Go BIG on Iran

Colonel Martin A. Perryman, U.S. Army - Retired

The tit-for-tat strikes between Israel and Iran that led to the massive strike by the U.S. on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities scuttled diplomatic efforts by the U.S. to limit Iran’s nuclear program. There is no discernable strategic objective. This back and forth of retaliation will most likely go on for several weeks or months with much destruction and loss of life, but little forward progress. It is unlikely to devolve into a major war. Any negotiation to address Iran’s nuclear program will produce an agreement eerily like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), popularly called the Iran Nuclear Deal.

Since the U.S. withdrew from that agreement in 2018, Iran has exploited disengagement to accelerate processing. Sources estimate that Iran has a 400 kg stockpile of enriched uranium at 60%. For context, civilian uses, like medical or reactors, need an enrichment level of under 5% while weapons grade uranium is 90%. With further enrichment, that 400 kg would have been sufficient to produce about 10 bombs. Even with the recent strike, much of that uranium and the processing equipment is likely to be recovered eventually. In the worst case, a determined effort could still produce a handful of nuclear weapons in less than a year.

This illustrates the futility of myopically focus on only the nuclear issue and settling for some variation of a return to the pre-2018 status quo. As a ratifier of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has every legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Likewise, any state determined to gain a nuclear capability will not be thwarted. Any agreement that only addresses nuclear weapons will not hold up in the long term.

The only way to effectively deter Iranian nuclear ambitions is to alter the dynamic. World events offer an opportunity for a grand bargain that creates a path for rehabilitating Iran, removes their need for nuclear weapons, increases stability in the Middle East, improves the security paradigm for Israel, and reduces the ability of other bad actors like Russia and North Korea to evade international sanctions.

Since deposing the Shah in 1979, the government, run by Shia Clerics, has rejected western economic and cultural influence and cast themselves in opposition to their regional neighbors. As a result, Iran has been the most sanctioned nation on earth for several decades, only giving up the number one position to Russia following their invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In addition to the United States, the European Union and United Nations also maintain extensive sanctions regimes designed to retard Iran’s nuclear program. There are also sanctions targeting the petroleum industry, military capability, and participation in global financial institutions related to support for terrorism and regional instability.

Herein lies the seeds for a comprehensive negotiation. Iran’s position, always tenuous, has all but collapsed. The fall of the Assad regime and subsequent international support for the interim government in Syria has increased their isolation. The degradation of Hamas and Hezbollah have greatly reduced their ability to act. Overreach by the Houthis has focused international attention that will ultimately reduce their capability. Russia, bleeding and distracted in Ukraine is unable to intervene and China’s focus is also elsewhere. Iran has nowhere to turn.

While the Iranian government may not be ready to rejoin the family of nations, the Iranian people are ready. Holding out an olive branch, with clear, achievable, and verifiable metrics on both sides will, at a minimum, increase domestic pressure on the current government.

There are three keys to a successful long-term rehabilitation, first, Iran must be allowed, at some level, to save face. Negotiations should not be aired in public and final decisions need to be announced as a mutually beneficial agreement between equals. This is inconsistent with the current administration’s modus operandi, but necessary in this case. Second, at each step, Iran must be required to make the first move and allow for verification before reciprocation. Third, given the broad context of the negotiation and the lengthy implementation process, Iran can be given the leeway to determine sequencing and timing of most categories under discussion (of course the nuclear issues will have to be addressed first).

Regionally, such an effort will dovetail nicely with efforts regarding Syria and support the aspirations of Lebanon and Iraq. As a byproduct, a more stable and prosperous region will create conditions in which the Palestinian issue and other bilateral relationships with Israel can finally be addressed.

Beyond the region, the global list of bad actors will be reduced, and the gray market of criminal sanctions busting will be constricted. Russia will be more isolated as Iranian petroleum re-enters the global market with mostly beneficial economic results and Iranian consumers will re-gain access to a variety of global imports.

Of course, Iran could reject such an offer, but that would only leave the status quo in place, possibly destabilizing the regime even further. Alternatively, if the U.S. offered an exit ramp by taking a broader approach it could prove mutually beneficial. There's a lot to gain and little to risk.

About the Author

Colonel Martin A. Perryman is a retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (48G) with operational assignments to the Pentagon, Central Command, and European Command. His most significant assignments include Chief of Middle East War Plans on the Army Staff (G3-5-7), Executive Officer at the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Turkey, Chief of ODC Albania, and Country Program Director for Iraq at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Following retirement from the Army, he worked closely with host nation defense and security forces executing multiple installation projects for security scanning equipment internationally to include in the region with Rapiscan Systems, Inc. He currently is providing contract support to the International Partners Division of Space Systems Command, a major command of U.S. Space Force.