An Analysis of the Motivation behind Russia’s Violation of The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

By Lieutenant Commander Yuki Yagi, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

Introduction

On 20th October 2018, President Donald Trump declared that the U.S. would withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF treaty). This treaty is a formal treaty between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This was an arms control treaty between the U.S. and Soviet Union (and its successor state: The Russia Federation). The U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the treaty on 8th December 1987. Russell reported the nations had eliminated 2692 missiles by May 1991, followed by 10 years of on-site verification inspections. The treaty has worked as a core of European security since its conclusion. 

The substantial reason for the U.S. withdrawing is Russia’s violations of this treaty. Russia has developed prohibited missiles for several years under the treaty in spite of years of the U.S. pointing out the prohibitions. Emott noted that the U.S. official said that Russia violated the treaty by testing the prohibiting missile (SSC-8 cruise missile) in 2008 and the U.S. has evidence about this test launch. The Department of Defense of the U.S. reported that the U.S. had accused the violation of Russia since 2014 because the U.S. recognized that Russia had developed a new cruise missile with prohibited capabilities. At the first time when the U.S. started to accuse Russia, the U.S. remained faithful to the treaty and to push Russia to return to compliance. Eventually, the U.S. changed policy and denounced the treaty because of years of Russia’s violations. In Borger and Pengelly reported, Trump said:

“Russia has violated the agreement. They’ve been violating it for many years and I don’t know why President Obama didn’t negotiate or pull out. We’re not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and do weapons and we’re not allowed to. We’re the ones that have stayed in the agreement and we’ve honored the agreement but Russia has not unfortunately honored the agreement, so we’re going to terminate the agreement, we’re going to pull out.” 

The statement indicates that Russia's violation of the INF treaty gave the U.S. a reason for its withdrawal from the treaty.

The issue in this paper is why Russia continued violating the treaty in spite of the denunciation of the U.S. The INF treaty is quite meaningful for Russia because it has contributed to restrict the expansion of the NATO Nuclear force which is mainly constituted by the U.S. forces in Europe. As a reason for Russia's violation of this useful treaty, some argued that the aim of development of INF by Russia enhanced the deterrence against NATO and Asian countries. Fitzsimmons insisted that Russia's violation of the INF Treaty was due to the improvement of strategic deterrence to secure the military balance with NATO in Europe and some nations in Asia. Since Russia contemplated the using of nuclear weapon (including INF) in response to a large-scale conventional attack by other nations, Russia's nuclear capabilities strengthened by its violation of the INF Treaty clearly enhanced its strategic deterrence.

On the other hand, it is questionable whether Russia's decision can be explained solely by improving its strategic deterrence. The violation of the INF Treaty was risky for Russia, because there was a risk that its strategic nuclear deterrent might be relatively lowered due to the security dilemma with NATO. It was highly likely that Russia recognized the risk that the U.S. would withdraw from the INF Treaty if they continued violating the INF Treaty, as the U.S. repeatedly pointed out Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. Russia's violation of the INF Treaty would prompt the U.S. to withdraw from the treaty, and due to it, the U.S. could develop Europe's nuclear force in response to Russia's growing the strategic force. As a result, Russia's violation of the INF Treaty would have the risk as relative decline in its strategic deterrence against NATO by strengthening U.S. involvement in Europe. Actually, in 2014, at the U.S. congressional hearing, it was reported that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe had stated that some measures should be taken in relation to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. This implied the U.S. involvement in Europe in violation of Russia's INF Treaty. Accordingly, the enhanced strategic deterrence resulting from Russia's violation of the INF Treaty could increase the U.S. involvement in Europe, which could lead to a decline in Russia's relative strategic deterrence. Originally, the INF Treaty had a role for Russia in preventing the deploying of the U.S. nuclear capability in Europe. It was not reasonable that Russia would had the risk of the invalidity of the INF Treaty in order to ensure strategic deterrence against NATO, since the treaty had a role to prevent the enhancement of NATO's strategic deterrence.

Why had Russia violated the INF Treaty by taking such a risk? This study investigates the military situation and uses the mathematical method to analyze the motives for Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. Since the reason for Russia's violation is considered to be a response to threats from NATO and Asian countries in previous research, we examine the military balance between Russia and its potential rivals, NATO and China. In addition we focus on the characteristics of both strategic nuclear and non-nuclear assets in the INF. In the mathematical analysis, we analyze the non-cooperative games on violation of the INF Treaty with Russia and the U.S. as players. The results of both analyses indicate that Russia's violation of the treaty was mainly aimed for countering China. In conclusion, the main motive for the violation of the INF Treaty was to enhance strategic deterrence against threats from Asia, particularly China.

Methodology

General

This study uses two methods to analyze the motivation for Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. First, we investigate the military situation in Russia and analyze the data to determine the motives behind Russia's decision to violate the treaty. Second, we use game theory to mathematically analyze Russia's decision to violate the treaty.

In this study, we assume that Russia's decision to violate the treaty lies in enhancing its strategic deterrence mainly against NATO or China. Before 2008 when the U.S. pointed out Russia’s violation, Russia's main threats were NATO and Russia could consider China as a potential adversary. Indeed, it was reported in 2009 that Russian military leaders singled out NATO and China as Russia's most dangerous geopolitical rivals. Actually, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Georgia, both of which were promised NATO membership in 2008, showed that Russia viewed NATO as an adversary. On the other hand, Russia also seemed to have viewed China as a potential threat. In fact, it pointed out that Russia was worried about the possibility of China's invasion in the Far East region, since Russia was concerned about the population ratio of China and Russia in this region. In addition, Saradzhyan noted Russia recognized China as a potential threat and argued that Russia should have pursued military reforms to counter China. Fitzsimmons also suggested that the expansion of NATO and the development of INF in Asian countries, including China, may have affected Russia. Kearen showed that between 2005 and 2010, China's INF holdings more than doubled, and by 2010, it had more than 4 times more INF than other Asian countries, suggesting that Russia would have felt China was a greater threat than other Asian countries.

Investigation of the military situation

The first approach is to analyze the military situation in Russia between NATO and China, which was a threat from Russia. First, we examine the positioning of the INF in Russia and consider the indicators. Next we analyze the military balance between Russia, NATO, and 

China in accordance with the results of the survey, and consider the impact on the decision to violate the INF Treaty.

Regarding the positioning of INF in Russia, INF developed by Russia is an important asset which constitutes both nuclear and non-nuclear strategic force. The missiles, which appear to be in violation of the treaty developed by Russia, can be used as both nuclear strategic force and long-range the Precision Guided Munition (PGM) that are used by non-nuclear strategic force. PGM is defined as a “guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage”. PGMs typically use the global positioning system (GPS), laser guidance, or inertial navigation systems. For example, it has been pointed out that the SSC -8, which was pointed out by the U.S. as a violation of the INF treaty, is equipped with GPS guidance or self-guidance equipment. Russia regards long-range precision strike capability as part of its strategic deterrence. Indeed, in 2017 Russian military leaders pointed out that in the future it would be possible to gradually shift nuclear deterrence to a non-nuclear strategic force composed of precision strike capability, and that non-nuclear strategic forces would be increased more than 4 times by 2021. In order to elucidate the motive behind Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, it is necessary to consider the roles of both the nuclear strategic force and long-range PGM of this weapon as non-nuclear strategic force.

In this study, we introduce the nuclear and non-nuclear strategic force as the indicators to investigate the military balance which contributed to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. Russia has tried to strike a military balance with its adversaries in strategic non-nuclear forces (long-range PGMs) as well as strategic nuclear forces. In fact, it has been pointed out that Russia recognized that the long-range PGM of the U.S. posed a strategic threat, and that the long-range PGM of Russia was originally developed to counter the precision strike capability of the U.S. As Russia viewed that INF had the roles of both the nuclear strategic assets and non-nuclear strategic assets (long-range PGM), Russia's decision to violate the treaty should have been influenced by the military balance with its adversaries in both nuclear s and non-nuclear strategic factors. Thus, the military balance of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic forces, which is consisted by long-range PGMs, is researched in this study in order to analyze Russia’s decision behind violation of the INF Treaty, 

Analysis by applying game theory

In the second approach, we analyze the motivation of Russia’s violation by using a mathematical method. We assume the game in which the players are Russia and the U.S., both of whom are signatories to the INF Treaty. The both play roles in selecting the actions of each country from the two options of compliance with and violation of the INF Treaty. We examine the motives behind Russia's violation of the INF Treaty by analyzing this game, incorporating the above assumptions in consideration of Russia's preferences. The situation is expressed in the non-cooperative game in which each player acts independently. In the non-cooperative game, a strategic form is used to analyze. In the strategic situations of the study, Russia and the U.S. choose actions C (Cooperation): compliance with the treaty, D (Defection): violation of the treaty) on INF treaty. 

Parameters are defined as below: 

• Russia’s action: x

• The U.S. action: y

• The set of actions: (x, y)

• Russia’s gain function: f1(x,y)

• The U.S. gain function: f2(x,y)

In this problem, the strategic form can be expressed by bi-matrix form, since the strategy set is finite and there are two players. An example of bi-matrix is shown Figure 1. 

Figure 1. Example of the bi-matrix form

In this non-cooperative games, we analyze Russia’s motivation to find the Nash equilibrium of each player as the solution. In this study, we infer the gain function fi(x,y) from the analysis of the preference of both nations. Regarding the decision on the gain function of the U.S. and Russia, Russia’s decision about the violation of the INF treaty would be made considering the relationship between Russia, NATO, and China, thus we assume Russia’s preference was to secure the strategic deterrence against NATO or China. The determination of Russian gain function is divided into cases based on this assumption. The motivation of Russia's decision is analyzed by solving the game based on the gain function determined in each case.

Result

Investigation of the military situation

In order to analyze Russia's perception of the military situation, we examine the nuclear strategic forces and the long-range precision-guided strike assets as the non-nuclear strategic forces of Russia, NATO and China that pose a threat to Russia. 

Nuclear Strategic Forces

The military balance of nuclear strategic forces was unlikely to have influenced Russia's decision to violate the INF Treaty. It was not an incentive for Russia to violate the INF Treaty to increase its nuclear strategic capability, since NATO's nuclear force was decreasing, while China's nuclear force was overwhelmingly smaller than Russia's.

NATO's nuclear capability was not an incentive for Russia to violate the treaty. NATO's strategic nuclear forces have been shrinking since the Cold War. The U.S., a major supplier of NATO nuclear forces, reduced nuclear weapons in Europe by 97% by 2009. In 1991, in particular, the U.S. reduced its nuclear arsenal by 80%. In addition, the number of the nuclear warheads of the U.S. itself decreased dramatically in the 1990s. Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia tried to strengthen its nuclear strategic force against NATO's nuclear force by violating the INF Treaty. 

Additionally, China's nuclear capability was not as strong as Russia's, so it was not an incentive to increase Russia's nuclear capability. China possessed far fewer nuclear warheads than Russia. For example, data from 2013 show that China possesses only about 3% of nuclear warheads compared to Russia. It was unlikely that China's growth affected Russia's decision to violate the INF treaty. Thus, the military balance between Russia, NATO, and China in terms of nuclear strategic forces was unlikely to have influenced Russia's decision.

Non-Nuclear Strategic Forces

The analysis of the balance of non-nuclear strategic forces showed that China was a greater threat to Russia than NATO. The survey targeted 2000, and 2008, when Russia conducted an experiment on SSC -8 in violation of the INF Treaty, in order to confirm changes in the military power. 

In order to verify the balance of non-nuclear strategic forces, the INF and the number of fighters and bombers are used as indicators. Since non-nuclear strategic forces are used to attack strategic assets, long-range precision attacks are required. Based on the positional relationship between Russia, NATO, and China, focusing on land forces, long-range precision strikes can be carried out using long-range surface-to-surface missiles or fighters and bombers equipped with PGMs. Therefore, in order to confirm the military balance, this study focuses on the INF, fighter and bomber numbers. In addition, in order to add a qualitative factor as well as a quantitative factor, fighters were targeted for the third generation and later.

Table 1 and Table 2 show the INF and the number of fighters and bombers from Russia, NATO, and China in 2000 and 2008. From these tables, it seems that Russia felt more threated by China than by NATO. Since comparison between 2000 and 2008 shows that NATO’s force was on the decline at the time, it was not seen as a big threat to Russia. Between 2000 and 2008, NATO's force was reduced by the number of fighters at around 64%. On the other hand, China was rapidly building up its military capabilities. From 2000 to 2008, it increased its combat capabilities by about 2.2 times in the number of fighters, by about 1.5 times in the number of bombers, and by about 2.5 times in the number of INF. Because Russia recognized that it was likely that China’s force would substantially exceed Russia’s in the near future, Russia would have considered China a greater threat than NATO. In fact, it was possible that Russia placed more importance on deterrence against China than on NATO, since A U.S senator reported in 2010 that the majority of Russian short-range tactical nuclear weapons were deployed along the Chinese border to deter China rather than NATO. Therefore, the balance of non-nuclear strategic assets showed that China was a greater threat to Russia than NATO.

Analysis

Considering the military balance, Russia seemed to have violated the INF Treaty in order to strengthen its deterrence against China rather than NATO. From the viewpoint of INF nuclear strategic assets, it is difficult to say that the military balance between Russia, China, and NATO had influenced Russia's decision to violate the INF Treaty. On the other hand, from the perspective of non-nuclear strategic assets, Russia may have felt a stronger threat from China than from NATO. In light of the above, from the perspective of military balance, Russia's main motive for violating the INF Treaty was the strengthening of deterrence against strategic non-nuclear weapons against China, not NATO.

Analysis by applying game theory

This chapter uses game theory to analyze Russia's motives for its decision to violate the INF Treaty. First, we assume the two cases about the main motive of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty to determine Russia’s preference. Second, we decide the gain functions by considering the preferences of each players (Russia and the U.S.) in each case. Third, the motivation is indicated to analyze the game of each case. 

Russia’s preference

In determining the preferences of Russia, we introduce the two assumptions and make two cases. The assumptions are as follows.

Case A: Assume that the primary motive for Russia's violation of the treaty was to improve its strategic deterrence against NATO

Case B: Assume that the primary motive for Russia's violation of the treaty was to improve its strategic deterrence against China.

In Case A, it is clear that the best choice for Russia, was (D, C). By developing INF, Russia could enhance its strategic deterrence against NATO without creating risks. It is also clear that the worst case was (C, D). Russia faces only the risk of enhancing U.S. military capabilities. The next best case would be (C, C). According to the research of military balance in this paper, NATO’s nuclear strategic forces in Europe were significantly reduced and NATO’s strategic non-nuclear forces were inferior to Russia’s. In addition NATO's military building was more restrained than Russia's. In fact, the annual military expenditures of NATO countries in Europe remained below 2% of GDP, showing a downward trend. On the other hand it was pointed out that Russia's military spending, taking inflation into account, would amount to 2.5 ~ 2.8% of GDP in the same period. Thus, in the case of (C, C), Russia could maintain a certain level of strategic deterrence against NATO, while, in the case of (D, D), there is a risk that Russia would lose its strategic deterrence against NATO. Russia's violation of the INF Treaty could lead to the strengthening of NATO's deterrence through U.S. involvement. Considering the fact that the Soviet Union had concluded the INF Treaty with the U.S. in the past out of fear of this risk, it could be fatal for Russia since Russia considered NATO deterrence as a priority in this Case. Therefore, the order of preference and gain function of Russia in Case A are as follows:

1. (D,C), f1(D,C)=4

2. (C,C), f1(C,C)=3 

3. (D,D), f1(D,D)=2

4. (C,D), f1(C,D)=1

In Case B, it is clear that the best case is (D, C) and the worst case is (C, D). In this case, the next best case is (D, D). If Russia attached importance to China's strategic deterrence, it would be acceptable for NATO to improve its capabilities through U.S. involvement. On the other hand, if (C, C) was chosen, it would have no effect on Russia's enhancement of strategic deterrence against China. Therefore, the order of preference and gain function of Russia in Case B are as follows.

1. (D,C), f1(D,C)=4

2. (D,D), f1(D,D)=3 

3. (C,C), f1(C,C)=2

4. (C,D), f1(C,D)=1

The U.S. preference

We consider the preference of the U.S. in this problem. The U.S’s best choice is (C, D). In the case of (C, D) the U.S. had the freedom to unilaterally develop INF. It is clear that the worst choice is (D, C). The second best choice is (C, C). The U.S. benefited from maintaining the INF Treaty, because it restrained Russia from strengthening its strategic nuclear deterrent against NATO. At that time, since the U.S. needed to carry on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that began in the early 2000s, the INF Treaty, which restrained Russian forces, should have been beneficial. For the same reason, as U.S. interest in China's military buildup was relatively low, the U.S. would not have withdrawn from the INF treaty in order to counter China. Friedberg pointed out that in the early 2000s, the U.S. needed to focus on fighting terrorists and had little interest in China. In fact, even after the U.S. recognized Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, it consulted with Russia and aimed to maintain the treaty. It proves that the (C,C) (maintenance of the treaty) was more beneficial for the U.S. than (D,D) (denunciation of the treaty). Therefore, the second best choice for the U.S. is (C, C). The order of preference and gain function of the U.S. are as follows. 

1. (C,D), f2(C,D)=4

2. (C,C), f2(C,C)=3 

3. (D,D), f2(D,D)=2

4. (D,C), f2(D,C)=1

Analysis

By deriving a Nash equilibrium for each case, the motivation for the violation of Russia's INF Treaty is analyzed.

In Case A, this game is expressed as strategic forms in Figure 2. The gain structure of the game turns out to be a prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma is that the Nash equilibrium is (C, C) if there is mutual communication and (D, D) if there is no communication. Since the U.S. and Russia had some communications about this issue, the solution of the game is (C, C).

In Case B, This game is expressed as strategic forms in Figure 3. The gain structure of the game is found to be deadlock. In this case, no matter what choice the U.S. may make, it would be reasonable for Russia to choose D, taking into account the gains that Russia would obtain. In response, the U.S. selects D, making the Nash equilibrium (D, D).

A comparison between the analysis of each case and the actual phenomenon shows that the assumption in Case B provides a more reasonable explanation for Russia's motives. Based on the assumption of Case A, the solution is (C, C) whereas in Case B, the solution is (D, D) which corresponds to the actual phenomenon. It can be seen from this that the main reason Russia violated the INF Treaty was the improvement of its strategic deterrence against China.

Discussion

Some may argue that Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty mainly aimed to strike a military balance with NATO. In previous research, Fitzsimmons insisted that the one of the reasons of Russia’s violation for the treaty was to increase powers against NATO. Russia was alarmed by the growing influence of NATO in Eastern Europe. 

However, it is unreasonable to argue that the objective of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is to secure its deterrence against NATO. The military investigation in this paper demonstrates that NATO's strategic force continued decreasing at that time. In addition, since Russia's violation of the INF Treaty could increase U.S. involvement in Europe, it undermined Russia's strategic deterrence. Thus it is difficult to believe that Russia had breached the INF Treaty in order to counter NATO's declining deterrence. 

A major factor in Russia's violation of the INF Treaty was securing the deterrence to China. Russia responded to China's threat by taking the risk of improving NATO's strategic force. The strategic non-nuclear balance presented in this study indicates that Russia would have felt a greater threat from China. Russia's insistence on the multilateralization of the INF Treaty also indicates Russia's concern about China's INF. Additionally, since it was pointed out that Russia was planning to deploy INF in Irkutsk to counter China, it can be seen that Russia intended to deter China's threat by using the INF. Therefore, it can be said that the main objective of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty was to control the growing threat from China.

Conclusion and Recommendation 

From the above, the main motivation behind Russia's violation of the INF Treaty was to enhance of its strategic deterrence against China. In this study, based on the characteristics of the INF as a strategic asset, the motive for Russia's violation of the treaty is studied using two methods: the investigation of the military situation and the mathematical analysis. For the investigation of the military situation, Russia seemed to have violated the INF Treaty in order to strengthen its deterrence against China rather than NATO. To balance the non-nuclear strategic assets, Russia may have felt a stronger threat from China than from NATO, since Russia recognized that China’s force would likely exceed theirs in the near future. For the mathematical analysis, we assumed that the key motivation behind Russia's violation of the treaty was to gain its strategic deterrence against either NATO or China and analyzed Russia’s optimal action of the treaty applying game theory into two cases. The results show that it is reasonable to assume that the reason for Russia’s violation was to improve its strategic deterrence against China.

The analysis of this study that Russia felt a potential threat from China's growing the strategic forces suggests that Russia will be more actively engaged with China in the management of these forces with U.S. China has strengthened both its strategic nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Indeed, China's ability to produce nuclear weapons has been strengthened, and the number of INF stockpiles has continued to increase. Thus, Russia's perception of the threat against China is likely to be stronger than when it violated the INF Treaty. On the other hand, the U.S. is trying to involve China in a framework for strategic arms control. In fact, the U.S. is now arguing with Russia that China should be included in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The results of this study suggests it is possible that Russia, together with the U.S., will increase its engagement with China to manage the threat of its strategic forces.