Deterring and Defending Against Russian New Generation Warfare
By Colonel James Heath Harrower, U.S. Army
Editor's Note: Colonel Harrower's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Army War College. In the interest of space we publish here without research notes. To view the thesis with all research materials, go to www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding Scholarship.
The Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 raised concerns of Russia’s expansionist ambition as it relates to former Soviet territory. Security officials have since labeled the actions taken to achieve the annexation of Crimea as Russian New Generation Warfare (RNGW). Russian New Generation Warfare capitalizes on latent grievances and susceptible populations and applies a mix of actions designed to threaten national security while remaining below the threshold of a collective defense response within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5.
Most states are vulnerable to some degree to RNGW though former Soviet States, to include the NATO members of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, are particularly vulnerable to RNGW because they lack a security framework specifically tailored to deterring and defending against Russian destabilizing activity. Current NATO defense efforts focus on conventional wartime preparation though effective deterrence and defense against RNGW largely depends on the ability to compete below the threshold of war. Concepts and solutions need to focus on denying the Kremlin confidence in the ability to keep the conflict limited below a NATO or United Nations self or collective defense response. This ability is dependent on examining vulnerabilities specific to RNGW and devising solutions that increase the complexity of the Kremlin’s decision-making process to include informing and invoking a NATO Article 4 based security response and bolstering Article 3 resiliency requirements.
Within this study, I use the Baltic States as the optic for examination because of their proximity to Russia, their status as former Soviet Republics, the presence of an ethnic Russian population, and the potential for these states to lead the transformation of NATO deterrence efforts vis-à-vis Russian destabilizing and subversive activity because of their unique geography, history, and understanding. However, the recommendations should inform the broader Alliance while not dismissing either the specific legal frameworks (and challenges) within each state that prove critical to enabling deterrence or the response frameworks already in place, some of which remain state secrets. I first define RNGW and provide an example of its application using a Ukrainian focused vignette and examine why NATO needs to modify its deterrence and defense approach as it pertains to Russia. I then propose restructuring NATO and Baltic institutions to enable a three-part strategy to enhance the ability to deter and defend against RNGW on NATO’s eastern flank. The first part of this strategy is enabling early response to derail the progressive application of RNGW. The second part entails innovating conventional military capability to counter a limited application of Russian conventional capability. The final part of this strategy is transforming Baltic focused military security cooperation toward defending against RNGW.
Understanding Russian New Generation Warfare
For the purpose of this examination we will use Kuhn’s description of RNGW as a “distinct and genuinely indigenous Russian innovation aimed at winning the conflict by coercing the alliance-largely through all measures short of open warfare-into giving up on the post-Soviet space and, finally forswearing further enlargement.” These subversive measures include disregarding select national boundaries, international behavioral norms, and national and international laws to achieve limited strategic goals. Characteristics also include limited military engagements between fielded military forces on a non-linear battlefield though in the absence of a declaration of war in order to lessen the chance of a conflict with NATO.
Though labeled “New Generation,” this type of conflict is not new. Nations have often sought to use measures short of war to broaden control, reduce influence of competing states, and accomplish limited objectives without crossing into major military confrontations. As an example, totalitarian states sought to promulgate power within the Cold War environment in a similar manner. George Kennan described their actions in the late 1940s as subversion through psychological operations, assassination, economic pressure, blackmail, and any other means available to assist in meeting their objectives.
However, the character of RNGW is unique to the Russian Federation because of its linkage to Russian history, culture, worldview and a decision calculus markedly different from that of the US and many of its Allies and partners. RNGW characteristics include activities oriented towards: 1) sowing disruption and confusion to undermine the credibility of otherwise secure countries (those with stable institutions and without a sympathetic Russian population) and 2) targeting vulnerable diasporas and institutions within adjacent countries to expand influence. Central to RNGW and the Kremlin’s application of this subversive activity is the claim by Russia of their right to protect ethnic Russians living in former Soviet territory. Former Russian President and current Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev proclaimed, “Our unquestionable priority is to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are. We will also proceed from this in pursuing our foreign policy.” Russian General of the Army Valery Gerasimov describes accomplishing this through a reliance on non-military actions and domains (political, humanitarian, informational, and economic) that are supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out of actions of informational conflict and the actions of special operations forces. The open use of forces-often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation-is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the final success in the conflict.
He describes the character of this type of warfare as a blurring of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. He further amplifies the character as a blurring of defensive and offensive operations as long-distance “contactless” actions become the primary means of achieving objectives, one being spreading Russian influence.
Russian leaders adroitly capitalize on a number of different actions and mechanisms to spread regional influence and bolster the connection with ethnic Russians living abroad. A range of examples include leveraging the Russian Orthodox Church for the purpose of advocacy, establishing Russian affiliated professional sports teams in former Soviet states, and perpetuating a reliance on Russian energy to strengthen the Kremlin’s economic and political coercive ability. Not so obvious is the Kremlin’s use of surrogate personnel and venues to create an environment conducive to Russian interests and objectives. Gerasimov proffers that “The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.”
Not surprisingly then, the Kremlin uses surrogate information venues to protest perceived and actual human rights violations and discrimination against Russian diasporas and compliments this by granting Russian citizenship and issuing passports to ethnic Russians living abroad (with an eye toward separatists) to further strengthen Russian identity and allegiance. The Kremlin also provides Special Operation Force (SOF) and Intelligence advisory support to various criminal and paramilitary elements to sow societal and political chaos and to conduct intelligence collection and operations aimed at further subverting legitimate governance. We should note that few Russian persons within these former Soviet states have been noticeably disloyal to their country of residence and few have elected to move to the Russian Federation; however, the Kremlin is still successful in setting their hooks within various separatist elements to husband local ownership of insurrection and to conduct increasingly damaging subversive activities.
External to the target country, the Kremlin employs sophisticated cyber attacks and synchronizes these with internal subversion activity to amplify confusion and further damage institutions and officials. The Kremlin often combines this with other elements of national power such as exploiting dependency on Russian energy and trade partnerships. Militarily, the Russians leverage exercises to reinforce Russian military superiority and to intimidate neighbors. Finally, the Russians may conduct limited military operations under the guise of providing humanitarian assistance to oppressed Russian populations though that actually serves to destroy remaining enemy formations and resistance. The Kremlin’s sponsorship of propaganda and information operations, proxy forces and covert action, and the conduct of limited overt military operations stand to erode and eventually change borders, resource access, and population status quos in Russia’s favor without risking NATO intervention. To date the countries of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have been unable to prevent Russian destabilizing activities within their borders.
Ukraine: A Case Study in Russian New Generation Warfare
The Kremlin’s use of RNGW against Ukraine in 2014 provides an excellent vignette of RNGW application. First and as it relates to the annexation of Crimea, this region contained an ethnic Russian majority and existed as a separate political entity within Ukraine though in close proximity to Russia. Russia also maintained legitimate military and transit agreements with Ukraine that extended Russian military reach and enabled covert operations. Finally, Russia disputed the internal transfer of Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (SFSR) to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that occurred in 1954 and claimed the transfer violated both the Russian SFSR and the Soviet constitutions. These unique circumstances made Crimea a likely target of Kremlin destabilization efforts. Significantly, at the geo-political level, these efforts also stood to deny Ukraine’s entry into the European Union (EU) and NATO because territorial disputes serve as a disqualifying factor for membership.
Kremlin subversion efforts within Crimea amounted to covert operations that reinforced civil conflict that subsequently enabled a conventional invasion. The Kremlin began by shaping public opinion in advance of military operations through state media outlets. The Kremlin reinforced the messaging by coercing Ukrainian business elites with Crimea interests to defect to the Russian system to bolster the connection to and perception of the Russian heritage and lifestyle. Undeclared SOF infiltrated into Crimea to build support networks to collect intelligence, co-opt local officials, spread disinformation and sow confusion, and provide the perception of credible resistance against Ukrainian oppression. Russian SOF also leveraged and advised separatist rebels (many of whom came from Russia) that quickly secured vital infrastructure such as airports, police headquarters, military installations, and other government buildings. Additionally, the Kremlin conducted limited supporting military operations that destroyed select Ukrainian military outposts and implemented population control measures within Ukraine in support of the Russian nationalists. With key infrastructure and institutions in hand, to include the Supreme Council (Crimea parliament), the Kremlin installed a pro-Russian government that then held a referendum to separate from Ukraine and request inclusion within the Russian Federation. Kremlin support and direction of Crimea separatist efforts also fermented unrest in other parts of Ukraine.
The Kremlin also supported separatist efforts within the Donbas area of eastern Ukraine. These political protests transitioned into a violent insurgency that subsequently allowed the Kremlin to use humanitarian relief as a cover for action for Russian forces to cross the border and provide support to the pro-Russian elements. The Kremlin increased support-to include lethal aid and combat advisory assistance-to these separatist elements, several being led by Russian “volunteers.” As the insurgency worsened, Russia evoked the need to protect the Russian population and directly engaged Ukrainian military units. While the two campaigns are different and the linkage is less clear than it might appear, the subversive character of both are consistent within RNGW. Ukraine proved susceptible to this subversive character because they failed to establish effective deterrence and defense below the threshold of war to dissuade Russian actions and derail the progressive application of RNGW.
Why a Change of Approach is Needed
North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, especially those that previously fell behind the Iron Curtain previously, are also susceptible to Russian destabilizing efforts. The Kremlin continues a policy of re-exerting Moscow’s influence over former Soviet territory and previously demonstrated few scruples in destabilizing Ukraine and Georgia for its own security and foreign policy advantages. Specifically, the Baltic States and Poland offer Russia many additional strategic security and foreign policy advantages. First, their geography provided Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union strategic depth as it related to Western European countries and NATO military forces and could offer the same for the Russian Federation. These former “buffer states” are now NATO and EU members. Second, these states contain ice free ports within the Baltic Sea of both military and commercial value. Third, the Russian province of Kaliningrad is of critical importance to Russian military power projection and Kremlin coercive abilities. It is geographically isolated between Lithuania and Poland and provides Russia its only ice free port access to the Baltic Sea and Europe, serves as the home of part of the Russian Baltic Fleet, and houses numerous ballistic missile complexes. Additionally, portions of eastern Estonia (Ida-Viru) contain large oil deposits that are in very close proximity to the Russian border. Collectively and to avoid the fate of other former Soviet Republics that stand in the shadow of the Russian Bear, the Baltic States, in partnership with NATO, need concepts, capability, and a response framework specific to deterring and defending against RNGW.
The purpose of deterrence is to prevent an adversary from initiating harmful actions. The United States Army Special Operations Command offers an applicable definition of comprehensive deterrence as “The prevention of adversary action through the existence or proactive use of credible physical, cognitive, and moral capabilities that raise an adversary’s perceived cost to an unacceptable level of risk relative to the perceived benefit.” As it pertains to NATO’s eastern flank, a large part of deterrence rests with NATO and its obligation to defend member states within Article 5 (an attack on one is an attack on all). As it pertains to recent deterrence efforts, NATO provides threat analysis and policy recommendations through its various centers of excellence and is shoring up its cyber defense capabilities. NATO also increased its deterrence and defense posture through the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework that included the establishment of four battle groups in the Baltic States and Poland. Each battle group contains a mechanized or armored battalion and consists of a multi-national force of approximately 1,000 soldiers. NATO uses the eFP to signal to the Kremlin its increased support to members bordering Russia in the wake of Kremlin destabilizing efforts and to reinforce the premise that an attack on one member is an attack on the Alliance.
Problematic to this NATO response is that it focuses deterrence within traditional conventional wartime preparedness efforts and providing for the collective defense of a member above the threshold of armed conflict. Conversely, the Kremlin attempts to obfuscate Russian involvement and support wherever possible. The Kremlin does this by building and leveraging proxy and surrogate forces already within the target countries-to include disguising Russian forces as locals-while only using Russian forces in an overt manner to provide nominal protection to ethnic Russians within a framework of contrived grievances. These actions diminish the value of deterrence through conventional wartime preparedness. Failure to recognize and deter these actions offers the greatest provocation for Russia to increase these actions.
Conversely, preventing application of RNGW rests on the premise that the reward will not be worth the cost. Accordingly, because Russia seeks to employ measures intended to remain below the NATO threshold for invoking Article 5, NATO and its members need to build credible deterrence below the Article 5 threshold. This deterrence needs to focus heavily on leveraging the application of Article 4 that allows any member to consult NATO and request assistance when it feels its security or independence is threatened. It also needs to inform resiliency requirements within Article 3 to bolster each country’s ability to resist and recover from an attack.
Specifically, targeted states need to focus their deterrence efforts through an understanding of Russian thinking and then build measures to prevent Russia from acting. This deterrence must address the asymmetries in action between those that trigger a NATO Article 5 response, those that warrant a NATO Article 4 consultation, and those that do not. This understanding should subsequently drive changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) processes predicated on increasing NATO Article 3 resiliency requirements to resist coercion and subversion. These changes should also complicate the employment of the lower level use of force consistent with RNGW. However, NATO and the respective countries must first deliberately structure their military institutions to enable innovation congruent with RNWG application.
Restructuring Baltic and NATO Institutions
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in partnership with member states, first needs to build the appropriate framework to enable innovation. This includes establishing entities within each country to identify innovation requirements and linking those entities to NATO. This will provide the ability for each country to examine and devise solutions specific to their vulnerabilities while enabling NATO to serve as a subject matter expert to the broader alliance by instituting lessons learned, appropriate doctrine, and shaping plans, response options, and security cooperation events. The examination of a contemporary vignette demonstrates an applicable framework that enabled rapid military innovation in the face of complex challenges.
The US Army successfully innovated across the DOTMLPF spectrum to prevail against the irregular warfare tactics encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army Chief of Staff established the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) to assist units in countering asymmetric operations within Iraq and Afghanistan. The AWG independently examined doctrine and equipment that resulted in the institutionalization of numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures to frustrate enemy asymmetric efforts. This in turn led to the development and fielding of related equipment such as the man portable line charge used to clear improvised explosive device lanes. The Army subsequently placed AWG as a direct reporting unit to the Commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine and Command. Within this architecture, AWG routinely collaborated with the Army Centers of Excellence to develop relevant training and doctrine focused on countering enemy asymmetric capability, worked with the Training Centers for evaluation of concepts, and partnered with industry to field material solutions rapidly. Much like the US Army rapidly innovated to defeat myriad asymmetric threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, a similar construct within NATO could enable the rapid innovation of capabilities and concepts relevant to RNGW.
As it relates specifically to the Baltic States, no institution currently exists focused solely on innovation specific to RNWG. Instead, SOF is the de-facto military instrument for conceiving applicable counter-RNGW methods and equipment, though they relate primarily to SOF missions. The institution charged with identifying change requirements within the various Baltic States vis-à-vis RNGW will need to propose scenarios to drive discussion of potential threats and reactions to assist in identifying asymmetric vulnerabilities, specifically within the realm of subversion and coercion (and likely in partnership with police or internal security forces). The scenarios and exercises should include responses to Kremlin shaping operations, invasion and protracted struggle, and should examine conventional operations, special operations, and nonmilitary operations. The results should first inform country specific solutions aimed at increasing their individual resiliency to resist and recover from an attack, a principle anchored in NATO Article 3. These solutions should then inform curricula within the Baltic States Defense College that provides operational and strategic level education to Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian civilian and military leaders. By inculcating these solutions into the professional military education of the Baltic States these same leaders can then shape and inform broader NATO mil-mil engagements, national level exercises, and national defense plans.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization can accelerate this understanding and institutionalization through creation of a NATO Center of Excellence (CoE) focused on countering RNGW methods. Similar to the US Army CoEs that AWG collaborated with to enable innovation, NATO CoEs can also enable broad innovation. Specifically, NATO CoEs are international military organisations that train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO member and partner countries. They assist in doctrine development, identify lessons learned, improve interoperability and capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation. They offer recognised expertise and experience that is of benefit to the Alliance, and support the transformation of NATO, while avoiding the duplication of assets, resources and capabilities already present within the Alliance.
These centers specialize in a single functional area to serve as the subject matter expert to the broader alliance. There are currently twenty-four NATO accredited CoEs that range in expertise from Joint Airpower to Mountain Warfare. Some NATO CoEs are relevant to RNGW such as Cooperative Cyber Defense and Counter Intelligence and the Latvian based Strategic Communications CoE, but none is dedicated directly to serving as the subject matter expert specific to RNGW. While there is a Finland based European Hybrid CoE that examines a broad spectrum of hybrid threats, its focus is broader than NATO. However, a European Hybrid CoE and NATO CoE partnership stands to bolster a stronger and broader security framework by linking non-NATO member countries to NATO through the European CoE. It also serves as an opportunity to expand a coalition of expertise provided the NATO and European CoEs work to compliment and not duplicate efforts. Additionally, connecting individual NATO member innovation entities to a NATO RNGW CoE (and by extension, the European CoE) could serve as a powerful framework to enable innovation through implementation of lessons learned, experimentation of potential solutions and concepts, codifying into doctrine and recommending material solutions, and informing and shaping NATO security cooperation events and exercises aimed at countering Russian aggression.
Finally and given their proximity to Russia and their nuanced understanding of the threat, the Baltic States could likely serve as the “pathfinders” for NATO as it relates to informing and transforming broader NATO deterrence efforts that reside below a collective defense response. Within a framework that links individual NATO members to a NATO RNGW focused CoE, the following are proposed emphasis areas for innovating deterrence and defense: 1) enabling early response, 2) innovating conventional military capability to counter limited application of Russian conventional capability, and 3) transforming NATO and US military security cooperation events.
Enabling Early Response
The basis of building credible deterrence rests on a state’s ability to identify the application of RNGW through specific indicators that enable early responses to derail the progressive application of RNGW. Early identification of these indicators will allow NATO members to describe Russian actions to NATO quickly and accurately with intent of convening an Article 4 meeting to explore NATO security options. Within this, NATO should consider a spectrum of collective security responses to enable deterrence below an Article 5 collective defense response. Involving NATO early is important to eroding the Kremlin’s confidence in their ability to limit the scope of the conflict through largely non-attributable subversive activity.
A logical start point for examination is Kremlin attempts to influence opinion and perception in its favor. Example indicators include: 1) increased messaging and actions aimed at increasing Russian affinity within susceptible populations (primarily ethnic Russians or Russian speaking populations), 2) employment of narratives focused on cultivating and separating susceptible populations (real, perceived, or imagined grievances), 3) propaganda efforts to delegitimize the existing government, 4) exacerbating existing tensions to set conditions or to manufacture a pretext for future Russian intervention.
Related, NATO members should pay particular attention to humanitarian vectors the Kremlin can use to coalesce and organize resistance groups. Example indicators include increased Russian interest in human rights, voter rights, discrimination, and passport programs. The NATO members also need to develop indicators pertaining to the exploitation of the cyber domain to reinforce messages and actions that further damage, subvert, confuse, and coerce institutions and officials within the target state.
Additionally, the NATO members need to establish indicators of Russian attempts to establish physical and human infrastructure for the conduct of more mature destabilizing operations. Examples include insertion of Russian SOF and Intelligence cadre to recruit influence agents and establish information mechanisms and venues camouflaged from Russian sponsorship. These networks can subsequently amplify Russian sponsored messages to reinforce the perception of a large resistance element within the target state (i.e., the use of surrogates to reinforce media messages with physical observables that include graffiti, vandalism, and any other physical actions).
Also included is Kremlin assistance to extremist paramilitary groups, terrorist organizations, and criminal organizations. These groups provide potential avenues for Russia to conduct blackmail, bribery, sabotage, assassinations, and insurrection operations to build further influence. As operations mature from influencing to direct action, these groups can morph into purported “local defense groups” operating under the pretense of protecting the vulnerable Russian population. In reality, the Kremlin could obscure its actions by leveraging these groups to seize key institutions and infrastructure (airports, government buildings, financial institutions) within the target country.
The NATO members also need to develop conventional military indicators. They need to pay particular attention to the Kremlin’s use of conventional military capability as a psychological tool to reinforce Russian dominance or a particular narrative. A near border exercise can serve to undermine target country morale by highlighting the futility of resistance. They can also serve as covers for action from which to conduct covert operations and to stage pre-invasion forces with indirect fire, aerial reconnaissance, engineering (including assault bridging), and anti-access/area denial platforms being critical components of initial Russian conventional operations.
As member states develop these destabilizing indicators, they can then explore non-standard deterrent options to counter these asymmetric vulnerabilities with a likely focus on societal resilience. While it is outside of the scope of this paper to determine potential solutions per NATO member, the solutions will likely result in new defense concepts and models that increase the risk of expanding the conflict and assist in fulfilling their NATO Article 3 requirement to develop capacity to resist and recover from an attack. As an example, Lithuania established a Strategic Communication Office charged with tracking and providing a common operating picture of Russian propaganda. The government then enacted a propaganda law that provides the state the ability to close certain outlets or programs based on content. This is a noteworthy effort to counter RNGW and is the start point to providing a common operating picture of broader Kremlin subversive efforts.
As these concepts evolve, countries may find that making concerted efforts to engage and involve Russian populations will lessen their vulnerability to Kremlin influence. Additionally, they may find that introducing a layered territorial defense is a natural next step to current efforts aimed at educating the populace on resistance (e.g., Lithuania published a civil disobedience manual titled “Guide to Active Resistance” for distribution in school and libraries). The use of a combination of civilian resistance networks working in tandem with police and security forces to defend the population against Russian subversion agents may pose a more complex problem to Russia than the introduction of additional NATO or host nation conventional capability. As another example, findings may conclude that a nationally dispersed and networked auxiliary force with ready access to a large inventory of man portable anti-tank weapons through a decentralized armory system complicates Russian decision making more than increasing conventional capability. Once accepted, this defense model will then necessarily drive a new DOTMLPF process that ensures the appropriate training, organization, and material procurement relevant to the threat of RNGW.
Innovating Conventional Military Capability
Increasing the complexity of Russian decision making and denying the Kremlin the confidence it can limit the scope of the conflict also requires states to identify appropriate defenses against the conventional military capabilities that the Kremlin employs as a supporting effort within RNGW. The application of conventional military capability within RNGW is dependent on target acquisition capabilities to quickly find and destroy targets and degrade the communication infrastructure to deny effective response. Accordingly, NATO members need to focus on anti-target acquisition capabilities and hardening command and control (C2) infrastructure. This includes such measures as reducing force signatures, dispersing formations, and employing multi-spectrum camouflage, infra-red and radio frequency obscurants, counter-lasers, decoys (visual, radio frequency, acoustic, infra-red, and computer network), and communication and acoustic jammers.
Specifically, Russian unmanned aerial systems (UAS) combined with Russian Spetsnaz and SOF teams provide a layered sensor network to feed targeting information to indirect fire systems. Also inherent to this layered acquisition system is the mass employment of snipers. These sniper formations canalize opposing forces for targeting by indirect fire systems consistent with Russian doctrine that continues to employ artillery as the primary battle operating system. While some munitions are global positioning system (GPS) or laser guidance capable, the Russians continue to rely on a high volume of indirect fire. Thus, reducing force signatures while increasing employment of counter-UAS capabilities, decoys, radio frequency obscurants, and multi-spectrum camouflage across dispersed formations will serve to frustrate Russian target acquisition capabilities. This will lessen the likelihood of limited Russian conventional capability quickly defeating opposing formations and will put at risk the Kremlin’s desire to limit the scope of the conflict by resulting in a greater likelihood of a NATO response.
Respective NATO defense and security forces also need to harden their command and control infrastructure against Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Russian EW capabilities provide the ability to jam a spectrum of signals to prevent opposing forces from communicating or navigating through GPS means with a corollary effect of directly increasing the effectiveness of the Russian target acquisition process. Conversely, the Russians can transmit false data to opposing forces to cause them to make faulty plans and movements. Finally, the Russians also incorporate EW capabilities into their target acquisition process to locate (through electromagnetic direction finding) and bring indirect fire to bear on opposing command and control locations. These counter target acquisition and communication hardening solutions will also drive the DOTMLPF process to enhance broader deterrent capabilities and will also inform and guide broader military partnerships with both NATO and the US.
Transforming Security Cooperation Events
Implementation of these solutions into doctrine and training will drive future NATO and US military security cooperation exercises and engagements. The NATO and US cooperation with the Baltic States is imperative to ensure proper integration of new acquisitions and concepts into the broader NATO structure within a security paradigm that focuses on denying destabilizing activity on the NATO eastern flank. The internalization of these new deterrence concepts will also drive acquisition demand. At the NATO level, security cooperation and defense initiatives that account for social networking to better connect with Russian diasporas, incorporating auxiliary and reserve elements into non-traditional roles such as cyber defense, and incorporating a decentralized armory system in support of territorial defense will almost assuredly prove more effective against RNGW than traditional exchanges and partnerships that focus primarily on tactical level military capabilities and conventional preparedness. This proposed change will also directly support United States European Command’s desire to “build the capacity of allies and partners to contribute their own deterrence and defense.” The combination of creating institutions and processes focused on innovation to build capability relevant to deterring RNGW can serve to inform and transform NATO’s capacity and capability to do the same.
Conclusion
Deterring and defending against RNGW is dependent on building a tailored security framework. Specifically, because the application of the majority of RNGW methods operate in the realm of actions other than war and deliberately obfuscates the Kremlin’s support to avoid a NATO collective defense response, defense efforts need to focus at the same level without abandoning traditional strengths. This is a departure from the traditional focus of deterring through wartime preparedness. A potential institutional framework is creating a NATO RNGW CoE to partner with individual defense ministries and the Baltic Defense College to promote broad understanding while tailoring capabilities, responses, plans, and exercises. Additionally, NATO members need to build a framework of indicators to recognize application of RNGW that enable early response. Early NATO involvement, potentially through an Article 4 collective security response, is critical to derailing the progressive application of RNGW. Additionally, NATO members need to identify defense measures against Russian conventional military capabilities likely to provide limited support within RNGW operations, specifically Russian target acquisition capabilities. Doing so will again increase the complexity of Kremlin decision-making and deny them confidence that they can limit the conflict through quick and efficient use of conventional military capability. Finally, these solutions need to inform NATO and US military security cooperation events to ensure proper integration of planning, training, and acquisitions into the broader NATO structure within the proposed security paradigm that focuses on denying subversive activity.
About the Author
Colonel Heath Harrower is a Special Forces officer currently serving in the United States Army Special Operations Command. COL Harrower served in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Horn of Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United Arab Emirates. He holds a BS from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and masters degrees from the Air Command and Staff College, the Army War College, and Norwich University.