Improving the Effectiveness of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence
By Colonel Thomas H. Melton, U.S. Army
Editor's Note: Colonel Melton's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Army War College. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship. To meet spacing requirements, we publish this version without research notes. To request the full thesis, email editor@faoa.org.
At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, allied heads of state and government agreed to increase NATO’s deterrence posture in Eastern Europe through Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), a rotational deployment of four multinational battle groups (MNBGs) stationed in each of the Baltic States and Poland. This decision, a direct response to Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, served important political and military purposes. Politically, it reassured the most vulnerable allies that the alliance is committed to their collective security. Militarily, it increased the risk Russia would face if it continued its trend of military adventurism by attacking NATO in the Baltics. The critical questions, though, are whether EFP, combined with the indigenous armed forces in the Baltics, represents a combat credible force capable of inflicting unacceptable costs on an attacking Russian invader and whether NATO possesses the capacity to rapidly reinforce and sustain EFP during a crisis. For NATO’s expeditionary, forward posture to provide an effective deterrent, the answer to both questions must be a resounding ‘yes.’
In the event of a Russian attack against the Baltics, the NATO Response Force (NRF) would have the task of rapidly reinforcing EFP. Established in 2002, the NRF consists of land, sea, and air components capable of rapid deployment, totaling more than 40,000 military personnel. NATO strengthened the NRF concept in 2014, creating a “spearhead force” known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which is a brigade-sized light infantry force, augmented with air, maritime, and special operations forces, capable of deployment within seven days. But just like EFP, there are significant questions regarding the NRF that NATO must address when assessing the effectiveness of its deterrent. For example, does NATO possess the strategic lift enablers, and is there sufficient infrastructure in Eastern Europe to enable the NRF to reach the crisis in time to matter? If so, has such a plan been sufficiently exercised to credibly demonstrate this capability to Russia? Finally, will Russia’s long-range precision fires from Kaliningrad close the Suwalki gap before NATO can reinforce and resupply EFP, leaving NATO forces in the Baltics to suffer a second Dunkirk?
There is ample research from both the academic and policy communities attempting to assess the effectiveness of NATO’s deterrent posture in the Baltics. Both communities tend to agree that EFP represents a ‘tripwire’ intended to trigger a NATO response against Russian aggression, thereby raising the cost Russia would incur for invading a Baltic state. The key concept behind EFP is that major allies put “skin in the game,” with US, UK, French, Italian, Canadian, and German soldiers, among others, immediately in the line of fire of any future conflict. While EFP does improve NATO’s preexisting deterrence posture, it is questionable whether a ground force of only 5,000 personnel without a demonstrated reinforcement mechanism is sufficient to deter Russia, even with the token presence of American and Western European soldiers on the ground. The easy solution is to call for a larger rotational NATO presence in the Baltics, but such a recommendation is tone-deaf to the alliance’s political realities as well as antiquated. Political divisions internal to the alliance make the likelihood of increasing NATO’s military footprint all but impossible. Further, deterrence no longer requires legions of field armies commanding multiple corps along the line of contact as it did at the height of the Cold War. Fortunately, better, more sustainable options exist.
This paper reinforces existing literature that while EFP does strengthen the alliance’s overall defense posture, it contains two significant shortcomings that prevent NATO from credibly deterring Russian aggression in the Baltics: 1) EFP consists of insufficient capability to inflict unacceptably high costs on an attacking Russian force, and 2) NATO lacks the military mobility to rapidly reinforce and sustain its forward presence in a crisis. Rather than adding yet another call for increased infantry and armor presence in the Baltics, this paper argues that NATO should mitigate existing shortcomings and exploit Russian vulnerabilities by shifting to a strategy of deterrence-by-denial. Such a strategy should incorporate principles of the US Army’s Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept by simultaneously presenting Russia with multiple dilemmas and increased complexity through massed, multi-domain effects. To do this, NATO must augment its existing manpower capacity with multi-domain weapons systems capable of rendering any future Russian attack against a Baltic state either unlikely to succeed, too expensive, or unsustainable. NATO can accomplish this in three ways. First, it must prioritize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) on its eastern flank to provide advance warning of any Russian military buildup and indications of invasion. Second, NATO should establish an area access/area denial (A2/AD) capability within EFP. This includes augmenting EFP with ground-based missile systems to deny Russia access to NATO airspace and the Baltic Sea and creating an unconventional warfare capability among indigenous populations to attrit an invading and subsequent occupation force. Finally, NATO should enhance military mobility by championing long-term dual-use infrastructure projects, prepositioning additional armor and mechanized equipment forward, and regularly exercising the rapid reinforcement of EFP under combat conditions. None of these recommendations would drastically increase the size of EFP, nor would they violate the principles of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
The Russian Threat
An increasingly assertive Russia, intent on undermining Euro-Atlantic security and the liberal international order through military power, poses the most significant threat to NATO and its member states since the end of the Cold War. As President Putin’s resurgent Russia grows in global influence, it has become increasingly competitive with and hostile towards NATO. Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy goes so far as to single out both NATO and NATO expansion as security threats. President Putin takes every opportunity to attack NATO’s center of gravity – its unity – by attempting to divide the alliance, alter its approach to collective defense, and prevent further expansion. Russia is not shy about competing with NATO below the level of armed conflict and probing the true threshold of NATO’s Article 5 guarantee. Recent Russian actions against NATO, all of which violate international norms, include irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that ultimately led to the treaty’s demise, cyber-attacks against Baltic countries, provocative military exercises conducted on NATO’s borders with decidedly anti-NATO scenarios, and the 2018 nerve agent attack in the United Kingdom, just to name a few.
Given Russia’s recent track record of malign activity, the alliance must continually assess whether Russia might be willing to cross the Article 5 threshold and directly attack a NATO member in the Baltics or elsewhere. Scholars and military analysts currently assess such a scenario as unlikely. However, the Russian threat is real and presents a considerable challenge due to Russia’s greatly modernized conventional military forces that stand as a near-peer to NATO’s. Despite the low probability, a Russian invasion of the Baltics, if successfully realized, would have catastrophic consequences to NATO’s credibility and could potentially threaten the alliance’s continued existence. After all, should NATO either fail to respond to Russian aggression against one of its member states or not succeed in defeating such an attack, its role in promoting the liberal world order and defending its security interests in Europe would be shattered, leaving the alliance’s future viability in jeopardy. So, what would prompt Russia to pursue such a bold and risky foreign policy? The most plausible answer is that Russia views maintaining critical lines of communication to Kaliningrad – Russia’s exclave in Eastern Europe – as a vital national interest worth the risk of direct military confrontation with NATO. The existence of sizeable Russian populations in the Baltics gives Russia the perfect justification for pursuing this objective through military intervention.
Before deciding to take military action in the Baltics, Russia must first consider the likely consequences it would incur. These include increased economic sanctions, condemnation from the international community, and high costs associated with sustaining a long-term occupation of territory inhabited by hostile populations, any of which could threaten Russia’s military missions elsewhere and adversely impact the Putin regime’s domestic standing. Russia suffered similar consequences – most prominently economic sanctions and international isolation – following its 2014 annexation of Crimea, but so far, these consequences have failed to reverse Russia’s policies in Ukraine and its penchant for confronting the West through malign activity. Regardless, the limited sanctions against Russia are at least a contributing factor to Russia’s dire economic situation that reduced Putin’s popularity to its lowest level in recent memory, and the West maintains the ability to tighten these sanctions, should its leaders deem necessary. These types of consequences assume Russia prevails in any invasion scenario, but Russia must also consider the consequences of failure. In a worst-case scenario for Russia, a failed invasion of the Baltics could permanently threaten critical lines of communication to Kaliningrad, leaving its geographically isolated exclave without direct support from the mainland.
Russian Perspective
Historical mindedness is critical to understanding Russia’s recent track record of malign activity both globally and in Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact dealt a serious blow to the Russian psyche as well as its perceived security. Following World War II and throughout the Cold War, Russia depended on the territories of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact to serve as a buffer zone protecting it from its core threat – NATO. With much of this territory now integrated into NATO or actively seeking membership, Russia perceives that its traditional ‘sphere of influence’ is under attack.
Russia fears further NATO expansion, and its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine suggest that Russia considers NATO presence on its borders as an existential threat that it is willing to counter with military force. In both countries, Russia pursued a vital national interest – stopping NATO expansion towards its borders – under the pretext of defending ‘oppressed’ Russian minority populations. In each case, Russia gambled successfully that it could quickly achieve limited national security objectives without military opposition from the West. The key conclusion for NATO was that the Baltics are vulnerable to a similar fate as Georgia and Ukraine, despite the fact the region has steadily slipped from Russia’s grasp since the early 1990s. Given the lessons of recent history, it is not farfetched to conceive of Russia using similar false pretexts of ethnic oppression to directly confront NATO with military power in the Baltics, where sizeable ethic-Russian populations continue to reside.
Russia’s Conventional Military Threat
The conventional military threat to NATO emanates from Russia’s Western Military District (WeMD), which possesses 300,000 assigned forces, the most combat power of Russia’s five military districts. According to Catherine Harris and Frederick Kagan, Russia’s WeMD “is responsible for confronting NATO and maintaining Russian influence in the former Soviet space, with a particular focus on Ukraine and protecting the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad between Poland and Lithuania.” Its major subordinate commands consist of the 1st Guards Tank Army near Moscow, the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) at St. Petersburg, the 6th CAA arrayed along Russia’s borders with Ukraine and Belarus, as well as significant combat power in Kaliningrad that includes strategic air and sea capabilities.
The Russian forces closest to the Baltics belong to the 6th CAA and consist of three airborne regiments at Pskov (20 miles from Estonia), one motorized rifle brigade at Luga (70 miles from Estonia), and a second motorized rifle brigade at Kananka (140 miles from Estonia). In total, these units consist of roughly 30,000 airborne and infantry soldiers, supported by Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, postured in direct proximity to Russia’s border with NATO. A further 15,000 military personnel, equipped with heavy artillery, long-range ballistic missiles, and anti-aircraft weapons systems, are stationed to the west in Kaliningrad. In summary, the collective combat power of the WeMD represents a significant conventional overmatch compared to NATO’s much smaller military footprint in the region.
As NATO assesses Russian intentions in the Baltics, it should pay careful attention to a least two military factors that, at least for now, suggest that Russia has no ambitions of meddling. First, to pose an offensive threat to the Baltics, Russia would have to reinforce the 6th CAA with armored and mechanized combat power, probably from the 1st Tank Army near Moscow, a move that would take weeks to conduct and provide NATO with vital advance warning. A second indicator would be concrete steps by the Russian Armed Forces to address inadequate command-and-control of forces arrayed along NATO’s border. Russia has recently re-introduced the division headquarters into its force structure as the command-and-control node for multiple combat regiments and associated logistical support, and it is employing these new division headquarters in areas where it is engaged in ongoing military operations – the Southern Military District and along Russia’s border with Ukraine and Belarus. The lack of a division headquarters assigned to the 6th CAA likely signals to NATO that Russia has no present military ambitions on the Baltics. While NATO may take solace in the likelihood that Russia is not planning an imminent invasion, the alliance must remain vigilant and act decisively to address shortcomings in its deterrence strategy, as adjustments will require significant political and financial capital, finite military resources, and time to implement.
Regardless of whether Russia has the political will to attack the Baltics, it is clear from its annual strategic military exercises that the Russian Armed Forces prioritize the defeat of a conventional near-peer adversary and that the notional adversary in these exercises usually bears a strong resemblance to NATO. These exercises also suggest that during a conflict, Russia will seek to establish escalation dominance, capitalizing on speed, overwhelming force, and the potential to use nuclear weapons to quickly consolidate limited gains before the adversary can respond. In ZAPAD-2017, Russia’s most recent strategic military exercise in the WeMD, Russia used an armored division, supported by significant ground, air, and sea domain fires, to invade a notional territory resembling the Baltics and defeat a small presence of NATO-like personnel deployed there. The exercise, which NATO estimates employed 60,000-70,000 Russian troops, culminated with “nuclear messaging” intended to deter counterattack. According to Dave Johnson, a staff officer on the NATO International Staff, the “character, scale and intensity of Russian military exercise activities during September 2017 is consistent with the system of strategic operations that Russia would conduct in conflict with NATO.” The onus, therefore, is on NATO to effectively employ a deterrent strategy that raises the costs of invasion to an unacceptably high level, regardless of the likelihood of such action.
Assessing the Credibility of NATO’s Forward, Expeditionary Deterrence
NATO is acutely aware of the security threat Russia poses to its eastern flank. As stated in the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué:
Russia's aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
As a result, NATO must continually evaluate its military posture to ensure it fields a credible deterrent and can defend its most vulnerable members against attack. This is a difficult challenge because deterrence, defined as preventing an adversary from taking a specific action due to the likely consequences the adversary would incur, is inherently hard to measure. For example, have NATO actions heretofore deterred Russia from invading a Baltic state because Russia fears what would happen if it killed NATO soldiers stationed there, or does Russia simply view such an invasion to be unnecessary for the time being?
It is hard to imagine that Russia would fear NATO’s existing military presence in the Baltics and find itself deterred from taking military action, especially if it perceives survival or vital national interests to be at stake. While NATO does enjoy conventional military superiority over Russia in the aggregate, NATO’s presence in the Baltics is small and lacks critical mechanized forces and A2/AD enablers, and its reaction time to a Russian invasion would likely be slow to the point of making any response ineffective. The Baltic states and EFP lead nations, by default, would end up being initial responders, likely resulting in a piecemeal response hoping to survive long enough for the full weight of the alliance to be brought to bear. By contrast, Russia possesses a comparative advantage over NATO in its ability to quickly mass, employ, and sustain overwhelming military force into the territories on its immediate periphery and use established A2/AD capabilities to frustrate NATO efforts to reinforce forward-deployed forces and effectively counterattack.
Compounding analysis on the appropriate level of deterrence is risk. NATO could increase the size of EFP, but this may lead to inadvertent escalation. When calculating its rotational presence in the Baltics, NATO must be careful not to violate the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act – which Russia likely defines as the presence of anything exceeding one brigade in any single frontline state – and thereby provoke the very war it seeks to deter. On the other hand, the deployment of too little military force signals to Moscow that the alliance’s commitment to the Baltics is not serious, relegating Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to de facto NATO buffer states, thereby undermining alliance solidarity and credibility.
For deterrence in the Baltics to work, Russia must perceive that NATO possesses both the political will and the military might “to do what it says it will do.” In the case of the Baltics, the credibility of NATO’s forward expeditionary deterrence is dependent on two factors. First, NATO’s military footprint must either possess the capacity of a large enough troop presence or the capability of A2/AD systems to inflict unacceptably high losses on an invading Russian force. Second, NATO must possess and clearly demonstrate the capability to rapidly reinforce EFP with additional forces either before or during a crisis. A careful examination of these two factors draws into question the deterrent value of NATO’s EFP as currently configured.
Factor 1: NATO’s Military Footprint in the Baltics
Article 3 of the Washington Treaty states that nations “will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Thus, NATO’s defense of the Baltics begins with the indigenous armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which collectively consist of 32,650 active-duty personnel. Lithuania, the most populous Baltic state, has the largest armed forces, totaling 19,850, while Estonia and Latvia, with their considerably smaller populations, only total end strengths of 6,600 and 6,200, respectively. In terms of ground forces, this equates to one mechanized infantry brigade and two light infantry brigades in Lithuania, one mechanized infantry brigade in Latvia, and one mechanized infantry brigade (minus) and one light infantry brigade (minus) in Estonia. Given the lack of heavy armor in any of the Baltic states’ armed forces, the collective land domain combat power of the three countries is roughly equivalent to one light infantry division by US standards, insufficient to deter an adversary like Russia, with its two combined arms armies and one tank army postured within striking distance in the WeMD, albeit several hundred miles away in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and arrayed along the Belarus and Ukraine borders.
With Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, it became immediately obvious to NATO that it lacked a credible deterrent to prevent a similar attack against the Baltics. As then-Deputy Secretary General Vershbow noted, “[f]or 20 years, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has been based on the premise that we do not face an adversary to our east. That premise is now in doubt.” This renewed threat to NATO’s eastern flank led to the 2016 decision at the Warsaw Summit to create EFP. The framework nations for the four MNBGs are the United States, Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which lead MNBGs in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, respectively. Currently, EFP consists of 5,000 personnel from 20 NATO members assigned to two armored MNBGs (Poland/US and Estonia/United Kingdom) and two mechanized infantry MNBGs (Lithuania/Germany and Latvia/Canada).
Figure 1. NATO Enhanced Forward Presence
EFP serves important deterrent purposes, both politically and military. Politically, it sends a powerful signal to Russia that an attack against the Baltics is not simply a bilateral issue but instead represents an attack against the 20 troop-contributing nations. Second, the presence of Western military personnel in the Baltics has helped reassure vulnerable populations that NATO will protect them from Russian aggression. In Lithuania, 76% of the populace believes that EFP deters Russia. Similar sentiments are echoed in both Estonia and Latvia, where 65% of Estonians and 61% of Latvians report they feel more secure due to NATO’s presence.
Militarily, it is undeniable that EFP enhances NATO’s preexisting defensive efforts along its eastern flank. The addition of four MNBGs, which represents an increase of a combined arms brigade to the region, provides a significant boost in combat power, especially to the Estonian and Latvian armed forces. However, while the overall increase in combat power is welcome, the collective military power of EFP and indigenous forces remains significantly outnumbered and outgunned by Russian forces in the WeMD, drawing into question whether such a NATO presence is truly sufficient to inflict the level of damage on an invading Russian force necessary to deter Moscow’s decision making. For historical comparison, NATO employed a force of eight allied corps (20 divisions) to deter the Soviet Union along the border between West Germany and the Warsaw Pact at the height of the Cold War. This area was roughly equivalent in length to the modern border between the Baltics and Russia, which NATO currently defends with only 38,000 ground forces, less than 5,000 of which are from the most militarily powerful nations in the alliance. Another military shortcoming with EFP is a lack of cooperation between the MNBGs. This stems from EFP’s complicated command and control structure and the nonhomogeneous subunits on relatively short rotation cycles that make up the four MNBGs. Finally, the American contribution to EFP is exclusive to Poland. Russia, which is most concerned with US military assets near its borders, could mistakenly interpret the lack of US military personnel north of the Suwalki Gap as a signal that the US is not serious in its commitment to the defense of the Baltics.
A 2016 RAND study attempted to demonstrate the inadequacy of NATO’s collective military footprint in the Baltics through a series of simulated exercises. The key finding of this study, which saw an invading Russian force capture a Baltic capital within 60 hours or less in every simulation, is that NATO’s forward presence lacks the required military capacity and capability to deter a conventional Russian attack. This study, like most computer-simulated exercises, was not perfect, as it failed to account for marshy terrain in the Baltics that would present a significant challenge to advancing Russian armored and mechanized forces, channeling these forces into urban areas that favor the defender. In addition, it occurred prior to the establishment of EFP; however, it did account for four US and UK light infantry battalions deployed to the Baltics, roughly equivalent in size, if not capability, to NATO’s four MNBGs present on the ground today. Regardless of these shortcomings, the study’s findings are useful, as they portray a dire situation for the Baltics that EFP fails to completely address.
The key utility of the 2016 RAND study is that it demonstrates through a limited wargaming tool that NATO’s rotational military presence in the Baltics is unlikely to defeat a Russian invasion and prevent a fait accompli, limited gain scenario without significant and rapid reinforcement. However, the authors’ principal recommendation – that NATO deploy more conventional forces – is politically shortsighted and discounts other available options. In their analysis, the authors concluded that a force of seven brigades, including at least three armor brigades, supported by long-range fires and air support, is required to fundamentally change Moscow’s strategic estimate. Even a force of this magnitude, they argue, would be insufficient to defend the Baltics, but it would represent a combat credible force capable of raising the costs of a Russian invasion to an unacceptably high level.
While calls to increase the size of EFP are convenient, enacting them would prove difficult politically for at least two reasons, likely making them a non-starter within NATO Headquarters. First, NATO’s official policy towards Russia is a ‘dual-track approach,’ which attempts to complement deterrence measures with dialogue through the NATO-Russia Council. Lacking any major provocation, many allies would find it difficult to support increasing troop levels in the Baltics because doing so would adversely impact Russia’s willingness to engage NATO in meaningful dialogue. Second, increasing NATO’s conventional presence in the Baltics would limit what NATO can do against other threats. While Russia is arguably the alliance’s most vital threat, countering terrorism and projecting stability on its southern flank also demands NATO’s attention and its finite military resources. Fortunately, there is a range of options at NATO’s disposal that would strengthen deterrence by addressing alliance shortcomings and exploiting Russian vulnerabilities without requiring the deployment of additional battalions and brigades to the Baltics.
Factor 2: Military Mobility
NATO’s presence in the Baltics is underpinned by military mobility, defined as “the seamless and speedy movement of troops, equipment, and assets” to the point of need. Military mobility is an indispensable component of military readiness, encompassing infrastructure, command and control, border crossing procedures, and strategic lift. According to General (retired) Scaparrotti, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, “[o]ur strategy rests on the fact that we need to be able to move large forces quickly to have a credible deterrent.” This is because the introduction of new forces into a region during a crisis signals increased resolve through attempted escalation dominance, improving the likelihood “that an adversary will back down.” It also enables NATO to maintain a smaller footprint in the Baltics than would be necessary to defeat an invading Russian force since military plans assume reinforcements are on the way.
To successfully deter Russia, the alliance must demonstrate that it possesses the military capacity to reinforce EFP either before or during the initial phases of any crisis, something NATO has so far failed to do. Such a crisis would likely require the movement of mechanized and armored divisions and brigades to and across Europe, an operation not routinely exercised by the alliance in the post-Cold War era. Alliance focus during this period has rightly been on out-of-area counterterrorism and stability operations and coincided with years of decreased defense spending, resulting in unintended military mobility shortfalls internal to Europe. Critical shortfalls include the low probability of reaching the Baltics from Poland under intense fire from Russian precision munitions, insufficient and incompatible infrastructure across Eastern Europe, and slow reaction time to deploy sufficient mechanized and armored units to the region. Until NATO addresses these concerns, the Baltics remain at risk of being cut off by an invading Russian force during the early hours of any conflict. By accepting such risk, NATO damages the credibility of its deterrent strategy.
Terrain poses the first challenge to NATO’s ability to reinforce EFP during a crisis. The Suwalki Gap, which is NATO’s ground avenue of approach into the Baltics from Poland, serves as a vulnerable chokepoint to military movement and maneuver. This 65-mile-wide corridor, flanked by Kaliningrad and its A2/AD capabilities on one side and pro-Russia Belarus, traditionally permissive to Russian military activity, on the other, offers only one northbound railway line and two roads, one of which is limited to 7.5-ton capacity. When combined with the likely congestion of refugees fleeing the Baltics from the opposite direction and precision Russian fires, transiting the Suwalki Gap and reinforcing EFP once the conflict starts is a daunting task, and success is anything but guaranteed. NATO has largely ignored this risk, relying instead on peacetime logistics procedures to resupply EFP and failing to exercise the ability to forcefully enter the Baltics with armored and mechanized divisions under hostile fire conditions. Thus, the 2016 RAND study finding that NATO is not capable of getting sufficient armor to the Baltics after a Russian invasion starts remains a valid concern for NATO’s deterrent strategy.
A second challenge to NATO’s ability to reinforce EFP is insufficient and incompatible civilian and military dual-use infrastructure. As the alliance’s borders moved eastward in the 1990s and 2000s, mobility infrastructure in Eastern Europe, including railway lines, roads, bridges, tunnels, ports, and receiving and staging facilities, did not keep pace. According to General (retired) Scaparrotti and Ambassador (retired) Bell, “[m]uch of the existing infrastructure in former Warsaw Pact states is largely unsuitable for modern NATO equipment.” Railway lines, the most efficient method for transporting armored and mechanized equipment, are especially problematic, as the Baltic states continue to use the Russian standard rail gauge rather than the European standard, and Moscow controls the supply of rail wagons compatible with these lines.
In 2018, there were signs that European countries recognized the significance of its inadequate dual-use infrastructure, as the European Union (EU) and EU member states pledged €13 billion for infrastructure upgrades from 2021-2027. While insufficient to completely address infrastructure shortfalls, this funding would have injected much-needed positive momentum into the process. Unfortunately, the EU’s recently approved long-term budget through 2027 reduced military mobility spending from an initial forecast of €6.5 billion to a paltry and woefully inadequate €1.5 billion, primarily due to economic constraints caused by COVID-19 relief. The end result is that Europe and NATO will remain without access to sufficient infrastructure in Eastern Europe to rapidly move equipment and personnel to the Baltics for the foreseeable future, a fact that Russia undoubtedly understands and will consider when calculating the costs of potential military action.
A third major military mobility challenge is NATO’s relatively slow reaction time compared to Russia’s. Three issues here give Russia the upper hand. First, NATO’s ability to react timely in a crisis will be slowed, at least initially, by the requirement to gain political consensus among 30 allies. The Kremlin, meanwhile, remains unconstrained in the same way thanks to Russia’s highly centralized, unitary decision-making process, providing a major advantage in a crisis where hours matter. Second, legal and bureaucratic processes for moving military equipment across Europe are not standard across the continent. These cumbersome processes led Lieutenant General (retired) Hodges, former US Army Europe Commander, to advocate, unsuccessfully, for blanket approval to move military equipment freely across the territory of NATO members, or what he termed a “military Schengen” for NATO. The lack of such approval inhibits military commanders from exercising the complex task of reinforcing EFP with brigade and above formations.
In contrast, Russia remains unrestrained in the movement of forces near NATO’s borders, which it routinely does in both strategic level and no notice ‘snap’ exercises. Finally, there is a long lead time required for US military personnel and equipment to arrive in Europe from the continental United States (CONUS). The relatively small US army footprint in Europe means that large armored and mechanized formations of CONUS-based ground forces are critical, if not decisive, to any NATO effort to defeat a Russian invasion. However, such deployments will require weeks, if not months, to execute. In the recently conducted US European Command (USEUCOM) exercise Defender Europe 20, USEUCOM required a four-month pre-deployment window to move one division of personnel and equipment from CONUS to Europe during peacetime conditions, and this timeline may have been longer had the deploying division not had access to prepositioned stocks in Poland. NATO Military planners involved in the exercise estimate that it would take at least 60 days to move a heavy US division from CONUS to the Baltics and 5-6 months to move an entire corps. This is the level of US commitment likely required for NATO to defeat a Russian invasion with a conventional response, but this timeline would pit arriving US forces against a Russian military consolidating its gains and backed by a nuclear deterrent of its own.
Recommendations for Improving NATO’s Deterrent Value in the Baltics
Clausewitz argued that the defense is the stronger form of waging war. However, for this axiom to hold true in the Baltics, NATO must alter its approach to deterrence in a way that remedies its shortcomings and capitalizes on Russian weaknesses inherent in any invasion scenario. To improve its deterrent value, NATO should shift to a strategy of deterrence-by-denial, which “comprises the use of measures that would impede the ability of the adversary to achieve its campaign objectives at acceptable cost.” Such a shift in strategy requires the alliance to address capability gaps of EFP, such as slow reaction time prior to the initiation of hostilities, inadequate A2/AD capabilities capable of inflicting unacceptable losses on an invading force, and an unproven ability to rapidly reinforce and sustain EFP in crisis.
While much of the existing research on a possible invasion of the Baltics gives Russia a decided advantage over NATO, Russia does face at least three vulnerabilities that the alliance can exploit in any deterrence-by-denial strategy. First, while Russia’s ability to mass combat power is comparatively faster than NATO’s, Russia’s lack of sufficient mechanized units and command and control nodes postured close to the Baltics would require time – likely weeks – to remedy, providing the alliance with valuable advance warning of a pending attack if detected. Second, Russia lacks any semblance of soft power capability in the Baltics. The painful memories of Soviet occupation during World War II remain ingrained in the national identities of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, making it inconceivable that Moscow could ever install pro-Kremlin puppet governments in the Baltics as it did successfully in Ukraine. Even ethnic-Russian populations in the Baltics are likely to oppose repatriation with the motherland, despite perceptions that they suffer from injustices and discrimination, as they have grown accustomed to the freedoms and comfortable quality of life afforded to residents of the EU compared to Russia. Finally, a Russian invasion of the Baltics would expose Kaliningrad to NATO retaliation. This includes everything from being cut-off from the Russian mainland through a blockade to being the primary target of a NATO counterattack. In any scenario, Russian aggression in the Baltics likely results in adverse consequences to Russia’s exclave. These vulnerabilities create space for NATO to devise an effective deterrence-by-denial strategy in the Baltics capable of raising the stakes on Russia to an unacceptably high level.
Recommendation 1: Increase ISR to Detect Massing Russian Combat Power
Any buildup of Russian forces on NATO borders and changes to command-and-control nodes in the WeMD should be priority intelligence requirements for NATO military authorities and trigger decision points for executing pre-planned and rehearsed contingencies for the rapid reinforcement of EFP. Effective intelligence collection begins by ensuring that NATO’s most technologically advanced members allocate sufficient ISR assets to the region and then demonstrate the political will to share collected time-sensitive information. The US’s remotely piloted RQ-4 Global Hawk, with its high-altitude, long-endurance, and all-weather capabilities, offers an outstanding platform for increasing ISR collection against the WeMD from NATO air space. Employing such systems in the region would maximize NATO’s reaction time, potentially enabling it to rapidly reinforce EFP before Russia attempts to close ground and air corridors to the Baltics.
Recommendation 2: Improve NATO’s A2/AD Capability in the Baltics
Air defense is arguably the most significant military capability shortfall among the Baltic states and must be addressed if NATO is to field a credible deterrent. One short-term action is for the alliance to encourage EFP troop-contributing nations to include air defense systems as part of their deploying formations. In addition, NATO should consider expanding its Baltic Air Policing mission, currently limited to air-to-air interrogation and interdiction tactics, to a broader air defense mission. Because air defense systems are high-demand, low-density commodities, NATO should assist the Baltics states in developing indigenous capabilities. Wealthier NATO members, such as the US, should continue to focus security cooperation programs with the Baltic states on the acquisition of more Patriot Missile, which cost $2.5 billion per system, and other ground-based air defense systems and ensure that these systems are incorporated into a Baltic-wide integrated air and missile defense capability.
In the maritime domain, the Baltic Sea is key terrain. Russia relies on the Baltic Sea as a critical lifeline to Kaliningrad, while NATO’s presence defends shipping and reassures allies and partners in the region. While any armed conflict in the Baltics would likely start in the land domain, it would quickly become an all-domain fight, and control of the Baltic Sea would prove critical. NATO should ensure that it has sufficient capability to challenge Russia’s naval presence by employing ground-based, anti-ship, surface-to-surface missile systems. The value of these systems is that their ranges allow them to fire from rear areas, they are mobile, and they can be dispersed and concealed, all of which enhance survivability during a conflict. Norway’s Naval Strike Missile, with its 200km range, and the US’s Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), with a range of 300km, provide affordable options for establishing anti-ship and surface-to-surface missile capabilities in the Baltics. With as few as three anti-ship missile systems and two surface-to-surface missile systems, NATO could ensure coverage of the entire Baltic region.
Recommendation 3: Increase Prepositioned Stocks of Armor/Mechanized Equipment
The US Army’s MDO concept calls for the ability to converge forward presence to reach a crisis within days or weeks. Increasing prepositioned stocks of armored and mechanized equipment in the region would enable NATO to accomplish this at drastically reduced deployment timelines, requiring only the movement of personnel into the region rather than heal-to-toe units. One possible option is for the three non-US EFP framework nations to each preposition a brigade (minus) worth of equipment in Poland where it would join US prepositioned stocks and be survivable from any surprise attack against the Baltics. Such action would enable each MNBG to quickly become a multinational armored or mechanized brigade, possibly before Russia can mass the combat power it requires to initiate an invasion. The costs of prepositioned stocks, however, are not cheap, as seen by the US expenditure of $2.3 billion annually through the European Defense Initiative.
Recommendation 4: Demonstrate the Ability to Forcibly Enter and Reinforce the Baltics
In almost any invasion scenario, NATO will face the daunting task of reinforcing and resupplying EFP from Poland through the Suwalki Gap. The US Army’s MDO concept acknowledges the reality of this military requirement, requiring ground forces to possess the capability to penetrate enemy A2/AD systems and conduct operational and strategic maneuver through contested lines of communication. NATO must credibly demonstrate through Article 5 exercises that it possesses this capability and will reinforce EFP in times of crisis. Such exercises should include the NRF as well as additional follow-on forces from across Europe and CONUS. They should also coincide with major Russian exercises on NATO’s borders to prevent Russia from using exercises as a way of covertly building up forces for a no-notice invasion. Finally, they should be conducted with minimal advance warning to units involved to provide a true measure of alliance readiness, one that does not appear scripted or staged. USEUCOM attempted such an endeavor in 2020 with exercise Defender Europe 20; however, this was a US exercise, not NATO, and the realities of COVID-19 required a drastic reduction in its scope and scale. The US, as the alliance’s most powerful member and the one ally most likely to be at the leadership forefront of any crisis with Russia, should flag future large-scale national exercises as NATO exercises.
Recommendation 5: Increase Russia’s Costs of Occupying the Baltic States
Another tenet of the US Army’s MDO concept is enabling allied and partner nation irregular warfare capabilities through military advisors and materiel support. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each possess organized territorial defense forces totaling more than 35,000 personnel, most of which are volunteers with prior military training. NATO members have the capacity to train these forces in insurgency tactics, such as stockpiling weapons, employing improvised explosive devices, and attacking soft targets, through bilateral security force assistance. Such a capability would send an important message to Russia that even if it succeeds in temporarily seizing territory in the Baltics, it will face the unpopular prospect of waging a long and costly counterinsurgency campaign.
Recommendation 6: Upgrade and Standardize Dual-use Infrastructure Across Europe
Insufficient and non-standardized dual-use infrastructure across Europe represents a critical military capability shortfall that requires an urgent political solution. In the spirit of burden sharing, this is a European problem that must be solved jointly between the EU, NATO, and their collective European members. The NATO Secretary General is ideally placed politically to lead this initiative for the alliance and work directly with the EU and European heads of state and government. One thing NATO can do now is to incentivize progress by counting infrastructure investment towards its members’ stated goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense, making the expenditure of financial resources on infrastructure projects a much more attractive option for policymakers.
Conclusion
NATO’s 2017 deployment of four MNBGs to the Baltic states and Poland sent a powerful political message regarding alliance solidarity against a resurgent Russia threatening its eastern flank. No longer are the Baltic states left to face this threat alone, as any Russian invasion is now an attack against all 20 troop-contributing nations. Militarily, however, NATO’s footprint in the Baltics is small and possesses few enablers, rendering it a ‘tripwire’ force incapable of repelling a Russian invasion and maintaining the integrity of NATO borders. Such a strategy of deterrence-by-punishment promises a powerful NATO response against Russia once hostilities begin, but due to military mobility challenges such as contested and constricted terrain, inadequate dual-use infrastructure, and long deployment timelines to and across Europe, it is doubtful that NATO would be able to punish Russia with conventional forces prior to being presented a fait accompli.
Fortunately, NATO has options for improving deterrence in the Baltics that does not require the deployment of significantly more personnel to EFP. By transitioning to a strategy of deterrence-by-denial, NATO could impose unacceptable costs on an attacking Russian force, thereby deterring Russia from invading. To succeed, such a strategy requires critical changes to EFP. First, NATO must maximize its advance warning to a Russian invasion through increased intelligence collection and sharing. Second, the alliance must pose an A2/AD challenge to Russia by defending NATO airspace, contesting Russian naval activity in the Baltic Sea, and developing unconventional warfare capabilities. Finally, NATO must improve its military mobility through upgraded and standardized dual-use infrastructure, prepositioned stocks of armored and mechanized equipment, and the demonstrated capability to reinforce EFP during combat.
The total costs for implementing a credible deterrence-by-denial strategy are not cheap, likely in the tens of billions of dollars. These costs are prohibitive for the Baltic states to bear alone, and they are not insignificant to the alliance. However, NATO’s collective members, which represent some of the wealthiest nations in the world with a combined GDP exceeding $18 trillion, have ample means to realize their desired security ends. The question is no longer whether NATO can afford to make changes to its deterrence strategy. In the face of a resurgent Russia, not shy about changing borders by force and open about the vital threat it perceives from the West, the more appropriate question is ‘how can NATO afford not to?’
About the Author
Colonel Melton is a FAO with a concentration on Europe. He is currently Army Attaché, USDAO Baghdad, Iraq. Previous FAO assignments include Political-Military Affairs Officer and Executive Officer on the Joint Staff, J-5; U.S. Army Attaché to the Republic of Kosovo; and FAO Trainee at the U.S. Embassy to the Republic of Serbia. He maintains language proficiency in both Serbo-Croatian and Albanian.
Colonel Melton conducted three combat deployments to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Policy and Practice from The George Washington University and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the United States Military Academy.