Military Intervention: A Theoretical Examination
By Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Fultz, U.S. Marine Corps
Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Fultz’s thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Marine Corps University The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Abstract: The recent invasion of Ukraine by a seemingly overwhelming Russian force created a dilemma for the White House. Should America obligate military power to help repel the invading Russian army? If so, in order to protect what interests? President Biden clearly articulated his rejection of committing American troops to this fight. But in the face of such apparent violations of international law, how is this non-intervention justified? This paper bridges academia and real-world policy by using three primary paradigms of international relations theory to examine a theoretical justification for rejecting military force. Framing an argument through the variables of neorealism, liberal internationalism, and constructivism, the paper explores and compares which paradigm best explains the decision for non-intervention. The study concludes that the White House rejection of calls for direct military involvement is rooted in neorealist theory. Despite the horrific invasion of a sovereign neighbor, Russia does not threaten core American interests, and therefore does not trigger the deployment of American military power to the conflict.
On 24 February 2022, several months of military build-up culminated when Russian forces violated long standing international norms and for the third time in 15 years invaded a sovereign neighbor. Debates regarding U.S. military support arose both internationally and across the domestic political spectrum. Nightly news displayed horrifying images of terrified families fleeing for refuge and President Volodymer Zalensky pleaded with Congress to contribute airpower and create a no-fly zone over Ukrainian skies. Over one-third of Americans supported sending troops to defend Ukrainian territory. But President Biden rejected the pressure for direct military intervention opting to support with armaments and leverage other instruments of national power. Why? The decision to not intervene broaches important questions regarding deterrence, intervention, escalation, and America’s relationship with non-aligned partners.
International Relations (IR) theories help explain why nations go to war, but which IR paradigm explains a decision not to? This paper uses the contemporary case study to examine the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the American decision to rebuff calls for direct military intervention. Exploring the paradigms of neorealism, liberal internationalism, and constructivism the paper argues that President Biden’s dismissal of calls for military intervention is rooted in neorealist theory. In the current case study, adoption of neorealism as a behavior explaining model justifies non-intervention. Alternatively, of the three paradigms, constructivism is the most likely to result in the introduction of combat forces and liberal internationalism can be used as an explanatory model for either intervention, or non-intervention.
Neorealist theory roots security interests at the heart of all nation-state behaviors. Simply put, neorealism recognizes the international order as anarchic requiring states to maximize their own security through alliances and/or armaments. When a nation feels its survival is threatened by other nation-states it will lash out to preserve the ability to shape the global order. John Mearsheimer articulates convincingly why the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a fully rational act rooted in neorealist theory. But what about nonintervention? How does neorealist theory explain the American decision to not intervene militarily? Excluding the threat of nuclear exchange, two reasons are paramount. First, there is a clear interest mismatch between Russia and the United States and second, the involvement of American ground forces in Ukraine would be a distraction from higher priority security concerns.
A western leaning Ukraine economically linked to Europe and as a member of the NATO alliance threatens vital Russian security and economic interests. The two nations share a 2000 km long border while being linked historically, culturally, and geographically. Russian is widely spoken amongst Ukraine’s population and Kiev is a major trading partner providing key imports in agriculture, chemicals, metals, and machine parts. Ukrainian accession into NATO and deeper integration into European markets pulls a key population into the western alliance and further isolates Moscow. Alternatively, the United States has limited interests in the Bloodlands of Eurasia and Russian actions in Ukraine do not threaten any core U.S. security or economic priorities. The continued eastward expansion of NATO no longer provides the security blanket required during the Cold War. Instead NATO enlargement provokes a nuclear armed Russia ultimately diminishing global security. While Ukraine sits at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and has key ports on the Black Sea, the composition of the government in Kiev, or the territorial sovereignty of the nation is of peripheral interest to the security of the United States.
Second, the U.S. will not deepen its involvement in Ukraine because it distracts from higher priority threats to U.S. interests, specifically, controlling nuclear weapons proliferation and deterring China. Russia possesses over 6,000 nuclear warheads and is a key member of the coalition attempting to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the United States is attempting to “rebalance” to Asia for over a decade. Tying down forces on the Eurasian steppe engaged in fighting with Russia threatens the world with nuclear exchange, makes Russian assistance vis-à-vis Iranian nukes nearly impossible, and does not allow the White House to provide proper attention and force structure to confront China. By scoping the Russian invasion of Ukraine through a neorealist lens, the decision to not commit military forces is a rational act by the United States and best explains the decision.
Closely related in its desire to maximize security interests, liberal internationalism broadens the ways to achieve national security. Liberal internationalism aims for an interdependent collective good to make sense of the anarchic international system. Liberal internationalists believe in an “open, rules based order in which states trade and cooperate to achieve mutual gains.” They believe in peace between democratic states, but democracies “cannot be secure or prosperous alone.” The dilemma necessitates the creation of international institutions to guarantee economic prosperity and assure security. The creation of institutions defining the post-World War Two global order are rooted in liberal internationalist thought. Examples include The United Nations, World Trade Organization, NATO, and the European Union which collectively frame the modern global security environment. Protecting this global order rooted in liberal internationalism is in American interests, but to what extent? Is it worth spilling American blood to defend? Can liberal internationalism explain American non-intervention?
Liberal internationalism partially explains the non-intervention of American troops in Ukraine. Two competing arguments exist. The first claims the Russian invasion of Ukraine signals an end to the existing liberal international order. The act of military forces crossing recognized sovereign lines fully undermines the credibility of the rules based system creating precedence bound to be repeated by other authoritarian governments. In fact, the Russian invasion of Ukraine destroys the faith of the global community in the rules based system, lowers the confidence of nations depending on American leadership, and accelerates the return of the populist, nationalist governments of the early 20th-Century. What value do institutions have if nobody is willing to fight for them when threatened? There is proof of this trend already occurring as 2021 saw a marked erosion in democratic norms globally, and Taiwanese confidence for American military support in the case of a Chinese attack has dropped 30% in the past six months. If the entirety of the international order is at stake, then preserving the system is important (arguably vital) to American interests and the use of military force is warranted.
Countering this position is the belief that President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has assisted to bolster the alliances of the international order. NATO is unified in rejecting the Russian invasion, as is the UN. The renewed militarization of the German government, multilateral economic sanctions unleashed on the Russian economy, and the pending expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden are all indications that the international order is well intact. NATO is responsibly unwilling to expand military conflict but is nevertheless ably countering Russian aggression. Leveraging a robust arms delivery program enables Ukrainian soldiers to fight the Russians while international organizations undermine the credibility and viability of the Russian state. It is this logic the White House and NATO allies are adopting while justifying non-intervention of U.S. troops. In this sense, liberal internationalism does not necessarily explain non-intervention, otherwise provides a broader range of options in response to violations of international norms making military intervention less likely.
Of the three paradigms, constructivism makes the strongest case for U.S. military intervention in Ukraine. Constructivism as a theory rejects that national interests are fixed based on objective realities. Interests are instead a social construct that can change through time. Furthermore, national interests are not solely established at the state level in the international system. Constructivists argue they are created at the sub-state level within the population of a country who construct national interests through narrative, norms, and influence. Clearly stated, constructivists “debate the intangible assumptions that underpin the construction of reality.” In the case of Ukraine, the intangible assumption was based on the promise of western integration.
“NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations…MAP (Membership Action Plan) is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP.”
NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration April 2008
The promise of NATO membership signifies more than joining a security alliance. It infiltrates every part of Ukrainian society shaping norms and behaviors throughout government and the country. The “open-door” policy of NATO rearticulated by American administrations since 2008 framed the aspirations of a nation. Candidate Zelensky was a “Russia-wary, pro-Western candidate who put fighting corruption at the top of his agenda.” Pursuing further unity with the west and NATO membership was a key objective. The promise of western integration into NATO and the European common market established a social attachment between the people of Ukraine and Western Europe. In a country where 45% of the population lives below the national subsistence level of $124 per month, western integration symbolizes not only security from Russia and reprise from corruption, but implies previously unheard of economic opportunities. By promising NATO membership, the future election of western-leaning, anti-Moscow candidates in Kiev was a foregone conclusion. Societal constructs demanded it. By this logic, the eventual invasion of Ukraine was cemented in April of 2008. Consequently, from an ethical perspective, the United States and NATO allies should realize that the membership action plan paved the road to inevitable violence. The constructivist would argue that Western promises of a better life led to this war. Consequently NATO is responsible to protect those striving to be a part of its community. Using force if required. The construction of western civilization has deep precedence of similar courageous decisions.
The implications of this research are significant for two reasons. First, the framework of analysis bridges academia to policy making. After all, IR Theories are created to be useful when making practical decisions. Secondly, the analysis displays that rooting foreign policy perspectives in any single theoretical framework can serve as a blinder for decision makers. Alternatively, exploring multiple, competing IR theories during problem framing can serve as a valuable tool to discover options. Admittedly, the above discussion leaves questions unanswered, and although the current decision to not commit forces into Ukraine is rooted in neorealism, that does not make the other theories unhelpful, wrong, or illogical. They are simply distinctive foundations for opposing well-considered options.
The Ukraine case study provides a unique parallel to other parts of the world where U.S. interests are protected by a foreign partner opposed to a treaty ally. The obvious equivalent is Taiwan. Anchoring to neorealism provides the United States options. The freedom to get involved militarily, or not to. To leverage international alliances, or simply condemn malign actions in diplomatic forums. Referring to neorealism is a good foundation when beginning analysis of any major foreign policy decision, but it is only the beginning. Integrating other paradigms in the decision making process allows for valuable contributions. The other theories can also serve as a base for explaining what led to the war in the first place. While conducting post mortem of events, the model can elucidate decisions. In the case of Ukraine, neorealism most fully explains the decision to not intervene with military force.