Add Value to Security Cooperation through Joint Unification

By Colonel Jason “Hap” Arnold, U.S. Air Force Reserve (Retired)

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Since the end of the Second World War, Security Assistance (SA) and Security Cooperation (SC) have been integral tools of United States foreign policy. Working with the national security forces of friendly foreign nations towards mutual security goals is recognized as a core element of American foreign policy. Security Cooperation programs have been adapted to pursue a variety of strategic objectives and national security outcomes in the context of shifting policy environments, from the containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War to the current regionally-based multinational efforts against transnational adversaries.

Over the decades, the armed services, responsible for most of the execution of Security Cooperation, have been diverging in implementing process and practice. Improvements in Joint cooperation are now needed in SC. Past examples of how functional capabilities have been unified across the services can inform a solution for the SC enterprise.  The success of unified commands for Special Forces and Transportation functions as well as Space and Cyber operations suggest that a functional component command subordinate to one of the unified functional combatant commands is a path that could unify, standardize, simplify, and rationalize the SC efforts of the military departments.

In recognition of the changing security requirements that have required greatly expanded engagement with national security forces of friendly foreign countries, the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2017 sought to provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with a consolidation of SC authorities under one SC chapter in title 10 of the United States Code.  An important early step towards improvement is in recognizing that the myriad of diverse authorizations and associated funding contributes to a lack of clarity and an unwieldy SC enterprise. Diverging processes, duplicative assignment of personnel, and competing systems within the separate branches of the Armed Services’ SC organizations also undermines the ability of the DoD to effectively synchronize and execute SC activities. 

The need for effective Joint cooperation between military service branches has been an ongoing concern. The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act (GNA) of October 4, 1986 made broad and enduring changes to the National Security Act of 1947, reworking the command structure of the military. Previously, the U.S. military was organized so that the lines of command led to the service chiefs of the military branches. This led to parochialism, rivalry, and a competition for resources that was counter-productive to the national security needs of the United States. In peacetime, activities such as acquisition, procurement, doctrine, human resources, and training were all created within the confines of each branch, separate and divergent from one another. In wartime, planning and execution of operations had little coordination between branches resulting in wasteful replication, dangerous miscommunication, and disunity of effort, directly impacting completion of operational and strategic objectives. The problems that GNA addressed were mitigated to a great extent, but not completely resolved. Additional efforts have been required over the years as dramatic changes in society, technology, policy, and security have created a further need to adapt.

Precedents for unification and the merging of common functional activities across the service branches under a joint activity are easily found. There are many examples of functional capabilities that developed independently in the service branches, diverged to the point of ineffectiveness, and were corralled into functional commands. Consider two other recent areas of national security. The domains of Space and Cyber operations have proven to be critical terrain in global security, with Joint challenges similar to SC. However, additional unified functional component commands were created to focus and coordinate efforts in Space and Cyber domains across the military departments. In 2006, the Joint Functional Component Command (JFCC) for Space was created as a subordinate unit to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).[1]  In 2010, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) came online as a sub-unified command also subordinate to USSTRATCOM.[2]  These organizations were not conceived prior to their need. In the case of both, efforts to engage in the domains of Space and Cyber had already been made by the separate military departments with varying success, but as in the past, largely in isolation and uncoordinated across the service branches. This led to the predictable waste in replication of effort, divergent doctrine and practice, and squandering of resources for separate procurement, acquisition, and personnel lines. Similar inefficiencies and operational compromise are now evident in SC efforts.

In the case of Cyber, additional conflicts were seen between the National Security Agency (NSA) and USCYBERCOM, lashed up together to address the cyber domain with sometimes overlapping responsibilities and roles, as well as direct competition for resources stressing the seams between the organizations. This has led to the announcement of eventual separation of the two organizations.[3]

Another example would be in the Logistics enterprise. In 1978, following the woeful performance of our logistics capabilities highlighted by Exercise Nifty Nugget, a single manager for deployment and execution was created, the Joint Deployment Agency. In 1987, President Reagan ordered the Secretary of Defense to develop a Unified Transportation Command (UTC) in order to unify the various Transportation Operating Agencies. Eventually the UTC implementation plan merged the various military department transportation components into a unified functional combatant command called United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 1987.[4]  These reforms were an unqualified success, as demonstrated by logistical triumphs in Operation Desert Shield, Iraqi Freedom, and other named operations of the last thirty years. Successful operational logistics on this scale would have been impossible without the creation of TRANSCOM.

In yet another illustration, consider that the success and capabilities of our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are epic and almost taken for granted now, but back in 1980, it was a different story. Operation Eagle Claw, the failed attempt to rescue American hostages held in Tehran, resulted in disaster. This embarrassing operational failure exposed shortfalls inherent in isolated and disparate special operations units across the service branches. The unworkable command and control structure, duplication, inefficiencies, and misuse of SOF capabilities by conventional commanders created a desperate need for reform. The resulting Congressional inquiries and reform bills ultimately unified SOF forces from across the services into their own Special Operations Command (SOCOM)[5], with independent control over resources and tailored command and control arrangements with forces attached to the Combatant Commands. Change was neither quick nor easy, but improvements became evident in SOF heavy aspects of operations in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, where the reforms were validated by battlefield success. 

In the Security Cooperation Enterprise, the military departments loom large as the primary implementing agencies of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) cases, and in training activities.[6]  These SC programs provide our international partners with the capabilities they require both for their own security and to assist in regional security objectives that improve the overall global security situation. Most open SC cases have one of the military departments as an Implementing Agency (IA) and each service has built its own organizational structure, bureaucracy, and automated systems to support the effort.[7]

Over the decades, a familiar dynamic has taken place. The military departments have developed their own implementing processes in an insular way, isolated from the other branches, and accommodating their own unique business rules, methods, and systems separate from the others. In addition to contributing to the already significant complexity of the SC Enterprise, the familiar replication of effort, divergent doctrine and practice, and inefficient use of resources is again evident. Still, the Services continue to diverge.

Consider the difficulties these differing systems place on our international partners. Friendly foreign nations, committed to working toward our mutual security interests, must not only understand the various roles and processes in the general realm of SC, but also must learn the complexities of several different systems, depending on the implementing agency for a particular program. Indeed, this complexity is one of the primary complaints of the SC processes from our partners. Perhaps the complexity would be justified if it added value, but in almost all cases, the different processes add no greater benefit, but are due simply to the fact that they were developed in isolation by different organizations. Integrated processes and systems that are standardized across the implementing agencies would be a vast improvement, providing increased transparency, reduced complexity, and greater effectiveness across the board.

Security Cooperation is inherently an interagency process, and requires a whole of government effort. Presidential Policy Directive 23 identified the Department of State (DoS) as the lead agency for United States Security Sector Assistance Policy, and all Security Assistance and Security Cooperation efforts require coordination and consent across agencies. The interagency process can be hampered by the diversity of processes and players that are presented by the separate Services’ SC organizations. It is not only our international partners that struggle with learning the different ways and means of the various implementing agencies, our own interagency partners can experience confusion as well in navigating the various systems, doctrine, and processes. 

The Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03 identifies the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of SC policy, and the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as responsible for the provision of DoD wide guidance for the DoD components in the execution of DoD SC programs. Ideally, it would be DSCA that would herd the services’ SC implementation; standardizing and rationalizing the work of all towards a unified SC effort. However, while the DODD 5132.03 directs DSCA to manage and administer those Title 10 and 22 United States Code programs for which DSCA has responsibility, it does not give DSCA authority over DoD components, instead handing the Director of DSCA the following delineated task: “Supports DoD Components on planning and execution of Security Cooperation…”[8]  This creates inadequate clarity on the supporting/supported relationship between the MILDEPs and DSCA.

Those familiar with the joint publications JP 3-0 (Joint Operations) and/or JP-5-0 (Joint Planning) will recognize the threat to effective execution inherent in a lack of clarity in the supporting/supported relationship. When an organization does not feel it is compelled to support another, it generally does not provide any support. When an organization relies on support from another for planning, and yet does not receive it, a gap in capability is created, and operational objectives are compromised.

DSCA does not have the clearly delineated authority or adequate resources to compel the services towards standardization, simplification, and unity of effort. Instead, DSCA relies on the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the military’s strategic echelon to align SC goals. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) can also be relied upon to provide leadership, advocate for DSCA’s SC reforms, and foster the compliant participation of the MILDEPs in Security Cooperation in accordance with existing authorities. The MILDEPs, however, will have their own interpretation and perspective on their guidance from higher authorities, and this will sometimes conflict with DSCA’s vision on the effective implementation of SC programs.

DSCA provides direction, guidance, and in some cases resources for various standardization projects. One example is the development of DSCA’s Case Writing Division (CWD) which provides standardization and quality assurance in the development of cases. Likewise, DSCA’s implementation of automated systems such as the Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS), Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS), and Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution (SCES) are all efforts to improve standardization across stakeholders, and DSCA has had some notable success, but the timelines for implementation have been impacted by the lack of clear lines of authority to compel improvements in standardization.

Looking back at the stories of Space and Cyber, parallels to SC can be seen. While perhaps not as operationally focused as those domains, SC ultimately may prove one of the nation’s most potent forms of deterrence, shaping regional security through partnered efforts with friendly and capable governments and their militaries. Informed by this potential, it is time to explore the creation of a functional component command subordinate to one of the unified functional combatant commands that would synergize the SC efforts of the military departments as Security Cooperation components rather than as equal and contesting partners. This would allow a unified effort and more transparency and simplicity in our processes.  Systems could be standardized, replications in doctrine and process would be streamlined, and the implementation of programs would necessarily enjoy quicker execution due to improved coordination.

If the DoD were to develop a SC functional command, DSCA and other agencies could work with the military department implementing agencies through one organization, and the burden of herding the various MILDEP SC organizations would rest on a notional unified functional component command staff, the authority built on well understood, clear, and traditional military lines of command and tasking.

Joint Publication 1 (JP-1-0) – Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States outlines the creation of unified and specific commands, geographic and functional combatant commands, and the structure of service and functional components of those commands. A functional component command can unify forces from two or more services that should be integrated in a common undertaking. Currently, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard all have SC elements that could be unified within a functional component command in an effort to standardize the delivery of SC capabilities.

There are organizational challenges inherent in the creation of a functional component command focused on Security Cooperation, details of which are beyond the scope of this essay. There are pros and cons as to whether a sub-unified SC functional component command would fit better under STRATCOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, or some other unified command, but that is less important than the recognition that such a unifying organization is needed for the overall success and improvement of the SC enterprise. A SC sub-unified functional component command would need to remain nimble, with rank appropriate to the task, and an overall personnel scope that does not create an onerous staff-heavy burden on an already over tasked Joint enterprise. Currently, Combatant Command and component staffs are being trimmed down, not built up, with the recognition that staff headquarters can become “self-licking ice cream cones” where bureaucratic churn generates staff-work that does not add value to the enterprise. This was the lesson of the ill-starred Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) disbanded in 2011.[9]  However, innovative solutions have been used before, as in the creation of USSOCOM through the transfer of billets and basing facilities from the disbanded United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), which allowed a relatively rapid standup of the new SOF command in 1987.[10]

Fundamentally, there is added value in lashing together the SC endeavors of the military departments through a SC functional component command whose job is to standardize and rationalize their efforts towards more effective delivery and better outcomes. In addition to the continual increase in provision of defense articles and services to friendly foreign nations, the focus of SC is turning to higher level engagement with international partners in improving ministry and agency level Defense infrastructure through Defense Institution Building (DIB). Security Cooperation requires vast resources, generating the requirement to pursue ever-more vigorous Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AME). The AME effort is so important that it receives its own chapter in the Joint Publication 3-20 - Security Cooperation.[11]  These new focus areas require unity of effort, and will not be achievable without improvements in the standardization and synchronization of practices and processes across the services.

While DSCA makes heroic efforts to provide direction and guidance that should lead to better standardization and synchronization, they are limited by the structure of command authority. Equal to the Service branches in the DoD hierarchy, the nebulous nature of supporting/supported relationships dictate that the DSCA policies and methods are enacted through collegial cooperation and collaboration with each separate Services’ SC organizations, rather than compelled through the Joint military hierarchy by a SC functional command, as proposed here, which could more effectively implement envisioned improvements.

In the past, our leaders have identified those functional capabilities that are critical to national security, and time and again provided reforms to unify and synchronize the disparate organizations across the services to create unity of effort. We have seen this in the domains of Space and Cyber, as well as with SOCOM and TRANSCOM. In all of these cases, vast improvements in outcomes were seen as a result of consolidation of resources and clearer command and control. With the advent of NDAA FY 2017, we see the same recognition of the importance of the SC capability. It is time to look for a Joint solution that will provide a unified military Security Cooperation capability.

About the Author

Jason “Hap” Arnold is an Instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation and a former Assistant Professor at National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College.

Additional References

114th Congress. 2016. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1587.

99th U.S. Congress. 1986. "Public Law 99-433." Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Washington D.C.: Congressional Printing Office, 10 1.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 2017. Security Assistance Management Manual 5105.38-M. Washington D.C., 10 17.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2013. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States JP 1-0. Washington DC: Department of Defense.

—. 2017. Joint Operations JP 3-0. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.

—. 2017. Joint Planning JP 5-0. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.

2013. "Presidential Policy Directive 23." Security Sector Assistance. Washington D.C., 4 5.

[1] USSTRATCOM. 2017. Joint Functional Component Command for Space. 10 18. http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-View/Article/976376/joint-functional-component-command-for-space-jfcc-space/. [2] USSTRATCOM. 2017. U.S. Cyber Command. 10 18. http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/. [3] Tucker, Patrick. 2017. "What the Announced NSA/Cyber Command Split Means." www.defenseone.com. August 18. Accessed 09 20, 2017. http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/08/what-announced-nsa-cyber-command-split-means/140362/. [4] USSTRATCOM. 2017. USTRANSCOM . 11 21. www.ustranscom.mil. [5]  "2017 Fact Book USSOCOM." USSOCOM Public Affairs Command Information. 11 21. https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2017%20Fact%20Book.pdf.   [6] Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies. 2017. The Management of Security Cooperation. Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies. [7] Ibid. [8] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 2016. DoD Directive 5132.03 DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.   [9] Obama, Barack. 2017. "Presidential Memorandum -- Disestablishment of United States Joint Forces Command." obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 11 21. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/06/presidential-memorandum-disestablishment-united-states-joint-forces-comm. [10] "2017 Fact Book USSOCOM." Ibid. [11] Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2017. "Security Cooperation JP 3-20." V1-V10. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.