How Can USAFRICOM Support its West-African Partners to Enhance the Maritime Security in that Region?

By Lieutenant Choilio Sanogo, Republican Forces of Cote d'Ivoire

Editor's Note:  Lieutenant Sanogo's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Naval Staff College.  The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Introduction 

         According to the International Maritime Bureau, the number of crew kidnapped in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) increased by more than 50 percent in 2019. With 121 cases in 2019, the GoG region represents 92 percent of hostage-taking cases reported at sea worldwide. This insecurity in the region raises insurance rates and shipping costs, which lead to an increase in the cost of living for the local population. Also, maritime insecurity has several repercussions on regional socio-economic stability, human security, and the maritime environment in the GoG. Since its creation in 2007, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has supported GoG nations’ efforts to secure their maritime domain through different programs such as the African Partnership Station (APS). These efforts have enabled the establishment of a regional maritime security structure in the GoG -- the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety (YAMS). Despite several signs of progress, GoG remains the epicenter of unlawful acts at sea. Therefore, USAFRICOM, as one of the vital security partners of GoG countries, should reassess the support that it provides to better address the maritime security issue in the region. USAFRICOM can improve its support to its West African partners for enhancing maritime security in the region by reinforcing the existing maritime law enforcement capacities, providing more training, and supporting the regional effort for maritime legal and regulatory reforms.

The first part of this paper will display the current maritime security picture in the GoG region by presenting the consequences of the three main maritime threats: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU); drug trafficking; and piracy with associated unlawful acts at sea. The second part presents the West African countries’ actions as well as those of USAFRICOM to overcome the current security challenges. Finally, after identifying the weaknesses of these actions, the paper will discuss how USAFRICOM can improve its support to its partners while preserving its interests on the continent. USAFRICOM should strengthen maritime law enforcement capacities of key regional partners to facilitate the operationalization of YAMS, reinforce its training capabilities in the region, and provide more support to update the maritime legal system of the GoG countries. This support will not only consolidate maritime security, but also boost US influence in the region while preventing a large footprint of the US military in the GoG. 

Current Maritime Security Situation in the GoG

For the purpose of this paper, GoG represents the maritime zone from Senegal to Angola. With a coastal arc of over 6,000 kilometers and a population of over a half billion, it encompasses 12 major ports and 25 coastal and landlocked countries from Senegal in West Africa through Cameroon in Central Africa to Angola in Southern Africa. Also, this region accounts for more than 50 percent of the oil production on the African continent with substantial offshore gas and oil reserves still unexploited. Maritime activity is an essential source of income for GoG countries. Therefore, maritime insecurity could reduce GoG countries’ capabilities to raise financial resources needed to address the threat of Violent Extremist Organizations, which remain the first concern of USAFRICOM on the African continent.

 Taking advantage of the geostrategic position of the GoG, privileged sea lines of communication, and source of economic development, requires the GoG countries and their partners to overcome three main maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea: IUU, drug trafficking, and piracy and unlawful associated acts at sea. 

IUU Fishing in the GoG

With more than six million people depending on fisheries in the GoG, IUU endangers the maritime environment and biodiversity -- a critical source of food and income for the GoG population. Coastal communities are losing jobs, revenue, and their main source of food because of the destruction of the fish stocks due to illegal activities. Caused by unemployment, youth migration induces not only the lack of labor force necessary to develop their communities but also the degradation of the traditional social support system for vulnerable people.  

In addition to the damage to their coastal communities, GoG coastal countries are also affected by the loss of their tax revenues. More than one-third of the catches are not reported to the local authorities. As a result, IUU fishing in West Africa is responsible for a loss of over 2.3 billion US dollars a year. This amount -- more than the 2018 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of four countries in the region -- is a considerable loss for the regional economy.

Drug Trafficking in the GoG

The GoG region is a crossroads for global drug trafficking networks. Its strategic position between major drug producers and consumers -- from Asian heroin producers to North America and from South American cocaine producers to Europe -- combined with the fragility of the law enforcement in the GoG region has reinforced its position as a critical transit route for drug traffic.

Drug trafficking in the GoG region funds terrorist organizations in the region. The 2016 Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa report explains how terrorist groups in central and western Africa are involved in drug trafficking. Some of the narcotics coming from South America are smuggled through the Sahara Desert before transiting the Mediterranean Sea to reach European countries. Taking advantage of the control that they have on the smuggling routes in the Sahara Desert, terrorist groups such as Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) are involved directly in smuggling of drugs while groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) charged ‘transit or protection taxes’ to drugs dealers.

Piracy and Associated Unlawful Actions at Sea

As opposed to the Somali coast, the modus operandi of the GoG pirates was previously violent and oriented on the theft of the cargo. However, this trend has recently changed with a considerable increase in the number of kidnapping for ransom. Even if Nigerian waters remain the epicenter of these unlawful actions, the GoG as a region is also impacted. While physical injuries, trauma, loss of lives and ransom payments are the apparent consequences of pirate actions to the crews, their families and maritime companies, the increase of the final cost of exported goods for local consumers is not insignificant. Accounting for 90 percent of global kidnappings reported at sea, the GoG is classified as a high-risk area. Therefore, expansive insurance premiums for ships operating in the region are affecting maritime trade in the region.

Actions Taken to Address Security Challenges in the GoG

Action Taken at the Regional Level       

Since the passage of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) about security in the GoG, countries of the region have taken several actions to enhance their maritime security. The culminating point was the 2013 Yaoundé Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea. GoG countries adopted the Yaounde Code of Conduct (YCC), which set up YAMS at the operational level. This organization is in charge of coordinating actions of regional navies and coast guards for preventing illegal actions in their waters. 

This maritime architecture divided the GoG into five zones (A, D, E, F, and G) as shown in figure 1. Each zone has a Multinational Maritime Coordination Center (MMCC) coordinating operations of the national Maritime Operation Centers within that zone. Then, two Regional Centers for Maritime Safety (one for Western Africa called CRESMAO and the other for Central Africa called CRESMAC) coordinate the operations of the MMCC in their respective region. Finally, the Inter-regional Coordination Center (ICC) is responsible for gathering all valuable information and data from both regional centers to assist GoG political decision-makers. 

Figure 1. The Maritime Architecture of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Figure from Center for International Maritime Security, http://cimsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Ralby-Yaounde-Architecture.png.

This operational coordination system allows naval or coast guard units operating under the command and control of the MMCCs to patrol in their maritime zone without national boundary restrictions. Through that agreement, countries in the same zone can support each other and compensate for the lack of naval assets of smaller navies. Also, by sharing the picture of their operational environment, national MOCs enable better surveillance of regional waters. 

Unfortunately, this framework, which was adopted in 2013, is not yet fully operational. The MMCCs of zones A and G are not set up. Even centers that have been officially opened are not totally functional due to a lack of communication and maritime domain awareness (MDA) equipment as well as required staffing. However, countries are working with available means to get the Yaoundé architecture functioning. For example, in December 2018, the Ghanaian navy, by sharing information with its Ivorian counterpart through YAMS, enabled the arrest of suspected vessels. Despite these signs of progress, directors of the Yaoundé architecture acknowledge that more needs to be done regarding security challenges in the GoG.  

USAFRICOM --- A Key Partner for Maritime Security in the GoG

USAFRICOM is active across the spectrum of security cooperation with GoG countries through programs like International Military and Education Training (IMET) for training, APS for multinational and joint exercising, and Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership program (AMLEP) for bilateral operations at sea with its GoG partners. By organizing yearly exercises such as Obangame Express, USAFRICOM is the only international partner allowing all the GoG navies and maritime law enforcement agencies to exercise altogether for improving regional maritime security. For example, during Obangame Express 2019, the 33 participating nations executed more than 80 scenarios over the five maritime zones of YAMS and spanning seven national military command centers and nineteen maritime operation centers. This Obangame Express allows the GoG coastal law enforcement agencies and navies to implement at the operational and tactical levels the Yaoundé maritime architecture. Building its scenario exercises upon the existing structure of the YAMS, Obangame Express represents the available means to assess this maritime security architecture at all levels—national, zonal, regional, and inter-regional. Therefore, it is an essential instrument for optimizing the maritime architecture of Yaoundé, which represents the GoG countries’ solution to their maritime problems.

While reinforcing the GoG military leadership through the IMET program, USAFRICOM developed a unique maritime cooperation program, AMLEP, which permits law enforcement agencies of GoG to conduct bilateral maritime operations with their American counterpart. As an example, Operation Junction Rain 2018 -- the culminating point of the AMLEP program with Ivorian maritime law enforcement agencies -- was the first-ever operation involving all the Ivorian government stakeholder agencies at sea. The leadership provided by USAFRICOM allowed Ivorian maritime law agencies to overcome their inter-services rivalry to plan and execute together this successful operation. Consequently, USAFRICOM’s bilateral engagement with GoG countries fosters local maritime law enforcement structure. 

Through programs like IMET, APS, and AMLET, USAFRICOM contributes significantly to improve maritime security in the region by providing training and logistic support for empowering its GoG partners. Also, USAFRICOM’s involvement in the region provides the leadership necessary to enable a stronger cooperation among maritime stakeholders in the region.    

Analysis of the Impacts of these Actions

Despite these efforts, there are limitations that prevent GoG countries from successfully securing their waters. To illustrate, the current status of the GoG -- designated by the International Maritime Bureau as one of the riskiest maritime areas -- proves that the effort of regional stakeholders and their international partners do not meet the maritime security challenges in the region. The analysis of the GoG countries’ effort and those of USAFRICOM highlights the following limitations:  under-equipped local maritime law enforcement department, inappropriate US training policy, and outdated local maritime laws.   

Navies and coast guards of the GoG countries remains under-equipped to properly patrol and protect their waters. Most of the countries naval assets are coastal patrol boats unable to sustain several days of operations at sea. Additionally, GoG maritime law enforcement agencies do not have an accurate picture of their operational environment. As an example, for the success of the Obangame Express, international partners provide most of the capable platforms and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. This tremendous support and reinforcement provided by international participants is primordial for the success of exercises like Obangame. Consequently, at the end of exercises, GoG maritime law enforcement units lose these critical capabilities essential for the success of their daily operations.

The current USAFRICOM approach to training is not favorable for a sustained program, and it does not permit training of enough local maritime law enforcement officers. For instance, USAFRICOM deploys small training units from its headquarters or U.S. mainland to GoG countries in order to train local officers for a short time. Also, these training sessions can only provide training to a few locals because of the small number of US trainers in each training team. Therefore, USAFRICOM cannot provide training sessions on a regular basis to several countries and to enough local officers because of the availability of the training teams. 

The third limitation is the outdated maritime judiciary system of the GoG states that impacts the effectiveness of prosecutions. To illustrate, Operation Junction Rain 2018, executed jointly by the US law enforcement teams and their Ivorian counterparts, had achieved humongous operational successes. However, because of the inappropriate Ivorian maritime laws, the prosecution of the cases ended up with fines considerably inferior to the supposed damage. Emphasizing interdiction operations at sea without a dissuasive legal framework to prosecute illegal actors reduced the effect of the law enforcement actions.  

Recommendations for USAFRICOM

1. Strengthen maritime law enforcement capacities of key regional partners

USAFRICOM should take advantage of the zones of YAMS to select key maritime partners per zone and focus more on reinforcing the capacity of these partners. This reinforcement of capacity should include naval assets for increasing maritime interdiction capacities and ISR capabilities for improving MDA in the GoG. Through donation programs or sales with advantageous conditions, USAFRICOM will facilitate the acquisition of offshore patrol vessels with several weeks of autonomy at sea and multi-mission capability throughout the spectrum of law enforcement operations at sea and of ships for building up a GoG country per zone. This key partner should be a “natural” leader -- which is already leading security actions -- in its zone and should not represent a threat for US interest on the continent. Also, it should have enough financial resources to maintain those capacities. Hence, a possible choice could be Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroun, and Angola, respectively, for the zones G, F, E, D, and A. 

However, it does not mean that USAFRICOM will cease maritime cooperation with other countries in the GoG. By choosing key partners in each zone, USAFRICOM will focus its effort and facilitate the rise of local maritime powers able to sustain the international effort for securing the region. These key partners will lead the effort in their respective zones and compensate for the lack of other coastal countries. With this privilege relation, the United States will increase its influence on the continent while enabling a successful operationalization of YAMS.  

2. Reinforce local training capacity

To improve its training policy, USAFRICOM should partner with coastal countries to support the creation of an interregional maritime center in one of the GoG countries. This training center will be a hub for naval personnel and other maritime stakeholders operating in the maritime law enforcement domain. Beginning with training for the tactical level in order to provide the interdiction expertise at sea, this center will develop in the second phase course for the operational level as well. The objective is to develop a common understanding of the vocabulary and standard operating procedures for regional maritime law enforcement officers. This will be the basis for building a future doctrine for maritime operation. 

The advantages of such an initiative are the increase in the number of students, the frequency of training, and the development of personal relations among students. The augmentation of the number of trainees will reinforce the maritime capability of coastal countries. At the same time, the relationship built among students will ease the staffing process and coordination effort in multinational centers of the YAMS.  Moreover, this center will ensure continuous and sustainable trainings compulsory to create competencies at the regional level. The host country for this center could be Nigeria. In addition to being a regional maritime and economic power with strong educational institutions, the central position of Nigeria among coastal countries of the GoG is another advantage that will facilitate the transportation issue for international students. 

3)   Support maritime legal reforms  

USAFRICOM should take advantage of the expertise of the US Coast Guard in the matter of international maritime laws to help coastal countries update their national maritime judiciary system. In fact, harmonized legal procedures within the region will prevent unsuccessfully prosecuted cases. This is compulsory for judging criminals and deterring future illegal activities. Also, prosecutions should take into account that several countries could intervene in the same crime scene. Thus, harmonizing regional legal frameworks will avoid contradictions and gaps among the maritime laws of GoG countries.  

Counterargument or alternatives

Some might argue that the best solution is to deploy a U.S.-led international coalition to ensure maritime security in the GoG because of the example of the 2009 U.S.-led multinational naval task force --- Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150)   -- responsible for repressing maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden. This coalition may be combined with private companies providing security on vessels. They argue that this combined maritime task force will be ready to fight illegal activities with the most advanced navies; therefore, security in the GoG will be quickly re-established. This solution has the advantage of not requiring long-term investment into developing GoG navies. Also, the uninterrupted presence of US forces in the region may guarantee US access to that part of the continent and counter other great power influence in the region. 

Some might also advocate for deploying a US ship permanently in the GoG region. They argue that this solution will benefit the United States and its GoG partners in all domains. It will contribute to the coastal navies’ interdiction effort by providing tactical interdiction expertise and support to the coastal maritime interdiction teams. Also, this US ship will provide information to the maritime operation centers of their African partners to improve their MDA. Moreover, this ship will sustain US effort to provide continuous training to its regional counterparts. Finally, this solution will increase US influence in the region by supporting US diplomacy effort through regular port visits to GoG countries.    

Rebuttal

Even if these solutions present some advantages, they may cause unintended consequences. First, applying the example of CTF 150 in the GoG would cause friction between USAFRICOM and its regional partners. As opposed to the Somali case, GoG countries are not failed states. In this condition, it would remain challenging for the international coalition to get UN resolution allowing an international intervention in the GoG waters. This solution would violate the sovereignty of GoG countries. The violent reaction of the Ghanaian population to the fake news announcing the creation of a US base in Ghana is an example of a possible reaction in GoG countries. Instead of increasing the US influence into the GoG countries, this illegal solution would reduce US influence in that region.

Concerning private security companies, they are subjected to the law of coastal states when they are operating in their territorial sea. The lack of political consensus and legal harmonization among GoG countries about the use of force by private companies would impede the effectiveness of private security significantly. Also, USAFRICOM advocating for hiring security companies would sound like a refusal of USAFRICOM to support the implementation of YAMS. Therefore, it would highlight a discrepancy in the USAFRICOM’s posture of supporting African solutions for African problems.

Even if a continuous deployment of a US ship in the GoG waters would strengthen U.S. bonds with its GoG partners, this solution would not change the security trend in that region. For example, France has kept a permanent presence in the GoG by deploying a Navy’s ship in the region since 1990. Even though this French naval presence has helped in many ways, it does not prevent the actual degradation of the maritime security situation in that region. Deploying a couple of ships in the GoG is not enough to secure such a vast area. Choosing a solution that increases US influence on the continent without bringing significant changes in the GoG security situation will prove USAFRICOM skeptics’ argument right -- USAFRICOM is solely a U.S. geopolitical instrument and not an instrument for improving truly African security. 

Conclusion

Despite the potential of the GoG -- privileged sea lines of communication, natural and fisheries resources -- current security challenges like UII fishing, drug trafficking, and piracy are preventing people of that region from leveraging their maritime resources to improve their socio-economic status. Aware of that situation, GoG countries and their international allies, particularly USAFRICOM, have invested tremendous effort to secure GoG waters. However, USAFRICOM needs to address three main aspects in its cooperation with regional partners to invert the insecurity trend in the region. 

USAFRICOM should focus its efforts on key partners in the GoG region by reinforcing their law enforcement capacities, particularly naval assets and MDA capabilities. Also, it should support the creation of a GoG regional training center for maritime security in one of the coastal countries to provide adequate human resources. Finally, USAFRICOM should assist regional countries for reforming the maritime legal and regulatory system essential for potent prosecution. Solving these problems is critical for implementing the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security, the regional solution to maritime insecurity in the GoG. Failing to tackle these gaps in its regional security cooperation could reduce USAFRICOM’s influence, especially if its great power competitors address these challenges in the GoG area.