Early Challenges to SDO/DATT Implementation

By Captain Joseph W. Piontek, U.S. Navy - Retired

Disclaimer:  The views expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Introduction

One morning in the spring of 2008, the leadership at the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS) entered the school’s main classroom and congratulated several of the students preparing to become Defense Attaches (DATTs). The identified students would no longer serve in the traditional DATT position their respective military department (MilDeps) had assigned them to fill. Instead, these Army, Navy, USMC and Air Force officers would be the first generation of leaders to serve at U.S. embassies in the newly minted position of Senior Defense Officials and Defense Attaches (SDO/DATTs). The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) designates the SDO/DATT as the “principal DoD official in U.S. embassies, who serves as the diplomatically accredited defense attaché (DATT) and chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO).”

That moment marked the beginning of the implementation of an idea that had lingered in several forms since 1964 when SecDef McNamara directed consolidation of MilDep attaches at U.S. embassies under a DATT.  However, the fundamental axiom of unity of command for military personnel – in this case those located at U.S. embassies – went unheeded for a half-century. In 2019, slightly over a decade after that 2008 initial implementation of the SDO/DATT concept, this article looks back at early implementation challenges and discusses the initial progress and success of the concept.

Historical Overview and the SDO/DATT Concept

From its inception, SDO/DATT implementation related to and leveraged DoD requirements for foreign area expertise and formalized Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs. A synopsis of FAO program history is germane.

Formalized foreign area expertise programs have a long history within the DoD. Some argue that the first modern program dates to 1947 when Department of the Army Circular Number 83 established the Language and Area Training Program (LATP).   Often driven by world events, multiple attempts at programs to ensure a capability of foreign expertise emerged – and then faded as new priorities emerged. The cycle continued into the late 1990’s when after the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. military forces experienced explosive growth in the amount of participation in foreign engagements and named operations. By one account, the U.S. armed forces led or participated in 40 percent more overseas and multinational operations in the last decade of the twentieth century than in the rest of the century combined.  Thus, it was not surprising when DoD issued the original 1997 Directive (DoDD 1315.17), which was a formal SecDef tasking to all U.S. Military Departments to develop Foreign Area Officer programs.  

A weak response from the MilDeps regarding their respective FAO programs drove DoD leadership – especially after the horrific and world-changing terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 – to re-issue a much more detailed and exacting FAO Program directive update in 2005.  Still another update in September 2007 followed – one that preceded the original SDO/DATT implementation directive by only three months.

A House Divided

As mentioned, DoD agency leadership and those military serving at embassies had debated the consolidation of the DoD presence at U.S. embassies under one authoritative position for a long time. Going back to some of the origins and coinciding with the timeframe of the LATP, some attribute the

U.S. military mission to Greece between 1946 and 1947 as one of the first formal efforts of what today would be Security Cooperation.  A half-century later, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed the initial directive establishing the position of the SDO/DATT on 21 December 2007.  Yet, for the fifty years since that era at the end of World War II, the DoD presence on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (the primary embassy leadership forum) evolved primarily in a divided team construct.

On one side of the team was the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) led by the DATT and housing all the diplomatically accredited MilDep attaches. As trained attaches and accredited diplomats, the chain of command for these officers went via the ambassador directly back to Washington, D.C. and the leadership at the DIA. 

On the other side of the DoD presence on the Country Team was the Security Assistance Office (SAO) or later Security Cooperation Office (SCO) led by the “SCO Chief” and housing the entirety of the DoD personnel managing SA and SC engagements and programs. It is noteworthy that the term SCO is a generic term as these offices have different names depending on local history and relationships with the partner nation.  In contrast to the DAO, the SCO’s chain of command goes via the ambassador to the respective Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and back to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the aptly named and clear lead SC agency for DoD.

With a split DoD presence on the Country Team having separate missions, representing separate equities and following separate chains of command while also lacking a formal unifying position or function, DoD cooperation and teamwork on the Country Team depended on personal charisma and individual professionalism. Unfortunately, ignoring the well-proven and time-tested universal “unity of command” tenet of military organizations allowed for dysfunctional operating environments to emerge between some DAOs and SCOs. Indeed, there were highly embarrassing cases of embassy leadership having to intervene and relieve DoD personnel of their embassy assignments to be “returned to service” due to lack of professionalism between attaches and security cooperation individuals – to include accounts of shoving matches between DoD personnel within embassy spaces.

The animosity between DAO and SCO personnel went deep, and in many cases had set into the fabric of the respective organizational cultures. Even within the U.S. Army FAO program (by far the MilDep with the most robust and mature FAO program), older FAOs told the young ones to pick their path and take either the DAO/attaché track or the SCO track as the two were simply not to mix. By extension, many retired FAOs took this divided organizational culture into their post-active duty civilian jobs at theater headquarter organizations, further memorializing and cementing the division into the organizational cultures of those higher headquarters.

To use SOUTHCOM as an example, even as late as 2008, it was still extremely difficult for an attaché – even a DATT assigned to a country in the SOUTHCOM theater to gain access to HQ SOUTHCOM spaces for office calls. In that year, one SDO/DATT (designate) to Peru attempted to use an official travel stop in Miami to visit HQ SOUTHCOM for briefings and consultations and to establish relationships and begin coordination. As an attaché, the officer was not welcome – the reluctance was found  across the command. After much insistence, the SDO/DATT (designate) eventually received permission to visit SOUTHCOM spaces but with specific and stringent limitations to meet only with Intelligence Directorate (J2) personnel.

Of note, resistance to SDO/DATT implementation existed not only within the DoD but within some Department of State (DoS) quarters as well. DoS leadership abbreviated one Ambassador’s tenure in part because of the Ambassador’s very pointed attempt to degrade the role of the SDO/DATT and keep the DoD Team divided. Though this ambassador was “a career FSO [Foreign Service Officer] who previously served as ambassador at another WHA [Western Hemisphere Affairs] post,” something was clearly and genuinely amiss. Among other leadership, prioritization and morale problems, the ensuing DoS Office of Inspector General (OIG) report after her early departure noted the following:  The previous Ambassador dealt separately and equally with the mission’s several different DOD elements and sometimes excluded the SDO/DATT from meetings with other DOD components. Recently, the mission prepared a briefing book for the Ambassador-designate. The coordinator of the process tasked each DOD element for separate briefing papers. Failure to recognize the Secretary of Defense’s designation of a SDO/DATT contravened the instruction of the Deputy Secretary of State and disempowered the SDO/DATT. Before the inspection, the acting DCM began to acknowledge the SDO/DATT’s position, and the chargé met with the attaché during the inspection for a discussion of his role. 

Yet, despite examples of normal and abnormal resistance to change, good leadership prevailed and SDO/DATT implementation went forward at U.S. embassies across the globe as directed.

A House United

To further leverage the SOUTHCOM example, the rate and degree of change to implement and accept the SDO/DATT concept on the DoD side was impressive. In 2009, the annual SOUTHCOM SCO conference proved pivotal to the effort due to a (then) revolutionary and controversial decision made by the SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff, USMC Brigadier General David C. Garza. Traditionalists on SOUTHCOM staff were confused and upset over the prospect of having some attaches (those already designated as SDO/DATTs and officially responsible for Security Cooperation activities and programs) attend the traditional SCO conference. For the long-term staff, it was simply anathema to have attaches travel to SOUTHCOM for a conference intended for SCOs. With the benefit of an outsider not encumbered by the way it had always been and reflecting a heightened appreciation for SecDef directives, BG Garza set out to implement the then current (2007) DoD Directive 5105.75 titled DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies. For emphasis, that directive’s paragraph 4.2 – a stand-alone paragraph – states “Unified DoD representation in U.S. embassies is critical to the accomplishment of national security objectives.”  

BG Garza issued in a genuine change in basic assumptions and directed the staff to invite all SDO/DATTs in theater (actual and designate) in addition to all the SCOs who were now under those SDO/DATTs for a one-time special conference that would break old molds. The conference was a success for building new bridges, yet it paled in comparison to the strong, clear and lasting message sent reverberating through the staff; SDO/DATTs have full responsibilities for both attaché and Security Cooperation operations and are unequivocally an integral, fundamental and intrinsic part of SOUTHCOM.

Other GCCs went through similar transitions with SDO/DATT implementation with differing degrees of difficulty depending on historic outlooks in the respective organizations. A decade later in 2018, the SDO/DATT concept is well-established and the preponderance of all GCC’s countries have an SDO/DATT – some FAOs but some not – leading the DoD Team within the Country Team. In general, the few remaining exceptions are those countries that have had to manage General and Flag officer level SC billets in country that were challenging to bring under the attaché rubric though even some of those – most notably Saudi Arabia as of 01 November 2017 when U.S. Army MG Peter D. Utley became the SDO/DATT – have started the transition to the SDO/DATT concept.

It is logical that FAOs, those military officers specifically trained and educated as military- diplomats and experts in foreign affairs should serve in SDO/DATT positions. This is particularly true of the very senior SDO/DATT positions. Recognizing this, both the 2005 and 2007 versions of the DoD Instruction on FAO Programs had language addressing a requirement for the management of FAO career paths all the way to general/flag officer (G/FO) levels. Service (MilDep) secretaries were to “Ensure DoD policies provide the Military Departments guidance on FAO career paths that ensure FAOs are competitive, based on their performance, for promotion to the G/FO level.  However, there is a certain irony in the fact that two of the most important flag officer SDO/DATT positions (Moscow and Beijing) remain essentially pure DATT positions as there is not much in the way of traditional SC efforts and engagements – not to mention a decided lack of Foreign Military Sales cases – with these “partners”. 

No system is perfect and along the way, there have been interesting inconsistencies by some MilDeps, yet with updates and over a decade (2007-2017) of momentum building behind them, those DoD instructions have made a difference and started to bear fruit. One prime example of the system working as intended is now-retired U.S. Army LTG Charles Hooper, former director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), who is both a former SDO/DATT and the senior FAO in the DoD.

Generational Change

From the beginning of SDO/DATT implementation, those involved realized that the change would take three or four generations of SDO/DATTs before the concept became the accepted norm with DoD Teams at U.S. embassies and the respective staffs at Geographic Combatant Commands.  Indeed, in 2019 SDO/DATTs-in-training take a required 4-week course in Security Cooperation at the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU, formerly known as DISCS and DISAM). The normalcy of the DoD Team structure under the SDO/DATT at a U.S. embassy is fait accompli. 

This does not mean that leadership did not allow some change within the parameters of the concept. For example, the initial directive was very clear on the fact that the SDO/DATT was absolutely both 100% DATT and 100% SCO Chief – and that the title of SCO Chief would not be used by anyone else. Many interpret this rather draconian requirement as a method of helping “break old habits” and to help solidify the SDO/DATT as the undisputed leader of the DoD Team at U.S. embassies. However, the DoD Teams themselves needed a way to identify those previous leaders who would now work directly under the SDO/DATT. For example, what would the team call the previous ODC Chief now working under the SDO/DATT but still in a leadership position within the ODC? By the 2010 timeframe, DoD leadership authorized an initial solution identifying the title “Deputy for Security Cooperation Operations”. Conversely, if the former DATT was now only the Air, Naval of Army attaché, she or he could be the “Deputy for Attaché Operations”. 

This was the difficult reality for the first generation of SDO/DATTs but as they rotated and the second and then third generations of SDO/DATTs arrived at embassies, further changes and a softening of the draconian rules appeared. By the 2013 timeframe, it was common for DoD Teams to again start calling the “Deputy for Security Cooperation Operations” the SCO Chief. Everybody – including the SCO Chief, embraced the fact that this person unquestionably worked for and under the SDO/DATT – the actual title proved a contentious issue no more.

From the moment they begin their training tracks, individual members of both sides of the formerly divided but now clearly united house learn and understand they will be working on a team led by an SDO/DATT. However, the rate of change is perhaps a bit slower on GCC staffs only because of the slower turnover of personnel who remember the former construct. The same logic applies – but perhaps a bit more pointedly – with the Local Employed Staff (LES) personnel within the respective sides of the DoD Team at U.S. embassies. Often, the LES personnel will have served for decades in their capacities and are the institutional memory of many an SCO or DAO. They are worth their weight in gold, but some are more capable than others of adapting, especially if it was a location that experienced turmoil under the previous divided house construct.

Among other mission and operational challenges, SDO/DATTs headed to U.S. embassies must understand the history of the DoD Team they are about to lead and be prepared to continue to facilitate and expedite the transition – especially with LES and sometimes even with GCCs – past any united- teamwork friction points that still may exist. The DSCU curriculum requires SDO/DATTs in training to complete a “Country Reference Guide” which drives them to identify key players and begin unpacking issues from the Security Cooperation perspective. On the attaché side, JMAS schedules briefings and consultations (Cs & Bs) with key National Capital Region players to allow SDO/DATTs in training to have exposure to a host of topics and the dynamics of the respective country team should figure prominently. These steps are both positive and proactive – and they must continue. It is also clear each progressive generation of SDO/DATTs will have an increasingly easier time with this particular but waning leadership challenge.

Conclusion

More than a decade since implementation of the SDO/DATT concept, this article looked back at early concept implementation challenges. As key personnel in the arena of DoD foreign area expertise, MilDep FAOs and their respective community managers played and still play significant roles in SDO/DATT implementation. Resistance to the concept was initially stiff and not exclusive to DoD personnel. Nonetheless, some exceptional leaders took early and aggressive steps to drive implementation in very positive ways. With minor modifications, the SDO/DATT concept has remained largely intact. In 2019, slightly over a decade after that 2008 initial implementation and moving into the third and fourth generations of SDO/DATTs (depending on the embassy), the concept is entering an initial phase of normalcy where the whole enterprise now understands and accepts the DoD Team concept as a given. As always, there is room for improvement. Yet, overall and after decades of risk-inducing division of DoD presence at U.S. embassies, DoD Teams now operate with increasing normalcy in a teamwork environment. In turn, both U.S. country teams and DoD higher headquarters realize and acknowledge the benefits of unity of command under an SDO/DATT.

About the Author

Joseph Piontek is an Instructor of Security Cooperation at the Defense Security Cooperation University in Dayton, Ohio. A native of Puerto Rico, he received his commission at the United States Naval Academy in 1987 and served on active duty for 30 years. He is fluent in multiple languages and has written extensively on DoD Foreign Area Officer community issues. Initially a Naval Aviator, he was a Mission Commander on EP-3 aircraft, but in 2006 was designated a U.S. Navy FAO as one of that communities’ original and founding members. He served as a first-generation SDO/DATT and has over a decade of experience serving at U.S. embassies, as well as tours as a foreign liaison officer at Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters and as a DIA Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.