Evaluating Libya as a Multi-Polar Conflict

By Major Stefan G. DePaul, U.S. Air Force

The character of the conflict in Libya is a result of an increasingly interconnected and multi-polar world order.  As Libya smolders and global centers of power evolve, the U.S. and other NATO countries have an opportunity to reflect on what can be learned from the conflict thus far to prepare for future multi-polar engagements and the unique challenges they present. This paper evaluates the strategic impacts of the multi-polar context on the Libyan conflict and draws operational lessons that may be especially applicable to conflicts of a similar character, providing military leaders with a stronger basis for future planning, training, and organization.

Background

The conflict in Libya is a multi-polar conflict not simply because it is influenced by multiple states pursuing their strategic interests, but rather more complex than multiple states aligned on either side against each other in a bilateral proxy-war.  Rather, Libya’s conflict is multi-polar because it involves multiple types of actors, from multiple poles, for multiple reasons.  Religion, ethnicity, race, tribe, regional affiliation, economic incentives and family ties are just a few of the markers that form the collage of identity in Libya.  Loyalties and grievances are the result of a long history of inequality across a broad range of these intersectional identity markers.  The American experience in Libya up to 2014 showed that many Libyans find their identity in a patchwork of these identity categories, and that many hold allegiances that seem paradoxical and fluid to outsiders.  

In cases where such intersectionality exists, allegiance to broader sides of a conflict, like the Libyan National Army (LNA) or the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, may be similarly complex, and the support of third-party states is often aligned by coincidence rather than intent.  For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, and the Russian Federation all support Khalifa Haftar and the LNA, but their methods and motivations for doing so serve independent competitions.  

The UAE is seeking advantage in a conflict that is largely regional and ideological as it seeks to reduce the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and grow the influence of secular governance in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region.  France harbors legitimate fears about the Islamic extremist threat emanating from North Africa and views Haftar as a preferable ally in its counter-terror operations in the region compared to the GNA, who has occasionally been politically manipulated by the Islamists groups that they rely on for Tripoli’s security.  Russian strategic goals are agnostic about France or UAE’s objectives, and are instead designed to pursue future influence in the Mediterranean and favorable economic terms.  On the ground, these parties place Libya not just at the center of its own civil war, but as a battleground in the multiple, intersecting regional and geopolitical conflicts of its foreign supporters.  These layers of conflict amplify the complexity of the strategic environment and influence the operational challenges and opportunities of its participants.

It should be noted that multi-polar conflict is not a new idea.  It does, however, require a historical focus that is largely outside the lived experience of operational commanders from the U.S.  Growing up in a post-WWII global environment it is easy to accept bilateral confrontation as a norm in global conflict, and view history as a consecutive series of dominant empires and competing rivals.  Much of history, however, takes place in more complex times than that understanding.  These more complex eras are more useful for thinking about Libya and the global environment the U.S. finds itself in today.  Commanders looking to understand how to engage a conflict like Libya would do well to look to eras where the political landscape resembled a multi-polar world order, like the periods before WWI and WWII.  Conflicts like the Spanish Civil War have much to offer the strategic thinker in understanding today’s multi-polar conflicts.

Looking deeper into the Libyan conflict as a case-study, the conflict shares several important characteristics with other fragile countries (i.e. Bolivia, The Central African Republic, Somalia, Sudan, and Venezuela) that could become future arenas for multi-polar conflict.  These three characteristics may be understood as precursors to multi-polar conflict, and their presence in multiple fragile states heightens the importance of viewing Libya not as an isolated conflict, but as one of many deeply multi-polar struggles likely to develop over the next decade.  

The first characteristic that made Libya ripe for the development of a multi-polar conflict is the ease of linking external actors to internal divisions.  Haftar’s rise from exile in the U.S. through a highly competitive field of would-be leaders in East Libya to leadership of the LNA relied not only on the ease of travel and communications facilitated by the modern world, but on the pre-existing grievances and lack of cohesion in Libyan society following Gadhafi’s rule.  Internal stresses and division are a requirement for any conflict within a state, but in a more globally networked context mutually beneficial connections between external powers and internal actors are easier to develop, maintain, or impose. 

The second is the presence of at least one geographic, economic, or cultural pretext for involvement.  Libya hosts all three, with a valuable geographic position in the middle of the Mediterranean, enticing oil wealth, and cultural and religious ties to former historical colonial powers and the Arab Peninsula.  

The third is that the situation in Libya demonstrates that conflict is more likely to invite multi-polar influence in a contested or peripheral area of influence between poles.  The complexity of the Libya conflict increased significantly after 2014, the year the U.S. closed its embassy and effectively removed itself from the burgeoning conflict there.  This departure contributed to a vacuum of power in Libya and invited a competition for influence.  While a sustained presence would have led to other unknowable consequences, the Libyan conflict may never have grown to be so deeply multi-polar if significant U.S. and European support had continued from 2011 through the present.   

Given the number of countries across the globe that possess characteristics that facilitate multi-polar conflicts, the following strategic lessons learned through examining the current Libyan conflict can provide future operational focus and may facilitate preparedness for conflicts of a similar character.    

Operational lesson 1: Continue to develop the skills and relationships necessary to impose no-fly zones, maritime embargos, and counter-smuggling operations.

One lesson Libya has shown at the strategic level is how low the barrier to entry is to influence contemporary conflict.  Previously, the logistical, material, or technological capability to export the weapons and expertise necessary to influence a conflict were often prohibitively challenging or expensive.  Today, the globalized network of shipping, airlift, and freight necessary to keep most countries running provides a dual-use function enabling them to transport equipment and personnel to the location they wish to influence.  This influx of military capability can lead to escalation and increase the risk for regionalization of a conflict.  In Libya, competing escalations of vehicles, drones, anti-air capabilities, and fighter aircraft by foreign backers over the last few years has significantly raised the operational capabilities of both sides, but has brought neither side victory.  

In order to de-escalate a conflict like Libya that has already had a significant amount of external materiel support augmenting both sides, externally supplied capabilities must be suppressed or at least frozen in order to allow the ground situation to move towards resolution.  The operational momentum of the conflict will continue to shift between combatants if their external support feeds a cycle of escalating and matching capabilities.  Thus, at the operational level, developing the relationships and capabilities necessary to physically monitor and control entry via land, sea, and air routes is necessary to effectively control this cycle.  This effort will take significant improvements in monitoring capacity and interoperability. Technologies like Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) platforms or dedicated satellite monitoring of ships are vital to these efforts.  They can be further augmented with a more integrated approach to commercial flight and ship tracking software and technologies.  Finally, these systems require enhancement of joint or combined information sharing in order to be successful in large swathes of sea, expanses of desert, or challenging mountain regions.  

Operational lesson 2:  Continue to develop the skills and relationships necessary to conduct counterinsurgency.

Internal instability is a precondition of a multi-polar conflict, but instability is often complex.  The pre-existing conditions of the Libyan conflict will need time and security to be reconciled. Providing the necessary security for peace initiatives to achieve progress will require an effective whole-of-government strategy delivered with an adequate counter-insurgency capability.  Within both GNA and LNA, the deficit of trust and cohesion among their alliance members is evident in their weak central control and changing allegiances. The lack of cohesion among these parties and instability at the local level means that win, lose, or draw for either side in the fight between LNA and GNA, the seeds of the next conflict have already been sown.  From an operational perspective, this means the LNA-GNA fight that frames the foreign perception of the conflict in Libya is inadequate to deliver the peace necessary for civil society to resume, but the fight is too central and too dynamic for the necessary local and community peace efforts to move forward.  

As a result of these underlying conditions, the most likely result of a military resolution to the conflict between LNA and GNA is a prolonged insurgency, and a diplomatic solution will likely fail to produce a lasting resolution unless it patiently facilitates local peace.  In order for international peace efforts to succeed, they must begin with a Libyan will for peace and actively remove the existing seeds of conflict through initiatives at the local and community level; if ignored, these seeds will simply flower into future conflicts.  These efforts will take time, and will likely occur while levels of trust and security remain low.  

Such circumstances necessitate that operations begin with a thorough evaluation of the operating environment to prepare the force for the requirements of the unique human terrain, thoroughly evaluating the loyalties and motivations of our allies as deeply as our enemies.  The stronger and clearer our understanding of our allies and their motivations, the greater the ability of members to operate towards mutually beneficial objectives, which was a key challenge of the American experience in Libya. 

In addition, the complex and incremental process of achieving peace amidst a multi-polar conflict places an operational onus on the warfighter to work as both a combatant and peacemaker, in order to help establish the trust required to move parties from combat to peace.  By focusing on trust and bringing any justifiable capabilities or equipment possible to make an immediate, sustainable, and positive impact on the communities they encounter, commanders may best position themselves for mission success.  Relatedly, commanders should continue to be ready to train and cooperate with local forces and act as an arbitrator in local conflicts.  

Operational Lesson 3: Be prepared to continue to operate bilaterally, or across a coalition, without a U.N. mandate.

Libya is also a demonstration of how multi-polarity challenges the post-WWII liberal political and economic order.  International organizations and economic pathways that have become central to international trade and politics appear increasingly circumvented by powers developing their own competing networks or undermining international organizations.  The conflicts in Syria and Libya exemplify the limitations of the power of international organizations like the U.N. and the waning influence of the international monetary system.  During the Syrian conflict, explicit Russian support has led Russia to use its veto power in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) fourteen times.   In Libya, by contrast, no veto has been used and many resolutions have been passed, but as seen in the example of UNSC 1970, the passing of a U.N. resolution does not guarantee its implementation, as the U.N. cannot compel enforcement.  The U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) similarly has found itself vocally supported by UNSC members, but sidelined and frustrated in practice.  In Libya and Syria, Russia has shown that U.N. influence can be neutralized from within or from without. 

Beyond the inherent tension between national sovereignty and international organizations, the Libyan conflict is an example of how unlikely, even paradoxical, alliances can develop in the increased multi-polarity of the global context.  For unrelated reasons, both France and Russia have aligned themselves behind LNA, and such unlikely alliances further detract from the unity necessary for a response by international organizations like the U.N.  Indeed, the lack of unified will for Libyan peace among UNSC members is seen from various perspectives as enabling and perpetuating the conflict.  Notably, the waning legitimacy of the U.N. is accompanied by increased challenges to the unified control of the international monetary system. In Libya, sanctions leveraging the central role of the international monetary system have been successful in limiting the operational capability of third parties to interfere with the independence of the Libyan National Oil Corporation by limiting who can sell Libyan oil.  Such strategies are unlikely to be as effective in the longer term as many countries are devising economic strategies to mitigate their vulnerability to the international monetary system. As key pillars of the international world order become increasingly eroded, it is unlikely that the UNSC will be able to confer the kind of unity it needs to produce sufficient deterrence through effective resolutions or economic sanctions. This means the development and employment of bilateral or multilateral coalitions will remain the most likely make-up of crisis intervention efforts, and that in an increasingly multipolar world, the need for developing and maintaining a global network of allies is especially acute.  Given these realities, the more U.S. military leaders can develop relationships with partners and assure them of a commitment to the defense of shared values, the more these efforts will pay dividends in strengthening U.S. national security.

Operational Lesson 4:  Anticipate that third party foreign supporters of multi-polar conflicts are especially likely to pursue instability as a status quo. 

At the strategic level, ongoing multi-polar conflicts like Libya are themselves a kind of leverage for third party foreign supporters who insert themselves within a conflict for their own strategic gain.  From a U.S. perspective, interminable conflict is understood as a waste of resources and a political black eye.  The strategic value and pursuit of an uneasy status quo in a conflict runs counter to most operational maxims, which seek rapid victory and to minimize human and material costs in the pursuit of a better peace. By contrast, the strategy employed by Russia in its near-abroad, Syria, and Libya all demonstrate how a third party can value the continuation of tension or conflict as a desired end-state. In response, command staffs should prepare to encounter and exploit such conditions in a multi-polar conflict.  

Two authors -- Jakub Lachert and Andrew Sprague -- have written compelling articles about how Russia has repeatedly manipulated the temperature of conflicts in the Black Sea region and in Syria—using frozen, warm, and hot conflicts in South Ossetia, Donbas, and North Western Syria. ,   Russia has played these situations to facilitate its strategic objectives in three main ways:  To maintain its ability to expand influence in the Russian near-abroad, maintain its existing influence, and expand its operational reach.   Russia’s fueling of conflicts in both Syria and Libya represents a strategic effort to similarly achieve strategic objectives and expand influence in the Mediterranean.  

Syria is a clear example of how comfortable the Russian Federation is with unresolved conflict, and how willing they are to develop and leverage assets available to them through this partnership in order to strengthen their strategic position.  While the fight in Syria continues, Russia has used its influence there to develop air, air defense, and naval capabilities in the Mediterranean, as well as recruiting fighters for and projecting airpower into Libya. GNA representatives justifiably fear that Haftar, with Russia’s support, may lead Libya to follow this Syrian precedent and become a client state.  As argued above, whether the conflict reaches a stalemate, Haftar defeats GNA, or even if he garners enough influence to otherwise co-opt GNA’s legitimacy, a definitive resolution to the conflict will likely remain elusive.  A continued Russian presence in Libya, providing Haftar with further support in an interminable conflict, fits the Syrian pattern and provides Russia with another platform for yet further international influence and a counter to the strategic context and constraints it has faced in the Mediterranean since the Soviet era.  Ongoing investigations by the U.S. and the U.N. into efforts between Venezuela and LNA to bypass global finance networks show how Russian influence in Libya could be used as a tool to support objectives further afield.  This is a demonstration of how the continuation of a conflict may provide a strategic advantage for foreign supporters by serving as a pretext for continued engagement and thus influence.  

Operationally, either escalation or de-escalation of the conflict in the short term can ultimately draw out a conflict rather than press a decisive victory or promote conflict resolution.  For example, the Russian air capabilities announced by AFRICOM to be present in Libya on 26 May 2020 likely have the capacity to reverse the GNA’s advantage, but this air capacity was not immediately used in this manner. Instead they were employed to defensively establish a stalemate around Sirte.  Despite this apparently defensive, de-escalatory move, the continued presence of these warplanes in Libya and the veneer of deniability provided by Russian private military corporations have a strategic value of their own.  Their presence replicates for Russia an operational rheostat to control the heat of a conflict, as seen in their near-abroad, at little strategic cost, as such a military force is relatively small, even in expeditionary terms.  This control ensures an influence in Libya regardless of the status of conflict that ensures the conflict continues to serve Russian strategic interests.  Commanders should be aware that seizing the initiative in such a conflict requires individual evaluation and will be driven by the context of the individual conflict rather than a replication of methods applied elsewhere.

Operational Lesson 5: Expect operational restrictions stemming from threats originating outside of the operational environment. 

The operational opportunities available to states and alliances are dictated by the impact that those operations have on their interests.  As Basil Liddell-Hart said: “The military objective is only the means to a political end.”  Every state has vulnerabilities, and in a multi-polar conflict the interconnected relationships between actors may increase the likelihood that operational choices in theater would be restricted by military or non-military means applied locally or in separate geographical areas. 

Libya provides an example of how political factors, like migrant policy in the EU, can become vulnerabilities that impose operational restrictions that could otherwise contribute to conflict resolution efforts.  UNSC Resolution 1970 is meant to impose an embargo of weapons destined to the Libyan conflict.  This resolution has been enacted and even implemented by the EU through the creation and employment of Operation IRINI, yet tons of weapons, including advanced surface-to-air missiles and fourth generation fighter aircraft, have been able to enter the conflict.  Operation IRINI has been ineffective in achieving the aims of UNSC 1970 in part because the design and enforcement of the EU’s embargo has been influenced by political debates surrounding migrants in EU countries. 

First, Operation IRINI, like Operation SOPHIA before it, was delayed and hindered by internal debate over how the ships in the operation were to deal with migrants at sea.  Second, many European nations are concerned that an effective arms embargo imposed in Libya could lead to increased tensions between their Turkish NATO allies and Russia in northwest Syria, further stressing Turkey’s capacity and willingness to harbor refugees.  Turkey already leads the world in hosting displaced persons, with more than 4.1 million refugees and asylum seekers within its borders, and further stress could lead to an increase of Syrian refugees entering Europe.  The EU’s reluctance to accept additional refugees from Turkey has thus had a chilling effect on the arms embargo in Libya, and this political crisis exemplifies how levers of power can be effectively applied from outside of the military sector, and outside of the operating environment, to influence operational choices.  

Notably, in autocratic states like Russia, a close alignment between long-ruling government leadership and diplomatic, information, military, and economic sectors facilitates responses in conflicts that are faster, more cohesive, and more consistent over time than is often available from the commonly fractured democratic processes of the U.S. and its allies.  As a result, the U.S. and its allies should anticipate third party autocratic states being well-positioned to nimbly employ whole-of-government approaches to influence the arena in ways that result in asymmetrical operational restrictions. Where the U.S. and its allies may struggle to leverage even a whole-of-government approach to engagement, its adversaries’ non-democratic state structures may also facilitate a further ability to compel and incentivize assistance from additional non-governmental actors such as corporations for mutually beneficial influence. Russia appears to already be having success with this model in the Central African Republic, where The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, acts as an agent of Russian diplomatic, information, and military interests while pursuing economic opportunities outside the security realm.  Private military corporations like the Wagner Group have hundreds of troops on the ground in Libya. Despite being ostensibly private, the use of such organizations as arms of Russian foreign policy is an open secret. Indeed, the presence of the fighter aircraft announced by USAFRICOM in May stretches the credibility of their independence in Libya past the breaking point. With companies like these present around the globe and involved in government and economic ventures outside the security realm, third parties are further able to apply pressure from outside the operating environment that can force operational restrictions. The multi-domain cohesion of a potential adversary increases their opportunity to apply strategic pressure to impede operational freedom and would require serious attention at the operational level to navigate through whole-of-government cooperation and liaison efforts.

The location and origin of the next conflict that will require the attention of the U.S. and its allies is unknown, but as the centers of power shift and broaden around the world, ongoing multipolar conflicts like Libya are a valuable resource.  By looking at the strategic context and operational character of the Libyan conflict, the operational lessons discussed here emerge to focus preparation for future conflicts.  With these lessons, operational leaders will be better prepared to interpret the operating environments and characters of the conflicts they face and can more effectively leverage their capabilities towards strategic objectives, ultimately forging a better peace.

About the Author

Major DePaul is currently assigned to NATO in Spain where he focuses on NATO’s southern flank. He has previously worked as a South Asia Air Forces analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and has performed regional analysis while stationed in South Korea, and in CENTCOM. He received his Master’s degree in Strategic Leadership in 2014. These broad experiences have provided a gateway to understanding the strategic intersections of global interests in other regions, primarily in Africa and Latin America.