A Proposed National Strategy for Shaping Post-War Russia
By Lieutenant Colonel Mathison G. Hall, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
(Image: U.S. State Department courtesy photo / Public Domain)
Editor's Note: Lieutenant Colonel Hall's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at National Defense University. For space reasons we publish this shorter version provided by the author. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not necessarily represent the official views of the U.S. Marine Corps, the National War College, the National Defense University, or any other U.S. government entity.
Russia must realize strategic defeat in Ukraine and be held accountable for its illegal war if the United States and our allies are to preserve stability and security in Europe and defend the liberal international order. However, a defeated Russia subject to reparations risks destabilizing Russia, threatening any peaceful resolution. Moreover, a destabilized Russia will pose a substantial threat to the global economy, a severe threat to U.S. security due to unpredictable control of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and a significant threat to U.S. values of maintaining a peaceful global structure. Conversely, a conflict resolution that does not include Russia’s defeat on Ukraine’s terms, payment of reparations, and isolation from influence in international institutions poses a severe threat to U.S. global influence.
For nearly two decades, American national security leaders and policy wonks have identified Russia as an acute threat to European peace and stability. Putin confirmed the suspicions of senior defense and intelligence officials concerning the Kremlin’s plans to use force to regain control over its bordering nations when Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The United States and most of our allies and partners have launched a unified and aggressive response to support Ukraine in defeating this illegal and unprovoked invasion. The 2022 National Security Strategy of the United States calls for ensuring Russia realizes strategic failure in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the chorus of Western leaders demanding Russia be held accountable for this war of choice is growing.
A Russian state emasculated by strategic failure in Ukraine will rightfully become a prime target for reparations from Ukraine and the broader European community. While Moscow certainly owes the people of Ukraine reparations, it is unlikely the current or future regimes in the Kremlin would agree to such reparations, the payment of which could fatally weaken the Russian economy. A defeated Russia will also threaten the rest of its European neighbors, from the Baltics to the South Caucuses, as the Kremlin will likely attempt to recover a narrative of Russian greatness in the face of failure. Such a faltering future for Russia would seriously threaten peace and stability in Europe, likely requiring massive economic and military intervention by the United States and our allies. Therefore, we cannot simply pursue the defeat of Russia in Ukraine in a well-intentioned effort to enforce international laws and norms and to realize justice for the people of Ukraine. We must also develop a post-conflict strategy for rebuilding Ukraine and repairing Europe’s economic damage that holds Russia and its leaders accountable without allowing Russia to lash out at other vulnerable neighbors or crippling Russia’s ability to recover from the conflict. Achieving such aims will require a carefully planned and tuned strategy, the execution of which will be light walking a tightrope. However, now is this time to lay the foundations for a post-war strategy to avoid an often repeated American error in conflict termination: a failure to plan for what comes next.
Knowns, Critical Unknowns, and Key Assumptions
Our approach to a post-war strategy rests on several assumptions. First and foremost, a post-war strategy assumes that Ukraine will prevail in this conflict on Ukraine’s terms. Such a Ukrainian victory is the precondition for the complete execution of this proposed strategy. We must also assume that China’s direct military and potential increased economic support for Russia’s war will remain muted, as Beijing can change the calculus in Ukraine if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chooses.
Vladimir Putin or his successor is assumed to remain a rational actor by not using nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in retaliation for losing the war. While we know the leaders of China and India unequivocally condemn any use of nuclear weapons by Russia, we do not know how far we can push the Putin regime before it spurns Beijing’s and New Delhi’s warnings. We also assume Russia views and will continue to view the expansion of Western defensive capabilities in Europe as a threat to Moscow’s ability to balance military power in defense of vital Russian interests, including territorial integrity and national unity.
Moscow views “near abroad” states, or those that were ever a part of the Russian or Soviet empires, as not fully sovereign within the Westphalian order. Therefore, Moscow will view any American support for democratic institutions and processes not aligning directly with the Kremlin’s interests as interference in regional stability and Russian territorial security. This strategy also does not assume that Russia has an inexhaustible ability to manipulate the nations on its periphery based on its recent experience in Ukraine, Latvia, and Georgia.
Economic independence from Western institutions is a vital Russian national security interest. Therefore, we must assume economic sanctions against Russia will embolden Russian intransigence even when such actions are warranted. However, it is still to be determined to what extent the Russian people will tolerate such sanctions, especially when China and a few other nations offer an alternative economic path forward.
National Interests of the United States, Threats, and Opportunities
This national strategy for shaping post-war Russia supports two vital and three important interests of the United States:
Non-proliferation and non-use of weapons of mass destruction is a vital national interest. Russian President Vladimir Putin has overtly threatened the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield and strategic nuclear weapons against nations that threaten Russia.[i] However, such threats also present an opportunity for the United States to influence the conflict to a satisfactory conclusion, as using such weapons also contradicts the interests of China and India.[ii]
Regional stability in Europe is also a vital American interest. An expanded European conflict or collapse of European states would threaten U.S. economic stability and likely draw the U.S. into a broader European conflict. We must contain this war between Ukraine and Russia.
Protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations with whom the U.S. maintains diplomatic relations, including former Soviet and Russian client states, is an important U.S. national interest as protected sovereignty and integrity significantly reduce both the probability of and consequences from interstate conflicts. Allowing Russia to maintain any territory seized by force directly threatens the global norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity as codified in the United Nations Charter with potential implications for future conflicts in Europe, on the Indian subcontinent, and over Taiwan.
American regional and global influence, especially vis-à-vis a rising China, are important U.S. interests that support American prosperity and values. The war in Ukraine and its aftermath presents both a threat to American influence and an opportunity to strengthen our global leadership. Realizing this threat or opportunity rests mainly on the war's outcome. Stable global trade, especially in energy and commodities markets, is an important U.S. interest and critical to protecting American prosperity. We must defend such markets during and after the conflict to ensure long-term stability.
Political Aim
Russia expelled from Ukraine and unable to militarily threaten its European neighbors with conventional forces, while Moscow retains internal governance and the ability to engage in conflict resolution diplomacy on terms shaped by the United States.
Strategic Objectives
The United States must constrain the Kremlin’s ability to engage in a new, post-Ukraine conflict and prevent a post-conflict collapse of the Russian Federation, which would destabilize Europe and Central Asia and potentially allow the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
This strategy proposes three primary objectives to support the realization of this political aim: Russia (1) constrained from further revanchist pursuits, (2) held accountable for death and destruction in Ukraine, and (3) reintegrated into international institutions with constraints.
Objective 1: Russia Constrained from Further Revanchist Pursuits
The current leadership of the Russian Federation has openly committed to re-establishing the Kremlin’s control or influence over the territories once part of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.[iii] Many of these nations are NATO members, and all are sovereign states. We should not believe that Russia will stop with Ukraine, and the U.S. and our allies achieving success in this strategy’s first objective could lead to Russia lashing out at other neighbors, such as Moldova and Georgia, to save face and maintain domestic support at home.
The United States should isolate Russia’s southwestern flank by tightly coupling the three Southern Caucus states with U.S. and allied interests. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Department of Energy should enable the continued development and expansion of hydrocarbon pipelines and high-voltage power lines from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to Europe via the South Caucuses by insuring and encouraging U.S. private investments in Azerbaijani and Georgian energy companies. Such efforts will further develop business partnerships between the U.S. and those countries and provide additional energy avenues to Europe free of Russian and Chinese influences.[iv] In support of this objective, the Secretary of State and Ambassador to Armenia should shape Armenia’s strategic alliance objectives by exploiting Armenian anxieties over the lack of Russian support during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War while offering economic and military development support. Continued acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide and encouraged support from the Armenian-American Diaspora should be leveraged to dissuade the Armenian people from Russia. The United States military should also pursue military training and exchange programs in Georgia and offer renewed military training, education, exchange, and exercise programs in Azerbaijan and Armenia contingent upon a lasting and observed cease-fire agreement.
In support of this objective, the U.S. should continue encouraging and endorsing Moldova’s and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU). The State Department should also expand and supervise emerging leader education programs and local and national government exchange partnerships to continue developing liberal democratic expertise in those nations’ governments. In coordination with the Department of Education, the Department of State should increase resourcing to the American University Kyiv, the American University of Moldova | Chisinau, and Georgian American University, expanding into major cities with satellite campuses and establishing complementary secondary schools.
Cabinet and sub-cabinet level officials should make regular, well-publicized visits to their Moldovan, Ukrainian, and Georgian counterparts and invite counterparts to regular engagements in Washington, DC. Such efforts will bolster relationships and message America’s commitment to supporting a strong and democratic Moldova and Ukraine ready to accede to the EU.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should lead economic development efforts in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, focusing on investment and enabling rather than aid and loans. USAID should identify and provide training and education opportunities to emerging local and national business leaders in concert with the Department of State programs listed above. In support of these actions, the DFC should expand access and risk insurance to American businesses and investors seeking to invest directly in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.[v] While market forces will shape long-term investment strategies, the DFC should seek opportunities that vertically integrate the potential for value-added products.
The United States military should continue conducting training and education exchanges and exercises with the Georgian Armed Forces. In addition, the Department of Defense could offer to construct a permanent rotational force training facility to house training units and stations contingent upon satisfactory Georgian judicial and security service reforms. The military could also provide similar training, education, and rotational exercise commitments to Moldova upon request and contingent upon similar reforms.
As a sub-objective in constraining Russia's ability to continue to pursue its revanchist strategy, the United States must weaken the Russian military-industrial complex. This sub-objective is critical to realizing our political aim. The United States Intelligence Community should continue publicly releasing intelligence on Russian operational failures due to inadequate training and the poor performance of specific weapons systems to discredit the quality of Russian arms exports and training partnerships. The primary target of this effort is India, with Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt, and Vietnam as secondary targets.
The Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Department of Defense should focus market development efforts on India, Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt, and Vietnam to replace Russia as those nations’ primary arms supplier, especially with major end weapons systems such as the F-21 fighter jet, the M1 main battle tank, and the new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle.[vi] The Department of the Treasury should maintain global sanctions on all Russian companies associated with the Russian military-industrial complex and those outside Russia that conduct business with Russia’s military-industrial complex. The Department of Commerce and supporting organizations should expand export bans on dual-use technologies to any company that operates with any entity within the Russian military-industrial complex.
Objective 2: Russia held Accountable for Death, Suffering, and Destruction in Ukraine
The United States and our allies are committed to holding criminal states and their leaders accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially when such cases involved invading sovereign neighbors, as was the case for Germany, Japan, and, after the international recognition of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia. Russia’s brazen actions resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and rapes and the destruction of hundreds of billions of dollars of infrastructure threaten global norms. Therefore, Russia must be held accountable for the death and suffering in Ukraine. Russia should remain isolated from key international leadership positions until selected Kremlin leaders are either tried and, if convicted, imprisoned or have died.
The United States must ensure Putin’s regime remains an international pariah until Russia accedes to an acceptable post-war reality or until those leaders are no longer in power. The Intelligence Community and Department of Justice should cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to identify Russian officials suspected of war crimes and to bring each indicted member of Russia’s government to justice. Such cooperation will include publicly identifying Russia’s senior leadership members, including Vladimir Putin, as being indicted by the ICC. Furthermore, no senior government official should meet with an indicted member of Russia’s government or conduct any Track I diplomacy with such members.[vii] The Intelligence Community, Department of Justice, and, where applicable, Department of State should cooperate in identifying and publicizing war crimes committed by Russians in Ukraine, where supported by the evidence, such war crimes should be tied directly to senior Russian officials.
The United States should seek to restructure the UN Security Council (UNSC), including removing Russia as a permanent member and removing Russia from other international institutions using diplomatic and information means. While critics comment on the difficulty of achieving such an objective, the composition of the UNSC has changed twice before, first when the People’s Republic of China replaced the Republic of China and again when the Russian Federation assumed the Soviet Union’s seat on the Council. The global community must update a charter drafted in 1945 to reflect 21st-century realities. In support of this goal, the U.S. mission to the United Nations should build support for removing Russia from the UNSC and leadership positions in any other UN institution. The U.S. should propose rewriting the UN charter or creating a new one to reflect contemporary global realities. The U.S. should advocate emerging powers representing global interests to become permanent members of the UNSC to induce support for this radical restructuring.
Washington should also force Russia to pay full reparations to Ukraine directly or indirectly. This sub-objective is critical to realizing our political aim. Current estimates of the cost of rebuilding Ukraine and compensating the families of those killed range from $400 billion to approximately $1 trillion as of April 2023. The U.S. and our allies have frozen roughly $350 billion in Russian state assets and nearly $1 trillion in public and private Russian assets.
The Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury should support the government of Ukraine and private entities within Ukraine in suing the Russian Federation and Russian citizens who supported the Russian government for compensation in American and European courts, with liabilities paid from frozen funds. The diplomatic, intelligence, and justice communities should support evidence collection as part of the prosecutorial team for such suits. The Department of State should encourage our partners and allies who hold frozen Russian state or private assets to follow a similar path, including sharing best practices and lessons learned from lawsuits in American courts. The U.S. government could offer to stop such suits if and when the Russian government agrees to directly compensate Ukrainian public and private entities with payment of such compensation from garnishments on the profits of restarted energy exports to Europe.
As a final component of this objective, the United States should employ diplomatic, informational, cultural, and economic means to force the Russian people to face the realities of the war their country forced upon the Ukrainian people. The glaring disparity between how the world held Germany and Japan accountable after the Second World War and the lack of accountability the USSR and its leaders faced during and after the Cold War has enabled Russia’s illegal and immoral actions today. The Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should support and promote foreign journalists, artists, and cultural entities recording, analyzing, and interpreting the horrors of the Putin regime and the war in Ukraine. The National Endowment for the Arts should support and promote domestic artists and cultural entities recording, analyzing, and interpreting the horrors of the Putin regime and the war in Ukraine. Finally, the Department of State should coordinate with the Intelligence Community and the commercial media industry to declassify and publish intelligence and information, including verified images, videos, and recordings, that discredit Russian disinformation campaigns designed to undermine truthful narratives of the war.
Objective 3: Russia Reintegrated into International Institutions with Constraints
One of the most significant geopolitical lessons of the 20th century is the critical requirement to reintegrate defeated states into the international community with a path to prosperity for their peoples. Failing to do so is a recipe for either a failed state and resulting civil war or a new chauvinistic state under a demagogue leader with a perceived mandate to forcefully re-establish the nation’s honor and prosperity, typically through conflict. Both results are unacceptable for a powerful, nuclear-armed state like the Russian Federation. Therefore, this fourth objective seeks a balance of enabling Russia to reintegrate into the global community as an influential, prosperous, and honorable nation.
The United States should employ diplomatic, economic, and legal means to influence the reintegration of Russian energy exports to the West and successfully hold Russia accountable for the war in Ukraine through the payment or scheduling of reparations. American ambassadors to our European partners and allies should persuade those nations to gradually resume imports of Russian energy contingent upon the payment of reparations to Ukrainians. Such payments may be garnishments on the profits of energy exports.
United States Departments of Energy and Commerce can incentivize the development of alternative energy corridors to Europe to enable a diverse market, providing competition for Russian energy and holding future imports of Russian energy at risk. The Department of Treasure, in concert with the Intelligence Community and Department of Justice, should impose sanctions on energy-exporting enterprises led by or owned by Russians indicted by the ICC or identified by the United States as war criminals. The United States should reserve the right to exercise expansions of such sanctions to European entities that import energy from such a Russian enterprise.
The White House and Department of State should persuade leaders in the international community to block Russia from international organizations until the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukraine is complete and until all reparations are either completed or scheduled. The U.S. should not support Russia retaining or regaining its permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the foreseeable future. The U.S. should encourage its partners and allies to stand firm with Washington to refuse to fund and, if necessary, withdraw from international organizations that allow Russian participation before meeting these conditions. The United States should exercise the right to form alternative international institutions with our partners and allies to discredit and circumvent any international institutions that refuse to abide by these demands.
The DFC should prepare investment insurance and guarantee provisions for U.S. financial institutions and corporations to invest in Russian commercial and financial entities should Russia agree to the rule of law reforms at home. In addition, the U.S. diplomatic community should encourage our partners and allies to repair similar investment packages contingent upon enacting rule of law reforms. Such packages induce Russia to accept voluntary training exchange programs from the U.S. Department of Justice and our partners’ and allies’ equivalent institutions to enable Russia’s successful transition to a system of rule of law. These inducements should be an alternative to the inevitable Chinese investments in Russia. Furthermore, these investments should only be allowed once the Russian people elect a government under free and fair elections with impartial outside observers recording and reporting on such polls.
This objective allows Russian business entities and people to turn toward the West or China. This strategy accepts the risk that the Russian people may refuse to consent to rule of law reforms and turn toward China. However, such postwar structural reforms or changes within Russia must originate from within the Russian population.
Risks to the Strategy
The principal risk to this strategy is weariness by the American public and the populations of our European allies and partners. For many Americans, this war now seems remote and not directly threatening our nation. Some public figures, including lawmakers, have openly questioned why we are spending our treasure and risking an expanded conflict over a “territorial dispute” in which we have no stake.[viii] While this war’s threats to American interests are real and compelling, aside from the inflationary pressures the American consumer feels, those threats are primarily indirect. In Europe, the threats from a savage war are more direct and apparent, but so are the consequences of a protracted or expanded war. The economic pain of the war and sanctions levied against Russia are also much more concrete for many of our European allies.[ix] The relatively long-term commitments in this strategy could exacerbate these threats to this strategy.
An additional risk is a possible nationalistic or prejudiced backlash against the ethnic Russian diaspora in Ukraine, the Baltic States, and elsewhere in Europe. Any widespread or ethnically-based repression of the Russian diaspora in Eastern or Southern Europe will likely undermine the resolution of the war and could incite the very chauvinistic nationalist reactions to the conflict we are seeking to avoid on all sides of this conflict.
A final critical risk to this strategy that we must consider and counter is the possibility that Russia employs influence or even force to block constraining efforts by the U.S. and our allies in former Soviet states. This risk is acute in the South Caucuses, where Armenia is still formally allied with the Russian Federation, and Russian interests have infiltrated the government of Georgia.[x]Moldova also remains weak, with Russian troops stationed in the separatist Transnistria region, and the future of Serbia is unsettled. While NATO will likely dissuade any direct threats to former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members that are members of the Alliance, Russian influence operations short of war remain potent.
Risks from the Strategy
The potentially most dangerous risk from this strategy is that Russian desperation in the face of strategic defeat in Ukraine and isolation in its other border regions leads to direct conflict with the U.S. and our allies and partners. Such desperation could result from the Putin regime’s perception of losing power in the face of a dissatisfied public or from an upwelling of chauvinistic nationalism within Russia in reaction to such defeat and isolation. The probability of realizing this risk is moderate, and the consequences are severe, especially if Putin or his successor fails to continue to act rationally and employs nuclear weapons. The United States should seek to mitigate the likelihood of this risk by offering the reintegration and investment efforts articulated within the strategy.
A second risk from this strategy is that the isolation of Russia’s military-industrial complex encourages Moscow to increase investments in weapons of mass destruction to compensate for weakened conventional forces. The realization of such a risk would mean strategic success in constraining Russia’s ability to threaten neighbors conventionally but with the consequence of further erosion of global efforts to reduce threats of such weapons.
A third risk the strategy seeks to prevent is that the Russian Federation fractures or collapses due to successfully realizing the first three objectives. While Russia has proven resilient in the face of economic hardship and multiple conflicts since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no guarantee that such resilience will continue. Therefore, we will mitigate the likelihood and consequence of this risk through the proposed international reintegration of and investments in Russia.
A final overarching risk from the strategy is that China benefits from a weakened Russia and an overextended United States. Beijing is already in the process of transforming Russia into some form of dependent or even vassal state. Such a result would strengthen China by giving it cheap, controlling access to Russia’s vast natural resources and military technology. The successful realization of this strategy could further estrange China from the West with a potential long-term East-West rift. Realizing this risk could temper the aggressiveness of any future Russian regime as Beijing would have strong national security interests in preventing Russia from fomenting future conflict. Ultimately, the Russian people must choose if they wish to become subjects of Beijing’s indirect rule.
Analysis of the Strategy
While Russia’s brutality in Ukraine has shocked the world, the United States must be measured and clear-headed after achieving strategic success in Ukraine. Objectives cannot be overly idealistic or philosophical as not to be realistic or measurable. While this strategy certainly has ambitious goals, it offers affordable ways and means to achieve America’s national interests relative to Russia and the war in Ukraine.
This strategy is feasible and sustainable economically and politically as none of its goals are zero-sum, and none of the means called upon to achieve those goals are without some form of return on investment. Each objective either increases mutually beneficial partnerships with allies or draws upon non-taxpayer resources. The strategy does not seek to employ overwhelming U.S. military or other governmental resources to achieve its ends. It also specifically does not support the U.S. taxpayer funding the rebuilding of Ukraine. Instead, it seeks to build capacities with investments in our partners and allies to defeat Russia and reshape the postwar geopolitical reality. Forcing payment of direct and indirect reparations from Russia to Ukraine further minimizes the strategy’s cost. If necessary, lawsuits in Western courts may enable the legal transfer of approximately $1 trillion in frozen Russian assets already under the control of the U.S. and our allies. Such an approach is sustainable in the current deficit-conscious American electorate and acknowledges the political agendas of both major U.S. political parties.
Finally, this strategy is both suitable and acceptable in that it adheres tightly to the morals and values of the American people in defending democracy and human rights while avoiding open war at all costs. Support for Ukraine’s forces preserves our commitment to a global order dedicated to the principles of state sovereignty and human rights articulated in the UN Charter. Moreover, this strategy is consistent with America’s other principle national goals, as expressed in the 2022 National Security Strategy, except for the risk that a weakened Russia further empowers China.
Theory of Success
This strategy employs three principles to achieve success. First and foremost, it engages the interests of multiple constituencies domestically and among our allies and partners in its various objective lines of efforts. For example, the strategy employs a mix of military engagement and capacity building that will benefit American and allied industrial bases with public and private infrastructure, technology, and commerce investments. It also leverages cultural and artistic means of communicating the horrors of Russia’s actions to facilitate acknowledgment of and recovery from the resulting trauma. Multiple constituencies, many with powerful influence in the U.S. Congress, have a stake in the successful execution of this strategy.
Second, the strategy does not pursue rigid requirements to realize success. The only nonnegotiable goals of the strategy are to defeat Russia on Ukraine’s terms and to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise, the strategy is flexible enough for all stakeholders, including Russia, to have multiple cooperation options that align with their interests. The strategy also provides opportunities for Russian noncompliance that do not result in overall strategic failure, such as pursuing multiple future European energy structures, tolerating varying levels of American investments, and allowing for varying levels of support from other nations. Even if the Russian government outright refuses to pay reparations to Ukraine or acknowledge fault for the war, which is likely, the legal seizure of approximately $1 trillion in frozen Russian assets and the isolation of Russia from international institutions can achieve our political aim without any Russian cooperation.
Finally, the fundamental goal of the strategy is to avoid further expansion of the conflict, which benefits all nations involved, including Russia. While expelling Russia from Crimea and disenfranchising the regime are certainly not in the interests of the current occupants of the Kremlin, the overall strategic end state benefits the Russian nation within the context of the international legal order defined in the UN Charter.
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Mathison Hall is an infantry officer in the U.S. Marine Corps and, when writing the research paper from which this article is derived, a student at the National War College, National Defense University, in Washington, DC. LtCol Hall was a member of the Russia Strategic Practicum and traveled to Europe and the Caucuses in the spring of 2023 for his research.
END NOTES
[i] Guy Faulcondridge, “Russia’s Putin issues new nuclear warnings to West over Ukraine,” Reuters, February 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-update-russias-elite-ukraine-war-major-speech-2023-02-21/#:~:text=Putin%2C%20who%20has%20over%20the,West%20backs%20off%20in%20Ukraine.
[ii] Anwesha Mitra, “India, China may have averted nuclear war with Ukraine by influencing Russia: US,” Mint, February 26, 2023, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-china-may-have-influenced-russia-prevented-nuclear-war-in-ukraine-us-11677322391450.html.
[iii] Such evidence ranges from Vladimir Putin’s speech on the eve of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine to his speech at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit, among many other speeches, publications, and proclamations. Vladimir Putin “On the Historical Unity of Russia,” President of Russia website, July 12, 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181; Vladimir Putin, speech at the NATO Summit, Bucharest, April 2, 2008, https://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putin-s-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html.
[iv] While the European Union imports 83% of its natural gas, only 3% of those imports were sourced via the South Caucuses before February 2022. However, imports from Russia dropped from 48% to 11% between February 2022 and the end of that year, providing a challenging but achievable opportunity for the South Caucuses to fulfill a meaningful portion of the EU energy import market. European Council, “Where does the EU’s gas come from?” last updated February 7, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20the%20EU%20imported,)%2C%20particularly%20from%20the%20US.
[v] Daniel Mejia, “Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs, Brookings
Institution” July 2016, accessed February 19, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/wp content/uploads/2016/07/mejia-colombia-final-2.pdf.
[vi] Congressional Research Service, “Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 14, 2021).
[vii] While the US is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that created the ICC, this relationship allows the US to cooperate with the ICC to pursue justice for Ukraine while directly involving American courts in such cases.
[viii] For example, for comments from Governor of Florida and candidate for the Republican nomination to be President of the United States Ron DeSantis, see Jack Forrest, “DeSantis saying Ukraine support is not ‘vital’ national interest sparks backlash in GOP,” CNN.com, March 15, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/14/politics/desantis-republicans-ukraine-aid/index.html.
[ix] The average price per megawatt-hour in EU countries increased by approximately 300% between August 2021 and August 2022, compared to a roughly 14% increase in the United States. Statista, “Average monthly electricity wholesale prices in selected countries in the European Union (EU) from January 2020 to January 2023,” Statista.com, March 7, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1267500/eu-monthly-wholesale-electricity-price-country/; Utility Dive, “Electricity prices surged 14.3% in 2022, double overall inflation: US report,” UtilityDive.com, January 19, 2023, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/electricity-prices-inflation-consumer-price-index/640656/#:~:text=10.,by%20a%20penny%20in%202024.
[x] For example, see Emil Avdaliani, “Armenia Tries to Diversify Its Foreign Policy Away From Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume, 20 Issue, 24, February 9, 2023, https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-tries-to-diversify-its-foreign-policy-away-from-russia/ and Anastasia Mgaloblishvili, “Russia’s Clandestine Victory in Georgia,” Visegrad / Insight, March 9, 2023, https://visegradinsight.eu/russias-clandestine-victory-in-georgia/.