Explaining the Outcomes of U.S. Attempts to Deter North Korea

By Jeff Jager

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Abstract 

Is the United States actually deterring North Korea? Deterrence theory suggests that effective deterrence derives from clarity in U.S. communications regarding what actions the U.S. is attempting to deter North Korea from taking, clarity in U.S. communications (threats) regarding what the U.S. will do should North Korea take said actions, North Korea’s belief in the U.S. capability and will to execute its threats, and whether North Korea is, in fact, deterrable. Whether the U.S. is deterring North Korea is a question of quite literally existential importance, as the major objects of deterrence (OOD) involve North Korea’s nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them, raising the specter of nuclear war should U.S. deterrence efforts fail. The evidence strongly suggests major weaknesses in U.S. deterrence approaches, which may contribute to understanding how and why North Korea has emerged as a highly-capable nuclear weapons state. 

Conclusion 

U.S. deterrence efforts vis-à-vis North Korea have been and are ineffective. There is no relationship between North Korean actions vis-à-vis the OOD and the level of clarity in U.S. communication regarding the OOD. There is no relationship between North Korean actions vis-à-vis nuclear attack, conventional attack, or its ballistic missile program and the level of clarity in U.S. communication regarding the actions the U.S. will take should North Korea pursue the OOD. There is no relationship between North Korean actions vis-à-vis sanctions, bolstering allies, nuclear attack, and chemical and biological weapons attack and the level of North Korea’s belief that the U.S. has the capability and will to carry out its threats. There is no apparent relationship between North Korea’s motivation for aggression and the severity of U.S. deterrence approaches. 

One may counter-argue that U.S. deterrence efforts have been effective, in that North Korea has not conducted a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. However, it very much appears North Korea’s restraint derives from factors other than U.S. deterrence efforts. The counter-argument might more accurately be stated that North Korea has not yet conducted a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack: because the U.S. has not deterred North Korea from pursuing or achieving any other OOD, it may be that North Korea has simply not yet defied the remaining U.S. deterrence goals. Furthermore, for three OOD, U.S. deterrence efforts appear to have yielded counterproductive results. In regards to nuclear proliferation, North Korea’s activities increased concomitant with an increase in U.S. clarity in communications. In regards to chemical weapons, U.S. clarity and consistency in communications decreased over the assessed time period, in which North Korea actually used a chemical weapon in an assassination, evidencing the predicted negative relationship but in a direction opposite to U.S. intent. Similarly, in regards to North Korea’s ballistic missile program, there has been a clear increase in the regime’s ballistic missile tests and launches and an expansion in quantity, quality, type, and means of delivery over time. A concomitant apparent decrease in North Korea’s perception of U.S. will and/or capability to stop these activities, suggests the negative relationship between these, but again not as the U.S. intended.

Ineffective U.S. deterrence may very well be linked to lack of clarity and consistency in the U.S. approach to deterrence. For no OOD has the U.S. in the Kim Jong Un era leveraged clear, consistent communication in regards to both the North Korean actions the U.S. intends to deter and the actions the U.S. threatens to take if North Korea takes these actions. As the U.S. has not applied two of the three “fundamental conditions for successful deterrence, it should be no surprise that U.S. deterrence efforts have failed. Regarding the third fundamental condition, North Korea’s perception of the U.S. capability and will to respond in a nuclear or conventional manner has likely decreased over time, and while this has not (yet) resulted in an increase from zero in the number of North Korea nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks, it is cause for concern. When it comes to deterrence, “(s)aying so, unfortunately, does not make it true; and if it is true, saying so does not always make it believed.” Finally, the lack of an evident relationship between North Korea’s motivation for aggression and the severity of U.S. deterrence approaches suggests the possibility that North Korea may not, in fact, be deterrable, lending support to the very many studies that share this view. Should the U.S. eventually develop an approach to deterring North Korea that incorporates even the basic fundamentals of deterrence theory, in the future scholars may have further opportunity to investigate this possibility. 

About the Author

Jeff Jager, a retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO), served multiple FAO tours on the USEUCOM-USCENTCOM seam, including as an attaché in Cyprus, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Liaison Officer in Turkey, and a Foreign Military Sales Officer and ODC Chief in Lebanon. He also served as a military advisor at the Department of State. He is currently a Ph.D. student in Salve Regina University’s international relations program.