Seabees presence from the U.S. Secretary of War during the most recent Shangri-La Dialogue.
Over the years, the Seabees have completed more than 100 school and medical clinic rehabilitation projects,significantly improving infrastructure and goodwill. During my tenure, they spearheaded construction of a national HADR warehouse at Baucau Airfield, designed to store critical supplies for disaster response along Timor-Leste’s eastcoast. This flagship U.S.-funded project fully occupied their efforts, limiting their ability to conduct routine rehabilitationactivities.
Seeking additional "wins” to support embassy objectives, I engaged civil affairs officers from the 9th Mission Support Command (9th MSC), a subordinate unit of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), who proposed deploying an Oceania Engagement Team (OET) representative during a TDY visit to their headquarters. Subsequently, the OET assigned a civil affairs reserve officer to support our efforts. While I am well aware that Timor-Leste lies firmly in Southeast Asia—not Oceania—I take help where I can get it. This officer quickly assessed humanitarian needs and, through close coordination with the embassy’s Regional Security Officer and the Australian Embassy, we identified opportunities for joint projects that culminated in a significant emergency communications initiative. Leveraging funding from the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program, this project aims to establish reliable communication capabilities across districts during disasters, reducing the current reliance on unreliable cell phone networks. While it supports positive diplomatic relations, its primary value lies in delivering real-time assistance that canhelp save lives during emergencies. Security cooperation works best when it addresses real needs on the ground, and efforts like this demonstrate how practical, meaningful progress can be achieved together.
The State Partnership Program: A Critical Bridge
While much of the security cooperation workload naturally falls on my shoulders at ODC Dili, it is important to recognize the vital support provided by the Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) and the State Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP pairs U.S. state national guards with partner states to build enduring relationships, enhance military capacity, and advance shared security objectives through sustained engagement and cooperation.[6] DoD established an SPP between the Rhode Island National Guard (RING) and Timor-Leste shortly before my arrival. Rhode Island’s small size andPortuguese heritage create a natural cultural synergy with Timor-Leste and the F-FDTL, helping to deepen trust and continuity.
Throughout my tenure, teams from Rhode Island’s Army and Air National Guard regularly deployed to conduct subject matter expert exchanges, participate in exercises, and strengthen professional partnerships. Air Guard teams travelquarterly to Dili to train air component airmen in aircraft maintenance, airfield security, and other essential skills, supporting Timor-Leste’s growing aviation capabilities.
These recurring, familiar interactions build bonds beyond those achieved by intermittent INDOPACOM activities. While exercises and other exchanges bolster relationships across the region, the SPP provides consistent, hands-onengagement—becoming the “most familiar face” to many in the F-FDTL.
The BAO, a captain from the Rhode Island Air National Guard, played a critical role not only in managing theRhode Island SPP but also in contributing substantially to the broader mission of ODC Dili. Effectively serving as a deputy, the BAO provided invaluable support in coordinating engagements, managing logistics, and sustaining relationships across multiple lines of effort.
A small ODC like Dili, with limited resources but complex and substantial security cooperation demands, requires leveraging all available personnel assets. The BAO’s multifaceted contributions helped ensure the ODC met efficientlyand effectively its wide-ranging responsibilities—spanning from training coordination to diplomatic liaison and program execution. This kind of shared leadership and teamwork is indispensable in maintaining momentum and delivering tangible results in challenging environments.
Wearing the Unofficial Attaché Hat
I have never attended Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS) nor officially held the Department of Defensedesignation of Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT). I hesitate to label myself “de facto SDO/DATT” because I lack formal training and credentialing. Nonetheless, the responsibilities inherent in that role fell to me by necessity, making the title a practical description of my duties.
In the absence of a formal defense attaché in Timor-Leste, I served as the senior DoD representative in Dili, effectively representing U.S. defense interests at the highest levels. While I did not perform all functions of a DefenseAttaché Office (DAO), I carried out many duties typically associated with the SDO/DATT. I advised the chief of mission as the military representative on the country team, received visiting senior military officials, escorted delegations, liaisedwith host state counterparts and foreign attachés, and hosted key partner and allied events.
Much of this diplomatic work required balancing expectations with limited budgets—security cooperation funds rarely cover lavish events or receptions sponsored by the intelligence community, requiring creativity in engagementefforts. At the same time, crafting talking points, speeches, and State Department cable content -- which I did frequently -- demanded both precision and diplomacy. Successfully managing these financial and communicative demands proved essential to representing U.S. interests effectively and fostering strong relationships despite resource constraints.
On one vivid event I escorted Lieutenant General Falur Rate Laek, Chief of Defense of the F-FDTL, to the INDOPACOM Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) conference in Hawaii. Coordinating logistics, clearing airport security, and facilitating his medical team’s travel amid strict protocol tested our team. The stress culminated in a last-minute gate holdto reunite the party for the final flight leg—an operation where timing and persistence made the difference.
At the CHOD conference I, one of the least experienced participants, joined seasoned SDO/DATTs ranging from lieutenant colonels to brigadier generals. Still, U.S. counterparts and international partners alike widely regarded the ODCChief role in Dili as embodying both defense cooperation leadership and the many functions of a defense attaché, a dualresponsibility often held by higher-ranking officers. My prior engagements with ambassadors, ministers, and senior military leaders in Dili had thoroughly prepared me for this environment. These CHOD gatherings not only provided invaluable mentorship and networking within the INDOPACOM FAO community but also strengthened the relationships and insights I relied on to represent effectively U.S. defense interests in Dili.
Lessons for Future Security Cooperation Practitioners and FAOs
The critical need to tailor security cooperation to the realities of partner capacity stands as one of the most important lessons from my time in Dili. Larger militaries have the bandwidth to absorb multiple programs simultaneously, but smaller forces like Timor-Leste’s require patient persistence and carefully calibrated efforts. Every Timor-Leste officer represents a vital national asset; temporarily removing personnel for training or exchanges can strain smaller military formations. This means programs must be shaped around the partner’s capacity, not imposed according to external schedules or expectations.
Secondly, longstanding initiatives such as the SPP offer invaluable continuity, cultivating trust and relationshipsthat develop over years or even decades. While two years may seem brief in diplomatic terms, establishing routines of excellence and reliable engagement builds a foundation that far outlasts any short-term, high-profile efforts.
Finally, this experience underscored the importance of adaptability and stepping beyond formal roles to meetevolving challenges. In small missions especially, flexibility and a willingness to fill gaps can prove essential to sustaining momentum and advancing both partner capacity and U.S. interests. Consistent presence and relationship-building remainthe bedrock of effective security cooperation.
Conclusion: The Quiet Power of Showing Up
In microstates with limited capacity, the U.S. defense engagement mission holds strategic importance that far exceeds the size of the team. A well-prepared, adaptable officer can effectively bridge multiple roles, nurture enduring partnerships, and uphold U.S. influence through consistent, focused effort.
ODC Dili, one of the smallest teams in the region, consistently punches above its weight when given the opportunity. Small, targeted investments in Timor-Leste’s military generate outsized returns—helping Timor-Leste to overcome historical challenges and establish its rightful place in the region.
Luckily, effective security cooperation does not require genius—just dedicated professionals who understand partner needs through experience, cultural awareness, and tact. Grand gestures rarely define success; rather, it isbuilton steady, deliberate engagementovertime builds to success. That quiet power—the commitment to simply show up and stay the course—forms the foundation of relationships that endure.
About the Author
Major Harris serves as a U.S. Army FAO and recently served as Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Dili, Timor-Leste. A career logistics officer, he currently serves at U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), on the China/Taiwan desk, Security Cooperation Division. Commissioned in the Quartermaster Corps, Major Harris has held logistics, operations, and command positions across the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and the United States, including command of a forward support company in the 10th Mountain Division and later as Officer-in-Charge of the Army ROTC program at Idaho State University. He is proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Tagalog and holds a Master’s in International Relations and a Graduate Certificate in East Asia Security Studies.
[1] Silva, R., & Ball, P. (2006, February 9). The profile of human rights violations in Timor-Leste, 1974–1999: A report by the Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group to the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste. Benetech Human Rights Data AnalysisGroup.
[2] Lu, W. H. (2025, May 27). Timor-Leste to be granted full ASEAN membership in October, says Malaysia PM Anwar. The Straits Times. Retrieved July 25, 2025, from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/timor-leste-to-be-granted-full-asean-membership-in- october-says-malaysia-pm-anwar
[3] Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2015, February). Timor-Leste country program evaluation 2009–2014: Summary brief. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/timor-leste-eval-report-2014-summary-brief.pdf
[4] Macao News. (2024, April 10). World Bank warns East Timor spending unsustainable. Retrievedfromhttps://macaonews.org/news/lusofonia/east-timor-leste-budget-spending-world- bank/
[5] Hanich, Q., & Hutauruk, F. (2022). Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in Timor- Leste’s waters: Estimating potential economiclosses [Report]. Australian Stateal University, Development Policy Centre.
[6] State Guard Bureau. (n.d.). State partnership program. Retrieved July 25, 2025, from https://www.statealguard.mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/Interstateal-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/