Improving DoD’s Security Assistance Planning Process
By Colonel Robert B. Padgett, United States Army
Editor's Note: Colonel Padgett provided this shortened version of his excellent article, to meet Journal space requirements. To read the longer version, please contact www.faoa.org.
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) articulates a strategic approach that strengthens alliances by maintaining favorable regional balances of power, defending allies from military aggression, bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense. The NDS states that accomplishing this requires deepening interoperability with allies and accelerating their modernization and ability to integrate with U.S. forces. Congress annually appropriates a significant amount of funds for security assistance (SA) to enable DoD to achieve these objectives. In recent years, Congress also changed the framework for legal authorities related to SA. As a result of the increase in appropriated funds and changed legal authorities, DoD has updated its processes for planning SA.
However, from a practitioner’s standpoint – U.S. military officers stationed in embassies overseas who are responsible for coordinating and implementing SA with host nation militaries – DoD should improve the process by ensuring that the military services more effectively and routinely participate in the SA planning process and provide required expert advice early in the planning stage. As the system stands now, the organizations with the relevant expertise – on appropriate capability solutions and their availability, production, purchase, and delivery timelines, integration requirements, and costs – are not interjecting at the right time to provide advice on recipient nations’ capability requirements and appropriate solutions.
This study assesses the efficacy of how DoD plans the execution of SA funds and finds that DoD needs to fix significant shortcomings in the process. Relevant service headquarters must ensure that the appropriate subordinate organizations with the required expertise participate and provide their advice at the most crucial point in the system. The current approach results in stakeholders not having the information needed to plan impactful, tailored, appropriate SA packages for key allies and partners. This paper uses the Baltic region as a case study to examine existing processes for planning SA due to the importance of the region to NATO and the U.S. in deterring and defending against adversary aggression. Though the processes for planning SA vary to a minor extent across the geographic combatant commands, the role the military services play in the overall process is relatively the same. This paper focuses on security assistance defined as congressionally appropriated funding authorized under Title 10 and Title 22 US Code (USC) that provides or allows partner nations to purchase, equipment and training to build capabilities.
Role of Congress
Congress has significant power. Congress determines who receives authorization to spend funds, e.g., DoD or Department of State (DoS), what types of funds (e.g., Section 333 Title 10 USC Building Partner Capacity [BPC] or Title 22 USC Foreign Military Financing [FMF]), and which partner nations can receive assistance, how much, how long, and for what purpose. DoD and DoS are required to notify Congress of spending plans. Title 10 SC falls under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate armed services committees while Title 22 SC is under the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs committees. Funding for Title 10 programs is provided through annual appropriations bills, which originate in the House and Senate appropriations defense subcommittees.
The congressional committees have the power to determine whether the expressed purposes of spending plans meet the purposes authorized in Title 10 legislation, as well as identifying which nations are authorized recipients, how much funding each nation will receive, and for how long. Congress can decide whether providing SA to a particular nation meets U.S. policy objectives and can use SA as a lever to achieve policy objectives by deciding that a nation should not receive SA, or by limiting its uses.
This paper focuses on BPC and FMF funding because those types of funding represent the largest portion of SA funds. Congress also has discretion to reform the legal authorizations for SA. For example, the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act consolidated and codified existing Title 10 SA authorities into 10 USC Sections 301-386. Other key reforms from the 2017 NDAA included a consolidated DoD budget request for Title 10 SA programs (the first was released in FY2019); harmonized congressional notification requirements for most DoD train and equip programs (Section 333); institutional capacity building programs; and required assessment, monitoring, and evaluation programs tied to SA plans.
DoD’s Role
DoD’s 2018 NDS outlines its objectives as “maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere” and “defending allies from military aggression, bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense.” The NDS emphasizes that our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces and provide access to critical regions and that each ally and partner is unique. Combined forces able to act together coherently and effectively to achieve military objectives requires interoperability. DoD will prioritize requests for U.S. military equipment sales, accelerating foreign partner modernization and ability to integrate with U.S. forces. Fortifying the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance is vital to our security.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)’s Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) plays a lead role in DoD’s SA planning process, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) leading oversight of the execution of DoD SA funds. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Global Partnerships is responsible for prioritizing global BPC security cooperation programs and planning overall budget requests for each program, in coordination with regionally focused DASDs and based on proposals submitted by each combat command. Those prioritized proposals constitute DoD’s annual budget request for SA and receive funding based on Congress’ actual appropriation for SA.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Role
DSCA is the DoD agency responsible for oversight and management of the execution of SA programs. DSCA manages the International Security Cooperation Program (ISCP) account used for congressionally appropriated Title 10 SA funds. DSCA allocates funding to the military services to execute purchases of training and equipment for BPC programs. Each military service has its own SA focused command, or implementing agency (IA), that is responsible for executing BPC cases: the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC); the Navy International Program Office (NIPO); the Air Force Security Assistance Command (AFSAC); and other DoD agencies specifically authorized as IAs. However, DSCA does not have the authority to direct the military services at the department level to assist with planning SA programs. In fact, DSCA states that security cooperation offices (SCO) work through combat commands to nominate BPC proposals to OSD for approval and that DSCA provides program management and execution through the IAs.
Furthermore, DSCA’s Security Assistance Management Manual largely focuses on the role of the lower-level service IAs in case management and does not address the role that civilian leaders and staffs in the services should play in assisting combat commands and SCOs with SA planning. Although each military service has an assistant secretary that oversees SA programs, they primarily focus on managing policy requests related to technology transfers and not planning SA.
The military service’s lower-level IAs act mainly as case managers and are not capability experts. The service IAs rely on other program offices within the services to provide expertise on what capabilities are available, what they cost, what requirements are valid, incomplete, or unavailable for purchase through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, and on what timeline it is feasible to procure and deliver equipment and training. However, the service IAs are not subordinate commands to the IAs. For example, the U.S. Army’s Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), Tank- Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), and Joint Munitions Command (JMC) are subordinate commands of the U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) – the same higher command HQs as USASAC, the Army’s IA. USASAC, commanded by a one-star general, does not have authority over these other expertise-focused commands, commanded primarily by two-star generals. The breadth of their collective higher command’s (AMC) responsibility, such as equipping the entire U.S. Army, precludes sufficient focus on overseeing the extent to which they are advising and assisting combat commands and SCOs with planning SA programs for partner nations.
Combat Command and Services’ Roles
The combatant commands, particularly through their SCOs resident in partner and allied nations, can influence what capabilities partner nations desire to develop using U.S.-provided SA. Command and service component command key leader engagements with host nation civilian and military leaders can assist with influencing host nation preferences and prioritization of specific capabilities to complement U.S. regional priorities. SCO engagement with host nation militaries can assist with understanding what specific host nation capability gaps exist and sharing that information with combatant command and service component command planners. Where desire and capacity exist, capability proponents from those commands’ staffs can coordinate through the SCOs to visit host nation militaries and conduct in-depth site visits and assessments to develop BPC program proposals.
However, as identified earlier, real capability expertise lies within the military services. Yet, the military services largely do not participate in DoD’s SA planning process. The organizations that are several levels down in the military services do participate, but not in planning, only in the later stages of execution. When the services do participate, they do so only on specific issues such as technology release approvals and other industry-specific areas later in the execution phase, not in the SA planning process. For example, the website for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA-DE&C) states that it leads the U.S. Army Security Assistance Enterprise and emphasizes a focus on “processing the necessary policy approvals to ensure compliance with policy guidance to protect U.S. technologies from being transferred to unauthorized parties.” While it further states that staff “seek U.S. Army and other sourcing solutions to meet combatant command-validated operational requirements and partner nations’ delivery timelines,” the author’s experience is that it largely focuses on technology transfer approvals and high-dollar value FMS purchases rather than SA planning. The Offices of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF-IA) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for International Programs (DASN-IP) primarily perform similar roles. SA planning for allies and partners is largely left to the combatant commands and SCOs, which often do not have the required capability expertise.
Department of State’s Role
The Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for Political-Military (PM) Affairs leads DoS policy direction for SA and is the principal link to DoD. PM’s Office of Security Assistance “manages DoS Title 22 military grant assistance (~$6.5 billion annually) to allies and partners through policy development, budget formulation, and program oversight” and “manages concurrence on DoD Title 10 authorities, including joint planning and development of Section 333.”
This means that for DoS Title 22 SA funding (FMF), DoS focuses on policy, budget, and oversight. DoS does not plan specific capabilities to be provided, though it exercises oversight through direct discussion with in-country SCOs on Title 22 spend plans. Instead, DoD executes Title 22 SA funding on behalf of DoS through DSCA’s oversight. As outlined previously, DSCA does not provide capability expertise for planning Title 22 programs, and unlike for BPC programs, combatant commands play a limited role in FMF planning. SCOs perform the majority of FMF planning, despite lacking the required expertise on capability solutions. The military services also do not play a role in assisting planning; the IAs are only involved much later in the case execution process when partner nations submit detailed Letters of Request to DSCA through the SCO using FMF. The expertise that resides in the military services’ program offices is only available to the extent those organizations respond to SCOs and agree to answer specific capability questions; more generally, that expertise is not available to plan overall FMF programs.
Regarding DoD’s Title 10 programs, DoS does play a role, but one largely limited to DoS concurrence with an entire annual slate of DoD Title 10 BPC proposals – for example, whether the identified country recipients and program objectives align with U.S. national security policy objectives. DoS is largely not involved with the specifics of what capabilities are planned and whether those plans have been informed by capability experts in the military services. Lastly, like the combatant commands, DoS produces regional and country specific strategies. These documents provide overall policy objectives and capture areas of cooperation with partners and allies. However, country teams write the country strategies, SCOs often draft the SA goals to reflect ongoing and planned future SA programs.
The Security Assistance Planning Process
This paper will now describe the existing process for planning BPC funded programs. Congress appropriates BPC authorized funds based on DoD’s annual budget request, though often at a different level than DoD requests. DSCA manages those funds via its ISCP fund. The combatant commands, in advance of the budget request and congressional authorization, each develop prioritized BPC proposals for their region containing program descriptions and Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) costs. USD-P and its subordinate DASDs review the combined combatant command lists and develop a globally prioritized list. Based on Congress’ actual annual appropriation of funds, USD-P implements a cut line for the globally prioritized list and DSCA funds the programs above the cut line. Since combatant commands plan BPC proposals as five-year programs and Congress appropriates annually, DoD, DSCA, and the combatant commands often must alter planned funding per year for specific programs or they may alter the years in which various programs are funded, thus spreading them across future years to maintain individual program viability. For some BPC programs, one combatant command solution involved use of on/off years where a program received funding one year but skipped the following year so that funds were spread across a wider range of proposed programs, resulting in frustrated host nation expectations and delayed total capability delivery.
Combatant commands develop campaign plans for their regions and Country Cooperation Plans for each country in their region and assign responsibility for different capability domains to various proponents. Those proponents are either the relevant service component command or a staff directorate from the combatant command. Typically, that responsibility encompasses all efforts, including exercises, military-to-military engagements, and security cooperation programs, for their specific capability domain in the country cooperation plan. SCOs play a vital role in ensuring that the Country Cooperation Plan for their partner nation encompasses all ongoing and future planned SA programs.
However, prior to 2018, SCOs developed all SA proposals for their partner nation and submitted them to DSCA for feasibility reviews by the IAs, often resulting in lengthy turnarounds when proposed capability solutions were unavailable, ROM estimates were wildly off, or proposals lacked required components of a capability solution. Often, SCOs depended on the partner nation to develop lists of equipment, with none of the required expertise in U.S. systems solutions. Since 2017, BPC programs have seen vast increases in scale, scope, and complexity. Previously, SCOs managed one or two BPC programs. Now, in key regions, SCOs often manage multiple BPC programs in addition to large increases in Title 22 funded programs, FMS purchases, humanitarian assistance programs, large scale exercises, agreements, and military-to-military engagements. Nevertheless, SCOs have seen little change in staffing size to manage these programs. In each Baltic nation, SCO staffing remains tied to the size and amount of FMS sales with three military officers and three local civilians. Yet, in each Baltic nation, SA increased from one BPC program worth ~$30M and ~$25M in Title 22 funds from 2015-2017 to fifteen BPC programs worth ~$200M and ~$140M in Title 22 funds from 2018-2022.
With the changes to security cooperation legislation in 2017, particularly the combination of multiple BPC authorities into Section 333 and the initiation of multi-year planning for and prioritization of BPC programs across combatant commands, service component commands and combatant command staff became the combatant command’s desired proponents for identifying important capability gaps in the Baltics and planning related BPC programs in coordination with SCOs. However, the SA planning process did not change to ensure that the military services provide timely capability expertise to inform the development of executable, appropriate SA proposals.
Case Study: Baltic Region
This study uses the Baltic region to demonstrate why DoD should task the military services to assist with planning SA programs. Seven BPC programs for each Baltic nation were programmed over a five-year period: integrated air and missile defense; land forces command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) (later on long-range fires); maritime domain awareness; airfield development; resistance; countering weapons of mass destruction; and military medicine. Often, identified capability areas depended on staff proponents’ interest level, capacity, and ability to perform planning functions. In the Baltics, several proponents did include service or DoD agency expertise in planning the BPC programs through voluntary agreement.
The combatant command’s staff proponent for missile defense proposed an integrated air and missile defense BPC program and sought agreement through a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Army’s lead organization for that domain, Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space, to plan the program. PEO Missiles and Space traveled to the region, met with SCOs and partner nation militaries, and determined host nation existent capability, remaining gaps, relevant U.S. equipment and training solutions, timelines for availability and implementation, and ROM costs over five years. Similarly, the combatant command’s staff proponent for countering weapons of mass destruction gained agreement by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to plan the countering weapons of mass destruction BPC program. The navy service component command gained the agreement of a CONUS-based U.S. Navy program office with the requisite capability expertise to plan the maritime domain awareness BPC program. The Air Force component command used internal expertise to plan the airfield development BPC program. The Special Operations component command led planning for the resistance BPC program. And the military medicine BPC program resulted solely from the efforts of a dedicated civilian within the Army component command’s surgeon general office responsible for medical-related military- to-military engagements in region. This individual planned the BPC program, engaged with SCOs and host nation military medical staff and units, and reached back to CONUS-based Army medical acquisition offices for planning assistance.
In comparison, the last program, land forces C4I (later on long-range fires-potentially the most significant program), resulted solely from SCO engagement with the host nation military and identification of a critical capability gap crucial to allied interoperability and host nation data resilience. The SCO requested assistance from the CONUS-based Army command responsible for C4I capability development and acquisition for the U.S. Army to help plan the BPC program, without success. After several years of the SCO planning and implementing the program without the benefit of capability expertise, it became clear that SCOs could capably identify general gaps and work with host nations to determine the broad outlines of a desired solution, but only the relevant military service command for developing and acquiring C4I solutions could provide relevant detailed equipment lists, often hundreds of items long, and appropriate complex training, software, and integration solutions.
Without that needed expertise, SCOs instead submitted host nation desired lists of equipment, which the host nation often developed through research into potential U.S. capabilities, uninformed by real cost estimates, availability, contracting and delivery timelines, transportation options, communications security (COMSEC) and interoperability requirements, software licensing solutions, and other vital information. SCOs then submitted the C4I equipment list to DSCA for review by the relevant service IA and program office or command to determine feasibility – whether the equipment could be purchased as an existing program of record, its availability and on what timeline, the real expected cost, whether the list of equipment constituted a complete capability package, or what alternative options needed to be considered due to unavailability, long lead times, or vastly differing real costs.
The SCO then provided this information back to the host nation for decision. This process often occurred over multiple iterations before a viable list of equipment, training, and services could be concluded. The process took months and often conflicted with the two-year availability of BPC funding, either resulting in postponement or rushed last minute coordination, to great host nation military frustration. Further, this long process occurred after congressional appropriation of funds, often late in the cycle, with the funding level uninformed by actual requirements due to the lack of involvement by the military service capability experts.
Due to these problems, primarily driven by lack of service engagement with relevant capability expertise in the earlier stages of planning prior to appropriation, and with the emergence of regional host nation interest in developing a new capability for their militaries – long-range fires – the SCO proposed that the combatant command transition the C4I BPC program to a new program that would complement the host nation’s desired acquisition of a long-range fires capability. This time, SCOs in the region requested that the combatant command task the army service component command to lead planning for the new regional long-range fires BPC program. The army service component command turned down the combatant command request. Fortunately, the SCO was already working with the CONUS-based U.S. Army command for long-range fires on a host nation Letter of Request to purchase a long-range fires capability using host nation funds (FMS). As a result of this process, the SCO linked that CONUS-based U.S. Army command up with combatant command planners and transitioned the program to combatant command staff proponent lead, with continued SCO assistance through liaison with host nation military experts.
However, this was entirely the result of a planned host nation purchase and SCO recommendation to plan SA funds to augment and complement the purchase. If the host nation had not submitted a Letter of Request to purchase the capability, the SCO would have been unable to get expert planning capability assistance from the CONUS-based U.S. Army command to plan a BPC program solely funded by SA appropriations. This process played out for just one of many programs, each with their own time demands and immense complexities.
Implications
The comparison between the various BPC programs and related planning processes and implementation could not have been starker. Those BPC programs benefiting from a lead proponent with the relevant capability expertise, whether through voluntary agreement or official request between the service component command or combatant command staff proponent and a related CONUS-based service command or other DoD executive agency, were successfully planned based on available capabilities, relevant ROM cost planning, and an understanding of available timelines for production, procurement, and delivery to host nations. In addition, they benefitted from engagement with the host nation military to understand existing capability, remaining gaps, and integration and interoperability requirements. Few if any delays in execution or postponement of programs resulted from this type of detailed planning coordination, led by a capable service office with the required expertise.
The host nation benefited from in-country assessments of existent capabilities and remaining gaps by the service command experts and an understanding of what capabilities could be funded, when they would be funded, and when to expect deliveries. This greatly enabled host nation planning for what complementary capabilities the host nation needed to plan to procure itself, when they needed to plan those procurements, how the programs fit into their own host nation Ministry of Defense multi-year defense acquisition planning, what infrastructure requirements the host nation needed to develop, and when to plan personnel to receive either in-country or out-of-country training to be ready to operate the planned capability.
On the other hand, programs based primarily on SCO and host nation military determination of gaps and solutions, without the benefit of U.S. service specific capability expertise, due to lack of funding, lack of capacity, or simply due to lower prioritization or higher command directive, experienced sub-optimal results. When reviewed for executability on the back end of the planning process, when appropriated funds needed to be expended, cost estimates were widely inaccurate, capabilities were not available on the desired timeline or not available at all, and suitable alternatives were relayed late in the process. Host nations became frustrated by the lack of clarity of what would be provided, when, the quantity of major end-items that could be purchased, supporting equipment, spare parts, maintenance and training requirements, and how it would all fit into existing host nation acquisition plans, parts of which were already in progress. Often, late in the process, entire lists of equipment were cancelled due to host nation plans to acquire the capability more quickly or were moved to a later year due to cost estimate ROMs that exceeded appropriations, several times by double or more.
Furthermore, the lack of a lead proponent with required C4I expertise led to a key oversight. The BPC programs for maritime domain awareness, integrated air and missile defense, and land forces C4I each included key C4I components that required integration with the others to avoid duplication, ensure interoperability, and maximize efficiency. Late in the BPC programs, the combatant command staff proponent for C4I recognized the problem and created a regional C4I board to coordinate cross-program requirements, ensure regional interoperability, and to work with the lead proponents for each of those BPC programs to plan and integrate their multiple C4I-related components.
The inefficiencies in the bureaucratic system for planning SA are due to the primary purpose of the FMS system, supporting partner nations using their own funds to purchase U.S. equipment. A partner nation submits a Letter of Request to purchase a known piece of equipment and the system delivers an offer for the host nation to purchase that capability, with timelines and costs laid out in the offer. Often, nations that mainly purchase capabilities using their own funds (FMS) have sufficient expertise to assess capability gaps and determine solutions to purchase. Nations that receive SA often lack detailed knowledge of U.S. offered capability solutions and interoperability requirements, and need U.S. provided capability advice. Planning SA for these partners requires an alternate design, one that includes expertise early in the process prior to executive branch budget submission and congressional appropriation of funds. This requires system restructuring so that, in accordance with the NDS, SA planning incorporates coordination between service commands with the capability expertise, the recipient partner nations, the combatant command designated BPC program proponent, and SCOs.
Recommendations
There are different programmatic levers available in the SA planning process. Congress has legal and resource tools. DoD has resource and policy tools. DSCA has oversight of funds execution. Combatant commands prioritize countries and critical capability gaps in their region. However, the organizations with levers most closely proximate to the problem are the military services. They own the design components that put policy into action – the capability expertise required to inform planning SA programs. That is where the greatest shortcomings in the SA planning process are located – the need to connect those experts to the process during the planning, rather than only the execution, stage.
DSCA lacks the authority to ensure that the organizations within the military services that have capability expertise provide that expertise during the SA planning process. The result is SA programs that are not fully informed by capability availability, cost, interoperability requirements, delivery timelines, and appropriateness. SCOs, in coordination with partner nations, attempt to recommend solutions through the combatant command, without capability expertise. Combatant commands and service component commands are generally not staffed with the requisite capability expertise, which resides in the services.
SCOs attempt to work with the organizations in the military services that have the capability expertise, but there are a vast number of those organizations; their agreement to assist, when made, is voluntary and unfunded; and SCOs are not staffed with the required expertise. Occasionally, service component commands or combatant command staff directorates work to develop agreements with those organizations in the military services to provide expertise in the SA planning process, but whether that happens is fully dependent on service component command or command staff proponent initiative, and whether the military service’s relevant command agrees. It is not a designed feature of the SA planning process.
The NDS priority of advancing allies’ development of interoperable military capabilities and its focus on the use of SA to accomplish these goals demands better results. Allied and partner militaries expect that U.S. capability experts will provide their expertise in planning SA. Combatant commands and SCOs, though able to identify and prioritize general capability gaps, lack the relevant expertise to plan detailed SA programs and assess partner nation interoperability requirements. Similarly, service component commands have competing higher priorities – serving as warfighting theater-level component headquarters, designing and executing large-scale in-region exercises, providing forces for regional deterrence and defense activities, and a host of other responsibilities. The military services are the appropriate providers of much needed expertise. Yet, they largely have not focused requisite efforts on providing the necessary oversight and direction to ensure the planning of appropriate, detailed, tailored, and executable SA programs.
I recommend a more effective system where SCOs, working with partner nations, recommend general areas of SA capability requirements by country to combatant commands, which submit regional prioritized lists to DSCA. OSD collects those general requirements and prioritizes them globally. OSD, via DSCA, would then task the military services to identify the appropriate organizations with the required capability expertise for each BPC program. The military services would then task those subordinate organizations to formally work with the SCO, partner nation, combatant command, and service component command or combatant command staff directorate to refine requirements by visiting the host nation, identifying an appropriate capability solution with equipment and training requirement lists, and developing a ROM cost phased over a multi-year timeline, depending on capability availability and specific partner nation requirements. It is vital that OSD engage the military services’ civilian offices in this effort. Without a written directive or memorandum adjusting the process, it is unlikely the services will respond to a DSCA request to improve the process. Similarly, service IAs also lack directive authority or seniority to ensure service command expertise is provided by what is essentially co-equal capability focused commands.
The combatant command would then use the results of those planning efforts, informed by capability availability and rough timeline and cost estimates, to submit a more complete list of requirements, informed by the military service capability experts, to DSCA and OSD. OSD would then review and adjust prioritization and determine appropriate funding levels for each approved BPC program. Finally, given the actual annual congressional appropriation, those plans would then move to DSCA for funding allocation and to the service IAs for case development, refinement, and execution.
DSCA and the military services’ senior civilian offices, now involved in the process with the motivation and needed programmatic understanding, would continue providing oversight of BPC case execution.
The military services’ senior civilian offices nominally responsible for SA would require sufficient staffing and need to implement organizational change to oversee this process. The military services’ commands for capability expertise would require staff to meet this new, formal requirement and need for regular reporting to the military services’ senior civilian offices. They would likely require expanded capability expertise manning to travel to partner nations, conduct site visits and assessments, engage with host nation militaries, and coordinate with SCOs, combatant commands, and capability proponent leads in the service component commands or combatant command staff directorates. Service component commands would face similar challenges. Generally, they are not manned with the required programmatic expertise to provide focused BPC planning advice on actual capabilities and are similarly reliant on CONUS-based service commands. They also have much broader theater responsibilities. Lastly, DSCA would need to update its Security Assistance Management Manual to codify these amended processes, authorities, and responsibilities.
Service commands with the relevant expertise are often unable to provide planning assistance due to lack of funding. With FMS, those organizations can use funds (a flat percentage FMS administrative fee) to conduct relevant site visits and planning coordination. However, this often does not apply to U.S. government funded SA programs (Title 10 BPC and Title 22 FMF). A solution to this problem could be through specific congressional funding for such activities or through legislative changes to permit the use of FMS administrative fees for planning Title 10 and Title 22 programs.
Another area of improvement could be resolving the difference between DOS Title 22 FMF, which use ten-year funds, and DOD Title 10 BPC programs, which use two-year funds. A congressional solution to change BPC funding to five years before expiration could markedly improve the system. Due to the ten-year period to use FMF funds, there is much more time available to conduct planning and adjust programs before funds expire. Two-year BPC funds allow little time to adjust.
Fortunately, the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the vital importance of SA and a renewed focus on SA processes has emerged. DoD formed a new joint command to coordinate arming and training Ukraine, highlighting a need for high-level focus on SA that had been lacking. At an Army SA-focused forum in December 2022, a key-note speaker advised that to maintain the strategic advantage, the enterprise should streamline processes to be more responsive, prioritize security assistance cases with the greatest impact and most important capabilities, and proactively collaborate. The most impactful change needed is at the military service headquarters and their senior service civilian offices. Greater involvement in providing oversight of SA planning at the service level, and active direction to provide needed expertise in the early planning stages, would more likely result in the required improvements to successfully meet the demands of the NDS.
About the Author
Colonel Robert Padgett is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer currently serving as Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché in Uzbekistan. His FAO assignments include Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Tallinn, Estonia; the Joint Staff J5 Europe/NATO/Russia; and Assistant Army Attache, U.S. Embassy Chisinau, Moldova. His education includes a Master's in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College; a Master's in Economic and Social History and a Master's in Comparative Social Policy from the University of Oxford, England; a Bachelor's in Economics from the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY; and an Associate's in Russian from the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, CA. His service as an infantry officer includes Vicenza, Italy; Fort Benning, GA; and Fort Drum, NY; and deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. He is fully joint qualified.