China's Peacekeepers: Assessing the Opportunities and Challenges for Africa
By Commander Jean Pierre Lamane Tine, Senegalese Navy
Editor's Note: Commander Tine's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Navy Command College. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Introduction
During the Korean War (1950-1952), the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) had sent thousands of troops to fight by the North Koreans against the first United Nations coalition forces. This engagement turned the tide of the war and gave China the impression that UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) were under western influence. China, for a long time, decided to oppose or abstain from participating in un peacekeeping matters. By contrast, the first and latest China policy on peacekeeping is advocating thirty years of Chinese peacekeeping while aiming to make China the world-leading nation in UN peacekeeping. In the great power competition (GPC), China's impressive achievement is worrying partners and adversaries about the good intention behind this sudden change.
Since the independences, Africa has been struggling with insecurity, instability, and conflicts. In recent years, Africa's security has improved with the more complex interaction between the influential older powers and the new emerging powers— China, Brazil, India, and Russia. UN peacekeeping in Africa is becoming a field of competition and cooperation, although becoming a land of GPC. Peace and stability have become a global concern. As China increased its UN peacekeeping footprint, Africa faces the dilemma of balancing the great opportunities and benefits gained from China's UN peacekeeping commitment and the risks and challenges of the GPC.
Most importantly, Africa has to figure out a way to transform this new China peacekeeping opportunity to restore peace and stability in the continent. Therefore, to benefit from the PRC peacekeepers' engagement, Africa and China must seek to deepen the relationship in UNPKO by taking a more active role in conflict resolution in the continent. Africa must also use the PRC opportunity to reinforce regional and continental mechanisms for peace and stability by building a comprehensive approach. Besides, Africa has to address the challenges and threats posed by the unwanted influence brought by Chinese peacekeeping engagement. Lastly, Africa must utilize the multilateral approach to deal with security threats and challenges while building an integrated architecture to peace and stability.
China's Peacekeeping: An Opportunity For Africa
Since its first mission in 1989 in Namibia, the PRC has sparked its contributions in both personnel and funding toward UNPKO. Chinese peacekeepers have participated in 25 UN missions, especially in Africa—16 out of 25 un missions. The PRC's increasing involvement in UNPKO is an opportunity for Africa to compensate for the western powers' decreased interest in UN missions. Chinese peacekeepers will provide more resources—personnel, training, and equipment—will strengthen the UN peacekeeping mechanism and empower African initiatives through partnership.
Firstly, the PRC increased participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Africa was helpful to handle some ongoing conflicts in Africa. By providing troops, equipment, and expertise, China was lessening the burden in the UN struggles to find well-equipped, well-trained, and well-funded troops. By contrast, most western countries would not commit forces under the UN banner. Remarkably, among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China is the leading member in the troop's contribution to UN missions. In Africa, the other global power preferred to have parallel or concomitant operations—particularly France. France has a dual stand of embedding staff in the UN while maintaining a force under the national flag as the situation warrant. French troops have conducted operation "Barkhane" in Mali, "Licorne" in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, and "Sangaris" in the Central African Republic while MUNISMA, ONUCI , and MUNISCA were ongoing under the UN flag. The PRC involvement under the UN banner is very symbolic of China-Africa trust. China's non-colonial history and anti-imperialist rhetoric record find a favorable echo amongst some African masses and elites in the new competition with western powers. China's commitment aims to shape the continent's future through the UN soft power to reinforce partnership with Africans.
Secondly, the level of expertise for the Chinese peacekeepers is expanding toward more specialized and technical fields—medical, engineering, logistical, force protection, aviation. This diversification of the PRC role in UNPK missions brought needed support for stabilization and conflict termination. China's participation in the peacebuilding mechanism was very successful in Liberia, and Sierra Leone by its support in infrastructure building and state functions support—medical, education, transportation. Chinese expertise and capabilities are valuable to help the reconstruction of vitally needed infrastructures while providing essential humanitarian assistance. Also, the persistent presence of Chinese forces and personnel in UNPK in Africa is supporting common shape understanding and fostering training opportunities for the African partners. The new PRC UNPK strategy is planning to strengthen African capabilities through funding and training. Remarkably, between 2016 and 2017, the AU's initiative "silence the guns" got from China $11 million to support training for the African peacekeepers.
Lastly, the PRC peacekeeping strategy also advocates more support and funding for specific African countries, the regional initiatives, and au to maintain peace, security, and stability. China supports AU through the African peace and security architecture (APSA) by strengthening Africa's capabilities toward preventing or resolving conflicts. Notably, in support of the APSA, president Xi Jinping offered five years of funding with $100 million worth in military assistance in 2015 for the African Standby Force and African capacity for immediate response to crises. This support will help UA and some regional economic communities (REC)—ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC—to better focus on peace operations around the continent—like in Somalia and Guinea Bissau. In recent years, AU and some REC have successfully launched operations ahead of the UN as first responders for a crisis. The main weaknesses were the lack of funding and sustainment. Mostly, the UN took over or transformed in hybrid missions most of the African initiatives—AMIS became UNAMID, MISCA ended as MUNISCA, AFISMA gave MUNISMA. The PRC support for AU initiatives is adding value to the UN and European Union partnerships. This support can move forward the Pan-African approach toward peace and security. In the end, as stated by El Ghassim Wane, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, "….the Africans want to take control of peace on their continent."
In sum, China's peacekeeping footprint is increasingly becoming more complex. China is taking bold moves to engage more in security, stability, and peace across Africa. By combining funding and support to the African initiative through the UN, China plays a more prominent role in shaping the trends and paths for peace in Africa. As China's involvement in peacekeeping in Africa is growing, the real intention of such a sudden interest and its impacts on the future of Africa is still unanswered.
China's Peacekeeping: Challenges And Threats For Africa
The new PRC policy on peacekeeping advocates, "China's armed forces participate in the UNPKOs because the pursuit of peace is in the genes of the Chinese nation." In contrast, the PRC defense white paper has listed eight of China's national defense aims without any mention of peacekeeping. The two last aims give a clear stand on the safeguarding of China's national interest. Therefore, Africa must be cautious about China's real motivations for peacekeeping. China's unrevealed strategy focuses mainly on support to a long-term economic vision of building a comprehensive military system capable of sustaining its political aim of being an influential world power.
First, the Chinese involvement in UNPKO follows trends of the economic growth from Deng Xiao Ping's "open door policy" to Jiang Zemin's "go out policy." China has tried to strive on the world stage and to recapture its lost influence. From 1981 to now, the economy has grown exponentially, so did Chinese involvement in world affairs, particularly in peacekeeping. Africa has become a resources provider and a market for goods and investments. With the "belt and road initiative" (BRI), China is investing heavily to secure its access to resources and trade opportunities. Therefore, the increasing involvement in peacekeeping is mainly a way to ensure its economic footprint. By analogy, this increased alignment between economy and military power can recall the European scrambled for Africa during the colonial era. China increased military presence may be a way to guarantee Chinese investment, access to strategic resources, or the need to protect the Chinese diaspora in Africa. The actual deployment trend in Africa shows links to strategic areas of interest for China—Sudan, South Sudan, and DRC are oil, minerals (iron, ore), and arms sales. These high economic interests drove the PRC to step in and pressure the Sudan government to implement a peace process in Darfur. The PRC had even to go against its pledge of non-interference to safeguard its interests. China's use of peacekeeping to preserve economic interests is a challenge for Africa. Moreover, this economy-based approach to peacekeeping is mainly accentuating the new rush for Africa's resources.
Second, China's longstanding goal is to build a world-class military in the mid-21st century. PRC is aiming to have a global outreach to defend China's national interests and protect Chinese citizens. However, China's People Liberation Army (PLA) has no actual combat experience—the last significant combat encounter was in the 1980s with Vietnam. Therefore, deploying peacekeepers in Africa is an excellent way to "carrying out military training in real combat conditions." PLA needs to strengthen its combat capabilities and experience, evaluate its military operational functions, and learn to operate in a hostile environment. Mali and South Sudan were very enlightening for mainly providing combat experience and testing new capabilities—hardware, doctrines, partnerships. China weighs its combat power in Africa under the cover of the UN—piracy and peacekeeping. PLA is gaining operational and tactical experience while showing its capabilities to deploy, sustain, and protect its national interest. This military outreach is demonstrating China's military capabilities. The main risk for Africa comes from arms proliferation as Chinese arms sales are growing in the continent. While acting for peace and stability, China simultaneously makes arms deals and donations to the African governments. Weapon proliferation, particularly small arms and light weapons (SALW), is a significant challenge for Africa's security. The ongoing conflict in South Sudan shows the impact of proliferation in regional security in East Africa.
Lastly, China's role in the GPC is expanding to Africa in providing an alternative political model. China's historical background as a developing country and its political stand of non-alignment—Five Principles of Bandung—have echoed in Africa as a reliable partner. Through the UNPKO, China seeks to transform the relationship with Africa by setting new standards for security and stability. However, China's foreign policy seems pragmatic and flexible, as shown by the recent conflicts and engagement in Darfur and South Sudan. China's non-interference policy shifted for a more accommodating interest-driven policy. The international controversial "responsibility to protect (R2P)" and the unconditional support to the sovereign government are challenging for China's peacekeeping policy. China and Africa have some opposite views on the priority between the safety of civilians during conflicts—human rights issues, war crimes and genocides—Darfur—and the right for interference from outside powers—in the Libyan crisis. The new China's involvement in Africa through peacekeeping is strengthening the Chinese foreign policy of strict compliance with sovereignty by promoting the authoritarian regimes. Sadly, this support of non-democratic governments is causing more instability and civil unrest across the continent—with El Bahir and Mugabe regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe. This new Chinese influence is downplaying human rights issues and democratic governance, thus, threatening UA's agenda toward democratic and rule of law-based governance—aspiration n°3.
In sum, the PRC's continued engagement in peacekeeping poses lots of challenges and threats to Africa. China's peacekeeping policy in Africa is an integrated strategy across the political, economic, and military domains to support its national interest in the great power competition era. With China's aim to shape the UNPKO in setting new standards for partnership, Africa must be proactive to find the right balance between competing powers.
Recommendations To Safeguard Peace And Stability In Africa
To achieve the ideal of "the Africa we want," AU must better tailor its engagement with China's peacekeeping to deepen the relationship and build an inclusive partnership with all the powers interested in supporting the APSA. AU must have cross-domain policies to address the challenges brought by China's increasing military footprint.
Politically, Africa must shape the Chinese approach to peacekeeping—mainly focused on the bilateral relationship with a narrow path to conflict. The regional or continental architecture–UA and CER—must be prioritized to coordinate an integrated initiative. Its provides better conflict management by focusing on a long-term solution for complex security challenges and transnational security threat. This gradual continental approach will aggregate the scarce resources by preventing competing mechanisms. Africa should use the Chinese pragmatic approach to manage and stabilize conflict while strengthening cooperation with other partners—UE, US, India, Russia, Brazil, Turkey. Notably, the UN-UA partnership must shift in trans-regional, cross-spectrum security management while building African capabilities to conflict prevention and management.
In the economic prospect, the lack of resources is a hurdle Africa must solve to safeguard its peace and security. By relying on foreign assistance, Africa will not have sustainable resources to strengthen its current peace and security architecture. AU must find an innovative resourcing mechanism by creating an Africa trust fund. African leadership should use the economic leverage given by China to invest in security. China's financial support combined with other partners is an effective tool to support alternative funding and security mechanisms.
China's expanding military footprint is transforming Africa to be the future battleground in the GPC. Therefore, Africa should work with all partners, including China, to lessen its military footprint on the continent. To do so, Africa must build a credible standby force by not relying on Chinese peacekeeper as a standby force. On the other hand, AU should work with member countries to limit the proliferation of foreign military bases on the continent to lower the risk of GPC confrontation. Furthermore, AU should address the proliferation of SALW by controlling China's surge in arms sales.
Lastly, by shaping the UNPKO in Africa, China is also influencing the governance standards. The rise of the authoritarian style of governance jeopardizes the AU and the Pan African ideal for peace and stability. China's influence and soft power in peacekeeping are likely to promote sovereignty over the right to protect civilians. AU should promote a comprehensive approach to bridge the difference while being persistent in the general aspiration of the African population.
Conclusion
In 30 years, China's peacekeeping did a great leap forward from a few personnel to 2,531 in 2020, mainly in Africa. This sharp increase in Chinese peacekeepers is mostly a renewed opportunity to help deal with insecurity. However, the Chinese interest-centered approach seems to be dragging Africa into the great power competition. Africa faces a dilemma between security and development. Therefore, the AU should enhance an inclusive partnership while building a comprehensive security and development architecture. Africa must seize the opportunities given by China while trying to mitigate the risks of the GPC.
More importantly, globalization and global threats—like terrorism, organized crimes, human trafficking—have put Africa in the center stage of a new scramble. To face the challenges of a new "Berlin Congress," Africa should unite and not be aligned to any major power. As stated more than haft a century ago by Kwame Nkrumah in his book "Africa Must Unite."