Mare Island, Indonesia: Security Cooperation and Security Assistance at Work, A Case Study
By Commander Rolfe K. White, U.S. Navy - Retired
Introduction:
I never truly bought into the idea of the importance of one person’s actions until July 2010. This is when a solitary act resulted in the Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy provided humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) for a three day period. As a result of one person’s actions, in the annual multilateral humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR) preparedness mission titled, “Pacific Partnership 2010” (PP2010), this became evident. A single email that I sent to the then Commodore Lisa Franchetti of the hospital ship USNS Mercy that may have played a major part in ensuring the two villages located on Mare Island, Indonesia, benefited from Security Cooperation (SC). This article is a testimony of one person working in the Security Cooperation workforce that had a direct impact on an SC mission. This “lesson learned” shows how the actions of one person impacted one thousand Indonesians lives when their proposed medical care was eliminated from a planned mission.
Background:
The Pacific Partnership (PP) began with U.S. Pacific Fleet participating in HA and DR on December 26, 2004, when a tsunami devastated coastal areas from Indonesia to Africa. As a result of this catastrophe, the U.S. Pacific Command’s establishment of PP, which now is an annual mission that provides HCA, such as medical, dental, veterinary, engineering support, and agricultural civic action programs through Southeast Asia. USNS Mercy’s sister ship, USNS Comfort, located on the east coast of the United States, has made two planned deployments and five unplanned deployments to the Caribbean, aiding sick and wounded people after hurricanes, earthquakes, and migration crisis.[1]
In 2010, Indonesia was part of the annual exercise aimed at strengthening regional partnerships and increasing interoperability (interactions) with host nations, partner nations, U.S. interagency groups, and international humanitarian and relief organizations. Additionally, the exercise would enhance the building capability of Indonesia to respond to frequent natural disaster in this region. This interoperability incorporates all the basic concepts the combatant commands (COCOM) strive to implement in accordance with key planning and policy guidance created and disseminated by key leaders in the executive branch of the U.S. government. The planning of these HCA and similar programs starts with the COCOM. According to Dr. Cynthia Watson of the National War College, COCOM’s oversee utilizing and integrating air, land, sea, and amphibious forces under their commands to achieve U.S. national security objective while protecting national interests[2]. It imperative to note this point because all activities provided to developing nations derive from the U.S. National Defense Strategy.
Pacific Partnership 2010 recap:
As the Navy Program Manager working at the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at U.S. Embassy Jakarta, I was tasked to work with U.S. Pacific Fleet and the Government of Indonesia (GOI) to identify islands desperately in need of HCA. GOI health department selected these islands using only two requirements: the civilian population required assistance and the islands must be in a remote area. Therefore, the following paragraphs will describe the mission in phases until the execution of the operation.
This mission had several phases, two of which I participated in. During the first phase in Jakarta, which took place in November 2009, the team discussed plans to deploy USNS Mercy, Indonesia’s own hospital ship, and other ships from the international community during a tabletop exercise dealing with a natural disaster scenario in the region. Notably, in January 2010, the GOI health officials, USNS Mercy personnel and part of ODC staff from U.S. Embassy Jakarta conducted site surveys of the intended three islands. Phase two brought more than 1,000 military medical and engineering professions from Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Indonesia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to execute this mission[3].
This was my second time working at a U.S. Embassy as the Navy Program Manager. The first country I was assigned was under sanctions. Consequently, I was very limited in conducting SC programs. As a graduate of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, November 2003, I was taught about the Security Cooperation programs I would be able to implement; however, there had not been much discussed about working SC where the U.S. has standing sanctions. Nevertheless, in Indonesia, I was able to engage in a variety of SC/SA programs. I led over 100 bilateral engagement activities that impacted the Indonesian Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
Site surveys of three islands:
The execution of PP2010 in Indonesia involved three site survey teams with a representative from the ODC, GOI military and health departments, and USNS Mercy personnel. The purpose of survey teams includes an assessment of the U.S. and country impact on funding for the mission and a significant impact on subsequent military procurement decisions. The three sites were surveyed concurrently with all three teams meeting together to synthesize our notes upon completion. As the Lead of all three sites, I can only be at one place at a time, so I selected to go to Mare Island because the GOI had specifically requested this island be included in this exercise as its people had never received medical assistance from the GOI. Mare Island is in the South Tidore archipelago, and the name of the two villages are Marekofo and Marengam. The site surveys were completed, and all was set for the arrival of USNS Mercy for its upcoming mission summer of 2010. Mare Island is in the light tan area directly above the smaller map. Mare Island is in the light tan area directly above the smaller map.[i]
Mare Island dropped from the original itinerary:
Approximately two weeks before USNS Mercy entered the waters of Indonesia, I received notification that Pacific Fleet dropped Mare Island from the exercise due to a report from Force Protection Detachment (FPD) Indonesia located at U.S. Embassy Jakarta. It is led by the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and is designated as the front line of defense for all Department of Defense (DoD) forces visiting and training in Indonesia. Their mission is to detect and warn of threats to in-transit DoD personnel and resources, as well as to act as a force protection and force multiplier for the American Embassy Country Team[5]. I did not read the communiqué for the FPD but was told the two villages on Mare Island did not get along and that having a U.S. presence would not be safe, meaning that U.S. personnel would not be protected from or exposed to danger from the villagers as a result of their informants.
After talking to my counterpart at U.S. Pacific Fleet, who relayed the bad news USNS Mercy would not conduct HCA on the island of Mare, I discovered that the FPD conducted site surveys separately from the other three teams. The FPD was not part of the comprehensive appraisal. As a result of my impaired coordination by not including the FPD with the three-site survey teams, it only highlights the importance of interagency collaboration. Such importance was conveyed in the article, “Collateral Duty Diplomacy” (2015) when it advises the reader, “to ensure that interagency counterparts and stakeholder, such as U.S. embassy country teams in the respective host nations and the United States Agency for International Development technical subject matter experts, are consulted and involved in the planning.”[6] Additionally, as the lead in the site surveys, I highly recommend that this become a “lesson learned” for the future: all stakeholders should discuss and approve/disapprove all aspects of assessments with consensus, especially as the exercise moves forward toward the execution phase.
I still did not speak with the FPD directly regarding its report to Pacific Fleet, possibly due to my anger, but correcting this error in the execution phase required a rapid action to salvage the HCA mission for Mare Island. I raised the question to myself of what other avenues might I use to make this HCA visit a reality. Should I contact Pacific Fleet Headquarters and plea or should I just allow the decision to stand unchallenged? I was committed to making this hospital visit possible by any means necessary.
The email that may have made a difference and the importance of one person:
Feeling defeated at so many levels, I was speechless. The gravity of the situation was very sobering. From the training as Foreign Area Officers at our various War Colleges and as being a student at DISAM, we were taught repeatedly not to “go native” and to know that all decisions made are not final, even as it approaches the execution phase. Unfortunately, the site survey team, including me at Mare Island inadvertently, had provided a false impression to the villagers that we would return and provide the HCA when in fact, it was not set in stone. It was a humbling reminder that we should have been more professional by advising the villagers that they would be taken under consideration as potential recipients of SC and not promise them that it will happen on a certain date and time. The dilemma confronting me was having one thousand villages believing they would be receiving health care from the United States, when suddenly two weeks before arrival, Mare Island was dropped from the itinerary. To compound the matter pending the GOI wanted an office call with me to explain why things had changed. I just could not accept meeting my Indonesian Health Care counterparts conveying why USNS Mercy will not be going to Mare Island. There must be some way to turn this ship around.
It was at this point I decided to appeal directly to the Commodore using an email. I do not recall all the words used, but my request was one of passion, and I proposed that I would provide armed local police from the Island of Ternate to ensure safety at the villages throughout the presence of U.S. personnel. The monies would come from the funds provided by Pacific Fleet for use in the successful execution of PP2010. The amount used would have had a minimum impact on what was allocated for the event.
Commodore’s Response
The Commodore responded three hours later utilizing her email, and she assured me that USNS Mercy would go to Mare Island, “no worries.” As far as the Force Protection aspect, the Commodore told me that my course of action in hiring local law enforcement would not be necessary. From that comment, I can only assume the personnel on USNS Mercy that accompanied me assured her that they felt safe during the site survey.
The good news was that USNS Mercy provided surgery and primary medical/dental health care clinics for three days. USNS Mercy, overall, provided 35,000 Indonesian citizens in remote areas the first medical care of their lives. Also, this outreach met the 2010 U.S. National Security objective by advancing American influence in the world[7].
As I researched the Pacific Fleet website pertaining to follow on PPs in Indonesia since the summer of 2010, I discovered the following:
Pacific Partnership / Locations in Indonesia since PP2010
PP2012 / Islands of Sangihe, Talaud, and Siau
PP2016 / Padang, Indonesia
PP2018 / Bengkulu, Indonesia
Although I previously mentioned lessons learned from the PP2010 experience, I, however, did not have an opportunity to provide my input to Pacific Fleet upon the event’s completion. A lesson learned is a scheduled meeting upon the conclusion of PP at Pacific Fleet’s headquarters, and the meeting is titled “hot wash.” The purpose is to identify ways in which they can improve and attain greater success in the future. PP occurs each year and ODC military staff members rotate from a post every two to three years. In a recent email to one of the locally employed staff that worked with me during PP2010, I asked how the execution of PP occurs currently and was told that the coordination and locations had been coordinated from U.S. Pacific Fleet and the GOI healthcare professionals. ODC no longer plays a key role in PP as it did when I was assigned.
Can one person make a difference?
I no longer doubt one person can make a difference. You can and should make a difference, even if the odds are against you. If you are a Security Cooperation Officer, do not discount what you can do. You are diplomat representing the United States in uniform, and your actions both the smart one and the problematic ones are of great significance.
END NOTES
[1][1] Craig Hooper, “It Took Comfort 39 Days to Get Pierside in Puerto Rico. That’s a National-Security Problem: DefenseOne, 2017
[2][2] Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress: Congressional Research Service, 2013, 2
[3][3] Brain Gaines, Pacific Partnership 2010 Begins Indonesia Visit in North Maluku, Chief of Information Attn: US Navy, 2010
[4] Author's sketch
[5][5] Scott Bernat, Force Protection Detachment Indonesia: Asia Pacific Security Magazine, 2012
[6][6] Matthew Lim and David Blazes, “Collateral Duty Diplomacy”, SCIENCE & DIPLOMACY, 2015, p. 06.
[7][7] Homeland Security Digital Library. “National Security Strategy Strategy [May 2010].” Center for Homeland Defense and Security Naval Postgraduate School DHS - FEMA2010, 1–60.
References
Bernat, Scott M., “ Force Protection Detachment – Indonesia.” Asia Pacific
Security Magazine, March2012
Feickert, Andrew. “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service2013, 2.
Gaines, Brian. “Pacific Partnership 2010 Begins Indonesia Visit in North Maluku.” Chief of Information Attn: US Navy Pentagon Washington DC 20350-1200. 2010. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=54619.
Homeland Security Digital Library. “National Security Strategy [May 2010].” Center for Homeland Defense and Security Naval Postgraduate School DHS - FEMA2010, 1–60.
Hooper, Craig. “It Took Comfort 39 Days to Get Pierside in Puerto Rico. That’s a National-Security Problem.” Defense One. 2017.
Lim, Matthew, and David Blazes. “Collateral Duty Diplomacy’ The U.S. Department of Defense and Global Health Diplomacy.” SCIENCE & DIPLOMACY, September2015.