Embassy Emergency Action Response and Overseas Crisis Management, Are You Ready?
By Colonel John E. Chere Jr., U.S. Army-Retired
Do not wait to prepare yourself for an overseas assignment
Disclaimer: “The author contributed this article in his personal capacity. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Defense Security Cooperation University, the Joint Special Operations University, or the United States Government."
Department of Defense (DOD) personnel deployed to assignments in our embassies overseas under Chief of Mission (COM) authority are typically not fully prepared for the potential crisis situations that they and their families could experience, to include the possibility of a short or no-notice evacuation back to the Continental United States (CONUS) or a temporary location overseas. Additionally, there are no overseas posts, regardless of location, that are immune from a potential crisis-situation. Furthermore, while DOD members are familiar with planning and reacting to crisis situations as part of their normal military or DOD civilian careers, that does not always fully translate to the fact that while serving under Department of State (DOS) and COM authority they will conduct crisis planning under the guidelines laid out by DOS and plans executed in country by the Ambassador and the country team.
While similarities in planning exist, there are also differences and preparatory training for understanding and preparing for crisis situations at our embassies varies across the DOD organizations that typically send personnel to overseas embassy assignments, i.e., The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Defense Attaché System (DAS); The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) for personnel in Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO); The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for International Technology and Armaments Exchanges; and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO), and longer-term Special Operations Forces Liaison Elements (SOFLE).
On September 14, 2012, at approximately 1330 hours over 100 demonstrators scaled the walls of a U.S. Embassy in North Africa and began a several-hour campaign to destroy property on the compound and attempt to gain access to the chancery building where approximately 50-60 American and locally employed staff (LES) were barricaded. Across the street from the embassy, the American International School was simultaneously attacked with significant damage and theft to the school buildings and property. Fortunately, the school had been closed as a precaution one hour earlier. Less than six hours after the attack began, U.S. military forces and additional Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) personnel arrived to help secure the compromised embassy compound, and less than 36 hours later a chartered civilian aircraft landed at the international airport to evacuate U.S. personnel “ordered” to depart country. These personnel included all USG dependents, over 50% of the designated non-essential personnel from the embassy staff, and several non-USG U.S. citizens who elected to depart. Additionally, several USG embassy employees in the compound during the attack joined their families at the evacuation link-up point prior to boarding the aircraft to say farewell or accompany them to the onward evacuation destination.
All personnel on TDY or leave outside the country during the attack were ordered to remain in place and not to return to post unless directed by the Ambassador. Of the subsequent evacuated personnel and those who were already outside the country, very few would return to the embassy and per DOS policy most were subsequently reassigned after six months to other duties in Washington DC or elsewhere. DOD personnel who did not return were returned to their services or parent DOD organizations. Personal property and vehicles left at post were packed and sent to onward locations with the help of the remaining USG personnel on the ground. Most DOD personnel were, the rare exceptions, allowed to return to post, although it took over three months to recover all employees. Those who had dependents at post during the attack had to deal with the additional fact that they were now separated from family members. Furthermore, because of the attack and several related events that simultaneously occurred in the North Africa/Middle East region, all subsequent decisions on security and personnel manning at post were mostly assumed and managed at the DOS senior management level in Washington. Much of that centralized decision-making remains in place, particularly in posts now designated as “High Threat Posts.”
While the situation above was unique to this North African country, it is not unique that embassies have to react to evacuate personnel on short notice for safety or other operational reasons. According to a GAO report 08-23 published October 19, 2007, and an updated report 17-714, dated July 2017, the DOS since 1988 has ordered over 293 evacuations from overseas posts due to civil strife, natural disasters, conventional wars, terrorist incidents and disease outbreaks. Furthermore, while crisis situations will vary around the world in the 150+ posts manned by DOD personnel, there is a requirement that all DOD personnel deploying overseas to work in an embassy must understand and be prepared not only to support and relocate family members in a fast-moving, crisis, but to contribute as DOD members to the embassy Emergency Action Plan (EAP). Because of their training, experience, and contacts with host-nation security forces, embassies normally rely heavily on their DOD personnel to step up to the plate during crisis situations to assist in a variety of ad-hoc tasks.
However, while there has been recent improvement in how DOS and its supporting interagency partners manage its evacuation planning and execution, more work needs to be done as outlined in the same cited GAO reports. Moreover, while the reports single out the DOS as the owner of the problems to fix, it is also correct to point out that the embassy in country is a “country team” made up of multiple USG agencies, with each one having assigned roles and responsibilities in crisis action planning and execution. The DOD is a significant contributor and shares equally in the burden to ensure that posts are prepared for all contingencies outlined in the EAP.
During a crisis, the COM is ultimately responsible for making all decisions with regard to safety and well-being of American citizens in the country, regardless of whether they are working directly for the USG or not. The COM makes these decisions by relying on the advice of the country team and more specifically the embassy Emergency Action Committee (EAC). The EAC is typically managed by the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and is composed of select members of the embassy country team, which typically includes the DOD. The EAC is responsible for devising courses of action to deal with any potential crisis that could occur in country and/or within the region. These courses of action are post-specific and known officially as the EAP.
In response to any crisis, i.e., natural disaster, civil disorder, hijacking, hostage taking, bomb attack, etc., the EAC is activated, and all members assess the situation and jointly discuss and decide on Courses of Action (COAs). The EAC makes recommendations to the COM, who may. among many other options short of a full evacuation, request a reduction in the number of American personnel in country through either an authorized or ordered departure. During an authorized departure, non-emergency personnel and eligible family members may voluntarily leave the post. During an ordered departure, USG non-emergency personnel and eligible family members MUST leave post as directed. Once a decision is made the message is disseminated throughout the entire mission community.
In the North Africa example, and typical of any other developing situations with little or no warning, the event began and was over in less than five hours. However, the resulting impact was severe, and while loss of life to USG personnel was avoided, the reaction by the embassy and Washington was not exaggerated given other regional events and evacuation --- and the primary fact that the host nation was unable to fulfill its role under the 1961 Vienna Diplomatic Convention to provide adequate security to ensure that the diplomatic compound was protected.
The employees, families, and dependents not at the embassy or school during the attack were mostly at home monitoring the situation via phones and the Embassy radio system. Messages going out from the embassy during the attack to USG families, employees, and all registered U.S. citizens in country via the warden system, directed personnel to shelter in place and avoid going anywhere until further notice. However, as events rapidly developed, messages were also disseminated for personnel to begin preparation to evacuate post and “drawdown lists” at the embassy were scrutinized to determine which employees would stay or depart once a final decision was made.
Once the decision was made to evacuate and drawdown the embassy staff, there was less than 18 hours to execute the plan to get designated personnel to the rally points, boarded into secure transportation, and onward movement made to the international airport. Personnel arriving at the rally point with pets, luggage and bags were not surprisingly in various stages of readiness having not slept much in the previous 24 hours and having to decide on their own in some cases (absent their significant others) what to bring and most did not know for how long they would be gone. Many other stories concerning varied levels of preparedness and a hasty departure followed in the months ahead. Many personnel that lost vehicles or personal property entered into a lengthy process to get compensation for their losses and some had difficulty in convincing their insurance companies that they were in fact covered for such losses.
As stated earlier, all personnel operating out of diplomatic missions overseas are not immune to the North Africa example described above and should be prepared in advance as to how they will react. Moreover, while it is under the DOS and country team umbrella that an evacuation occurs, once evacuated personnel are out of the country the support that follows is NOT equal and each USG organization has its own rules and responsibility for what occurs next --- including the DOD, which uses the DOD Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR). To further compound the complexity there are other governing rules, policies, and guidance that vary among DOD organizations. The training and exposure to overseas crisis management prior to arrival at post varies in scope for each parent organization, which further highlights the responsibility of DOD employees to ensure their families, whether accompanied or not, are adequately prepared for their new assignment.
There are many readily-available online resources, but service members must take the initiative to ensure family members are educated and family plans established for worst case scenarios. It is important this plan/discussion be accomplished PRIOR to leaving CONUS because many of the important decisions that need to be made may be too late once down range. For example, certain valuable items may be better left where the family will relocate if sent back to CONUS, or determining the need to establish an emergency reserve of cash funds. Once at post you will also have pre-established travel orders with fund cites for service members and dependents in case of evacuation, which will also require addresses to your selected home of record and evacuation location.
Waiting for more formal training or organization-specific guidance may also come late in the assignment process. It is important to be informed well in advance of your worst-case options and seek out guidance if there are questions. One of your best resources will be the gaining embassy and the desk officer at the specific DOD parent organization, as many of the lessons learned from previous events may only reside at post and the parent Geographical Combatant Command (CCMD). Additionally, be aware that some of the guidance provided on the DOS website may be unique to DOS personnel; therefore seek clarification from your DOD parent agency. It is always better to get the right answers up front.
As a final note, do not let the fact that crises do occasionally happen around the world spoil the great assignment that the majority of DOD personnel will have in this unique and challenging interagency environment. Being prepared and making decisions in advance should be what provides peace of mind for you and your family to enjoy your surroundings and not get into the “bunker mentality” that evil lurks around every corner. As a matter of perspective, having completed multiple embassy assignments in different countries with different security environments, I always found it ironic that many Americans serving overseas came from areas in CONUS that are statistically more “dangerous” than the countries where they were now residing, yet their reaction to being in a “foreign country” was to put up the barriers and not expose themselves to the perceived risks. Be safe and be aware of your surroundings, but also get out and enjoy yourselves and take advantage of living and serving in a foreign culture and environment! Your job success will also rely on your ability to build relationships with your foreign partners, fully understand your operating environment, and promote USG interests as part of an interagency team. Lastly, do not forget that your host nation is primarily responsible for your security, and despite failures like in our North Africa example, it is more the exception and most places do more than an adequate job of keeping you safe.
About the Author
Colonel (retired) John E. Chere Jr. is currently an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Defense Security Cooperation University and an Adjunct Instructor at the Joint Special Operations University, Security Cooperation Course, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida. Colonel Chere retired in 2014 after 30 + years active duty as an Infantry Officer and Middle East/North Africa Foreign Area Officer, which included Embassy tours in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Israel, Iraq and on the USCENTCOM staff in Tampa, Florida.