How International Relations Theory Explains The Tenuous Peace In The Arctic Following Russia’s 2022 Invasion Of Ukraine
By: Jeffrey Weinshenker
Editor’s Note: Mr. Weinshenker’s thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Eisenhower School, National Defense University. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of State, the National Defense University, or the U.S. Government.
The Arctic – a vast, remote, and desolate region constituting approximately four percent of the Earth’s surface – is increasingly in the international spotlight. The world’s superpowers have viewed the Arctic as a contested space for decades, but Russia’s recent aggression in Ukraine has escalated tensions surrounding the “High North.” This paper will examine the impact of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Arctic security and its implications for U.S. national security. I will argue that the intricacies of international relations theory explain the rising friction between Russia and the West and also the tenuous peace that prevails in the Arctic region. New and swift geopolitical currents encircle this region with far-reaching security implications. All the same, realism and balance of power dynamics offset liberal institutional failures and constructivist frictions and keep the risk of military conflict below the surface – at least, for now.
The Arctic – An Increasingly Contested and Militarized Domain
The Arctic is the northernmost region on Earth, most often defined as the area north of the Arctic Circle (66°33′ North latitude). Eight countries possess territory in the Arctic Circle: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States. Russia maintains an outsized presence: the country claims 45% of Arctic territory and roughly half of the approximately four million people who live in the Arctic.
In recent decades, most global attention on the Arctic has centered around environmental changes and the effects of a shrinking polar ice cap. However, the region has also played a key role in geopolitics since the last century, including as a theater of operations during World War II and a focus point of military activity during the Cold War. The Arctic’s proximity to both the United States and the Soviet Union made it vital to submarine operations, military basing, and nuclear (and long-range missile) posture and deterrence. The end of the Cold War brought a reduction in geopolitical tensions, and “the spirit of the Norwegian concept ‘High North, Low Tension’ prevailed.”[1] The Arctic Council, founded in 1996, created a safe space for the eight Arctic states – along with indigenous leaders – to collaborate on scientific research, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development.
Recent years have witnessed cracks in this prolonged period of peace. Russia, which has long maintained extensive capabilities on and around the Kola Peninsula, has placed increased emphasis[2] on the Arctic both to “restor[e] its lost military presence”[3] and to secure vital economic interests, including vast natural resources and strategic northern shipping lanes. Since the early 2000s, Russian military spending increased overall, including expenditures in the Arctic zone.[4] Between 2014 and 2019, Russia constructed nearly 500 military facilities in the Arctic[5], and the country has developed new missile capabilities. Russia’s 2022 naval doctrine raised the Arctic region to the highest priority, and the Kremlin has pledged to protect these waters “by all means.”[6]
This recent buildup – along with the escalating effects of climate change and potential for economic and energy competition in the Arctic– has caught the attention of U.S. policymakers. In 2022, the Biden Administration released a new National Strategy for the Arctic that “acknowledges increasing strategic competition,”[7] and in July 2024, the Pentagon issued a corresponding Arctic Strategy that lays out plans to increase domain awareness and collaboration with Allies to address growing threats. In spite of the hardening rhetoric, U.S.-Russia relations in the High North remained productive through the Arctic Council, and Presidents Obama and Biden suggested the Arctic could be “a potential arena for ‘resetting’ relations with Russia.”[8]
Ukraine invasion sends waves into Arctic waters: An international relations theoretical framework
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine had profound consequences for international relations. While the primary effects can be seen on the European continent, this event catalyzed important shifts in Arctic security as well. IR theories provide a valuable framework to assess holistically the implications of the invasion for Arctic security and, in turn, for U.S. national security.
In his foundational piece “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Stephen Walt argues, “No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy.”[9] Indeed, the only way to fully grasp the nuances of these developments is to analyze them through the lens of leading IR theories, principally realism, liberalism / institutionalism, and constructivism. I will pay greatest attention to theories that address the international system as a whole, as these are most pertinent to Arctic security, but will also assess briefly the implications of state and individual “images”[10] on these geopolitical developments.
The realist perspective
Realist theory describes the basic condition in the world as one of anarchy, in which there is no international institution or framework to enforce peace and nation states regularly come into conflict. To protect itself, each state must focus on maximizing power – whether on its own or through forging alliances. Ultimately, the balance of power and comparative strength of national interests are what dictate how nation states interact with one another.
Viewed within the realist lens, the balance of power has shifted significantly in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. First, Russia is economically and militarily more vulnerable as a result of the country’s full-scale mobilization for war in Ukraine and corresponding drain on financial and military resources. According to recent estimates, the Kremlin is spending 6% of Russia’s GDP and nearly 30% of the nation’s budget on the Ukraine war effort.[11] The Kremlin has had to divert troops, naval vessels, and advanced equipment such as tanks, artillery, and air defense systems from the Arctic region to the European front.
At the same time that Russia experiences the strains of war in Ukraine, the United States and Western Allies have increased their strategic footprint and unified posture in the Arctic, principally through NATO. “The accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO is a game-changer for the alliance’s posture in the High North and beyond,” write Matthew Van Wagenen and Arnel David. “…This pair of new Allies means that NATO is smarter and more informed about Russian capabilities and intentions. This strengthens the alliance’s presence and provides a unified front against Russian ambitions.”[12] NATO is conducting more joint exercises in the Arctic, and Norway recently inaugurated an amphibious warfare center in Sørreisa, in the north of the country, that offers amphibious training for U.S., British, and Dutch personnel.[13]
This combination of a distracted Russia and an expanded NATO presence has major ramifications for the Kremlin’s Arctic security posture. Michael Petersen and Rebecca Pincus note that “…with U.S. and NATO military activity increasing in response to Russia’s own military buildup, Russian fears of military domination there only increase… Informed by historical fears of encirclement and invasion, and distrustful of the West, Moscow believes that its Arctic interests are under threat.”[14] This commentary underscores a key point: Russia has critical national interests at stake in the Arctic. The region accounts for approximately 10% of the nation’s GDP and almost 20% of Russian exports, and is integral to Russia’s energy security, as 80% of its natural gas and 17% of its oil production comes from the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.[15] More broadly, experts estimate approximately 13% of the world’s oil reserves and 30% of its natural gas reserves can be found in the Arctic region, much of which resides in Russian territory; Russia sees these resources as increasingly at risk of contestation from other nations as polar ice melts and extractive technologies advance. Furthermore, the Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, accounts for approximately two-thirds of the Russia Navy’s nuclear strike capabilities.[16]
Understanding the strength of these national interests helps to place into context the Kremlin’s response to perceived Western aggression. Mathieu Boulègue notes that “Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance further fuels the Russian logic that the non-Russian Arctic has become ‘NATO territory’. This ends up creating a ‘NATO 7 vs. Russia’ approach, which tends to securitize Arctic affairs and shape discussions increasingly in military terms.”[17] In the face of these perceived threats, the Kremlin has ramped up military exercises in the Arctic, and Russian submarine activity appears to be on the rise.[18] The United States and other Allies have sounded alarms over increased hybrid tactics by Russia, such as the alleged sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines and undersea cables, GPS jamming in the Baltic region affecting airlines, and instigation of a migration crisis on the border with Finland.[19] Furthermore, Russian officials have amped up anti-Western rhetoric, warning NATO of “catastrophic consequences”[20] if the alliance boosts its involvement in the Arctic and in Ukraine, and have engaged in provocative posturing such as an extravagant military-style parade on the island of Svalbard to mark the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany.[21]
In large part to counter its geopolitical isolation and vulnerability following the Ukraine invasion, the Kremlin has also sought to deepen its partnership with the People’s Republic of China. Russian and Chinese warships have conducted joint naval patrols in the region as well as joint exercises near Alaska in 2022 and 2023, and earlier this year the Russian Coast Guard signed an Arctic cooperation agreement with the Chinese Coast Guard. This heightened military collaboration mirrors a growing economic partnership between Moscow and Beijing, as China increases investments in Russian energy exploration and trade activity along the Northern Sea Route.
And yet, while some experts and Western officials characterize these Kremlin responses as signs of heightened aggression, others including Petersen and Pincus argue they are more defensive in nature, “designed to protect critical economic and security infrastructure from attack by the United States.”[22] In fact, it can be difficult to separate fact from hype when it comes to perceived escalation in the Arctic. Various analysts have highlighted signs of restraint on the part of the Russian military – and Western forces – in the wake of the Ukraine invasion. Norway’s Chief of Defense has stated repeatedly that there have been no indications of unusual or threatening activity by the Russian armed forces. Heier notes a more cautious stance on the part of U.S. and Russian forces in and around the Kola Peninsula.[23] Hilde, Ohnishi, and Petersson argue that overall Russian military activity in the Arctic is in fact lower than normal, on account of the redeployment of assets to fight in Ukraine.[24] In short, while certain actors in the United States and Western Europe use “threat inflation”[25] to drive increased attention to and investment in Arctic security, a strong argument can be made that “there is no scramble for the Arctic.”[26]
Realist doctrine can help to disentangle these conflicting signals. Arguably, Russia and the United States find themselves in a “security dilemma,” according to which each side’s perceived provocations drive corresponding fears and tit-for-tat countermeasures, and yet – as with nuclear deterrence – the potential for severe negative consequences compels both sides to pursue risk avoidance. Simply put, neither side has an interest in a hot war. In addition, as mentioned above, Russia no longer has sufficient resources to pour into this region; likewise, the United States – in an increasingly constrained budget environment and facing more pressing threats in the Middle East and elsewhere – cannot commit to significant escalation in the Arctic. Perhaps this is why the U.S. 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies as a key goal for the Arctic merely to prevent or mitigate crises, not to exploit this region for global power projection.[27]
In the end, Boulègue points out that “Moscow’s strategic calculations regarding the Arctic have not been substantially altered by the consequences of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s regional posture reflects continuing security and military trends that have been emerging since the mid-2000s.”[28] In other words, while NATO expansion and heightened rhetoric and military posturing have increased tensions and the risk of costly miscalculations, balance of power and geopolitical realities have preserved the peace for now.
The liberal institutionalist perspective
Liberalism, or liberal institutionalism, posits that international cooperation, institutions, and interdependence can help states overcome the fundamental anarchic condition in geopolitics and mitigate conflict through diplomacy, trade, and democratic governance. In the case of Arctic cooperation, far and away the most important institution to ensure order and peace is the Arctic Council. Since the 1990s, the Council has served as “a high-level forum [that promotes] cooperation, coordination and interaction […] in particular [on the] issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”[29] Even amidst Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and growing militarization of the Arctic in the 2000s and 2010s, the eight states on the Council continued to enjoy productive relations, in part because security matters explicitly lie outside the organization’s remit and also because Arctic affairs offered a safe issue set to maintain communication and transnational collaboration between Western allies and Russia.
This exceptional cooperation ground to a sudden halt following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On March 3, 2022 – just over a week following the ruthless invasion – the seven non-Russian members of the Arctic Council decided to pause the Council’s work. At the time, Russia held the rotating chairmanship of the Council, and the remaining members were leery of continuing the Council’s work unchanged and appearing to legitimize Russia under the circumstances. While Norway, as chair since Spring 2023, has managed to resume some limited engagements, the Council’s 130 circumpolar projects—focused on everything from scientific research, to shipping, to Indigenous youth suicide—have largely faltered. To put it bluntly, “There’s no ‘Arctic Council’ without Russia.”[30] Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has led to a perceived securitization of the Council, and the Arctic writ large.
The consensus among Arctic and European security scholars is that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent suspension of the Arctic Council represent clear failures of institutionalism. Liberal norms and institutions failed to prevent international aggression and then failed to sustain dialogue on the margins (e.g. through the Council). As Hilde et al. underscore, “The most important impact in the Arctic of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was undoubtedly the decision… to pause the Council’s work…, [and] the primary Arctic victim… was cooperation in the Arctic Council, including notably scientific cooperation.”[31]
The constructionist perspective
Constructivist IR theory emphasizes the power of ideas, identities, and socially constructed norms to shape the behavior of nation states; the meanings that are assigned to phenomena assume importance above and beyond the existence of the phenomena themselves. As Esther Brimmer notes, the Arctic is not only “geographical” but also “conceptual.”[32] The Arctic has long held a coveted place in the Russian national psyche. Nearly one-fifth of Russia’s land mass is situated in the Arctic, and the country’s thousand-year presence in the region offers rich fodder for national folklore and historical memory. Meanwhile, international conceptions of the Arctic among nation states (both Arctic and near-Arctic) are evolving – from that of a “global commons” and “zone of peace” to a contested space for energy exploration, commercial trade routes, and power projection.
These ideas about the Arctic – along with Russia’s newfound identity as a revisionist challenger to the Western order – directly shape the impact of the Ukraine invasion on the Arctic. Arguably, the very idea that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a role to play in the Arctic is significant and feeds into the growing securitization of the region. In the end, the concept of the Arctic as a new domain for great power competition, if unchecked, could well become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
States and Individuals
One cannot conclude an IR theoretical analysis of Arctic security without a brief examination of the state and individual “images.” On the European continent as in the Arctic, the nature of each nation state shapes the course of interactions between them. The Biden Administration has framed the current moment in geopolitics as a battle between democracies and autocracies, and indeed this characteristic of governance has played an essential role in the rising conflicts between Russia and the West. Russia’s autocracy has shown it can and will act decisively and without respect for human rights or international sovereignty. A byproduct of the lack of democratic checks and balances is the tendency for autocracies to make more mistakes. This mix of brash action and heightened risk of strategic error has not only aggravated conditions in Ukraine, but also increased tensions and the potential for unwanted armed encounters between Russia and Western Allies in the Arctic.
Ultimately, the Kremlin autocracy centers around one uniquely powerful individual: Vladimir Putin. Putin is a lifelong street-fighter and political shape-shifter, driven by ambition, who is always prepared “to throw the first punch”[33] and to use deception, confusion, and ostentatious performance to win at all costs. He is unpredictable, often leaving adversaries and allies alike guessing, and has repeatedly shown wanton disregard for conventional norms. For Putin, winning the war in Ukraine is existential. In his view, Russia is under attack from the West, and any U.S. or NATO encroachment in Ukraine – or in the Arctic – is a direct and dangerous provocation. At the same time, Putin has little margin for error. Forcing the nation to fight on multiple fronts could exacerbate an already shaky economic and political situation at home and threaten his rule. As Heier argues, “The West does not want to provoke an aggressive, unpredictable, and thereby dangerous Putin, and Putin himself cannot afford an escalation of the situation in the areas close to his valuable Northern Fleet and its critical second-strike missiles.”[34] Viewed within this lens, the characteristics of the Russian autocratic state and of the individual behind that state lead to a condition of increased agitation and potential for conflict in the Arctic, however Putin’s survival imperative dictates that direct conflict in the High North is not on the table, at least for now.
Implications for U.S. National Security
Taking into account these IR theoretical frameworks, it appears likely that realism and the international balance of power will moderate the destabilizing tendencies of liberal institutional failure and constructivist redefinition of the Arctic as a zone of competition. To quote Hilde et al., “The political winds in the north are cold, but like the climate, not as cold as one could expect.”[35] The geopolitical status quo following the Ukraine invasion is one of tense stability, with the greatest casualty being routine communication and cooperation on non-security matters through the Arctic Council
What are the implications of this state of Arctic affairs for U.S. national security? First and foremost, given the decisive influence of realist considerations, balance of power will remain essential to preserving the peace and holding Russia in check. Mindful of continuing budget limitations and isolationist winds in the United States, the U.S. armed forces should continue to bolster deterrence and surveillance capabilities in the Arctic region. NATO provides the most convenient mechanism to do so, with six of the other seven Arctic states now Allies and with Scandinavian partners investing increasingly in burden sharing for joint readiness. Integrated deterrence also means closely monitoring and dissuading Russia-PRC military cooperation in the Arctic – through a mix of multilateral diplomacy, force projection, and sanctions, as needed – and addressing cyber and other hybrid vulnerabilities in undersea infrastructure.
Of course, the United States must be careful to balance readiness and deterrence against unnecessary provocations and miscommunications. One cannot overstate the paranoia that U.S. and NATO actions instill in the Kremlin at a time when the nation is mired in a costly, protracted war and when Russia’s strong economic and security interests in the Arctic appear under increasing outside threat. In the face of these risks, U.S. and NATO leaders should seek mechanisms for open and ongoing dialogue with Russian counterparts – even if not at the most senior levels – and pursue confidence-building measures such as joint search-and-rescue drills. Western Allies should also maintain smart boundaries on joint exercises such as the Norwegian restrictions on how close to the Russian border that U.S. and NATO forces can operate.
Additionally, I join the cohort of Arctic security experts who call upon the “NATO 7” to resume functions of the Arctic Council with active Russian participation. Reintegrating Russia does not imply tolerance of the Kremlin’s brutal actions in Ukraine, but rather a show of pragmatism that renews a less securitized conception of the Arctic. While the Arctic Council itself will not address security matters, liberal institutionalism could and should still serve as a moderating force. This would further the spirit of the U.S. National Security Strategy which calls for broad cooperation with any nation on shared global challenges at the same time we compete to defend our vital interests.
Hilde et al. state, “While there are few grounds for optimism in world affairs today, we would argue that the Arctic offers a glimmer of hope.”[36] If the United States, in partnership with Allies, can pursue successfully this dual strategy of deterrence and revitalization of Arctic governance, it can simultaneously build cooperation and mitigate conflict and ensure the Arctic remains a zone of shared opportunity rather than military confrontation.
Bio: Jeff Weinshenker is a career U.S. foreign service officer with 20 years’ experience spanning multiple continents. He currently directs the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Press Centers. Previous diplomatic assignments include Japan, India, Ecuador, Bulgaria, and multiple positions in Washington, D.C. From 2024-2025, Jeff attended the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy where he received a master’s degree, was recognized as a distinguished graduate (top 10%), and received the Commandant’s Award for Outstanding Research and Writing and the Foreign Area Officers Association Award for Excellence in Research and Writing. Prior to joining the State Department, Jeff worked as a speechwriter and communications advisor at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and in the public relations sector. Jeff earned a B.A. in Political Science and Government from Harvard University.
End Notes
[1] Esther Brimmer, “The Changing Geopolitics of the Arctic,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 18, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/report/changing-geopolitics-arctic-0.
[2] Nurlan Aliyev, “Russia’s Military Capabilities in the Arctic,” International Center for Defence and Security, June 25, 2019, https://icds.ee/en/russias-military-capabilities-in-the-arctic/.
[3] Michael B. Petersen and Rebecca Pincus, “Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory,” Orbis 65, no. 3 (2021): 490–512.
[4] Petersen and Pincus, “Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory.”
[5] Liselotte Odgaard, “NATO Is Unprepared for Russia’s Arctic Threats,” Foreign Policy (blog), April 1, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/01/nato-russia-arctic-steadfast-defender-2024/.
[6] Heather Mongilio, “Russia’s Arctic Rise,” USNI News (blog), October 29, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/10/29/russias-arctic-rise.
[7] The White House. 2022 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 2022), 3.
[8] Paal Sigurd Hilde, Fujio Ohnishi, and Magnus Petersson, “Cold Winds in the North: Three Perspectives on the Impact of Russia’s War in Ukraine on Security and International Relations in the Arctic,” Polar Science, Special Issue on “The Seventh International Symposium on Arctic Research (ISAR-7),” 41 (September 1, 2024): 101050, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polar.2024.101050.
[9] Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (Spring 1998): 30.
[10] Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
[11] Alexandra Prokopenko, “Putin’s Unsustainable Spending Spree,” Foreign Affairs, January 8, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-unsustainable-spending-spree.
[12] Matthew Van Wagenen and Arnel P. David, “NATO’s Northern Flank: Countering Russia & China Expansion in the Arctic,” RealClear Defense, October 10, 2024, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/10/10/natos_northern_flank_countering_russia_and_china_expansion_in_the_arctic_1064137.html.
[13] “NATO Opens Amphibious Warfare Hub in Arctic amid Turf Wars with Russia,” Newsweek, November 30, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/nato-opens-amphibious-warfare-hub-arctic-amid-turf-wars-russia-1993674.
[14] Petersen and Pincus, “Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory.”
[15] Angela Borozna, “Russia’s Security Perceptions and Arctic Governance,” Politics and Governance 12 (2024): article 7313, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7313.
[16] Petersen and Pincus, “Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory.”
[17] Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine,” The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, October 31, 2024, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-military-posture-context-war-against-ukraine/.
[18] Mongilio, “Russia’s Arctic Rise.”
[19] Colin Wall and Njord Wegge, “The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War,” CSIS, January 25, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war.
[20] Billal Rahman, “Russia Threatens NATO with ‘Catastrophic Consequences’ over Arctic Activity,” Newsweek, October 7, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-threat-nato-ukraine-war-latest-1964749.
[21] Andreas Østhagen, Otto Svendsen, and Max Bergmann, “Arctic Geopolitics: The Svalbard Archipelago,” CSIS, September 14, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/arctic-geopolitics-svalbard-archipelago.
[22] Petersen and Pincus, “Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory.”
[23] Erlend Heier, “Exploring Nine Years of US-Russian Rivalry: Has Russia’s 2022-War Made the High North Less Stable?,” The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, February 13, 2024, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/exploring-nine-years-us-russian-rivalry-russias-2022-war-made-high-north-less-stable/.
[24] Hilde, Ohnishi, and Petersson, “Cold Winds in the North.”
[25] Robert D. English, “Why an Arctic Arms Race Would Be a Mistake,” Arctic Today, June 18, 2020, https://www.arctictoday.com/why-an-arctic-arms-race-would-be-a-mistake/.
[26] Thomas Graham and Amy Myers Jaffe, “There Is No Scramble for the Arctic,” Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2020-07-27/there-no-scramble-arctic.
[27] Heier, “Exploring Nine Years of US-Russian Rivalry.”
[28] Boulègue, “Russia’s Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine.”
[29] Global Affairs Canada, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996),” Global Affairs Canada, April 12, 2017, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/declaration_ac-declaration_ca.aspx?lang=eng.
[30] Brett Simpson, “The Rise and Sudden Fall of the Arctic Council,” Foreign Policy (blog), May 31, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/31/arctic-council-russia-norway/.
[31] Hilde, Ohnishi, and Petersson, “Cold Winds in the North.”
[32] Brimmer, “The Changing Geopolitics of the Arctic.”
[33] “Vladimir Putin: From Russia’s KGB to a Long Presidency Defined by War in Ukraine,” BBC News, September 24, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15047823.
[34] Heier, “Exploring Nine Years of US-Russian Rivalry.”
[35] Hilde, Ohnishi, and Petersson, “Cold Winds in the North.”
[36] Hilde, Ohnishi, and Petersson.