Critical Thinking: Shifting from a Tactical to a Strategic Mindset
By LCDR Winston Alexander Charles Massey, U.S. Navy
As we reflect on recent Department policies to change which higher education programs are available to FAOs during their accession and training, LCDR Massey’s piece offers food for thought not only on FAO development but also on the development of strategic leaders in our military profession as a whole.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Military Departments, the Department of War, or the U.S. Government.
In “Learning the Art of Critical Thinking,” Richard Paul and Linda Elder define critical thinking as “the disciplined art of ensuring that you use the best thinking you are capable of in any set of circumstances.”[i] They emphasize enhancing critical thinking skills and provide recommendations for improvement. They also highlight the importance of “thinking about thinking,” which involves understanding how people process information and develop their reasoning.[ii] The same concepts can be applied to U.S. Navy communities as well, which emphasize, apply, and rely on critical thinking concepts in distinct ways. Analyzing professional military education within the maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA) and the foreign area officer (FAO) communities, this article examines three key elements of critical thinking, highlighting differences in decision-making systems, the type of learning environment, and the types of problems they encounter. As lateral transfer officers, Navy FAOs must reflect on the thinking skills used from previous communities to fully recognize, leverage, and apply the critical thinking shifts required in the Navy FAO community.
First, the MPRA community and the Navy FAO community emphasize different strategic decision-making systems. In “The Identification and Education of U.S. Army Strategic Thinkers,” Paul K. Van Riper identifies three approaches to decision making—those based on intuition and pattern recognition; those based on analytics and complex computations; and those that deal with nonlinear challenges with no single, clear answer.[iii] In the MPRA community, junior naval flight officers (NFO) serve as co-tactical coordinators (COTAC) and tactical coordinators (TACCO), relying predominantly on intuition and analytical systems to guide decision-making. While they conduct a variety of missions, P-3C and P-8A air crews specialize in identifying, tracking, and engaging submarines in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Training and missions emphasize analytic decision-making systems, as successful missions require in-depth study of submarine operational, tactical, and acoustic characteristics. Additionally, air crews must study and execute proper sonobuoy deployment patterns to track submarines using time, speed, and distance calculations. Beginner COTACs and TACCOs conducting ASW missions must perform significant pre-mission planning and predetermined calculations to ensure mission success. However, as they gain more experience in simulation training and real-world missions, intuition and pattern recognition approaches to decision-making become more prevalent. This type of decision-making manifests in the development of pre-planned responses, ‘on-the-fly’ calculations, and faster reaction times during submarine prosecution.
Conversely, the Navy FAO community tends to emphasize non-linear approaches to decision-making instead of intuitive or pattern-based approaches. Van Riper notes that, because some situations do not fall within analytical or intuition procedures due to their uniqueness or a lack of pattern recognition, decision-makers must “uncover or distinguish a structure from what is indistinct and obscure.”[iv] He further notes that, while these types of scenarios and problems lack strictly right or wrong answers, certain answers prove better than others.[v] Officers in the Navy FAO community deal with these types of non-linear approaches often in their daily work. For example, planning and cooperation staff officers at U.S. Navy Forces Korea work daily with their Republic of Korea Navy counterparts to enhance allied cooperation and pursue goals in accordance with U.S. and Korean national security strategies.
However, because national security strategy documents only provide general guidance, planners must decide how best to accomplish the end goals. Additionally, both the American and Korean planners must consider what their counterparts are willing (and unwilling) to do to achieve optimal results. For example, both American and South Korean strategic documents have prioritized partnering with allied nations to improve peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the means of achieving that result differs based on a multitude of factors. For American planners, having the South Korean military conduct joint exercises and drills with Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) would be an excellent way to strengthen military capabilities and promote security in the Northeast Asia region. Unfortunately, due to historical friction and current political climate, the South Korean military and JMSDF are hesitant to collaborate with each other. This scenario challenges Navy FAOs in Japan and South Korea to find ways for the two states to work together to help the U.S. achieve mutual strategic goals. U.S. planners have achieved greater cooperation from both Japan and South Korea in other areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. While full military cooperation between South Korea and Japan is unlikely in the near term, Navy FAO planners in South Korea used non-linear thinking approaches to identify common areas in which the two states can strengthen their national security goals together. This non-linear thinking approach, grounded in the underlying factors previously described by Van Riper, is invaluable to the Navy FAO community, as its officers face challenges that lack easily identifiable patterns, reliable historical precedents in changing political conditions, and fixed rules for accomplishing tasks that may not be readily apparent to FAOs who have served only one tour in a given country.
In addition to different decision-making systems influencing critical thinking, the type of learning environment emphasized in each community also impacts critical thinking differently. In “More Dissent Needed: Critical Thinking and PME,” Nicholas Murray explains that, although a lack of dissent serves useful purposes in the military, that same attitude is detrimental to the development of critical thinking and leadership skills.[vi] As part of his analysis of dissent between military and civilian educational programs, Murray defines the words training and education to assess how each term impacts critical thinking. He explains that training undermines critical thinking due to a lack of dissent, while education enhances critical thinking by promoting dissent.[vii] In terms of education, its level of importance can be seen in how warfare communities emphasize requirements. While the Navy provides education through institutions and programs such as the U.S. Naval Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), these avenues provide a baseline requirement for all officers prior to their commission regardless of the warfare community. Additionally, the Navy also offers master’s programs for all officers through institutions such as the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School. However, according to Naval Administrative Message (NAVADMIN) 223/21 from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy only requires officers in Year Group 2015 and later to complete in-residence graduate education prior to assuming major command, despite its recognition that “in-residence education programs continue to provide the best opportunity to mature critical and/or strategic thinking skills necessary for Navy leaders today.”[viii] As an unrestricted line community covered by this NAVADMIN, the MPRA and other aviation communities do not require advanced education to further develop critical thinking skills as part of their initial warfare qualifications. In contrast, the FAO community prioritizes the early development of advanced critical thinking skills, making such education a mandatory requirement for full qualification.
Further analyzing the FAO community’s emphasis on education, this type of learning environment also enhances critical thinking skills by encouraging dissent. Murray describes education as a process to “acquire a body of knowledge and practice thinking so that [students] are better prepared to deal with the unexpected.”[ix] As mentioned previously, because the Navy FAO community requires officers to earn a graduate degree as part of the qualification process, it places a high value on education. Specifically, the Navy FAO community sends most of its new officers to the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) National Security Studies program if they do not already have the prerequisite graduate education. The NPS curriculum consists of several majors based on the region in which the new Navy FAO will specialize. Furthermore, the classes in the program are interdisciplinary and consist of often-conflicting subjects such as history, economics, and political science at the macro level, with additional opportunities to dig deeper into particular subjects through individual research assignments and graduate theses. Each course requires the students to think about the relationships between the subjects and determine optimal solutions. Through assigned essays and class discussions, these exercises generate dissent as students freely share, debate, and question differing opinions while solving complex problems. As students express dissent through written and verbal discourse, their critical thinking skills improve, which prepares them for the uncertain geopolitical strategic challenges they will face during their first assignment overseas.
Discussing training as the second type of learning environment, Murray defines the term as an event that “typically involves teaching and practicing a specific task, skill, or drill intended to deal with a scenario that is known, or at least reasonably predictable.”[x] Because the MPRA community (and the aviation community as a whole) often requires the use of repetitive tasks in operational and tactical scenarios, training fits well in this type of learning environment. For junior officer TACCOs, training consists mostly of memorization of aircraft emergency procedures, operational limitations of equipment, and a menu of standardized tactical procedures for a variety of mission sets. After learning these items in ground school, officers then practice in simulators with other crew members to gain proficiency and strengthen habit patterns. After achieving simulator proficiency, new TACCOs and aircrew members integrate into a designated aircrew, flying training missions and conducting simulations together to sustain proficiency in their respective team roles. While this type of learning environment supports the necessary development of tactical expertise in junior officers, it constrains critical thinking by leaving no room for dissent in the early stages of their career. However, as TACCOs gain more flight hours, experience, and qualifications, they can later become qualified as mission commanders (MC), Instructor TACCOs, and Weapons and Tactics Instructors (WTI), which requires progressively more non-linear critical thinking skills to plan and execute missions successfully. For example, as an MC or Instructor TACCO, officers must plan complex missions involving increased internal and external variables and balance aircrew training objectives with real-world missions, in addition to completing their primary TACCO duties. Furthermore, WTIs demonstrate non-linear thinking skills through their roles by not only teaching the MPRA community tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) but also creating new ones within the multi-mission warfare areas in which MPRA aircraft specialize.
Finally, critical thinking skills in the MPRA and Navy FAO communities differ based on the types of challenges they primarily face in terms of kind and wicked problems. In Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World, David J. Epstein explores and favors “…the power of breadth, diverse experience, and interdisciplinary exploration, within systems that increasingly demand hyperspecialization.”[xi] As part of his analysis, Epstein references research conducted by psychologist Daniel Kahneman, who studied how people gain experience and expertise in kind and wicked problem domains.[xii] With these domains in mind, Epstein explains that specialists excel at solving kind problems, whereas individuals with broader experience navigate uncertain or wicked environments more effectively.[xiii] The MPRA community operates mostly in kind environments, while the Navy FAO community operates predominantly in wicked environments.
The MPRA community thrives in kind domains due to the specialized missions it conducts. Epstein defines kind domains as environments in which learning is based on repeating patterns that provide quick, accurate feedback to correct errors.[xiv] Epstein explains that “the learning environment is kind because a learner improves simply by engaging in the activity and trying to do better.”[xv] He states that learning in this type of domain is excellent for specialization in technical training, as personnel improve skills by receiving feedback and correcting their errors. The MPRA community reflects this model, with aircrews of radar operators, acoustic operators, pilots, and TACCOS specializing in their respective fields and continuously training to detect targets of interest such as ships and submarines. To improve skills, crews practice together in high-fidelity simulations that replicate the procedures and tactics needed to detect these targets. TACCOs practice dropping acoustic sonobuoy patterns extensively in simulators to find and track submarines. After dropping the pattern, TACCOs receive immediate feedback by either gaining acoustic contact with the submarine or hearing nothing at all. If they do not hear the submarine, they immediately reassess the situation by dropping a more accurate sonobuoy pattern or try a different sonobuoy pattern. Over time, reaction times, expertise, and knowledge about patterns improve due to the kind environment.
On the contrary, the Navy FAO community operates in a wicked environment, confronting few recognizable patterns and high uncertainty in achieving objectives. As Epstein describes, “in wicked domains, the rules of the game are often unclear or incomplete, there may or may not be repetitive patterns and they may not be obvious, and feedback is often delayed, inaccurate, or both.”[xvi] To combat wicked domains, Epstein emphasizes the importance of range, the ability for someone to take knowledge from one area and use it to find creative solutions in other areas.[xvii] Navy FAOs interacting with foreign governments and entities must have range to enhance international cooperation and achieve strategic objectives. However, countless variables across multiple fields—such as political atmosphere, economic ties, and historical tensions—can shape strategic cooperation. As a result, these shifting factors complicate identifying patterns and solutions that work consistently.
For example, South Korean presidents frequently shift their political stance toward North Korea, demonstrating constant change. From 2017 to 2022, President Moon Jae-In emphasized diplomacy and dialogue with North Korean leadership during his tenure.[xviii] However, his successor, President Yoon Seuk Yeol, took a stronger and more militaristic approach against provocative acts by North Korea.[xix] Providing an example of the range needed to adjust to this new stance as a Navy FAO, I helped facilitate President Yoon’s stance by coordinating his visit to the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT aircraft carrier in July 2022—the first visit to an aircraft carrier by a South Korean president in 30 years and only the third visit in the country’s history.[xx] While this instance advanced U.S. strategic objectives, limited precedence and minimal historical data offered no clear pattern to shape this solution in a political environment full of constantly changing variables. Furthermore, this visit was not the only solution because the U.S. can demonstrate military power to adversaries in other ways. Because of the strategic nature of their work environment, Navy FAOs must think broadly and be able to adjust solutions based on shifting variables within multiple fields.
In conclusion, critical thinking is a vital asset for making the best decisions in any given line of work. One way to improve critical thinking is to understand and “think about how we think.” Applying the same concept from a Navy community perspective, this article evaluated three key critical thinking elements within professional military education across the MPRA and FAO communities. First, the MPRA community typically deals with intuitive and computational systems, while the Navy FAO community mostly emphasizes non-linear approaches to decision-making, which require more critical thinking skills. Second, the MPRA community tends to discourage dissent by focusing on training, whereas the Navy FAO community promotes dissent by emphasizing education. Finally, the MPRA community operates in kind environments due to specialized mission requirements, while the Navy FAO community operates in wicked environments characterized by uncertain outcomes and limited pattern recognition in achieving strategic goals. These differences demonstrate that, at the beginning of an officer’s career in each respective community, the Navy FAO community emphasizes non-linear thinking skills and breadth of knowledge, while the MPRA community relies more heavily on linear, specialized expertise. Although critical thinking aspects differ in each community, it is important for officers to recognize, adapt, and align these skills with the nature of work they are required to perform. By reflecting on these concepts, Navy FAOs can assess how their own critical thinking has evolved from previous communities, strengthen the Navy’s Get Real Get Better mindset, and further cultivate excellence as strategic operators.[xxi]
About the Author:
Lieutenant Commander Massey was commissioned through Officer Candidate School in January 2012 and was designated a Naval Flight Officer in May 2013. Following training, he reported to Patrol Squadron EIGHT (VP-8) where he deployed to FOURTH, FIFTH, and SEVENTH Fleet in the P-3C and P-8A Poseidon. In February 2017, Winston joined Unmanned Patrol Squadron ONE NINE (VUP-19), where he operated the MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). Next, he served on USS Nimitz (CVN 68) in the FIFTH and SEVENTH Fleet areas of responsibility. Upon acceptance to the foreign area officer community in 2021, Winston attended the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute. From 2024 to 2026, he served as the N51 Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans at U.S. Naval Forces Korea in Busan, Republic of Korea. Winston now serves as an INDOPACOM Security Cooperation Planner in the J53 Global Engagements and Cooperation Division at U.S. Space Command, temporarily headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
[i] Richard Paul and Linda Elder, “Learning the Art of Critical Thinking,” Rotman Management Magazine, no. Winter 2014 (January 2014): 41, Winter 2014, https://doi.org/ROT221-PDF-ENG.
[ii] Richard Paul and Linda Elder, “Learning the Art of Critical Thinking,” 41.
[iii] Paul K. Van Riper, “Chapter 1: The Identification and Education of U.S. Army Strategic Thinkers,” in Exploring Strategic Thinking: Insights to Assess, Develop, and Retain Army Strategic Thinkers, ed. Heather M. K. Wolters et al. (United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2013), 17–20, https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/e639722013-001.
[iv] Paul K. Van Riper, “Exploring Strategic Thinking,” 19.
[v] Paul K. Van Riper, “Exploring Strategic Thinking,” 19.
[vi] Nicholas Murray, “More Dissent Needed: Critical Thinking and PME,” War on the Rocks, July 29, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/more-dissent-needed-critical-thinking-and-pme/.
[vii] Nicholas Murray, “More Dissent Needed.”
[viii] The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “NAVADMIN 223/21: Update to Senior Officer Graduate Education Requirements,” October 8, 2021, https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/Portals/55/Messages/NAVADMIN/NAV2021/NAV21223.txt?ver=35obCLB_ktBQHcDma05OZA%3d%3d.
[ix] Nicholas Murray, “More Dissent Needed.”
[x] Nicholas Murray, “More Dissent Needed.”
[xi] David J. Epstein, Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World (Riverhead Books, 2019), 289.
[xii] David J. Epstein, Range, 19–21.
[xiii] David J. Epstein, Range, 213.
[xiv] David J. Epstein, Range, 21.
[xv] David J. Epstein, Range, 21.
[xvi] David J. Epstein, Range, 21.
[xvii] David J. Epstein, Range, 34.
[xviii] Choe Sang-Hun, “Departing South Korean Leader Exchanges Farewell Letters with Kim Jong-Un,” World, The New York Times, April 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/world/asia/north-korea-kim-moon-letters.html.
[xix] Jessie Yeung et al., “Exclusive: South Korea’s New Leader Says Age of Appeasing North Korea Is Over,” CNN, May 23, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/asia/south-korea-president-exclusive-interview-intl-hnk/index.html.
[xx] Mun Jewon, “President Yoon Boards US Roosevelt Aircraft Carrier…Demonstrates ‘Strong ROK-US Alliance,’” The Asia Business Daily, June 25, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/08/205_377393.html.
[xxi] U.S. Navy Office of Warfighting Advantage, “Get Real Get Better (GRGB),” August 1, 2025, https://www.owa.navy.mil/organizations/grgb-home/.