A U.S.-Saudi Defense Pact Might Interrupt Saudi Defense Reform
by Colonel Robert K. Carnahan, U.S. Army (retired) and Colonel David M. Witty, U.S. Army (retired)
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is undertaking a defense transformation to make its military forces more effective and cost efficient. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the de facto ruler of the kingdom, who has consolidated power in a manner no other Saudi royal has done before him, initiated the reforms and has pursued them since becoming the defense minister in 2015[i] and continues to do so today as he serves as prime minister. MbS has pointed out the high cost of the Saudi military and its relatively low ranking in the twenties when compared to militaries worldwide. MbS also believed there was a high level of waste in military spending and that opportunities to improve capabilities existed.[ii]
These reforms have entailed the creation of a joint staff, a joint operations command, new doctrine, a national defense strategy, and a human resource management program, none of which previously existed. Saudi Arabia has designed new weapon procurement methodologies to save money and inject funding into the economy through the development of the local defense industry.[iii] MbS’s defense reforms aim to completely overhaul the general officer corps.[iv] The weaknesses of the Saudi military necessitated these badly needed reforms. While KSA has some of the most expensive military forces in the world,[v] critics have argued for decades that the Saudis lack the capabilities to defend themselves.[vi] After Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 and threatened to move against Saudi Arabia, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz acknowledged his military lacked the capabilities to defend the kingdom and requested U.S. and coalition support.[vii] Based on the Saudis’ most recent military performance in fighting with Houthi rebels in Yemen, little has changed.
Concurrent with these reforms, both the past and the present U.S. presidential administrations have sought to normalize relations between KSA and Israel to build upon the Abraham Accords, which President Trump said was his “fervent hope” during a visit to Riyadh in May 2025.[viii] In exchange for Saudi normalization with Israel, the United States has proposed committing to a binding defense pact with KSA, assisting in developing a Saudi civil nuclear program, and sharing advanced technology.[ix] This proposed defense pact would closely model the U.S. treaty with Japan,[x] which analysts regard as one of the strongest non-NATO U.S. defense commitments.[xi] The pact would require a U.S. troop and equipment presence in KSA to defend it against enemies, as well as increased U.S. arms sales.[xii] The Saudis would insist on U.S. Senate approval of the binding defense pact, to weather political changes in Washington[xiii]because they no longer consider the United States as a reliable partner in the present relationship.
Although the United States exists as the KSA’s closest defense partner, the Saudis have had doubts about U.S. policies and commitments in the region for over twenty years. These doubts started in 2003, with the Bush administration and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which the Saudis thought would destabilize the region and embolden Iran. During the Arab Spring, the Americans failed to back their longtime ally, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In 2013, President Obama failed to respond when Syrian President Bashir al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, which Obama had called a red line.[xiv]
In 2015, the KSA’s leaders opposed Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), because they believed Tehran would gain sanctions relief and use increased Iranian resources to finance pro-Iran regional proxies.[xv] President Trump left the JCPOA, but he viewed relations with the kingdom as strictly transactional and valued the relationship only for its potential for lucrative U.S. weapons sales. After Iran attacked Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019, Trump let a longtime supposed U.S. red line lapse when he failed to respond to the attack, arguing that Iran had not attacked the United States, and that the Saudis would finance any U.S. response.[xvi] The Americans did send troops to the KSA after the attack, but this proved too little and too late for the Saudis.
During the 2020 presidential election campaign, President Biden called the kingdom a pariah state and said that the relationship would be reevaluated. Biden also said he wanted to rejoin the JCPOA, again alarming the Saudis.[xvii]Due to concerns of Saudi use of U.S. supplied weapons against civilians in Yemen, Biden imposed a ban on the sale of offensive weapons to KSA in 2021, which remained in place until 2024.[xviii] The subsequent U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan further decreased the Saudis’ faith in U.S. commitments.[xix] In September 2025, Israeli airstrikes in Doha, Qatar, targeted Hamas leaders who were negotiating a ceasefire in the war in Gaza. Qatar had long been regarded as neutral ground and a place for negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, and Doha was hosting the Hamas team at the behest of the United States. This caused Gulf leaders to question the value of U.S. support if Washington could not restrain its closest ally, Israel, from attacking a Gulf country that was hosting U.S. supported ceasefire talks and a large U.S. military base.[xx] Combined with U.S. comments about deemphasizing the region and reorienting its military posture towards the Pacific, these events have provided justifiable reasons for the Saudis to see Washington as unreliable.
The defense pact would change this perception and give the Saudis assurance that the United States would maintain a more consistent policy towards the KSA and be more likely to defend it if attacked. While President Trump is unpredictable and has questioned long-term U.S. commitments to NATO and other allies, has frequently changed his position on the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and has even threatened to annex Greenland, future successors to the U.S. Oval Office are more likely to take traditional views and honor U.S. commitments abroad. A U.S.-Saudi defense pact would also limit Saudi cooperation with Russia and China and possibly deter them regionally.[xxi] A pact would also greatly limit the Iranian threat to KSA. Although the Saudis and the Iranians have reestablished relations, the Saudis continue to see Iran as a destabilizing influence in the region.[xxii] Even though greatly weakened after its proxy, and, at times, direct war with Israel after the start of Israeli military operations in Gaza, Tehran retains regional proxies such as the Houthis, and Hezbollah, although diminished, continues to exist, as do pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. Iran also possesses powerful ballistic missiles, and critics argue it continues to develop nuclear weapons capabilities.[xxiii] Even after the United States briefly joined Israel’s Twelve Day War to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, doubts remain about a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program.[xxiv]
Although not currently occurring, the Saudis have supported the on-again, off-again negotiations between the Trump Administration and Tehran to limit Iran’s nuclear program due to the regional stability such talks could achieve, as the Saudis need stability to diversify their economy away from a heavy reliance on oil. However, the Saudis also know the KSA’s location makes it a likely target if tensions between Washington and Tehran,[xxv] or between Israel and Tehran, escalate.
Originally, for the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel would have had to commit to at least a pathway to a Palestinian state.[xxvi] However, the Saudi position has since hardened, and the Saudis no longer support normalization without the establishment of a Palestinian state.[xxvii] Although Saudis will never view Israel in a popular light, MbS has acknowledged that Israel has a right to exist, the first Saudi royal to say so, and showed eagerness to pursue normalization for the economic and political benefits it would bring, even if it meant foregoing a long-term Saudi demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state.[xxviii] However, Israel’s war in Gaza has further enraged Arab and Saudi public opinion against Israel, eliminating the possibility for the Saudis to abandon demands for the creation of a Palestinian state, at least while fighting continues in Gaza.[xxix] Although Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has said normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia will happen,[xxx] the Israeli Knesset previously passed a resolution strongly rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state.[xxxi]
The Saudis developed an alternative plan for a defense pact with the United States that would not require normalization with Israel,[xxxii] and the Trump Administration has conducted talks with the KSA concerning the development of a Saudi civil nuclear program as part of a larger deal.[xxxiii] Analysts speculate that the United States might continue to seek the defense pact for the other possible benefits it would bring, such as greater cooperation on Iran, lower energy costs, regional stability, ending Saudi defense ties with China and Russia, and greater Saudi investment in the U.S. economy.[xxxiv] The possibilities also exist that the KSA may again accept a mere pathway for a Palestinian state if tensions subside in the region, or that if a new government comes to power in Israel, this new government might take a more sympathetic view of Palestinian statehood. Regardless of future scenarios, the Saudis probably view obtaining a defense treaty with Washington as more important than establishing formal relations with Israel.[xxxv]
While the establishment of a U.S. defense pact with the KSA remains hypothetical, examining the effect a defense pact would have on Saudi defense reforms remains worthwhile, which first requires a look at Saudi military forces.
Military Funding, Culture, and Reform
Saudi Arabia maintains a well-funded military force with modern equipment.[xxxvi] In 2024, Saudi Arabia ranked as the seventh highest military spender in the world, with an estimated expenditure of $80.3 billion. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia dwarfs the military spending of other states. For example, in 2024, Israel, the next highest, expended $46.5 billion, while Iran only spent $7.9 billion.[xxxvii] In 2022, the Saudis committed 7.4 percent of their gross domestic product to military spending, a percentage surpassed only by Ukraine.[xxxviii] Saudi Arabia ranked as the fourth largest arms importer worldwide from 2020 to 2024, at 6.8 percent of global arms imports. During this period, 74 percent of Saudi arms imports came from the United States,[xxxix] making the Saudi military among the best equipped in the region.